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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the aid process to discover why aid so often fails. It does 
this through an investigation of the determinants of Canadian aid policy, the forces 
which have shaped the manner in which it has been implemented in Tanzania, and 
how this has affected the outcome of these efforts. The study examines in detail three 
significant policy decisions taken with respect to the Canadian aid programme in the 
past fifteen years: the decentralization and recentralization of aid administration 1989 
-  1993; failed efforts in the DAC to further untie bilateral aid in 1999; and the 
termination of Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania and the rest of East Africa in 1993. 
In addition, Canadian assistance in Hanang District, Tanzania between 1967 and 1999 
is examined as a means to identify the numerous obstacles encountered by aid 
officials in the course of implementing aid agreements, and the forces which influence 
their decision-making process.
Particular attention has been paid to the influence exerted on the Canadian aid 
programme as a result of its participation in international organizations like the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and the World Bank. The study 
also identifies constraints on the effective use of aid resources inherent in the 
institutionalized processes of aid which inhibit the capacity of the Canadian 
International Development Agency to respond effectively to evidence of policy failure 
and improve aid practice. It is argued that bureaucratic processes have an enduring 
power to shape the policies they were designed to administer. In addition, that the 
institutional structure of the aid programme has made it extremely vulnerable to the 
pursuit of economic and political objectives which conflict with the stated purpose of 
Canadian ODA as an instrument for poverty alleviation in recipient countries.
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There is a hole in everything . 
That's how the light gets in.
— Leonard Cohen
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the aid process to discover why aid so often fails. It does 
this by investigating the determinants of Canadian aid policy, the forces which have 
shaped the manner in which it has been implemented in Tanzania, and how this has 
affected the outcome of these efforts. Although a number of studies have concluded 
that the impact of aid on recipient countries is very difficult to define with any 
precision,1 the history of Canadian aid in Tanzania suggests that ODA there has 
largely failed in both its officially proclaimed objectives of fostering economic 
growth and reducing poverty and, in most instances, in achieving the more modest 
goals of individual aid projects. In the words of one Canadian official, “We have put 
one billion dollars into Tanzania, and you can’t see it.” This study should help us 
understand why this is so.
0.1 THE PROBLEM AND THE HYPOTHESIS AND ITS PROBLEMS
This research project began as an investigation of the extent to which 
Canada’s participation in international organizations and the institutionalized 
processes of development assistance shape Canadian aid policy and provide an 
explanation of aid failure. The original hypothesis was that a number of policy trends 
over the life of the Canadian aid programme, and particularly in the last decade and a 
half, have combined to reduce the capacity of Canadian aid to respond effectively to 
the requirements of aid recipient countries. Aid policy among western donors has 
always been relatively similar in substance and form. The end of the Cold War and 
the identification of structural adjustment as a priority by the World Bank/IMF in the 
1970’s moved the aid agenda to the level of macro-economic policy interventions. 
This required increased donor coordination and facilitated the emergence of a 
consensus among donors as to appropriate forms of aid. In this process, control over 
development doctrine was concentrated in the hands of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, in practice if not in formal terms.
1 Cassen; Riddell; Toye.
2 Interview.
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In Canada, this shift was accompanied by a number of other significant policy 
changes. Beginning in the 1980’s and accelerating in the early 1990’s, CIDA (the 
Canadian International Development Agency) privatized virtually all aspects of aid 
delivery (project identification, design, implementation, evaluation, and, to an extent, 
policy analysis). A brief experiment with decentralized aid administration was 
cancelled in 1992, and management of the aid programme returned to CIDA HQ in 
Canada. Since 1989, the Canadian aid budget has been cut by almost half. The 
working hypothesis of this research was that these trends, and especially the 
delegation of the initiative at both ends of the aid process -  in the formulation of 
policy directions and in aid delivery -  have narrowed the scope for innovation in the 
Canadian aid programme and committed it more deeply to established modes of 
assistance. The Canadian aid programme was established in the 1960’s to administer 
the type of aid which was deemed appropriate at the time: technical assistance and 
large turn key modernization projects. As the aid programme expanded, a large 
bureaucracy developed to administer it. While history has shown that this approach to 
development has proven inadequate, bureaucracies develop a momentum of their own 
which can trap them into established patterns of behaviour. Bureaucratic practices 
also have an enduring power to shape the policies they were designed to administer.
While it is hoped that the following chapters will demonstrate that these 
claims are in their general contours justified, the research conducted over the past four 
years and presented here revealed that certain modifications had to be made to this 
original thesis. Why Canadian aid takes the form it does and how this affects its 
outcomes is not so neatly explained, alas. The “Washington consensus” on aid 
doctrine has had a powerful influence on the shape of the Canadian aid programme in 
Tanzania and elsewhere, as the discussion of structural adjustment and the application 
of policy conditionality in Chapter Four illustrates. However, the strength of this 
influence varies from issue to issue and policy initiatives originate at various points 
within and outside of the agency. For example, support for structural adjustment as a 
programme priority as discussed in Chapter Four originated in the office of the CIDA 
President following his return from a stint at the IMF. The decision to decentralize 
the administration of Canadian aid discussed in Chapter Two followed the 
recommendations of a Parliamentary Committee which had held public hearings
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across the country in 1987. The drastic cuts in the volume of aid to Tanzania also 
described in Chapter Four were primarily the result of a consensus among donors 
voiced in the annual Consultative Group meetings that Tanzania was failing to adhere 
to the conditions attached to international aid flows in the early 1990’s. The 
resumption of Canadian aid to Tanzania was primarily a response to a well 
orchestrated public protest by the NGO lobby in Ottawa. Different actors exert a 
varying degree of influence on Canadian aid policy at different times.
Another problem arose with respect to how to analyze the policy decisions 
which preliminary research had identified as significant. The privatization of virtually 
every aspect of aid delivery is arguably the most important change in Canadian aid 
policy in the past two decades. Chapter Two examines the origins of this decision. 
How this has affected the quality of Canadian assistance in Tanzania and elsewhere is 
an extremely important question. The Groupe Secor Strategic Management Review 
of CIDA in 1991 concluded that privatization had contributed to an increase in aid 
delivery costs. A review of CIDA funded projects in Tanzania suggests that a 
comparative evaluation of the effectiveness of private commercial contractors, non­
profit organizations and public servants as implementing agents for Canadian aid 
projects is an issue which merits serious examination. These matters are, however, 
beyond the scope of a single country study conducted by one researcher. The impact 
of the privatization of aid delivery is addressed here indirectly through an analysis of 
the generation and circulation of knowledge gained in the field and the integration of 
the lessons of experience into aid practice. The result of privatization and the 
recentralization of aid management, it has been suggested, is that CIDA is not a 
repository of knowledge about development, but simply a conduit for the 
disbursement of aid funds. It could be argued that while the practice of 
subcontracting aid delivery creates the potential for Canadian ODA to be applied 
more effectively and efficiently (depending on the agent chosen), it also permits the 
erosion of a fund of knowledge about poverty and development within the agency on 
which policy decisions can be based. Benefiting from the knowledge gleaned by 
contractors in the field depends on a mechanism for the exchange of information 
between CIDA and its executing agents to permit the accumulation of knowledge and
3 Pratt, 1994; DFAIT files.
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the adaptation of practice. To the extent that this interaction does not occur, or that 
there exists no mechanism to incorporate the lessons of experience into practice, there 
is a possibility that policy will be made on the basis of an increasingly shallow 
consideration of ‘development’ issues, reducing the agency’s capacity to adapt to 
changing conditions and entrenching existing practice. Under such conditions it is 
possible to imagine the calcification of the institution of aid in its current form and a 
pattern of path dependence in policy formation.
With respect to the idea of a policy consensus among donors, there are, in fact, 
significant instances of policy divergence among donors. The discussion of Canadian 
procurement regulations and international negotiations to untie aid in Chapter Three 
highlights an issue on which Canadian policy stands in violation of international 
principles. The evidence presented here strongly indicates that a number of other 
factors exert an overriding influence on Canadian aid policy; most importantly 
domestic economic and political interests. A number of these influences have 
previously been identified by other researchers, and this literature is examined in 
Chapter One. In addition, a review of Canadian aid to Tanzania, while 
overwhelmingly a bleak tale of ill-conceived projects and disappointing results, 
reveals several examples of innovative policy initiatives which fly in the face of the 
idea that CIDA’s store of new approaches is depleted.
In light of these caveats to the original thesis, the more interesting question 
became the identification of the constraints inherent in the institutionalized aid 
process which inhibit the effective use of aid resources and the capacity of CIDA to 
adapt and improve aid practice. In addressing this question, and in explaining 
Canadian aid practice and its outcomes, theories of bureaucratic failure have 
ultimately proved more useful than the concept of an international aid regime and the 
disciplinary power of its norms as codified in World Bank directives and the DAC 
Principles of Effective ODA. In particular, they highlight bureaucratic inertia and 
rigidity; the functioning of adequate oversight mechanisms for the aid programme 
and the possible existence of perverse incentives inherent in the aid process; the 
autonomy of the aid agency to formulate and implement policy; and the ambiguous 
identification of the ‘principal’ whose interests are meant to be served by the aid
programme as important issues to be considered in this context. The research 
presented here reveals that due in large measure to constraints inherent in its 
bureaucratic structure, the Canadian aid programme has proven extremely vulnerable 
to domestic politicking to the detriment of the pursuit of its avowed objectives. 
Likewise, it has been very slow to incorporate the lessons of experience into aid 
practice.
In their study of the activities of American, Chinese and Swedish bilateral aid 
donors in Tanzania, Hyden and Mukandala have noted that the literature on aid falls 
mainly into two categories: macro-level studies of the efficacy of aid in promoting 
economic development and as an instrument of foreign policy, and micro-level studies 
of individual aid projects in the field.4 They suggest that there is a gap in the 
literature at the meso-level: in the examination of the role played by aid agencies 
themselves. They say: “Implicitly, if not explicitly, they have been treated as only 
part of the solution of foreign aid, not as a problem associated with this activity.”5 In 
a similar vein, Saasa and Carlsson note the paradox between aid success at the micro­
level (a questionable assumption, but it might be accepted if success is defined as 
number of classrooms built, babies inoculated, etc.) and negligible positive impact 
perceptible at the macro or national level. They argue that the key must lie in what 
happens in between: i.e. in the institutions which act as conduits for aid in the donor 
and recipient countries.6
In identifying aid institutions as objects of analysis in trying to explain aid 
failure, it must be noted that this definition is not limited to the aid agency, in this 
case CIDA. An examination of the practice of policy-making and implementation 
must include not only the activities of the aid agency itself, but the whole aid process 
as it involves other Canadian government departments, international organizations, 
recipient government institutions, and the executing agencies which implement 
Canadian aid as well as other parties which claim a stake in the aid process in its 
various stages: the intended beneficiaries, Parliament, NGOs, in-country donor
4 Hyden and Mukandala, 1999. See for example Cassen et al; Riddell; Toye; Lele; Ferguson.
5 Hyden and Mukandala: 2
6 Saasa and Carlsson: 11.
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working groups and sundry other interests. Therefore, the object of study is identified 
here as the institutionalized aid process rather than the aid agency alone.
Although the policy decisions examined here have been selected as 
particularly dramatic examples of the way in which aid practice can run counter to the 
declared objectives of aid programmes, this study should not be read as a dismissal of 
development assistance as an international obligation or as a condemnation of aid 
officials individually or collectively. As the cases discussed below will illustrate, the 
point is rather that CIDA officials are generally very well aware of the problems and 
potential problems which plague the aid programme, yet established practice has 
proven painfully resistant to substantial alteration. CIDA has demonstrated a capacity 
for self-reflection in the past. In fact, Morrison suggests that the agency’s almost 
continuous restructuring and redefinition of its mandate is one of its defining 
characteristics. It would be false to suggest that the Canadian aid programme has 
made no effort to adapt aid practice to the lessons of experience. As an example, 
there is CIDA’s gradual inclusion of various pre-investment impact studies into the 
aid process. Canada is seen as an international leader in the incorporation of gender 
analysis into aid practice. Yet, as recently as 1988, a Canadian consultant hired to 
conduct an evaluation of the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project discussed in Chapter 
Five addressed the issue of the impact of the project on women by recommending that 
something useful be found for the cooperants’ wives to do in their spare time. The 
central question this study seeks to answer is why has it proven so difficult to change 
aid policy and practice when its failings are generally so obvious to all concerned? At 
issue is the aid programme’s vulnerability to domestic politicking and CIDA’s 
capacity to assimilate lessons from experience and to adapt practice accordingly.
In a discussion of the causes of aid failure, some acknowledgement must be 
made of the limitations of Canadian aid and of ODA in general in efforts to end 
poverty in Tanzania and elsewhere. The problems discussed here with respect to the 
Canadian aid programme are part of a much bigger issue concerning the structure of 
the international aid system and its role within the global economic system. Focusing
7 Morrison,! 998:11.
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a study of the causes of aid failure on the determinants of aid policy ignores the larger 
issue of whether aid is in fact the most effective policy instrument for the task with 
which it is officially charged, rather than trade policy, for example.9 In addition, 
Canadian aid to Tanzania is currently around ten million dollars a year. Enormous 
claims for and demands upon are made of this sum -  to end poverty, to change lives. 
As the research presented here will show, the potential benefit of aid is reduced by the 
fact that it is put in the service of objectives other than economic development and 
poverty eradication. The sum that is directed at developmental purposes is further 
dissipated by obstacles encountered in the recipient country: corruption and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies, a lack of the resources necessary to use aid effectively, 
and by the fact that sometimes, a lack of money is not the problem.
In a discussion of the causes of aid failure, the almost complete lack of 
coordination of donor activity in Tanzania over the past forty years suggests itself as 
an obvious and significant factor in aid failure. In its first years of independence, aid 
composed a small proportion of Tanzania’s revenue, and the noble objective of self- 
reliance embodied in the Arusha Declaration seemed for a time within the realm of 
possibility. However, through the 1970’s and ‘80’s, aid flowed into Tanzania in ever 
increasing volume as donors enthusiastically supported the Tanzanian development 
vision. The ODA/GDP ratio increased from 5 per cent per annum in the 1970’s to
57.3 % in 1992.10 Between 1986 and 1992, ODA made up 26.8 per cent of 
Tanzania’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Between 1990 and 1994, aid composed 
forty-four per cent of GDP, “making Tanzania into one of the most aid dependent
countries in the world.”11 1994/95 budget depended on external aid for 86.6 % of
10expenditures. According to World Bank figures, approximately one third of 
Tanzania’s public expenditures are currently funded by external aid. This includes 
around ninety per cent of the development budget and a portion of recurrent
8 CIDA. An Evaluation o f the Research Component o f  the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Program Phase II 
1979-1987, pg. 81, 30 March 1988, CIDA File no. 902/14966-01.
9 See Raffer and Singer, 1996.
10 Bagachwa:173.
11 Sobhan:141.
12 Bagachwa:173.
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11expenditures as well. Aid and the activities of donor agencies are, therefore, a very 
important element in Tanzania’s development efforts.
Although they comprise a significant portion of the nation’s resources, seventy 
per cent of ODA flows to Tanzania are not accounted for in the national budget.14 
These resources enter Tanzania through a variety of alternative channels: as the result 
of direct negotiations between donors and individual ministries or local governments; 
through NGOs; via special accounts established by donors to transfer aid funds; or 
they are paid directly to suppliers and consultants in the donor country and never pass 
through the Tanzanian Treasury. Although the Ministry of Finance is the official 
authorizing agent for all aid agreements made with other sovereign governments, this 
agreement is often obtained after the fact. In preparing its annual budget, the 
government therefore has little idea exactly how much revenue it will receive from 
external sources in any given year, or indeed, the full extent of its commitments to 
provide counterpart funding and the recurrent costs for aid assisted projects negotiated 
by other government departments. The vast majority of projects supported by 
external donors have not been initiated as the result of any kind of systematic 
prioritization of investment needs or as part of a national strategic development plan. 
This problem has been compounded by the fact that until 1997, the formulation of the 
development budget and the recurrent budget took place in two separate government 
departments.
A further demonstration of the limited integration of aid into any kind of 
coherent national management plan is the way in which the country’s sovereign debt 
is managed. Tanzania’s current debt load amounts to one hundred and thirty per cent 
of GDP.15 This has meant that debt service payments due over the past three years 
(excluding IMF loans) have averaged seventy-eight per cent of domestic revenue 
annually. Debt service actually paid has averaged thirty-five per cent of domestic 
revenue annually for the past three years. Tanzania’s external debt is managed by the 
Bank of Tanzania, and the 1998 Public Expenditure Review (PER) reported that 
although the Ministry of Finance prepares the annual budget (formerly in conjunction
13 Kessy,1998.
14 URT/World Bank, 1998; URT, Public Expenditure Review 1999.
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with the Planning Commission), the “MOF [Ministry of Finance] is not always aware 
of when foreign debt has been paid by the Bank of Tanzania.. .At present, MOF has 
no records on external debt.”16 In addition, the 1998 PER reported that GOT figures 
on its IBRD debt do not coincide with World Bank records. Since these problems 
have been identified, steps have been taken to attempt to correct them, but the fact 
that this has been the state of affairs up to recent times illustrates the lack of control 
the government has been able to exercise in managing its external revenue and 
expenditures. The amount Tanzania is obliged to pay for debt servicing and when it is 
paid has a direct impact on the government’s ability to plan for investment in 
development, particularly now that Tanzania is operating on a cash budget.
Knowledge of the complete extent of its commitments is therefore important. 
However, the government has not been alone in failing to reconcile these two aspects 
of financial management. As highlighted by the 1995 Helleiner Report, donors also 
continue to separate their discussions of Tanzania’s debt and its aid requirements 
between the meetings of the Paris Club of creditors and the annual Consultative 
Group meetings despite the fact that one clearly has a direct affect on the other.17
After 1986, bilateral balance of payments support in aid of the structural 
adjustment of the Tanzanian economy was quite carefully orchestrated under World 
Bank/IMF leadership and tight donor consensus in the Consultative Group. From the 
mid 1980’s to the early 1990’s this type of assistance comprised a large proportion of 
ODA to Tanzania, around fifty per cent. However, following the OGL debacle in 
1993/94 discussed in Chapter Three, programme aid of this type has subsided 
drastically. Project aid (capital goods and technical assistance granted in discrete 
projects) currently comprises seventy per cent of ODA to Tanzania and is almost 
completely uncoordinated. The Helleiner Report stated that there were at that time 
more than two thousand active donor assisted projects in Tanzania. The 1998 
Tanzania Public Expenditure Review reported that in 1997/98 the public investment 
portfolio of projects had been pruned from fourteen hundred to fewer than eight 
hundred through consolidation, elimination and the hiving off of activities to other
15 PER 1999.
16 URT/World Bank, 1998.
17 Helleiner et al,1995.
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• 18agencies. However, m attempting to improve its management of aid and donor 
activities in Tanzania, the government still confronts a myriad of project 
implementing agents and administrative structures. According to the UNDP, in 1996 
Tanzania received aid from sixty international donor agencies. In addition, an 
estimated eight hundred non-governmental organizations are involved in development 
oriented work in the country. The central government, with limited resources and 
administrative capacity, has found it difficult to control and direct this diversity of 
activity. The government has no firm idea of the volume of aid flows entering 
Tanzania on an annual basis, let alone the full extent of donor activity in the country, 
nor are donors aware of what their counterparts are doing, or even, sometimes, what 
they themselves have done in the past. This situation makes the notion that external 
aid has been applied to development priorities in Tanzania in any kind of systematic 
way unlikely. Given this state of affairs, the question of why aid so often fails might 
more usefully be posed as how could it ever be expected to work?
On several occasions during the course of reviewing its activities in Tanzania 
over the years, CIDA has criticized itself for pursuing a programme of disparate and 
unconnected parts.19 As the following chapters will discuss, Canadian aid 
commitments and those of other bilateral donors are dictated by a variety of factors: 
current agency priorities; recipient government priorities; donor capabilities; domestic 
political and economic imperatives; and the pressure to disburse accumulated funds 
and the opportunities to do so at a particular point in time. These factors contribute to 
the asymmetrical development of bilateral aid programmes. In addition, if the 
Canadian aid programme in Tanzania has historically lacked internal coherence, the 
operation of individual donors in isolation from one another has led accordingly to 
this problem writ large. The search for the magic solution, be it environmentally 
sustainable development, gender sensitive aid or structural adjustment, for example, 
has in the past led donors to shift their aid from one area to another to the expense of 
other priorities. According to some sources, the social services sector (health and
18 URT,1998.
19 CIDA, Tanzania Country Programme Review, various years.
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education) in Tanzania is currently inundated with aid, while water and agriculture are 
now comparatively neglected by donors.20
As the case of Canadian assistance to the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project 
(TCWP) presented in Chapter Five, as well as numerous other examples from the 
annals of aid history illustrate, aid projects often fail as a result of what, for want of a 
better term might be called ‘externalities’. For example, the TCWP was very 
successful in demonstrating that northern varieties of wheat could be adapted and 
grown on the fertile plains of Hanang. However, the lack of vital supporting 
infrastructure, i.e. a quick and reliable road or rail link with the major market in Dar 
es Salaam, inflated production costs to an insupportable level. Another commonplace 
example might be the construction of classrooms to accommodate more children 
where there are no funds to hire teachers or the teachers are so poorly trained and 
textbooks and other teaching aids so lacking that parents are wasting their hard earned 
money in sending their children to school at all. This depressing example might be 
extended to asking what becomes of those children who work hard and actually 
succeed in getting a decent education, only to find that there are no jobs for them at 
the other end. James Morton has ridiculed the myth of the ‘key sector’ in 
development practice, and the pursuit of successive fads among aid donors in their
91search for the key to development. What the sorry history of aid in Africa seems to 
demonstrate most vividly is that there is no escaping the imperative to attack poverty 
on numerous fronts. This campaign, must, however, be waged systematically, so that 
huge acerages of wheat are not planted where there is no serviceable road to transport 
it, and so that the activities of one donor in a particular sector or community 
_ compliment those of another and do not conflict with or duplicate them. And as aid 
donors, Canadians need to clarify just what exactly the objectives of their 
international assistance programme should be.
20 Interviews.
21 Morton, 1994.
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0.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary tasks of this thesis are the enumeration of the various influences 
on Canadian aid policy at each stage in the aid process, and a demonstration of how 
they effect the outcome of aid efforts. Particular attention has been paid to the 
influence exerted on CIDA by its participation in international organizations where 
aid policy is discussed, namely the World Bank and the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD, and to constraints on aid effectiveness inherent in 
established practices of assistance. In very crude terms, the issue addressed by this 
paper can be problematized thus: noble statements of purpose input at one end of the 
aid process emerge at the other in the form of failed projects and policies. What 
happens in between? The specific research questions it seeks to answer in the context 
of an examination of Canadian ODA to Tanzania are as follows:
Firstly, what is Canadian aid trying to do; i.e. what are its objectives, official and 
undeclared.
Secondly, how are these objectives determined; that is, what are the major influences 
on Canadian aid policy?
Thirdly, what affect have these various factors had on the outcome of Canadian aid 
projects in Tanzania?
Fourthly, what is CIDA’s demonstrated capacity to incorporate the lessons of 
.experience, into aid practice?
0.3 STRUCTURE OF THESIS
There is a tendency in some writing about CIDA both in the popular and 
academic press and in certain quarters of the NGO community to view CIDA as a 
monolith in the service of one interest group or another. This conception obscures the 
contestation of policy within the agency and between it and other governmental 
bodies as well as the structural constraints under which aid officials act. Unraveling
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the decision-making process, tracing the course of cause and effect and locating the 
critical power points within aid institutions is complicated by the symbiotic 
relationship among its various parts. Although a linear model of the aid process is 
employed here as an heuristic device to organize the analysis of the constraints on the 
effective use of aid, policy-making and implementation is a decidedly non-linear 
process. CIDA has by one estimate seventy-six internal committees concerned with 
various aspects of policy operating at different levels within the agency22, not all of 
which are active, record their activities, or follow their stated mandate. There are also 
numerous interdepartmental committees, and international organizations in which 
Canada participates and signs policy agreements which affect its aid policy.
Analyzing aid policy-making and delivery practices is further complicated by the fact 
that there have been numerous changes in government regulations and CIDA’s 
internal structure over the past forty years. In an attempt to get a handle on this 
unwieldy process, in addition to the various political and economic interests identified 
in the literature on aid as influences on aid policy, the theoretical literature on the 
function and malfunctioning of bureaucratic institutions is useful. This literature is 
reviewed in Chapter One in order to identify variables to be examined in relation to 
the cases presented in later chapters.
Three significant policy decisions taken with respect to the Canadian aid 
programme over the past fifteen years and the history of Canadian assistance to 
Hanang District in northern Tanzania over a period of thirty years have been selected 
as cases for examination. Chapter Two looks at the 1988 decision of the Canadian 
government to decentralize the administration of bilateral aid in accordance with the 
recommendations of a Canadian Parliamentary Committee, and in line with measures 
taken by a number of other western donor agencies around the same time. Early 
reports from the field were that placing Canadian aid officials closer to the intended 
beneficiaries of Canadian aid was having a positive impact on the quality of 
assistance CIDA was offering them. However, flaws in the administrative structure 
for decentralized administration became apparent and the policy was unpopular with a 
number of interest groups, most significantly the Canadian commercial sector. In 
1989, just over a year into decentralization, the process was reversed. One hundred
22 Secor,1991.
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and fifty million dollars had been spent shifting operations overseas before the 
process was halted and the administration of aid recentralized in Canada.23
The fact that Canadian ODA is heavily tied to the procurement of Canadian 
goods and services has always been a contentious issue in Canada. As outlined in 
Chapter Three, the evidence is quite conclusive that tying aid both reduces its 
purchasing power and creates a number of other problems for recipient governments 
in maintaining donor-assisted projects. CIDA’s restrictions on procurement have 
loosened somewhat over the years, yet the Canadian government, subjected to 
strenuous lobbying from Canadian manufacturers and commercial contractors, has 
resisted calls from the Canadian NGO lobby and international bodies like the World 
Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to further 
untie Canadian aid. In 1999, members of the DAC sought a new agreement on 
untying bilateral aid. After contentious interdepartmental wrangling and public 
consultations, the Canadian government agreed to support the new measure.
However, the agreement subsequently fell apart within the DAC, and Canadian policy 
has not changed from guidelines established in 1987.
In 1993, the Canadian government announced that it was terminating its aid 
programmes in East Africa, including its assistance to Tanzania. At that time, the 
Tanzania programme was not only CIDA’s largest in sub-Saharan Africa, but 
Tanzania was also, according to U.N. statistics, the third poorest country in the world. 
The government’s decision was condemned by the public, the media, the NGO lobby, 
and by members of Parliament from all political parties. Nevertheless, the cuts were 
in line with a dramatic reduction in aid flows to Tanzania from several of its major 
donors in that year. CIDA proceeded with its plans to wrap up most of its major 
commitments in Tanzania, and when the newly elected Liberal government restored 
aid to Tanzania the following year, it was at one third its former volume, a level it has 
since maintained. Chapter Four examines the determinants of the governments’ 
course of action in this matter.
23 Unless otherwise noted, all figures are in Canadian dollars.
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As described in Chapter Five, in 1967 the Canadian government received a 
request from the Tanzanian government for assistance in increasing its wheat 
production. The initial feasibility study stated in no uncertain terms that the project 
was not economically sound. After the initial success of adapting northern wheat 
strains to grow in Tanzania, Phase I of the project went badly with poor crop yields 
over several years, yet the project was expanded fivefold in a second phase. 
Evaluations of the project conducted during Phase II concluded unanimously that the 
project was not economically viable. In addition, violence and social conflict had 
erupted on the farms over the issue of land rights. Yet the recommendations of these 
reports and the claims of local residents were ignored and the project was extended 
into a third phase, and CIDA continued to provide funding for the project until 1993. 
Chapter Five addresses the question of why CIDA funded and continued funding this 
project when numerous reports concluded that it was not economically viable and was 
failing to achieve its objectives.
The Hanang Participatory Development Fund (HPDF) discussed in Chapter 
Six was initiated by CIDA in response to local resistance to the wheat project and in 
reaction to public criticism in Canada. Despite the ardent wishes of all the major 
players involved at the outset, and particularly those of CIDA, that the HPDF be 
implemented as soon as possible, it was nevertheless ten years between the 
conception of the project and the first disbursement of aid funds. During this period, 
the project objectives were redefined a number of times, the identity of the proposed 
Canadian executing agency changed five times, and a variety of administrative 
structures were considered. Project planners also struggled to identify a Tanzanian 
counterpart agency. The project was cancelled once, resurrected, then put on hold 
again before it finally got off the ground in 1996. Chapter Six examines the lengthy 
and troubled gestation of this project, which reveals the range of factors which 
continue to shape aid policy through the process of implementation.
What unites the three policy decisions examined in Chapters Two through 
Four with the history of Canadian involvement in Hanang District as discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six is the fact that in each case there was significant support from 
the parties involved that Canadian policy follow what was generally believed to be the
29
most beneficial to the intended beneficiaries of Canadian aid. Yet for a variety of 
reasons, in the first three cases, official support for this position could not be affected 
or maintained, and in the last case, it took ten years to achieve, and then it was on a 
much smaller scale than had originally been sought. It is believed that these cases 
provide clear illustrations of the constraints inherent in the aid process as it currently 
exists which inhibit the capacity of aid to achieve its declared objectives and to 
respond effectively to evidence of policy failure. They also provide insights into 
CIDA’s capacity to incorporate the lessons of experience into its aid practice.
0.4 METHODOLOGY
The cases analyzed here were selected as particularly significant and dramatic 
policy decisions which provided optimal conditions in which to examine the various 
forces acting on Canadian aid policy. Canadian aid to Tanzania was selected as the 
context in which to study the issues outlined above on the basis of several 
considerations Firstly, I am a Canadian citizen, and access to the relevant 
government documents related to the aid programme and to aid assisted projects in 
the field was most readily obtained in that country. Secondly, within Africa, Tanzania 
stands as the preeminent example of a country which sought, through a boldly 
articulated plan, to overcome poverty and to foster an economic prosperity which was 
to be enjoyed equally by all. Aid donors from east and west embraced Nyerere’s 
vision with enthusiasm, and until its cancellation in 1993, Canada’s aid programme in 
Tanzania was its largest in sub-Saharan Africa. The failure of the Ujaama policies 
and the donor community’s gradual disillusionment with Tanzania as discussed in the 
academic literature and in the following chapters makes Tanzania an intriguing case 
through which to examine the aid process.24 In addition, the Canadian assisted wheat 
project in Tanzania described in Chapter Five and Six was extremely controversial, 
and thus makes an interesting case through which to examine the decision-making 
process surrounding the implementation of aid projects and how CIDA as an aid 
agency responded to a failure of such dramatic proportions.
24 See Coulson; Pratt, 1976 and 1979; Hyden; Campbell and Stein; Sobhan.
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Looking at the three policy issues and the implementation of Canadian aid in 
Hanang as described above allows the examination of the aid process from several 
vantage points. The method employed was to trace the decision-making process from 
the identification of macro-level policy objectives through programming decisions, 
project identification, implementation and evaluation, in order to identify key 
influences at each stage and the structural constraints inherent in the aid process 
which compromise its developmental effectiveness. As the emphasis was on the 
decision-making process within the Canadian aid programme, this approach involved 
an examination of Canadian policy documents, project files, the recorded minutes of 
various meetings where the issues in question were discussed, and related memoranda 
held in CIDA and DFAIT files and in the National Archives of Canada. Press 
coverage and relevant files and reports prepared by sources outside the government 
were also reviewed. This research was conducted primarily in Ottawa over a period 
of twelve months between January 1998 and December 1999. This material was 
supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with Canadian and 
Tanzanian aid officials and with independent observers as recorded in Appendix I. In 
order that respondents might feel more able to speak openly on the topics under 
discussion, it was agreed that their comments would be non-attributable. Interviews 
with Canadian and Tanzanian aid officials, and with representatives of various other 
aid agencies active in Tanzania, observation at CIDA funded project sites, and a 
review of additional documentary material held at the Canadian High Commission in 
Dar es Salaam was conducted in Tanzania between March and August 1999.
0.5 LIMITATIONS TO STUDY
This study focuses on Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania to the exclusion of 
Canadian contributions to multilateral aid programmes and the activities of Canadian 
NGOs. It has employed a linear model of the aid process as a device through which 
to examine the forces which shape the decisions taken by aid officials at each stage 
and how this affects the useful application of aid resources. In attempting to trace a 
coherent line from policy formulation through the programming, project 
identification, design, implementation and evaluation phases of the aid cycle, several 
related and important elements have been left aside. As noted above, within CIDA
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alone, there are dozens of committees and offices which have a responsibility for 
formulating Canadian aid policy. In conducting this research, the decision was taken 
to focus on selected issues, rather than on the role of all participants in the process. 
Therefore, the role of the CIDA President’s Committee, the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Economic Relations with Developing Countries, the Special Advisory 
Group on International Trade, and the relevance of Canadian participation in 
international conferences on various development issues, for example, are not 
explored in any depth here.
Likewise, the selection of issues for examination was somewhat arbitrary. In 
examining the cases chosen for this study, the ideal approach would have been to 
trace each policy decision through its implementation and make an assessment of its 
subsequent impact on the effective use of Canadian aid resources. Unfortunately, that 
was not always possible. For example, it is impossible to calculate with any degree of 
certainty the impact of the decentralization of aid administration in 1989 on the 
quality of Canadian assistance to Tanzania before in comparison with what went 
before, or the precise degree to which Canada’s tied aid policy determined the design 
and outcome of the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project. However, it is hoped that the 
evidence reviewed in the following chapters will provide some useful insights into 
these questions. It would perhaps be useful to conceptualize the work presented here 
as a series of snapshots of the aid process taken from various vantage points which 
when viewed together, it is believed, provide a credible composite of how Canadian 
aid policy is determined and how this affects its outcome.
Two other significant limitations of the study must be noted. Firstly, the 
emphasis here is on the Canadian policy-making and implementation process with 
much less attention paid to similar processes within Tanzanian institutions which deal 
with aid. For example, although the history of Canadian aid in Hanang District as 
presented in Chapters Five and Six addresses the role of local conditions in shaping 
Canadian policy there, important issues such as the internal management of NAFCO, 
the parastatal which owns the wheat farms, and the evolution of local government in 
Tanzania are not examined in any detail. Thus only half of the question of why aid 
has the results it does is addressed. To complete the equation would take several
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more years of study and more information than is currently available to the researcher. 
This does not, however, negate the validity of the observations made here.
Finally, this study suffers from a limitation common to all “small n” case 
studies: the extent to which its findings can be claimed to be generalizable beyond the 
specific cases it considers. It is hoped, however, that this limitation is offset by the 
degree of detail which this type of study permits, which in turn identifies seemingly 
important issues which can then be examined in other situations.
0.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
It is hoped that the research presented here contributes to an understanding of 
the causes of aid failure. Its principal merit is in providing a detailed exposition of the 
aid policy-making process and the implementation of specific agreements made 
between one donor and one recipient country. In doing so, this study has provided a 
confirmation in concrete instances of certain claims as to the nature of the Canadian 
aid programme which have been made by other researchers at a more general level.
In particular, claims that Canadian ODA is heavily influenced by Canadian 
commercial interests. By focusing on institutionalized aid practices and the 
contestation of policy decisions, the study also dispels both the idea that CIDA is a 
monolith in the service of one interest group or another and the notion that aid 
agencies are neutral conduits for aid resources.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Competing Influences on Canadian Aid Policy
As a consequence o f the extensive consultations undertaken with 
stakeholders, CIDA is changing,..from old and outdated methods used 
to define and deliver international assistance programmes during the 
past two decades...to a new system that is more efficient, effective, 
transparent and relevant to the strategic interests o f Canada, while 
being responsive to the needs o f the developing countries and 
reflecting the goals and aspirations o f our stakeholders. These 
changes will provide organizations in Canada with new opportunities 
to propose innovative development projects for the various countries 
and regions in which CIDA operates, thus giving Canada stronger 
links to international markets.
— CIDA (1992), "Prosperity Initiative: Portfolio Consultations Final Report -  
Strengthening Prosperity Through a More Competitive Development Program "
This chapter reviews the various interpretations of aid policy found in the 
literature. The list of influences shaping aid policy which have been identified by 
scholars and enumerated here will form the basis of the examination of the aid process 
in the cases examined in subsequent chapters. This review is framed in the context of 
an analysis of the extent to which these factors can explain trends in aid policy, and its 
generally poor results over the past forty years.
1.1 THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR AID
Since the establishment of the first development assistance programmes in the 
1950’s, academic debates over aid have centred on three primary questions: the role of 
aid in inducing ‘development’; whether or not aid is effective in meeting its 
objectives; and whether or not the objectives outlined by various theories of aid are 
legitimate or desirable. These debates have produced a variety of views on the utility 
of aid in the development process, each with specific policy implications and 
allocating particular roles to donors and recipients in promoting ‘development’ in
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poor countries.
The first official aid programmes followed the dictates of modernization 
theory as articulated by Rostow, Chenery and Strout and others. Modernization theory 
and the assistance programmes it informed defined development as economic growth. 
Rostow outlined a series of stages through which, it was argued, all countries must 
pass en route from traditional society to an industrialized, high mass consumption 
economy. The crucial stage was ‘take-off, when an economy achieved self- 
sustaining growth. Rostow argued that for take-off to occur, three conditions were 
required: an increased rate of investment, a spurt of growth in one or more sectors of 
the economy, and an institutionally favourable environment. The proponents of 
modernization theory did not suggest that aid was either necessary or sufficient for 
development, but that it would accelerate the process by inserting additional resources 
into the economy.
Drawing on Rostow’s model, Chenery and Strout argued that the recipe for 
economic growth was the following: an increase in human skills, an increase in the 
level of investment and of domestic saving, the adoption of more productive 
technology, changes in the compostion of production output and employment, and the 
development of new institutions. Chenery and Strout pinpointed two gaps in 
underdeveloped economies which hindered their growth: a lack of skills and domestic 
savings for productive investment, and later, a shortage of foreign exchange when 
export earnings had not yet reached a level sufficient to finance the increasing volume 
of imports necessary for industrial production and consumption. Aid could be used to 
bridge these two gaps. It would be comprised of capital for industrialization and for 
the construction of the physical infrastructure necessary to support industry; food and 
consumer goods to permit the concentration of labour on the task of industrialization; 
and technical assistance in the adoption of more productive technologies. Aid was to
1 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol.61.
2 Riddell, 1987:88.
3 Ibid:89.
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be made expensive, offered in the form of loans to reduce the temptation of the part of 
recipient governments to use it for consumption purposes instead.4
The indifferent results this model of development produced in the 1960's and 
early ‘70's drew criticism from several quarters. Anti-interventionist economists 
Milton Friedman and Peter Bauer argue that, in fact, states have a moral obligation not 
to give aid, as it only retards economic advancement and impedes the functioning of 
the free market, which is more effective in creating wealth.5 Bauer argues that 
modernization theorists place undue emphasis on physical and human capital 
formation. He claims that economic growth is attributable to a cultural propensity for 
entrepreneurship, a matter in which foreign aid can play no role.6 Anti­
interventionists on the left like Andre Gunder Frank and other writers adopting a 
structuralist perspective argue that foreign aid serves to entrench unequal power 
relations between north and south, rich and poor, and therefore, the best policy for 
poor countries would be to ‘delink’ from the capitalist world economy and pursue 
self-sufficiency through import substitution and south-south cooperation. The 
dependency theorists and other critics on the left say that modernization theory is 
wrong in assuming the state to be a neutral instrument for development It is more 
. often in the service of elites. For these critics, the issue is not economic growth, but 
power relations and unequal access to resources. They charge that modernization 
policies do not address poverty alleviation or income and asset distribution.
Research in the 1970's and 1980's which sought to test the aid-savings-growth 
relationship put forward by Chenery and Strout was almost completely inconclusive 
for a variety of reasons outlined by Riddell. However, the result of this work and the 
contributions made by structuralist and marxist critics of aid were three important 
modifications to the two-gap model. Firstly, there was a recognition that not all 
capital assistance went directly into productive investment. This was due to
4 Ibid:90.
5 Bauer, 1991.
6 Toye:82.
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competing objectives in recipient states which led them to spend some of their savings 
on consumption (like health care), and because of the fungibility of funds which 
allowed the receipt of aid to free other resources for less productive, but perhaps more 
politically expedient expenditures. Secondly, there was a recognition that the state is 
not a neutral agent, but has a political agenda which may conflict with the interests of 
the poor. Finally, the failure of ‘trickle down’ economics led to an emphasis on 
meeting the ‘basic needs’ of the poor in development assistance programmes. The 
dominance of this goal among aid donors was short-lived (between 1972 and 1979), 
but it put poverty alleviation and the issue of distribution on the aid policy agenda.
The structural adjustment programmes which have been the central component 
of development assistance programmes since the early 1980’s are a reaction against 
Keynesianism and the perceived weaknesses of modernization theory. Proponents of 
structural adjustment attribute the poor economic condition of southern countries to 
four main factors: an overextended and inefficient public sector, an overemphasis on 
physical capital formation in modernization programmes, a neglect of human capital 
formation, and a proliferation of distorted economic controls. This view places much 
emphasis on the environment in which development interventions are made, claiming 
that the governmental and economic infrastructure must be ‘adjusted’ before 
development initiatives can be expected to work. ODA is now generally conditional 
on a commitment to make prescribed adjustments, designed to scale back government 
interference in the economy and to facilitate the free working of the market.
Despite these theoretical permutations, the integrity of the two-gap model 
which underlies orthodox foreign aid theory has remained intact. Aid theory has 
shifted its primary objective from determining how the development process might be 
accelerated in poor countries, to how it might be restarted.9 Charged with this task, 
structural adjustment is seen as a preliminary step to the process of development,
7 Riddell, 1987.
8 Toye:70.
9 Riddell, 1987.
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however, rather than a replacement. The structuralist and marxist critiques of the role 
of the state in the 1970's have been integrated into mainstream aid theory to a certain 
extent, translated into political conditionalities attached to aid and development 
policies which assign a catalytic role to private entrepreneurs in spurring economic 
growth. At the same time, poverty alleviation and redistribution of wealth have been 
incorporated into orthodox aid theory on the strength of the evidence produced by the 
critics of ‘trickle down’ development and the evidence of the hardship induced by 
structural adjustment programmes. While structural adjustment is the current 
preoccupation among aid donors, there is a consensus that measures to aid economic 
growth must be accompanied by efforts to ease the immediate suffering of the poor 
and to enable them to become productive members of society. This is the theoretical 
justification for aid to primary healthcare, education, community development, and 
income generating programmes, among other social welfare endeavours.
Foreign aid theory as briefly outlined above begins from the assumption that 
the object of aid is development, however that is subsequently defined. However, in 
examining how development theory is translated into aid policy and with what 
outcome, one must consider other factors which have influenced the formulation of 
policies and the construction of development assistance programmes. It is important 
to clarify the range of motives underlying aid because, as numerous researchers have 
demonstrated and as the work presented here confirms, it often seeks objectives other 
than the alleviation of poverty. The result is aid policy with conflicting objectives 
which compromise its ability to meet any of them.
1.2 THE ORIGINS OF AID
The origins of foreign aid are often dated to the Marshall Plan of 1948, 
although it could be argued that the concept of foreign aid had its origins in nineteenth 
century Christian proselytizing missions which imbued development assistance with
persistent notions of charity.10 The Bretton Woods Institutions, established to rebuild 
Europe and stabilize the world economy after WWII, were subsequently reoriented 
towards the Third World. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation ( 
renamed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) was 
established in 1948 and formed a Development Assistance Group (later the 
Development Assistance Committee) in 1960. These institutions provided the 
original infrastructure for development assistance. U.S. President Truman’s inaugural 
speech of 1949 marked the first public commitment to foreign aid. A contributor to 
reconstruction in Europe, Canada’s involvement in the provision of foreign aid to the 
‘developing’ world began in 1950 with the Commonwealth sponsored Colombo Plan 
in Southeast Asia. By the end of the 1960's most industrialized countries operated 
foreign aid programmes.
The institution and maintenance of development aid programmes has been 
attributed to a variety of motivations. There are those who see aid as the natural 
manifestation of altruism. Others see baser interests at work, claiming that aid is the 
result of western anti-communist fear, or of economic self-interest on the part of 
donor states. Another explanation suggests that donor countries do not act solely on 
the basis of their own self-interest or in the interests of the recipient country. Rather, 
they form part of an international aid regime and act in accordance with established 
norms to meet collective objectives. These collective interests are defined 
alternatively as the eradication of poverty or the preservation of a stable global 
economic order.11
These various interpretations of the forces shaping aid policy will be examined 
here. It is argued that domestic political, economic and humanitarian interests all play 
a role in the formation of aid policy. Less studied, but also important, is the 
disciplinary power of the international aid regime. This concept is used to explain the
10 Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Brodhead et al, 1988
11 Lumsdaine,1996; Spicer:1966; Raffer and Singer, 1996; Freeman, 1985; Pratt, 1989; Wood,1986 and 
1996; Black, Therien and Clark, 1996
relative homogeneity of the northern response to poverty in the south. Since the 
purpose of an aid regime may or may not be development, or may advance approaches 
to development that are misdirected, the functioning of this aid regime, if it does exist, 
bears closer scrutiny. It is also argued that looking at the bureaucratic processes 
through which aid is administered reveals constraints inherent in the institutions of aid 
which influence the nature of the assistance offered to poor countries and the outcome 
of aid projects.
1.3 THE COLD WAR
On the basis of rather compelling historical evidence, several writers have
12argued that foreign aid had its origins in the Cold War between the superpowers.
The proof, they suggest, is to be found in observing when aid was initiated, where it 
has been targeted, and what it has comprised. The United States, the first and until 
1989 the largest bilateral donor, made its first commitment to ODA in 1949, the year 
of the Chinese Revolution, when the U.S. was on the verge of involvement in the 
Korean War. Commonwealth countries launched their first aid programme in 1950 
with the Colombo Plan to Southeast Asia. Aid to Latin America began in the 1960's, 
immediately following the Cuban Revolution which brought Castro to power. It is 
telling that the U.S. was replaced by Japan as the largest donor of ODA in 1989, the 
year the Berlin Wall came down.13
Initially, foreign aid was concentrated on Southeast Asia where the threat from 
communism seemed greatest. Between 1952 and 1961, the Mutual Security Act was 
the legal basis for development assistance in the U.S.14 The Clay Report to the 
President of the U.S. made in 1963 noted that 72% of total military and economic 
assistance was concentrated on U.S. allies and other countries on the Sino-Soviet 
border. The same report recommended limiting aid to Africa because it was of no
12 Raffer and Singer, 1996; Griffin, 1991; Spicer, 1966.
13 Wood, 1996:35.
14 Raffer and Singer:63.
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strategic value.15 Aid to Africa began with the process of decolonization in the 1960's 
with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. backing a succession of allies and client regimes, often 
of a repressive nature. An impressive indicator that development aid is politically 
motivated is the fact that Israel and Egypt are the top recipients of U.S. ODA, while 
Cuba, ninety miles off the coast of Florida, the source of many refugees to the U.S., 
and lacking in many essential goods, receives no aid from its neighbour. Comecon 
aid, always limited in volume, was strictly directed at Soviet allies — Cuba, Mongolia, 
Vietnam, and other client states.16
To counter this argument, it may be noted that the top recipient of Canadian 
ODA is currently China, and as Lumsdaine notes, the most ardent supporters of aid 
are found in Scandinavia and among social justice activists, not among Cold Warriors. 
Lumsdaine says that the argument that aid was necessary to limit communist 
expansion “played the role in gaining swing votes for foreign aid and diffusing 
criticism” among conservatives who opposed giveaways, but was not the primary
17motive for aid. Wood also suggests that Cold War interests were a distortion of the
18real objective of aid which is the preservation of the capitalist economic system. 
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the aid policies of many donors, particularly the 
U.S., serve political ends as well as any other objectives, and that whatever their 
current orientation, the institutions of foreign aid were constructed to serve primarily 
political purposes. Their derivation continues to effect current aid policies which may 
seek different objectives, but through existing institutional structures.
1.4 THE PURSUIT OF COMMERCIAL INTERESTS ABROAD
It is frequently contended that aid is motivated more by economic self interest
15 Ibid:62.
16 Hook, 1996.
,7Lumsdaine:227.
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and the pursuit of commercial advantage than by political objectives or humanitarian 
sentiments. Criticism focuses on three characteristics of aid found in virtually all 
donor programmes. First of all, it is argued that the practice of tying a high 
percentage of aid to the purchase of goods from the donor country is evidence that aid 
programmes are used primarily for the purpose of developing overseas markets.19
This practice conflicts with developmental objectives as it can inflate the cost of
20necessary inputs by twenty-five percent or more. It also creates a bias toward large 
projects which can use the goods and services available from the donor country. To 
support export promotion, many donor countries have established programmes which 
subsidize private investment by their nationals in recipient countries frequently 
combining such subsidies with concessional aid to make a development proposal 
more attractive to recipient governments weighing competing bids.21
A number of analysts also see a fundamental contradiction between aid and 
trade policies affecting developing countries. It is argued that much of aid is oriented
toward the development of export commodities which often meet with high tariff
22barriers around donor country markets. Raffer and Singer quote a 1992 OECD study 
which concluded that a thirty percent reduction in OECD country tariffs on southern 
goods would lead to an annual income gain of ninety billion dollars for the Third
23World and Eastern Europe, a sum one third more than the annual expenditure on 
ODA. A 1994 UNDP study claimed that the removal of tariffs on Third World
18 Wood, 1996:22.
19 Raffer and Singer, 1996; Riddell, 1987.
20 Ibid.
21 Freeman, 1985:116.
22 Riddell cites an example of a USAID project aimed at expanding rice production in Thailand, 
suggesting that it is not an unusual case. Since the 1950's USAID with support from the World Bank, 
Japan and Germany have been involved in rural development projects in Thailand. These efforts were 
very successful in meeting their objectives and between 1978 and 1984 the volume of Thai rice exports 
trebled to 4.6 million tonnes a year, making Thailand the world’s largest supplier o f rice and 
contributing a substantial portion of the country’s income. In 1985 the U.S. Congress passed the Farm 
Act which created subsidies for U.S. rice which cut its price on the world market in half, making it 
cheaper than Thai rice. U.S. aid work was thus negated by its domestic economic policy.
(Riddell, 1987:212).
23 Raffer and Singer:33.
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textiles and clothing would add fifty billion dollars to developing country coffers.24 
These studies seem to suggest that if the object of foreign aid is economic 
development, trade liberalization would be a more effective means to achieve this end. 
Raffer and Singer note the irony in mainstream aid policy. The World Bank and 
Western donors prescribe structural adjustment and free market economics for aid 
recipients while they continue to protect their own industries from imports.25
Food aid is also targeted as proof of northern economic self-interest. Raffer 
and Singer note that all other forms of ODA are declining, now representing less than 
0.30% GNP among DAC members, well shy of the 0.7% target.26 Food aid, on the 
other hand, measured as concessionally financed shipments of grain to developing 
countries, amounts to approximately 2% of total food production in donor countries
27(Canada, the U.S. and Europe), consistently surpassing the U.N. target. What ever 
benefits may result from food aid, its provision can be more readily attributed to 
surplus dumping to support northern farmers than to altruism. U.S. Public Law 480 
passed in 1954 to regulate food aid was originally entitled the Surplus Disposal 
Program, which Raffer and Singer suggest is a more accurate label than Food for 
Peace.28
Other commentators observe that if the object of aid is to promote a donor’s 
economic interests abroad, there are more effective and less costly means of doing so, 
through trade commissions and bilateral agreements, for example. If aid is deemed to
24 Ibid.
25 An example of such protection is the International Multifibre Agreement which levies prohibitive 
duties on imported textiles. Protection for North American and European manufacturers in this sector 
dates back to 1935, but the current agreement was established in 1974 and placed under the aegis of 
GATT. It was deemed necessary as southern countries gained progressively larger shares of the market 
for synthetic textiles, which were at that point unregulated, and technological advances were causing 
layoffs among northern manufacturers. It is meant to be phased out by the end o f the century, but 
Raffer and Singer note, even if this occurs as planned, “the North will have enjoyed ‘necessary’ 
protection in one small part of their economies for up to seven decades, while southern countries are 
required to open their economies much more radically and much more quickly to free trade (Raffer and 
Singer:34).
26 German and Randal, 1995:105.
27 Raffer and Singer:79.
28 Ibid:80.
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be the best tool for this purpose they argue, one would expect it to receive more
29funding than it does. However, even allowing for the pursuit of humanitarian 
objectives through aid programmes, the negation of the benefits of some aid financed 
projects by trade policy and the unwillingness of western countries to use trade 
agreements as tool for development seems to indicate very clearly that economic self- 
interest is a significant factor in determining donor policy.
1.5 THE INTERNATIONAL AID REGIME
Kasner defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a
30given area.” Keohane says regimes are not quasi-governments, but are more like 
contracts, when these involve actors with long term objectives who seek to structure
31their relationships in stable and mutually beneficial ways.” It is not necessary that 
all members of a regime be equally powerful or benefit equally from their adherence 
to regime norms. It is only necessary that the benefits accruing to each actor continue 
to exceed the costs of belonging. Central to regime theory is the idea that 
participation is the result of a conscious, rational, cost-benefit analysis. “Weak actors 
as well as more powerful actors make choices, even if they make them with more
32severe constraints.” This assumption is contrasted with a realist interpretation of 
international relations which argues that international actors are guided exclusively by 
self-interest and that their actions are not mediated by adherence to any fixed set of
33norms. It is also in contrast to discourse theory, which envisions a more 
unconscious transmission, adherence and enforcement of norms. Writers working 
from this perspective within the field of development studies offer an intriguing
29 Lumsdaine, 1996.
30 Kasner further refines this definition: “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms 
are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights or obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
practices for making and implementing collective choice” (Kasner:2). 
h  Keohane: 146.
32 Ibid: 148.
33 Strange, 1983.
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critique of the developmentalist paradigm including foreign aid.34 They ask “Why is 
development touted as the cure? Why not justice or liberation?” and “How is it that 
academics and policy makers came to think of the Third World as underdeveloped as 
opposed to anything else they could conceive of it as being?”36 The post-modernists 
attribute the persistence of poverty in the south to flaws in the epistemological 
framework in which poverty is considered. Developmentalism, they argue, artificially 
circumscribes the search for solutions and accords primacy to the interests of the 
industrialized countries.
Regime theory is also concerned with how international actors formulate 
collective responses to global issues. However, whereas post-modernists concentrate 
on the construction of paradigms and how they shape public discourse, regime 
theorists focus on the establishment of institutions to organize and direct international 
relations. It is, perhaps, a more mechanistic model, but has the advantage of offering 
a rationale for why states and other actors behave in the manner in which they do, by 
what means they exert their influence, and to what purpose. The assertion of regime 
theorists that actors always make a conscious decision to adhere to international 
norms (including the norm to offer development assistance in response to mass 
poverty, as opposed to taking action in any other form) is questionable. One must 
concede a certain degree of unconscious adherence to existing paradigms. 
Nevertheless, focussing discussion on policy rather than epistemology creates a more 
manageable and tangible field for study.
Like New Institutional Economic theory, regime theory draws on
• * •  37microeconomics and applies its concepts to explaining international relations. As in 
business, there are costs attached to interactions between states and other international 
actors in global politics. It is argued that regimes come into being to allow actors to 
achieve outcomes together which they could not independently. Regimes are
34 Escobar,1995 and 1984; Johnston, 1991; Manzo, 1991.
35 Goulet, 1991.
36 Johnston: 150.
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structured to facilitate relations between states, reduce the costs of interaction and to 
provide stability. If there is a lack of a clear legal framework governing a particular 
field of activity, if obtaining information about another actors’ moves is costly, or if 
there is a cost attached to a transaction between states, it becomes advantageous to 
form a regime around routinized relationships to reduce uncertainty. What Keohane 
calls ‘issue density’, or the necessity of coordinating relations with other actors on a 
number of related issues makes regime formation more attractive than negotiating ad
38hoc agreements on a continual basis.
Haas says “Regimes arise when the states realize that a desired distribution of 
‘the goods’ cannot come about by way of autonomous action. Interdependence, far
39from being a wholesome mutual need is thus recognized as a regrettable condition.”
In speaking of a foreign aid regime, one must ask not only does it exist, and what are 
its attributes, but what are ‘the goods’ it is designed to produce? Is the aid regime 
built on voluntary cooperation for poverty alleviation as Lumsdaine suggests?40 Or is 
it necessary collective action for the maintenance of the existing global economic 
order as claimed by Wood?41 These two views are examined here.
According to Wood’s interpretation, in the closing days of WWII, the U.S. as 
global hegemonic power, was desirous of securing the stability of the global economic 
order on which its prosperity depended. A thriving European economy was necessary 
to provide a market for U.S. exports, and thus grants were offered by the U.S. and 
Canada to all the countries of Europe, including the U.S.S.R. and Germany, for the 
purpose of reconstruction. The colonized regions of the world were seen as having an 
integral role to play in this process as a source of revenue for Europe, a source of raw 
materials for American manufacturers, and as a market for European goods such that
37 Harriss et al,1995; Krasner,1983.
38 Keohane: 156.
39Haas:28.
40 Lumsdaine, 1996.
41 Wood, 1986; 1996.
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Eastern Europe used to provide, and the States were now unwilling to.42 To fulfill this 
role, the underdeveloped regions would have to develop their capacity to export 
primary commodities in order to supply the U.S. and to earn income for their colonial 
masters.43
Wood cites statements from U.S. officials which make it very clear that the 
U.S. wanted to squelch any expectation that ‘little Marshall Plans’ for the Third 
World would be forthcoming.44 Concessional aid was not offered to poor southern 
countries because the U.S. desire was to foster development of raw materials 
production through foreign investment. This it did through the provision of incentives 
to American investors. According to Wood, the Marshall Plan was significant in the 
development of the foreign aid regime because it created the concept of large scale 
economic aid programmes between states and “created a body of operating principles 
and procedures that remain an integral part of the aid regime.”45 It might also be 
argued that it marked a conscious decision on the part of the hegemonic powers to 
structure North -  South relations in a way which circumscribed future development 
choices in poor countries. In constructing the donor-recipient relationship with poor 
countries, the U.S., and later its allies, chose not to adopt two aspects of the Marshall 
Plan in Europe, namely regional coordination among recipients and the self- 
monitoring of aid funded development programmes. Raffer and Singer suggest that 
this decision sacrificed the potential benefits to be gained through cooperation, for 
example, in the collective procurement of goods and the sharing of information.46 It 
also instituted a hierarchical relationship between donor and recipient not part of post­
war aid to Europe. Aid, which included technical assistance and financing with 
varying degrees of concessionality, was chosen over other possible options to address 
poverty available at the time, i.e. trade liberalization or political support for national
42 Wood, 1986:40.
43 Brett has described the role colonized East Africa played in supporting the British economy prior to 
WWII. See Brett, 1973.
44 Wood, 1986:46.
45 Wood, 1986:65.
46 Raffer and Singer: 198.
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liberation movements.47 Stokke cites the failure of the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) as a later example of an alternative option rejected because it did not 
suit the interests of the hegemonic powers 48 The NIEO proposed that the First World 
adapt itself to enable the Third World to come to terms with poverty. Instead, the 
Third World has been obliged, first through the Marshall Plan, then through structural 
adjustment programmes, to adjust to the requirements of the First World economic 
system. Its role in this system has provided the rationale for a set of norms and 
principles which Wood argues continue to govern the functioning of the aid regime:49
1) Institutionalized non-competition. In accordance with the principle of 
facilitating private investment, all donor countries and multilateral agencies adhere to 
a regime norm which requires that concessional aid be offered only as a last resort.
Aid where private financing is available is, in fact, prohibited by the charter of the 
World Bank and many bilateral agencies, a principle enshrined in DAC agreements, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. Aid seekers are expected to begin their search for 
funding on the open market among private entrepreneurs and commercial banks.
Only after failing here may they approach in succession: the International Finance 
Corporation (offering commercial rates, but with the protection of the World Bank); 
the hard loan windows of the multilateral banks; the loan facilities of the bilateral 
agencies and the soft loan windows of the multilateral banks; the IDA of the World 
Bank, which offers interest free loans; and finally, the grant making facilities of the 
bilateral agencies, the EU, OPEC and the U.N. A prospective recipient may not 
necessarily make an application to each one of these agencies in turn, but 
theoretically, communication among them will ensure that the terms of the financing 
agreement will be as stiff as the market will bear.
Hand in hand with institutionalized non-competition is the informal rule of 
graduation. As a recipient country passes an unspecified threshold of economic
47 Wood, 1986:67-71.
48 Stokke: 12.
49 Wood, 1996:28-35.
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health, it is no longer eligible for concessional financing. South Korea is an example 
of a country which has passed through this process. Some observers have attributed 
the concentration of concessional aid on the poorest countries as evidence of the 
humanitarian basis of aid.50 Wood argues, however, that this pattern “may be 
consistent with a humanitarian outlook, but it is also consistent with the norms of 
international capitalism.”51
2) Asymmetrical bilateralism. The framework for negotiating aid packages is 
constructed in such a way that while donor countries may coordinate their activities 
through the DAC or the World Bank (though there is limited evidence of the 
coordination of aid programming to date), no comparative collective forum exists for 
recipient countries, save the toothless General Assembly of the U.N. Recipients 
negotiate aid agreements with bilateral and multilateral agencies as individual actors. 
Issues of trade and aid are also separated for discussion between donor and recipient. 
There is no institutional arrangement which recognizes the connection between them.
3) Strategic Non-lending. Wood claims that the notion that modernization 
projects of the 1950's and ‘60's were aimed at the industrialization of the Third World
52is a myth. He says “Virtually all donors withhold aid from industrial projects,” and 
that strategic non-lending is employed to avoid financing state owned productive 
enterprises, which conflict with western capitalist principles. The accuracy of this 
claim may be questioned with respect to aid to Tanzania. While Brett has shown how 
British colonial policy acted as a barrier to industrial development in Tanzania, in the 
postcolonial era, a number of bilateral donors have supported productive enterprises 
there.53
4) Servicing o f debt. While the Marshall Plan offered grants, most aid to 
developing countries was initially in the form of interest bearing loans. Repayment
50 Lumsdaine,1996.
51 Wood, 1986:223.
52 Wood, 1986:138.
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was dependent on a level of economic growth which did not occur. Third World 
countries were thus caught in a cycle which compels them to borrow more to service 
old debts, a situation exacerbated by the availability of cheap credit in the 1970's, 
often used to finance projects which subsequently failed. Wood sees the emergence of 
a ‘creditor cartel’ composed of commercial and multilateral banks and aid agencies 
which have joined forces to assert the absolute priority of interest payments on 
international debt over other obligations, and succeeded in making outright default 
taboo.54 The result, Wood suggests, is a further narrowing of the development choices 
of poor countries, as they struggle under the weight of accumulated debt and the 
conditions attached to new loans, which are biased toward development strategies 
based on private investment.
Wood argues that the aid regime as outlined above is maintained because the 
benefits of adhering to regime norms continue to outweigh the costs for both donors 
and recipients. Hegemonic control of the regime is centered in the U.S. and the World 
Bank. The World Bank group is part of the U.N., but is not subject to policy 
directives from the General Assembly or any other U.N. agency. Technically, the 
president of the World Bank is elected by its board of governors. In fact, he is always 
an American appointed by the president of the United States. The head of the IMF is 
traditionally a European.55 Raffer and Singer suggest that bilateral aid is generally 
conditional on a seal of approval from the World Bank, a procedure not formal, but 
effective.56
Formal mechanisms of regime control exist. For example, Article III.5 of the 
World Trade Organization requires that the WTO coordinate its policy with the IBRD
e n
and the IMF. This is, however, a rather vague directive. The members of the DAC 
have collectively agreed to a series of Principles for Effective ODA, but as will be
53 Brett, 1973. China and Sweden, for example.
54 Wood, 1996:32.
55 Raffer and Singer:46.
56 Raffer and Singer: 157.
57Raffer and Singer:36.
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discussed in greater depth in Chapter Three, there is no real means to enforce 
compliance. A reliance on informal, often unspecified mechanisms of regime 
discipline raises the question of its authority and of possible challenges to its norms as 
they have been outlined above. But there is sufficient anecdotal evidence in the 
history of aid in support Wood’s view to warrant further exploration of his arguments. 
As outlined in Section 1.1, the focus on basic needs in the 1970's did not alter neo-
58classical development philosophy. Nor did the demise of Comecon and rise of 
South Korea in the 1980’s affect power relations or norms. Raffer and Singer offer 
the gradual alteration in the provisions of the Lome Conventions as evidence of the 
concentration of control over development decisions in the hands of western donors.59 
It is possible, however, that the increasing prominence of Japan in the donor 
community could lead to an adjustment of regime norms given that the economic 
philosophies of Japan and the United States differ on certain fundamental points, for 
example, the role of the state in the development process.60
Lumsdaine also adopts the concept of an aid regime to analyze what he notes 
as “a striking similarity among seventeen or eighteen DAC donors in consistently 
pursuing a novel set of policies.”61 Like Wood, he traces the origins of the aid regime 
to the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II. But he rejects Wood’s 
interpretation of the regime’s purpose and character, arguing that “foreign aid was 
largely a product of humanitarian ideas and values in the developed democracies
58 Wood,1986:222.
59 The terms of Lome I in 1975 gave European donors and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(ACP) parity in decision-making. Raffer and Singer suggest that this principle was eroded with each 
subsequent round of negotiations. The original STABEX agreement was designed to protect 
developing countries from fluctuations in export earnings from primary commodities. It gave the ACP 
countries complete discretion as to the use of compensation payments. By the time Lome IV was 
signed in 1990, control over the use of funds had shifted to the donor in the form of intensive 
monitoring and the imposition of conditions. STABEX was criticized from all sides at its inception as 
both a subversion of the free working of the market and as a conscious disincentive to industrialization 
in the Third World. Some changes to the treaty were subsequently made to the advantage of the LDC’s; 
for example, compensation is now exclusively in the form of grants rather than loans. However, the 
significance of the Lome Treaties to a discussion o f the aid regime is their failure as an attempt at 
equitable partnership between north and south, and the retrenchment of control in the north. (Raffer and 
Singer: 88-102).
60 See Wade, 1996.
61 Lumsdaine: 104.
51
which found support in the domestic political arrangements and religious and moral
62traditions of the West.” He traces this humanitarianism from the moral philosophy 
of the Enlightenment to the creation of organizations like the League of Nations, the 
Red Cross, the United Nations, and the Marshall Plan, and finally to President 
Truman’s inaugural speech of 1949 which committed the U.S.A. to aiding poor 
countries. Lumsdaine attaches great importance to this speech, claiming it marked a 
new direction in U.S. and Western policy towards the Third World. He envisions a 
regime organized with ending poverty as its purpose, maintained not by mutual fear or 
manipulation, but by the mechanisms it has set in motion. They are: Firstly, 
rhetorical momentum. Truman stated on the public record the moral imperative for 
rich countries to give aid to the poor in other countries. Lumsdaine says “Once aid 
had been placed on such a footing, it could be criticized on such a footing.”
Secondly, a commitment to public scrutiny and criticism; thirdly, the growth o f a 
corps ofpolitically disinterested professionals; and finally, the setting o f official 
targets for volume, concessionality, untying aid, et cetera. Lumsdaine argues that 
whatever its origins, (and he admits the pursuit of other interests through aid), the 
institutionalization and bureaucratization of aid set it on a course towards meeting its 
officially stated objectives.
Once aid programs existed, they proclaimed the essential validity of the 
concept. At that point, it was possible to criticize aid for failing to seek 
the welfare of the recipients, but criticism of aid for failing to serve the 
interests of the donors was criticism of aid simply for being aid.64
Lumsdaine argues that the level of commitment of various donor countries to 
aid disproves the thesis that aid is primarily motivated by the political and economic 
interests of the western countries. He notes that politically neutral or leftish countries 
like the Nordic states have been the most ardent supporters of aid whereas cold 
warriors like the U.S. and Britain have gradually reduced their aid budgets.
62 Ibid: 115.
63 Ibid:275.
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If foreign aid served primarily national or subnational interests in donor 
countries, it is difficult to understand why aid found support mainly 
from groups and individuals concerned with social justice and with a 
cooperative international order, and was opposed by conservative 
groups, by and large. But if changes in internationalism and the 
welfare state lay behind the interest in foreign aid, the patterns of 
enthusiasm and disaffection for aid are as expected, and the whole 
development assistance regime becomes meaningful and intelligible.65
Lumsdaine refers to the increasing percentage of ODA channelled through 
multilateral institutions as evidence of an increasing willingness to sacrifice the 
political and economic leverage afforded a donor through bilateral aid in the interests 
of the poor. He also notes an increase in aid to LDC’s and claims low correlations 
between aid and trade relationships, stating that the major aid recipients are generally 
not important trading partners of donor countries.66
There are flaws in both Lumsdaine’s and Wood’s arguments which become 
apparent when they are applied to concrete cases as is done in the following chapters. 
Unfortunately, more holes are immediately visible in Lumsdaine’s optimistic 
conception of the objectives of aid. He has cast his net too short, considering only 
purely concessional aid (that with a grant element of twenty-five per cent or more), 
and thus only part of what Wood demonstrates to be a larger, multi-tiered 
development financing system. This limited frame of reference leads to conclusions 
that are perhaps unjustified. They are, in any case, made with too many qualifications 
to accommodate competing motives for his argument to be convincing. The 
concentration of concessional aid on LDC’s can be explained by the principle of 
graduation outlined above. When calculated as financing with a concessional 
element of more than twenty-five per cent plus that which has a concessional element 
less than twenty-five per cent, but still below market rates, most development 
financing is, in fact, directed at middle income countries which do have significant 
trading relations with the industrialized countries. Since 1987, Canadian ODA has
64 Ibid:272.
65 Ibid:229.
66 Ibid:78.
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been given exclusively in the form of grants. Yet, according to 1996 figures, less
67than 20 % of it is directed to LDCs. In addition, the channelling of ODA through 
multilateral institutions requires a closer look before it can be claimed to be aimed at 
benefiting the poor. Where it goes and for what purposes it is earmarked must be 
shown.
Finally, the adherence of states other than the U.S. to the aid regime can be 
explained in two ways. First of all, despite the fact that its aid levels have dropped 
consistently over the past twenty years, the U.S. is still the second largest bilateral 
donor after Japan. Its control of the World Bank assures its hegemony, and its 
traditional allies were drawn into the aid regime at the outset in response to urging 
from the U.S. to share the burden of stabilizing the global economic order. The 
support for aid by the Nordic countries, which are frequently critical of U.S. 
development practices, might be explained in terms of the aid infrastructure (including 
the U.N.) providing a ready made outlet through which to pursue their more 
humanitarian objectives. However, this can also be criticized as too simplistic an 
explanation of the aid programmes of countries with widely differing political 
orientations. Other influences apart from human kindness and economic self-interest 
must be considered.
It is possible to accept Lumsdaine’s argument that the aid bureaucracy 
provides its own momentum without accepting his assessment of its orientation. 
Rather than primarily sustaining a humanitarian impulse, it could be argued the aid 
regime, with its antiquated foundations in political and economic self-interest, 
perpetuates practices which hinder its current capacity to address poverty effectively, 
even if that were proven to be its primary objective. As the above discussion 
suggests, the motives for aid, and hence its objectives, are multiple. The question is 
not whether or not humans are altruistic by nature, but which forces prevailed at a 
given point in history. Explicit statements by policy makers at the close of WWII 
make it clear that the primary considerations in the establishment of foreign aid
67 Morrison, 1998:420.
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programmes were political and economic, not humanitarian. This is not to say that no 
one, or even the majority of people in the aid business have ulterior motives, but that 
humanitarian impulses are distorted by the aid system. The validity of this assertion is 
to be taken up in the research presented below.
Given the striking homogeneity of aid policies among official donor agencies, 
the idea of a self-regulating, self-disciplining system as presented in regime theory 
appears to be a useful analytic tool for examining how aid policy is determined. 
However, the broad-brushed sketches of the aid regime outlined above raise several 
questions which must be answered before the model can be accepted. First of all, if 
the U.S. and the World Bank form the hegemonic centre of the regime, by what 
methods are their principles and norms transmitted to other members of the regime? 
Given the lack of legal sanctions governing the behaviour of donors and recipients as 
it affects the use of aid, how are norms enforced? If Wood’s portrayal of the aid 
regime is accurate, why do donor countries bother with the poorest of the poor at all? 
If the regime is so exploitative, why do not the poorest just opt out? One might also 
ask where non-governmental organizations fit into an aid regime? If they are not 
subject to regime norms, what role do they play in defining aid policy? In the case of 
Canadian ODA, do closer working relations between CIDA and NGOs draw the 
private organizations under government and regime control? It is hoped that a close 
examination of the Canadian aid programme in Tanzania will help reveal the way in 
which an international aid regime does or does not function to shape Canadian policy.
1.6 AID AS A BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS
As noted in the Introduction, one of the objectives of this research is to 
examine aid as a bureaucratic process to determine how aid institutions shape both 
policy and its outcomes. This section presents a number of concepts found in the 
theoretical literature on bureaucratic failure which, it is argued, can be usefully 
applied in analyzing the constraints on the effective use of aid resources. As a
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starting point, Hughes offers a summary description of the bureaucratic model along 
the lines of Weber’s idealized notion of how public institutions operate:
The traditional model can be characterized as: an administration under 
the formal control of the political leadership, based on a strictly 
hierarchical model of bureaucracy, staffed by permanent, neutral and 
anonymous officials, motivated only by public interest, serving any 
governing party equally, and not contributing to policy but merely 
administering those policies directed by the politicians.68
Western democratic government bureaucracies, including the Canadian public 
administration of which CIDA is a part, were set up to function in this manner. Of 
course, examination of government bureaucracies and private firms has demonstrated 
that they do not always work this way. Observers have identified a number of 
characteristics of large bureaucracies which affect their capacity to operate effectively 
according to their stated purposes. These are outlined here in preparation for the 
examination of the case studies below.
1.6.1 TENDENCY TO RIGIDITY AND INERTIA
Dunleavy notes the idea that bureaucracies have lifecycles and tend to settle 
into established patterns, becoming more resistant to change with age.69 Clark and 
Wilson suggest that the natural bent of bureaucracies is toward entropy. They say, 
however, “the most important thing to know about an organisation is that it is an
70organisation and that it seeks to persist.” The original motivations which led to the 
formation of the organization may dissipate as a guiding force, but this does not mean 
that the organization dissolves. It finds other means and purposes for which to sustain 
itself. As the preceding discussion suggests, foreign aid programmes were established 
in western industrialized countries primarily as a means of containing the spread of 
communism in the south, and as an aid to economic recovery in the west. The type of
68 Hughes:23.
69 Dunleavy: 151.
70 Clark and Wilson: 131.
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projects they funded were based on the assumption that a direct transfer of western 
technology on a grand scale would be sufficient to spark economic take-off. Aid 
administrative structures developed to serve these ends. Despite its evident 
weaknesses, and although new objectives for aid have since been identified (meeting 
basic human needs, structural adjustment, et cetera), the basic structure of the aid 
process and the western response to poverty in the south which it embodies has not 
changed significantly in the intervening years. Dunleavy, summarizing Downs says:
Bureaus tend to be inertial, ‘to continue doing today what they did 
yesterday’ (pg 195), as a result of sizeable ‘sunk costs’ consisting of 
past investments in plant and staffing, standard operating procedures, 
and modes of relating to clients, including politicians and the rest of 
society.71
He offers the example of the manner in which budgets are reviewed by 
governing bodies as an explanation of bureaucratic inertia as well as a demonstration 
of the malfunctioning of public policy oversight mechanisms: “Empirical studies of 
budget-making show that most budget scrutiny, negotiations and controversy
72concentrates on marginal changes to a largely unanalyzed ‘base budget.’” The 
material examined below suggests that the day to day operations of the aid programme 
are largely unexamined by the Parliamentary committees charged with oversight.
Their focus is on annual shifts in volume and sectoral allocations. Rarely are the core 
activities of aid programme subject to scrutiny. Even where they are, there are 
powerful forces acting against any meaningful alteration to aid practice, particularly 
the political and economic interests identified above as beneficiaries of aid as it is 
currently constituted.
1.6.2 GOAL DISPLACEMENT
Brett, writing about public institutions in developing countries, argues that the 
orthodox Weberian model of bureaucratic organization for public administration and
71 Dunleavy: 149.
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73service delivery is no longer adequate. He cites bureaucratic rigidity, 
compartmentalism and goal displacement as traits which plague public institutions 
and compromise their effective operation. He questions the Weberian assumption that 
bureaucrats are consistently rational actors. The orthodox bureaucratic model allots 
employees specialized functions to fulfil in pursuit of the organization’s larger 
objectives.
This structure then becomes very good at the tasks for which it is 
originally designed, but gives its officials a vested interest in 
continuing to perform the actions associated with their own 
specialisation, since it is this that guarantees them employment and 
perhaps promotion. Then, by giving them security of tenure, it also 
makes it very difficult to get the structure to change sufficiently to 
perform new or changed tasks.74
Leaving aside for the moment the question of what motivates individual 
bureaucrats, the implication of this compartmentalization of tasks within an agency is 
that bureaucratic institutions lack flexibility and tend to smother innovation. The 
process becomes an end in itself.75 Morrison has highlighted a growing preoccupation 
with following established procedures as a problem in CIDA, arguing that this was the
76agency’s response to external criticism which began in the 1970’s. Hughes quotes 
Robert Merton’s definition of goal displacement within a bureaucracy.
Adherence to rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes 
transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs the familiar process of 
displacement o f goals whereby ‘an instrumental value becomes a 
terminal value. Discipline, readily interpreted as conformance with 
regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed 
for specific purposes, but becomes an immediate value in the life- 
organization of the bureaucratic’...In other words, the rules themselves 
become what organisational effort is directed at achieving, instead of 
fulfilling the organisations’ purpose.77
72 Jackson, 1982:Ch. 5 quoted in Dunleavy: 180.
73 Brett, 1988:4.
74 Brett, 1988:7.
75 Ibid.
76 Morrison, 1998:330.
77Robert Merton, 1968: 260, Quoted in Hughes, 1994:48.
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1.6.3 MALFUNCTION OF OVERSIGHT/CORRECTIVE MECHANISMS IN 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
One insight credited to the analysts of public institutions who came after 
Weber is that bureaucracies are not the politically neutral enclaves in society operating 
solely in pursuit of the public interest he imagined them to be. Government agencies 
are, in fact, riven with the same apathy, ambition, and struggles for power found in the 
rest of human society. Holding these forces in check and allowing for the correction 
of operational failure is the purpose of oversight mechanisms built into Western 
political systems, generally a combination of monitoring and incentives. Many of the 
weaknesses of public institutions identified by researchers can be classed together 
under the heading of the malfunction of these oversight mechanisms. Brett outlines 
the conditions necessary for the efficient functioning of public institutions:
Effective public provision cannot be expected in societies where the 
basic conditions of pluralistic democracy are absent. Bureaucrats will 
inevitably fail without effective political surveillance. And this means 
open access to public information, an expert and autonomous system of 
investigative research and reporting, developed pressure groups able to 
maintain a continuous and expert watch over the activities of their 
counterparts in the state machine, and a competitive political process 
which will get rid of governments which fail to do their job.78
The cases presented below provide a demonstration of the performance of the 
surveillance mechanisms intended to oversee the Canadian aid progamme. The media, 
the NGO lobby, and the business community fulfil the roles of “an expert and 
autonomous system of investigative research and reporting” and “developed pressure 
groups” respectively as identified by Brett. There are also a number of formal 
instruments of oversight. As the following cases will describe in more detail, the 
formulation of aid policy is the official responsibility of CIDA and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The programming of aid resources and the
78 Brett, 1988:10.
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79management of aid projects is done by CIDA. In accordance with Canadian
regulations governing hiring procedures and procurement, CIDA officers oversee the 
contracts of the private firms and organizations hired to conduct feasibility studies, 
and to design, implement and evaluate aid projects.
The responsibility for monitoring the agency’s fulfillment of these obligations 
falls to the federal Parliament, which has jurisdiction over Canadian foreign policy, of 
which aid policy is one aspect. As the events surrounding the aid budget cuts of 1993 
discussed in Chapter Four demonstrate, questions of aid policy are raised infrequently 
on the floor of the House, and then generally in response to current events. More 
regular and detailed consideration is the purview of Parliament’s Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and various ad hoc sub-committees.
Again, the scrutiny to which this body subjects aid policy is limited and generally after 
the fact. Its debate of aid policy is primarily focused on a review of the annual budget 
estimates. The Canadian aid programme has also been the subject of several federal 
commissions and task forces established by Parliament which have made detailed
recommendations to the government, among them decentralization, as discussed in
80Chapter Two. The aid programme is also subject to periodic review by the Auditor-
General of Canada whose findings and recommendations generally are given
81extensive coverage in the press and taken seriously within CIDA. It should be noted 
that CIDA’s activities, uniquely among Canadian public institutions, is also subjected
to international oversight by the DAC, which conducts periodic public reviews of the
82Canadian aid programme.
A mechanism for monitoring and adjusting Canadian aid practice which has 
increased in importance in recent years, primarily as a result of public criticism of
79 A small portion of the aid budget is managed by other government departments (IDRC, Finance, 
Foreign Affairs).
80 As listed in the bibliography.
81 Usually. In October 2000, no government members attended the meeting at which the Auditor- 
General was scheduled to deliver his report. According to the whip’s office, they couldn’t find the 
room.
82 See, for example: OECD, 1998; and OECD, 1994.
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CIDA’s secrecy and the findings of the Auditor-General, is the institution of formal 
consultations with various sectors of Canadian society concerned with development 
and aid -  NGO’s, representatives from industry, labour unions, academia. This 
consultative process is explored in more detail below with respect to the issue of tied 
aid. In addition, for the first time, in 1997 CIDA held consultations in Canada and 
Tanzania with organizations involved in development work in Tanzania in the course 
of preparing its new Country Programme Framework. Prior to 1997, country 
programme reviews and the formulation of programme frameworks were considered 
closed, confidential processes conducted within CIDA without the participation of the
83recipient government or other interested parties.
In examining the implications of the new ‘stakeholder,’ consultative, 
consensus-building approach to defining aid policy in Canada, it is worth bearing in 
mind Brett’s caution that the effective functioning of democratic processes does not 
imply direct public control over the activities of public institutions. He emphasizes 
rather the importance of the relative autonomy of each component of a democratic 
political system (the bureaucracy, the politicians, and civil society) in fulfilling their 
functions as described above.84 “Political accountability must not be allowed to turn 
into political interference. While the overall objectives of the service and its 
adherence to basic norms of efficiency and honesty must be ensured by the political 
process, its technical functioning has to be left to the experts.” He suggests that there 
needs to be a balance between technical autonomy, Ministerial Control and democratic 
rights. “The government must be accountable to the citizenry but not to the
85particularistic interests of particular groups or individuals, however powerful.”
This suggests there is a fine line between effective oversight and detrimental 
interference. As an example, unlike Canadian aid, American ODA is governed by a
83 Telex DAR to CIDA HQ 10 February 1986 re Country Programme Review: Notes that after initial 
requests to participate in the review process, the Government of Tanzania appears to have lost interest. 
“On this issue, [we] prefer to let sleeping governments lie.” Source: CIDA files.
84 Brett, 1988:10.
85 Brett, 1988: 5-6.
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Foreign Assistance Act, which sets out in dollar terms the legal scope of the agency’s 
activities. In 1991, a USAID Management Plan for performance management was
instituted, with the objective, according to an American official, of “keeping score out
86in the open where Congress and the taxpayers can see how well we are doing’ . 
However, Snook’s research on USAID in Tanzania suggests that the stringent 
regulations governing American aid has not enabled the agency to claim any greater
87success with its aid programme than can other donors. The issue of autonomy is 
addressed more directly below.
1.6.4 INCENTIVES
The other component of traditional systems of oversight are incentives, ideally 
designed to foster optimum performance in the pursuit of the organization’s stated 
objectives. As Hirschman observed, the practice of monitoring and evaluation has
little value if disregarding the findings of these exercises has no consequences for
88agents, be they public servants or employees of a private firm. A number of writers 
have offered explanations of what motivates bureaucratic behaviour. Niskanen has 
argued that the activities of public institutions may be explained largely by the desire 
of their employees to maximize their budgets. This he ascribes to personal ambition 
and to the belief that “Completely static budget demands will tend to be decoded as
89signifying the bureau’s stagnation or loss of role.” Nossal has made a similar 
argument with respect to the Canadian aid programme.90 However, this view of the 
force driving public institutions has been questioned by other scholars. Hughes says 
“The question about bureaucrats maximizing budgets to achieve their personal ends 
suffers from a marked lack of evidence.. .As Wilson argued: “One wonders why
86 Quoted in Groupe Secor: 196/1
87 Snook, 1999.
88 Hirschman, 1970.
89 Quoted in Dunleavy: 155.
90 Nossal, 1988.
62
Niskanen thinks bureaucrats are so desirous of maximizing their budgets if they can 
enjoy so few of the fruits.’”91 Dunleavy suggests the concept of ‘bureau-shaping’ as a
92more accurate description of the behaviour of bureaucrats. He argues that rather 
than being motivated solely by the desire to maximize their departments’ budget, 
bureaucrats are motivated primarily to secure a fulfilling, comfortable work 
environment. This includes maximizing the prestige of their office by controlling a 
large budget, but also activities like contracting out the less attractive aspects of the 
bureau’s work, a decision which may suit the bureaucrat’s purposes, but may not be 
the most effective way of achieving the organization’s stated objectives. While it 
seems presumptuous to ascribe such motivations to aid officials, given the wholesale 
privatization of virtually all of CIDA’s aid delivery work over the past decade, this 
idea merits further scrutiny in the context of the Canadian aid programme.
The problem of installing an appropriate incentive system and identifying 
motives in the administration of aid in Canada is complicated by the multiplicity of 
agents involved in the aid process. The Strategic Management Review of 1991 
determined on the basis of interviews conducted with CIDA officials that in general
93agency staff were committed to its anti-poverty objectives. Based on this finding, 
CIDA might be defined as a ‘purposive’ organization under Clark and Wilson’s 
typology.94 However, as the discussion of the negotiations surrounding Canada’s tied 
aid policy and decentralization in Chapters Two and Three indicate, the Canadian 
executing agencies hired to implement aid projects have strong incentives to
95maximize the size and the number of the aid contracts they win, first and foremost. 
Under Clark and Wilson’s typology, the tier of the aid bureaucracy they occupy might 
better be described as ‘utilitarian’ in character. Clark and Wilson say “The significant 
point here is that in utilitarian organizations, stated purposes are not important
91 Wilson, 1989,pg: 118 quoted in Hughes:55.
92 Dunleavy, 1991.
93 Groupe Secor, 1991.
94 Clark and Wilson, 1961.
95 See Putzel,1998 on European Union aid.
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incentives and have relatively little impact upon incentives.”96 The diverse motives of 
various actors and the differentiated and possibly perverse incentive structure within 
the aid administration process must be examined.
The evidence presented below suggests that the traditional model of 
bureaucracy, based on the assumption of rational, disinterested agents, is in reality 
undermined by the irrational allocation of responsibilities. As Brett observes, one 
should “never over-estimate the extent to which even the best intentioned official can
97behave ‘rationally’ in an irrational context.” Similarly, Niskanen suggests that 
whatever the motivations of individual officers, the scope for personal discretion in 
bureaucracies is limited.
It is impossible for a single bureaucrat to act in ‘the public interest,’ 
because of the limits on his information and the conflicting interests of 
others, regardless of his personal motivation. This leads even the most 
selfless bureaucrats to choose some feasible, lower-level goal, and this 
usually leads to developing expertise in some narrow field...A 
bureaucrat who may not be personally motivated to maximize the 
budget of his bureau is usually driven by internal and external
98conditions to do just that.
Hughes quotes the description of the individual public servant made by Gerth 
and Mills:
In the great majority of cases he is only a single cog in an ever-moving 
mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of 
march. The official is entrusted with specialized tastes and normally 
the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only
99from the very top.
Focusing on incentives rather than personal motivation to explain bureaucratic 
behaviour, Paul argues that “compensation of public servants typically does not
96 Clark and Wilson: 140.
97 Brett, 1988:9.
98Niskanen, 1973:23 in Hughes:53.
"G erth  and Mills, 1970:228 quoted in Hughes:45.
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depend on their efficiency or responsiveness to the public”100. As Brett has observed, 
there is no reward within development agencies for successful projects and no 
sanction for failure.101 Several commentators on the Canadian aid programme and on 
aid in general have cited the pressure on aid officials to disburse funds as quickly as 
possible as a contributing factor in the implementation of inappropriate aid projects.102 
This pressure has intensified within CIDA since regulations requiring unspent aid 
funds to be returned to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year was instituted in 1977. 
According to the Strategic Management Review of 1991, each permanent employee
1 A O
of CIDA was at that time required to disburse on average SI .8 million U.S. a year.
As described in detail in Chapter Six, the HPDF project was ten years in planning and 
involved extensive consultations between CIDA, intended beneficiaries and other 
interested parties during its formulation and implementation. Due to the controversial 
and highly public nature of CIDA’s involvement in this project, officials took great 
care to lay the groundwork, commissioning numerous reports, conducting intensive 
consultations, information and training sessions for the intended beneficiaries of the 
project. For this reason, three years after the implementation of the project, only 
around $10,000 had been disbursed, an expensive, highly labour-intensive method of 
transferring aid funds, the effectiveness of which can not be guaranteed, and which 
could not be sustained on a significant scale under the demands imposed by the 
current aid infrastructure designed to disburse $2 billion a year. The memoranda cited 
in Chapter Six illustrate the constant and conflicting pressures on aid officials to 
choose between immediate action and adequate analysis of a situation.
1.6.5 ACCOUNTABILITY
For oversight mechanisms of monitoring and incentives to work effectively, 
public agencies and individual agents must be accountable for their actions, i.e. there 
must be consequences for poor performance. This imperative raises two questions
100Paul:3.
101 Brett, 2000.
102 Pratt, 1994; Therien,1994; Morrison,1998:26.
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with respect to aid. Firstly, to whom are aid agencies accountable? Secondly, how is 
performance to be measured? Both of these issues are complicated by the unique 
characteristics of the aid programme which distinguish it from other public services. 
First of all, as alluded to above, the multiplicity of agents responsible for 
implementing Canadian aid policy makes defining lines of responsibility more 
difficult. Secondly, who is to be designated as the ‘principal’ in the aid relationship? 
The Canadian taxpayer, CIDA, the recipient government, or the identified 
beneficiaries of the project? Paul highlights the pitfalls of this confusion, describing 
the weaknesses of a hierarchical control system of monitoring and incentives.
This approach is valid, however, only when the problem of principal- 
agent relations within public agencies can be readily solved. When 
multiple principals with conflicting objectives exist (political actors, 
the public, and bureaucratic supervisors in the case), and opportunism 
and market imperfections prevail (information asymmetries; monopoly 
conditions), the scope for collusion increases, and the agency problem 
remains unsolved...Under these conditions, it cannot be assumed that 
an accountability system based on HC [hierarchical control] will serve 
the interests of the relevant stakeholders.104
As the discussion of competing influences on Canadian aid policy outlined in 
the next section will show, many interests claim a stake in the Canadian aid 
programme. In the government documents cited in this study, the ‘principal’ to whom 
aid officials believe they are accountable in the formulation and implementation of aid 
policy and projects is not only, or even primarily in some circumstances, the intended 
beneficiaries of Canadian ODA in Tanzania and elsewhere. The principal is also 
variously identified as the Canadian taxpayer, Parliament, the media, the NGO lobby, 
and commercial firms which may wish to bid on aid contracts. The problem arises, of 
course, when the interests of people in a poor community in Tanzania, for example, do 
not coincide with those of these other ‘stakeholders.’
103 Groupe Secor: 198/1.
104 Paul: 11.
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In their study of Swedish, American and Chinese aid to Tanzania, Hyden and 
Mukandala note the unique position bilateral aid agencies occupy in the government 
structure of donor countries: They serve an overseas constituency with no recourse to 
complain of the service provided to them; their work carries moral authority (helping 
the poor) which legitimizes their existence; and finally, as public agencies, they are 
insulated from market tests of efficiency. The result, these authors argue, is that 
“Donor agencies have typically been able to survive criticism of their performance 
which would have had more devastating effects on sister agencies in the government 
working exclusively in the domestic arena.”105 This raises the issue of how 
‘accountability’ and performance are to be measured. Hughes quotes Osborne and 
Gaebler’s argument that traditional oversight mechanisms are seriously flawed in this 
respect: “Traditional bureaucracy has an input-dominated structure, with output being 
only incidental. In attempting to control virtually everything, we become ‘so obsessed 
with dictating how things should be done -  regulating the process, controlling the 
inputs -  that we ignored the outcomes, the results.”106 The Strategic Management 
Review of 1991 concluded that this was a problem from which CIDA suffered and 
that the agency was over-regulated to the detriment of the fulfillment of its mandate.
The prudence and probity incentive thus rewards good process, because 
if prudent financial procedures are followed, the agency has a 
defensible public position in the case of misuse of funds, 
incompetences, etc. and also rewards the hiring and use of consultants 
which in turn has the perverse effect of increasing costs and the 
likelihood of error. This incentive has shifted CIDA’s operational 
skills away from development toward process, as the agency has 
slipped into greater reliance on consultants, contractors and volunteer 
organizations to design programs and projects, draft terms of reference, 
and execute, monitor and evaluate development programs and projects. 
Consequently, CIDA’s cost of delivery has been consistently
,u  107increasing over the years.
105 Hyden and Mukandala:20.
106 Osborne and Gaebler,1992:14 quoted in Hughes:49
107 Groupe Secor: 83/2.
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In a discussion of accountability, this statement raises three issues. Firstly, the 
consequences of the privatization of aid delivery for the quality of Canadian 
assistance; and secondly, its impact of the flow of information from the field on 
CIDA’s fund of development expertise. Both these issues are addressed below. 
Thirdly, the finding of the Strategic Management Review that the regulations under 
which CIDA operates have resulted in an increase in aid delivery costs is interesting 
not only for the financial implications of privatization it highlights, but in its 
identification of the costs of delivering aid as a measurement of aid effectiveness.
This may be a legitimate claim. However, aid delivery costs are a ‘supply-side’
108measurement of accountability, as is equating aid efficiency with the volume of 
disbursements made. In the absence of any measurement of impact at the output end 
of the aid process, ‘accountability’ in this case cannot be said to equal or even 
promote effective aid. The problems associated with this approach have registered 
with CIDA, as is evidenced in the agency’s recent adoption of Results Based 
Management. However, that this means of measuring accountability has its own 
shortcomings is likewise apparent. One official cited the example of measuring 
output for a training programme in terms of the number of participants completing the 
course without reference to the quality or relevance of instruction, or the use to which 
the knowledge gained was put following the course, as evidence of weaknesses in this 
instrument of measurement.109 On the basis of his study of Swedish bilateral aid to 
Tanzania, Elgstrom concludes that:
SIDA has not only delegated, but almost abrogated, its responsibility 
for administering the aid programme once the money reaches Tanzania.
In short, it has not considered the feedback as particularly significant.
It has been more important for SIDA to prove that the money has been 
pumped into Tanzania than to incorporate the lessons from how the aid 
funds were used.110
108 Paul: 10.
109 Interview.
110 Elgstrom, 1999: 150.
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It is argued here that Canadian ODA suffers from a similar problem. Although 
monitoring and evaluation are now required elements of CIDA funded projects, as the 
history of the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project makes plain, there is no guarantee that 
the information and recommendations generated by these exercises will be applied for 
the improvement of aid practice. In addition, the fact that CIDA never conducts 
evaluations of its projects after Canadian funding has come to an end means that the 
sustainability of a development effort is not even examined. Therefore, executing 
agents can not be held to account for the immediate collapse of a project following 
their withdrawal; not an uncommon occurrence, and one in which the failure of the 
CEA to live up to the terms of its contract is often a major contributing factor.111 
Further, any lessons for designing sustainable projects are lost.
1.6.6 THE GENERATION, CIRCULATION AND USE OF INFORMATION
To fulfill their function as instruments of correction, programme and project
evaluations must be accessible to officials and to the wider public. The effective
functioning of oversight mechanisms is blunted by an unreliable flow of information.
Brett argues that public access to information is not just a matter of adhering to an
abstract concept of freedom in a democratic polity, but is necessary to the functioning
of the process. Those interests which wish to maintain the status quo “will be able to
112exploit public apathy and bureaucratic secrecy to do so.”
The executing agencies hired by CIDA to implement aid projects are required 
to submit quarterly progress reports and project evaluations are done to monitor 
success and reduce the possibility of repeating the same mistakes in the future. 
However, this field knowledge has not been readily accessible to CIDA staff in the 
past. Mundy notes a study done by Andrew Clark and Ian Smillie of the 
implementation of CIDA’s 1987 policy statement Sharing Our Future. They found
111 Auditor-General of Canada, October 2000; and review of Project Termination Reports for CIDA 
funded projects in Tanzania.
112Brett,1988:8.
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that CIDA’s corporate memory database was “almost totally untrustworthy in
I i o
recording any kind of detail, and was mostly inaccurate on the big picture as well.”
The Auditor-General’s Report of 1993 concluded that the agency paid “more 
attention to process than substance of development.”114 The Auditor-General said that 
CIDA staff had too few opportunities to develop ‘core competence’ in social and 
economic development. “Hands-off management has become the order of the day 
without adequate recognition of either the consequent limitations on learning or 
increase in operation costs.”115 The report noted a lack of a Teaming culture’ and a 
reticence within the agency to disclose information about failed projects for open 
discussion, “lessons learned are not incorporated in a systematic and timely way into 
operations. Internal audits, project termination reports and end-of-project evaluations 
are used very unevenly to guide future activities or to highlight what works to achieve 
results and what does not.”116 The 1995 Auditor-GeneraFs Report contained CIDA’s 
strategy for addressing these criticisms, including making information on CIDA’s past 
experience more accessible both to CIDA staff and to the public. In 1999, CIDA was 
in the process of installing a new internal data management system, and in 2000 it 
launched a Knowledge Management initiative to facilitate the flow of expert 
knowledge to project managers and other decision-makers.
#
It is also worth noting here CIDA’s historical relationship with the 
International Development Research Centre, a potential source of knowledge about 
development for CIDA. The IDRC was established in 1970 to fund research in areas 
relevant to international development. Its mandate and relationship to CIDA were 
defined in the following terms: “In broad terms it is agreed that IDRC should finance 
first-stage research while CIDA might follow with large amounts later to assure 
development of new systems or techniques which have a proven chance of wide
113 Mundy, 1994:164.
114 Auditor-General of Canada, 1993:314-316.
1,5 Ibid.
116 Ibid:327.
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117success.” CIDA and the IDRC are represented on one another’s project review
committees, but CIDA programme and project files indicate that there is little use
made in the Tanzania programme of IDRC research. The 1978 Country Programme
review listed IDRC projects at the time but said “While the above are not closely tied
to the bilateral programme, they do address fundamental aspects of basic human
118needs, and are valid contributions to development.” The Winegard parliamentary 
committee which visited Tanzania, Senegal and Ethiopia in 1987, recommended in its 
report that CIDA make better use of IDRC research. “Too much research produces a 
impressive list of publications and little else. Too much development rests on poorly 
researched foundations.”119 A decade later, a comparative review of IDRC and CIDA 
projects in Tanzania shows little evidence that coordination of the activities of these 
agencies has increased.
1.6.7 RELATIVE AUTONOMY
Hyden and Mukandala argue that the ability to control the generation,
circulation, or withholding of information is one of three variables which determine
the degree of autonomy an aid agency is able to exercise in pursuing its objectives.
According to their argument, control over two other types of resources matter:
economic, and political. They note that aid agencies do not raise funds themselves,
and are therefore dependent on the national Treasury to release funds for their
activities. They suggest that an agency’s power therefore derives from its ability to
maintain political support within the government and among the general public. They
argue that support for foreign aid has for a long time rested on two things: a perceived
moral obligation to help the poor, and the commercial and political advantages to be
won by giving aid. In their view, control over expert knowledge serves as an
120important countervailing force against political and economic influences. From this 
perspective, agency autonomy is an important determinant of agency ‘responsiveness,’
117 CIDA,Tanzania Country Programme Review (CPR), 1976.
118 CIDA, CPR 1979/80,1978:8
1,9 SCEAIT1987; c.f. Morrison, 1998:281.
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191 Mor its adaptability and capacity to innovate, and is therefore desireable. This raises 
the question of the optimal level of autonomy for an aid agency in fulfilling its 
mandate, and how this is to be safeguarded.
Canadian development assistance is not governed by an act of Parliament and 
CIDA does not have a legislated mandate. CIDA was established by an Order in 
Council in 1968 (no. 1968-1760) with its intended purpose set out in a memorandum 
to Cabinet. Aid policy objectives have been laid out in the four comprehensive policy 
statements produced by the government in 1970,1975,1987 and 1995. CIDA’s 
current priorities are stated annually in Part III of the Main Estimates which detail 
government spending. Critics have argued that this legal framework does not offer 
sufficient protection to the development objectives of the assistance programme.
Long term priorities agreed upon between CIDA and recipient governments can be 
affected by the redefinition of Canadian government priorities in the annual 
Estimates.122
Enshrinement of CIDA’s objectives and mandate in legislation has been 
recommended by parliamentary committee in the past, but has been consistently
123rejected by the government and by CIDA. Governments have been loathe to 
formally commit themselves to specific policies. For example, Berry describes the 
intense negotiations over the inclusion of precise figures in the 1975 Strategy (like the 
0.7% GNP target) which would, it was feared in some quarters, bind the government 
to financial commitments it might not want or be able to sustain in the future.124 
According to Morrison’s research, CIDA decision-makers have likewise sought to 
keep statements of CIDA’s purpose deliberately vague to avoid attempts by other 
departments to circumscribe the agency’s autonomy. Former CIDA president Maurice 
Strong told him that “Although it’s true that we couldn’t state absolutely that our
120 Hyden and Mukandala: 19.
121 Elgstrom, 1999: 150.
122 Mareen McNeil, Director of the North-South Institute in testimony to the Special Joint Committee 
on Foreign Policy, 1994 (4:37).
123 SCEAIT,1987; Government of Canada, 1987
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mandate gave us the right to do x or y, nor could anyone else say that our mandate did
• 125not give us that right .” The cases presented in Chapters Two through Six suggest
that CIDA’s ambiguous position within the Canadian government structure and the 
lack of a legally binding obligation to place the interests of the intended beneficiaries 
of aid above all others has made the aid programme extremely vulnerable to domestic 
political pressures and the pursuit of conflicting objectives in the allocation of ODA. 
The aid programme’s autonomy and responsiveness has been further reduced by the 
decline in development expertise within the agency as described by the Auditor- 
General above. The last section of this chapter reviews these conflicting objectives as 
they have been identified by scholars examining the determinants of Canadian aid 
policy.
1.7 THE DETERMINANTS OF CANADIAN AID POLICY
Discussion of foreign aid in Canadian academic circles has centered on the 
motives which shape policy. This examination has been conducted mainly within the 
discipline of political science, analyzing competing interests within Canada. The 
debate has generally focussed on domestic determinants to the exclusion of external 
influences on aid policy. The debate over aid policy formation in Canada is 
comprised of five competing interpretations. The concept o f ‘humane 
internationalism' holds that the roots of development assistance lie in the recognition 
of a moral imperative to help other people. The ‘dominant class’ perspective stresses 
the primacy of economic and commercial self-interest in aid policy. Writers who 
might be said to be coming from a ‘pluralist’ perspective agree that both altruism and 
economics play a role in defining policy, but argue that other interest groups and 
issues contribute to the process as well. The ‘statist ’ explanation suggests that 
interdepartmental politics and the self-aggrandizement of the state are the main 
motivation and objective of aid. Finally, some writers have suggested that Canadian 
aid is influenced by a growing consensus among international donors on aid doctrine,
124 Berry, 1981.
125 In Morrison, 1998:63.
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and use the concept of an ‘aid regime ’ to explain this.
1.7.1 THE INFLUENCE OF THE COLD WAR ON CANADIAN AID POLICY
References in the literature to the Cold War as a determinant of Canadian aid 
policy are few. None of the interpretations discussed here challenge the idea that 
foreign aid had its origins in the Cold War. Policy documents related to the Colombo 
Plan which marked Canada’s first foreign aid commitment, state plainly that 
containment of the communist threat was the major objective of the plan. However, 
regardless of its initial mobilizing effect, the Cold War has long since ceased to be a
significant factor in Canadian policy making. As previously noted, China is currently
126the top recipient of Canadian aid. Cuba was first offered Canadian assistance in
1271973 and in 1994 CIDA reopened its programme there. CIDA is also active in a 
number of other ostensibly socialist countries. The Cold War, which has been very 
important in the formation of aid programmes in other donor countries, most notably 
the U.S., is pretty much a non-issue in Canada. An important qualification to this 
statement is the possibility that aid’s political origins in the Cold War did set a 
precedent for the use of aid as a political tool.
1.7.2 HUMANE INTERNATIONALISM
The most widely offered explanation of Canadian aid policy is that it is driven 
by the philosophy of ‘humane internationalism’. This is the public face of ODA, 
recited in policy documents and official statements. The concept is defined as “an 
acceptance by the citizens of the industrialized states that they have ethical obligations 
towards those beyond their borders and that these in turn impose obligations upon
CIDA, Statistical Report on ODA, 1996:6
127 Canadian aid to Cuba was cancelled in 1978 after parliamentary and media criticism of Castro’s 
military aid to Angola and Ethiopia (Morrison, 1998:124). One might cynically suggest that the 
reinstitution of aid to Cuba nearly a decade after the end of the Cold War coincides rather neatly with 
increased Canadian private investment there, as does the rise in aid to China.
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128their governments.” This theory links Canada’s foreign policy to that of other 
‘like-minded’ middle powers, namely the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. 
It explains their approach to aid as an extension of their domestic social welfare
129policies. Therien and Noel, for example, claim a close correlation between 
domestic social welfare spending and foreign aid spending, suggesting that they rise
130and fall in tandem. States that are concerned with the welfare of the poor at home 
likewise demonstrate concern for the poor abroad. Thus it is argued that Canada’s 
social programmes like universal free health care, government pensions and 
unemployment insurance influence the size and shape of its development assistance 
programme.
If one squints at the charts provided by Therien and Noel plotting domestic 
and foreign expenditures, it is possible to discern a loose correlation. However, it is 
clear that Canada is not nearly as generous as the Nordic countries at home or abroad. 
Its status as a ‘like-minded’ country adhering to the ideal of humane internationalism 
is ambiguous. Likewise, its status as the world’s seventh largest economy and only 
non-colonial power within the original G-7 means its position there is peripheral. 
Canadian participation in WWI and WWII accorded the state space on the 
international stage. As a non-nuclear power it has sought to carve a niche on the 
international scene by attempting to stake out the moral high ground, projecting an 
image of humanitarianism as a mediator of regional conflicts, through numerous U.N. 
peace keeping missions, and through its aid programme.
Canadian statespersons have periodically assumed visible leadership roles
131defending the interests of developing countries. However, these gestures, measured
128 Pratt, 1989:13
129 Stokke:l 1.
130 Therien and Noel:549
131 Former Prime Minister Lester Pearson chaired the Commission on International Development 
Cooperation whose 1969 report Partners in Development advocating a greater commitment on the part 
o f western countries to ending poverty in the developing countries. In 1980 Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau launched a parliamentary task force on North - South relations and an international campaign 
to convince other western leaders to take seriously the Brandt reports, but failed. As Canadian 
ambassador to the U.N. Stephen Lewis chaired the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole for the Special
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against Canadian aid and trade policies, indicate more style than substance. Over 
forty years of development assistance, Canada has maintained its position in the 
middle of the pack of DAC donors, currently devoting 0.28% of its GNP to ODA, 
much less than the U.N. target of 0.7% which it has repeatedly officially endorsed.132 
In 1994, the DAC estimated the proportion of Canadian aid devoted to poverty 
alleviation to be 0.023% of GNP, placing it near the bottom of DAC members in
133terms of the level of spending on human development. Successive governments
have chosen to reduce their financial commitment to ODA in line with other donors 
rather than maintaining a course which would have placed Canada among the more 
generous of donors. On the basis of this evidence, it must be concluded that while the 
existence of an altruistic impulse cannot be discounted altogether, it is minor and 
incidental in terms of policy formation, not causal.
1.7.3 THE DOMINANT CLASS EXPLANATION
A second explanation of Canadian aid policy that has been put forward 
emphasizes the importance of Canadian economic and commercial interests. It is 
argued that the primary objective of development assistance is to build markets for 
Canadian goods, facilitate profitable private investments abroad, and through a large 
food aid programme, subsidize Canadian grain producers. In his ‘dominant class’ 
theory, Pratt argues that the big business lobby in Canada enjoys an ease of access to 
and influence upon federal policy makers which other interest groups do not.134 These 
channels of communication are both informal and formal, including among others the 
Canadian Export Association, which has a Development Aid Committee to formulate 
policy positions; the Canadian Manufacturers Association (these two organizations
Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa in the General Assembly in 1986 which resulted in 
the adoption of the U.N. Programme for Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 
(UNPAAERD). Lewis was subsequently appointed special advisor on Africa to the Secretary-General 
(Burdette:230; Black et al:266).
132 CIDA, Statistical Report on ODA, 1999.
133 Therien notes the extreme difficulty in obtaining an accurate measure of aid targeting on the poor 
and meeting human needs. Therefore, these figures must be taken as an approximation and viewed with 
some skepticism (Therien, 1994:327).
134 Pratt, 1989; 1996.
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have now joined together to form the Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters 
Canada); the Canadian Chamber of Commerce; the Bank of Canada; the Canadian 
Wheat Board as well as the large group of private commercial companies through 
which CIDA subcontracts much of its work. It is argued that through these channels 
the capitalist class puts pressure on the government to direct aid policy to their benefit. 
The fact that Canadian aid has historically been heavily tied to the purchase of
135Canadian goods and services is cited as evidence that economic concerns outweigh 
humanitarian motives. Critics also note that CIDA directs the bulk of its ODA to 
middle income countries where, it is suggested, the investment climate and market for
136imports is more hospitable than in the LDC’s. CIDA’s own documents boast that 
“The jobs of more than 36, 000 Canadians are sustained by our aid program. Fifty 
Canadian universities and sixty colleges benefit from aid related contracts. The 2000 
Canadian businesses receiving aid-related contracts are making connections with
137some of the world’s fastest growing markets.”
Between 1969 and 1975 CIDA’s budget increased by 21.67% per annum.138 
Pratt sees evidence of an early interest within the agency in pursuing developmental 
objectives, but claims this soon collapsed under pressure from Canadian business 
interests. The first official aid policy statement was made by the Trudeau government 
in a 1970 white paper Foreign Policy for Canadians. It acknowledged an opportunity 
for commercial gain but also stated that “all allocations and commitments of 
development assistance funds should be measured against criteria relating to the
• • 139improvement of economic and social conditions of recipient countries.” Pratt says
1975 marked the apogee of the official commitment to developmental objectives 
within CIDA. In that year the agency submitted a major policy paper for cabinet 
approval entitled Strategy for International Development 1975-80. This first 
comprehensive exposition of ODA policy emphasized poverty alleviation and basic
135 Therien, 1994:322; Freeman, 1982; Gillies, 1986; Hendra.
136 Pratt, 1989:40-41.
137 CIDAa, 1996:2.
138 Pratt, 1989:39.
,39quoted in Pratt, 1989:38
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needs. It stated that Canadian assistance was to be concentrated on the LDC’s, 
reaffirmed the 0.7% target, pledged to untie aid and to harmonize aid, trade and 
international monetary policies. It also made a commitment to channel twenty-five 
per cent of ODA through multilateral institutions.
The policy paper was accepted by Cabinet only after a major struggle 
involving the Departments of Finance, Agriculture, and Industry, Trade and 
Commerce which Pratt says represented the interests of big business. It was also 
opposed by the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Exporters 
Association. Even though it was accepted as official Canadian policy, Pratt says 
“CIDA was seen to have overplayed its hand and was quickly thereafter brought to 
heel.”140 A new agency president was appointed, and in 1976 a new interdepartmental 
committee, the Canadian Development Assistance Board assumed responsibility for 
making policy. The 1975 strategy had little effect on aid practice. Aid remained 
highly tied, directed to middle income countries and, Pratt argues, commercially 
oriented. Only the commitment to direct at least twenty-five per cent of ODA to 
multilateral agencies was ever met, albeit long after 1980. Pratt and other writers 
have argued that this was not an isolated incident, but indicative of the influence of 
powerful economic interests on aid policy throughout the existence of the aid 
programme.
Freeman notes the body of literature which identifies Canadian economic 
interests as the primary determinant of Canadian aid policy to the detriment of aid’s 
supposedly philanthropic objectives, and which cites the countervailing power of the 
Canadian international development lobby as the reason why a large proportion of aid 
is given to very poor countries where there are few commercial opportunities to be 
found. Freeman argues that the exercise of influence over policy is more subtle than 
this model suggests and she evokes Nicos Polantzas’ concept of the ‘relative 
autonomy’ of the capitalist state to explain some of the deviations from an absolute 
responsiveness to Canadian commercial interests in the Canadian aid programme,
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such as would explain the large quantity of Canadian aid Tanzania has received since 
independence. This theory conceptualizes the state not as the captive agent of the 
dominant class, but as “an organizer of an unstable equilibrium of compromises” 
which may make some short term compromises which do not favour dominant class 
interests in order to preserve the status quo in the long run.141
A second tenet of this theory, which is in accordance with the ‘dominant class’ 
interpretation of Canadian aid policy articulated by Pratt, is that “there is an unequal 
representation of class forces inside the state apparatus; this has led to the dominance 
of certain branches and agencies of the state over others.”142 In applying this theory to 
the Canadian state, Freeman claims parenthetically that in Canada the dominant class 
is largely American. However, within the government, she locates the seat of power 
of the domestic dominant class in the Department of Finance, with Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (as it is now constituted) members of the inner circle, from 
which, it will be noted, CIDA is excluded. She argues that the parameters of the 
Canadian aid programme are set by Canadian economic and political interests as 
determined by the powerful government departments which represent the dominant 
class. These political interests she defines as an historical anti-communism, and a 
continuing desire for international prestige and influence. In the economic realm, she 
argues that the aid programme has served as a vehicle for capital accumulation within 
Canada and cites as evidence the fortunes of International Harvester, the company 
which supplied much of the heavy machinery for the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project, 
and for which aid related exports accounted for an increasing percentage of their sales 
throughout the 1970’s. She argues that Canada’s desire for political influence abroad 
explains the large proportion of aid directed to LDCs and the fact that it is highly 
concessional. Canadian commercial interests have ensured it remains heavily tied to 
available Canadian goods and services, and this she claims, explains both Canada’s 
willingness to fund an agricultural development project in Tanzania and the form it
Ibid:40; See also Berry, 1981
141 Freeman, 1982:481.142 TU;,
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took.
1.7.4 THE PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE
Pluralists such as Lavergne argue that the marxist or dominant class 
interpretations of aid outlined above accord too much authority to business interests in 
the policy making process.143 They suggest that there are several interest groups and 
issues which together shape policy directions. Big business is certainly one of them, 
but its influence is mediated by other pressures. For example, public opinion polls 
have consistently indicated that the majority of Canadians support the maintenance or 
increase in aid spending and that the purpose of aid should be to help the poor.144 
Pluralists argue that parliamentarians accord some weight to the views of the 
electorate when plotting policy.
There are also over five hundred international development NGOs in 
Canada.145. Two national umbrella organizations, the Canadian Council for 
International Cooperation and the Association Quebecoise des Organismes de 
Cooperation Internationale, monitor aid policy and lobby the government on 
development issues. NGOs present briefs to the parliamentary committees which 
review aid policy. There are also the formal annual consultations between CIDA and 
its NGO partners. The potential influence of the NGO lobby is enhanced by the fact 
that many large organizations are concentrated in Ottawa. It has been suggested by 
some members of the NGO community that this relationship between the state and the 
voluntary sector is too cosy. As a group, development NGOs receive an average of 
seventy-five per cent of their funding from the state.146 CIDA’s trend towards 
subcontracting its projects to private groups suggests that CIDA might influence NGO
Lavergne, 1989
144 In 1995, for the first time since 1978, more Canadians thought the government was spending too 
much on foreign aid (45% of respondents) than thought aid was not enough or just right (42%) (German 
and Randal, 1995:42).
145 Brodhead et a l,l988.
146 Ibid.
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policy as much as the other way around.147
Political issues are also cited as determinants of aid policy. For example, 
Canadian ODA is widely dispersed over one hundred and thirty countries despite 
repeated recommendations from within CIDA that aid concentrated in a smaller 
geographical area would be more effective. This dispersal is not expected to provide 
Canada with leverage in all or any of these countries as in none but Guyana is it the 
major donor.148 The explanation lies in historical cultural ties.149 Initially, Canadian 
aid was given to Commonwealth countries. During the 1960's Quebec nationalism 
gathered momentum, reaching a crisis with the 1978 referendum on separation. 
Pressure was placed on the federal government to recognize Canada’s cultural 
connection to other francophone countries by extending its aid programme. The 
unsettled ‘national unity’ issue continues to affect foreign aid policy ensuring the 
continued wide dispersal of resources. This issue is addressed more fully in Chapter 
Four.
In the realm of domestic economic policy, government commitments to reduce 
the federal deficit have resulted in cuts to CIDA’s budget of over thirty per cent since 
1 9 9 1  150 This has forced the agency to make difficult programming choices somewhat 
arbitrarily. This necessity precipitated the cancellation of the East Africa programme 
in 1993. In contrast to the dominant class perspective, which gives primacy to 
business interests, the pluralist or ‘mixed motives’ explanation holds that no one 
factor dominates aid policy.151 Its course is fixed by the issues of the day and by 
changing coalitions of interest groups with the state acting as the mediator of 
competing interests.
1.7.5 THE STATIST INTERPRETATION
14' Smillie,1994; Brodhead et a], 1987.
148 CIDAa, 1996.
149 Morrison, 1994:155.
150 German and Randal, 1995:39.
151 Nossal,1988.
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Nossal rejects all three perspectives outlined above. He says that those who 
argue the moral imperative cannot explain the miserly commitment Canada has made 
to ODA, and dismisses this argument as mere rhetoric. Likewise, he dismisses 
economic and trade motives on the basis that the sums involved are inconsequential. 
Strategic and political interests are similarly rejected. Canada has been called “a 
regional power without a region”, and as noted above, Canadian aid is too widely 
dispersed to give Canada any leverage in recipient government policy in the area of 
human rights, trade orientation or any other sphere. Nossal says the withdrawal of 
Canadian aid has occasionally been used in attempts to compel, punish or deter, but 
not in any systematic way or with much impact.
Nossal argues that “the primary and most concrete beneficiary of development 
assistance is the Canadian state itself; other recipients of the benefits of ODA
152allocations, in Canada or abroad, are of distinctly secondary importance.” Here ‘the 
state’ is defined not as the government of the day, or by the dominant interests in 
society, but as the bureaucracy itself. Nossal sees it as an institution with considerable 
autonomy from other societal interests and with its own agenda to pursue. Its 
objectives are threefold.
Firstly, the state is motivated by the prestige that an international presence 
gamers for it. The crucial motivating force is the fact that prestige and authority 
accrue to individuals working in field offices and high commissions overseas and in 
Ottawa. Negative responses to official policy (i.e. to programme cuts) fall to them as 
well. For this reason, bureaucrats have an interest in supporting the aid programme, 
regardless of its content. Nossal recognizes the limitations of this explanation.
Pursuit of prestige can possibly account for the existence of an aid programme, but not 
for the programming choices which are made. To account for this, he again points the 
finger at individual self-interest among civil servants. He suggests that a capital 
intensive, project-oriented, tied aid programme requires a large staff to run it. It is
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possible that other types of development assistance strategies would require fewer
1Canadian officials and experts and are therefore “persistently avoided.” He asks a
question central to the concerns of this paper:
Does a large bureaucratic structure exist because a succession of 
cabinets - for other reasons - decided to pursue a project-oriented, tied 
aid strategy of development widely dispersed over the globe, or are 
alternatives to the present package of development assistance avoided 
because they would threaten the existence of the bureaucracy?154
Nossal concludes that “a clear answer to this question cannot be offered” but 
this issue will be taken up in the research presented below.
Pratt’s example of the struggle over aid policy in the 1970's highlights the turf 
wars which flare up between government departments. Depending on the political 
stripe of the government of the day and the continuous adjustment of lines of 
jurisdiction between and within departments, these can affect policy formation. CIDA 
officials find themselves under pressure to disburse their full budget allocation each 
year in order to preserve the agency’s claim on government resources and they make 
programming decisions under this constraint. CIDA constitutes a lobby within the 
government bureaucracy as a whole in support of increased aid for this reason (rather 
than, Nossal would suggest, to meet any developmental objective). However, the 
necessity of limiting expenditure imposed by the economic recession (and now, 
presumably, by the government’s deficit cutting agenda) acts as a check on 
bureaucratic expansion and prestige aggrandizement. The persistence of tied aid is 
thus explained as a means to get more bang for the buck. Nossal claims that the 
central objective of Canadian ODA can be reduced to “achiev[ing] for the Canadian 
state the appearance of philanthropy both at home and abroad while at the same time 
avoiding as far as possible real expenditures”.155
152 Ibid:45.
153 Ibid:53.
154 Ibid.
155 Nossal:54.
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This is too cynical a view of aid even for Pratt, who says Nossal attributes 
more selfish motives to aid officials than they truly possess.156 In Pratt’s view, 
bureaucrats are pawns in a larger power game. It is difficult to ascertain personal 
motives, yet whether bureaucratic inertia is attributed to resistance on the part of 
individuals or to path dependence within the institution, the role of institutional 
rigidity in shaping Canadian aid policy requires closer consideration than it has 
received in the literature thus far. Nossal*s contribution to the debate opens up 
promising avenues for further investigation. In and of itself, however, it does not 
constitute a satisfying explanation of aid policy. His dismissal of all other motivations 
on the grounds that ODA is too small to meet any of their alleged objectives is too 
facile. It might just as easily be argued that Canada’s lukewarm response to poverty in 
other countries can be explained as the function of a dispassionate state in mediating 
competing societal interests, compromising all of them in the process.
1.7.6 THE INTERNATIONAL AID REGIME AND CANADIAN POLICY
All of the explanations outlined above focus on the domestic determinants of 
aid policy to the exclusion of broader international influences. Black* Therien and
157Clark suggest that an international aid regime has an effect on Canadian aid policy.
As proof of systemic influences on donor policy, they note that all northern countries 
created comparably structured aid bureaucracies in the 1960's. The volume of aid 
flows from each country have since risen and fallen with relative symmetry. These 
authors note shared preoccupations among donors: infrastructure projects in the
1581960's, basic human needs in the 1970's, structural adjustment in the 1990's. To 
this list might be added a generalized preference for particular modes of intervention: 
technical assistance, project aid, and programme aid with attached conditionalities. 
Among them, donors have delineated a common field of intervention in the Third
136 Pratt, 1996.
157 Black, Therien and Clark: 1996.
158 Ibid:260-61.
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World, and official aid agencies, including CIDA, are not mandated to think of 
international development in terms of domestic policy prescriptions, like removing 
tariffs on goods entering Canada from developing countries. Black, Therien and 
Clark also see general agreement among donors on the question of where their funds 
should be directed. Whereas the bulk of aid in the early days of ODA was targeted at 
Southeast Asia, they argue that aid is now concentrated on Africa, and that this is a 
major trend in the international aid regime. According to OECD figures, the continent 
now receives 38.3% of all ODA.159
A second major trend cited by these authors is “an unprecedented 
consolidation of a doctrine of international aid over the past fifteen years.” This is 
founded on a growing consensus that structural adjustment is the key to development, 
but includes a range of themes which have been embraced by donors and around 
which they attempt to coordinate collective action. The authors name structural 
adjustment, women in development, human rights and the environment as areas in 
which the aid regime exerts its influence on donors and recipients. They outline how 
each issue was placed on the international agenda in World Bank and DAC policy 
papers and at international conferences, and argue that subsequent international 
agreements have established norms for individual donor policy. They interpret the 
increasing percentage of ODA channelled through multilateral institutions as an 
important indicator of the growing strength of the regime because these organizations 
provide the “context in which systemic priorities are determined and consensus is 
forged.”160 On some policy issues Canada has followed international trends, whereas 
on others, like Women in Development “Canada has probably exerted more influence 
than it has absorbed”.161
The motive driving the aid regime, these commentators suggest, is a faith in 
structural adjustment coupled with a desire to maximize the impact of donor
Ibid:264.
160 Ibid:265.
161 t u : j
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162resources. While they agree that domestic factors have some influence on policy, 
they seem to share Lumsdaine’s conception of the aid regime as one oriented 
primarily towards developmental objectives. In their exploratory article, they do not 
provide sufficient evidence to support this conception of the regime or to refute 
Wood’s claims as to its nature. Nor do they suggest how these systemic pressures are 
reconciled with domestic interests. Also left open is the question of how or where 
innovations and trends originate before they are presented at international conferences 
and by what specific means they are transferred to and integrated into individual donor 
policies. In examining the concept of an international aid regime, one must also 
consider whether there is, in fact, a growing consensus in aid doctrine or increasing 
fragmentation as the cast of providers multiplies.
1.8 CONCLUSION
The literature on aid, as reviewed above, offers an array of explanations for 
how aid policy is determined and the implications of these pressures for the outcome 
of assistance efforts. Observers have identified altruism, political and economic 
interests, bureaucratic politics and international pressure as determinants of aid policy. 
The cases examined in this paper illustrate that there are limits to the hegemony of 
any force in public policy making. None of the theories outlined above can on their 
own account for why Canadian aid policy takes the shape that it does.
On the basis of an examination of the origins of foreign aid and trends in trade 
policy, tied aid and food aid, some writers have argued convincingly that commercial 
factors are crucial in shaping the form and content of ODA. By examining the means 
through which commercial sector interests attempt to influence aid policy and the 
results of these efforts in specific cases, the research presented here adds credence to 
this argument. This interpretation, however, cannot account for all policy decisions, 
as the cases presented here also demonstrate.
162 Ibid:282-83.
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Canada is also part of an international aid system which connects it to other 
donors and with recipient governments through institutionalized relationships.
Canada is a member of and a contributor to the United Nations and its agencies, the 
DAC, the World Bank and the IMF. It has a seat on the board of directors of all the 
regional development banks, and along with other bilateral and multilateral donors, 
participates in consultative groups and working groups organized around aid policy 
issues. As noted above, a number of scholars have used regime theory to explain the 
relative uniformity of aid policy among donors. Their argument is that collective 
pressure is exerted through international organizations and agreements which moves 
individual states to comply with generally accepted norms for ODA policy. The 
literature presents two contrasting conceptions of this international aid regime: one 
which developed to facilitate collective action to end poverty -  the embodiment of 
humane internationalism; conversely, an institutionalized relationship between 
donors and recipients designed primarily to preserve the status quo in the global 
economic system. In assessing the merits of these arguments, the research presented 
here sought evidence in specific cases that Canada, as an aid donor, has responded to 
pressure exerted by other donors through international organizations, or that Canadian 
aid policy is based on anything other than a calculation of its own internally defined 
interests, be they humanitarian, economic or political.
For a middle power like Canada, strategic interests, while important in the 
formation of the institutions of ODA, are less so now, at least in their original 
manifestation. Political objectives are now defined not in terms of establishing a 
presence in the Third World to stem the tide of communism, but in terms of 
promoting democratization and economic liberalization through the imposition of 
policy conditionalities. This reorientation of one aspect of foreign aid raises the 
question of the degree to which each of the perspectives presented here can account 
for changes in policy objectives. As a group, their focus is on establishing the 
dominant influences on policy, not on how policy is contested and changed. Regime 
theory is a useful analytic tool for explaining the dominance of neoclassical 
economics in donor programmes, and their homogeneity, symmetry and continuity. It
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is a less apt tool for explaining diversity and the redefinition of norms. As a macro­
level theory it cannot by itself explain counter trends and policy reversals within 
individual countries.
The pluralist approach to explaining aid policy recognizes the existence of 
various interests contesting policy which competing theories do not. It is argued that 
aid policy in Canada and elsewhere is heavily influenced by the political and 
economic interests of the donor country. It is suggested that the pursuit of these 
interests through the aid programme is advanced or actively opposed by conflicting 
pressure groups within and without the government -  government departments with 
differing mandates, coalitions of business interests, organized labour, non-profit 
organizations devoted to international development issues, and academic researchers. 
Public debate on aid policy is also significantly shaped by media coverage of 
development issues. However, this explanation does not include systemic or 
structural forces (those which cannot be attributed to a particular societal group).
Likewise, the theories put forward by Nossal and Lumsdaine seem excessively 
cynical and naive respectively. There may be little evidence that altruism is the 
guiding principle of bilateral aid programmes, but the proposition that most 
employees of aid agencies are on the make is similarly improbable. The merit in these 
two perspectives, however, is their suggestion that bureaucracies can develop a 
momentum of their own which can trap them into established patterns of behaviour 
and that they have an enduring power to shape the policies they were designed to 
administer.
The cases examined in the following chapters demonstrate that there are 
instances in which policy decisions cannot be attributed to any discemable interest 
group, domestic or foreign. Actions and events are constrained or propelled by forces 
inherent in the institutionalized processes of development assistance. Some of these 
are phenomena common to large bureaucracies in general: inertia, path dependence, 
goal displacement, the compartmentalization of tasks, and ineffective mechanisms of
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oversight. These symptoms of bureaucratic failure are complicated by the ambiguous 
objectives of the Canadian aid programme as outlined above and analyzed in greater 
detail below. This ambiguity leads to problems in identifying the principals and the 
agents in the aid relationship, establishing clear lines of accountability, and setting an 
appropriate system of incentives. As set out in Chapter Two and explored further in 
subsequent chapters, the management structure of the aid programme itself and 
CIDA’s position within the Canadian government system affects the access of special 
interest groups to decision-makers, the costs of aid delivery, and CIDA’s capacity to 
monitor and improve aid performance. It places CIDA’s mandate to help alleviate 
poverty in other countries in conflict with the responsibilities of other government 
departments. A detailed examination of the decision-making processes in specific 
cases also suggests that there are constraints on the degree of autonomy aid officials 
can exercise to correct evidence of policy failure or innovate to improve aid 
performance. This is true both in terms of aid policy-making and in the negotiation 
and enforcement of international agreements on ODA practice, as discussed in 
Chapters Two, Three and Four, and in the design and implementation of individual 
aid projects as discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
Participants in the debate over the determinants of Canadian aid policy have 
generally subscribed to the idea that it is the product of some configuration of mixed 
motives. The research presented below will continue in this tradition, suggesting that 
systemic and structural factors are important determinants of aid, but recognizing that 
other forces, specifically economic and political, also play a significant role. The 
preceding discussion of the literature on the determinants of Canadian aid policy 
offers an account of the allocation of funds and the broad features of bilateral aid, and 
how various forces intervene to divert aid from its official objectives. But a 
discussion of motives and objectives cannot fully explain the methods chosen to 
pursue these ends, or how this affects the outcome of aid interventions. One of the 
primary objectives of this research has been to examine the aid process in its entirety, 
from the transformation of theories of development into aid policy, through the 
operationalization of policy statements into specific aid projects, and their
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implementation and outcome. Part I of this thesis has set out the objectives of this 
research, reviewed the arguments found in the existing literature, and outlined an 
analytic framework in which to examine the chosen cases. Part II (Chapters Two, 
Three and Four) focuses on the forces which influence the aid policy-making process 
in Canada through a discussion of three significant policy decisions.
Part III (Chapters Five and Six) examines the project design, implementation 
and evaluation stages of the aid process, in this case in two Canadian assisted projects 
in Hanang, Tanzania. As will become apparent, a whole other set of factors come into 
play at this point. While hopefully benevolent in intention, an aid project is a hugely 
invasive intervention in the recipient country. The line between assistance and 
interference in the affairs of a sovereign state must be negotiated between donor and 
recipient. In a consideration of the factors which influence the course of events in an 
aid project and its subsequent outcome, the political interests of the recipient 
government and of its dominant class are as significant a determinant of the outcome 
of aid efforts as powerful domestic interests in Canada. As the events in Hanang 
illustrate, also significant are the political and social dynamics of the host community, 
the activities of other donors, the institutional capacity of the recipient government to 
fulfil its role in the project, and existence of necessary supporting infrastructure (like 
transportation and marketing systems).
We now turn to an examination of these various factors as they have been 
enumerated here in relation to a series of policy decisions drawn from the history of 
Canadian ODA.
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CHAPTER TWO 
CIDA’s Experiment with Decentralization 1988-1993
Inherent in the Arusha Declaration, therefore, is a rejection o f the 
concept o f national grandeur as distinct from the well-being o f its 
citizens, and a rejection too o f material wealth for its own sake. It is a 
commitment to the belief that there are more important things in life 
than the amassing o f riches, and that i f  the pursuit o f wealth clashes 
with things like human dignity and social equality, then the latter will 
be given priority.
— Julius Nyerere, 1967.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines CIDA’s experiment with decentralized aid 
administration between 1988 and 1993. In response to criticisms that the aid 
programme was ineffective and inefficient, in 1987 the government announced its 
intention to decentralize the administration of aid. Field staff was doubled and some 
decision-making authorities were transferred to the overseas posts. Tanzania was 
among the first six bilateral programmes decentralized in 1988. Despite early reports 
from the field that decentralization was having a positive impact on Canada’s ability 
to deliver more effective aid in accordance with the government’s stated objectives, in 
December 1989 only a little over a year into the transition, the government put the 
brakes on, advising CIDA and DEAITC to find ways to cut expenses. In May 1990, 
CIDA management was advised by the Treasury Board that the cancellation of
1 Nyerere, 1968:315.
2 Several requests were made to CIDA over a period of two years to review agency files on 
decentralization but permission was not obtained. The costs of accessing this material through the 
Access to Information Act were prohibitive, the sum estimated by CIDA’s Access To Information 
Programme officer to be in the thousands of dollars to pay for screening and photocopying of the entire 
lot as required by regulation. The discussion of decentralization presented here is based on a review of 
documents and memoranda contained in DFAIT files obtained through DFAIT’s Informal Access 
Programme, three CIDA Performance and Evaluation Branch discussion papers on decentralization 
obtained through CIDA’s Development Information Centre, a 1992 evaluation o f Decentralization 
released through CIDA’s Access to Information Programme, interviews with CIDA and DFAIT 
officers and outside observers, and Morrison’s discussion of CIDA’s decentralization in his 
comprehensive history of CIDA and Canadian ODA (Morrison, 1998: 285-286;303-311). The 
interpretation of events presented here draws primarily on government documents, but this reading is 
largely corroborated by interviews conducted on the topic. As this chapter examines decision-making 
processes within the government system, this concentration on government documents is considered to
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decentralization was a real possibility.3 Further budget cuts outlined in the February 
1992 federal budget made plain the government’s intention to discontinue the process. 
The official announcement was made in 1993. The responsibilities delegated to the 
field reverted to HQ and gradually decentralized staff returned to Canada, the last in 
1994.4 $150 million had been spent shifting operations overseas before the process 
was halted and the administration of aid recentralized in Canada.
In spite of the recent recommendation of the Helleiner Report on development 
cooperation between Tanzania and its donors that donors should decentralize their 
programmes to that country as a step towards making it more effective, and 
movements in that direction on the part of other western donors, there is little stomach 
at CIDA for a revisitation of the decentralization issue.5 However, the agency’s brief 
foray into the field is presented here as a case of an attempt at innovation foiled in a 
particularly dramatic reversal of policy seemingly on par with the cancellation of aid 
to East Africa in 1993 discussed in Chapter Four.
As a case study of the aid policy-making process in Canada, the 
decentralization and recentralization of aid administration is significant because of 
what it reveals about the dynamics of power within the aid programme. It is also 
instructive of the primary influences on Canadian aid policy and the comparative 
importance accorded to the supposed beneficiaries of aid versus various Canadian 
interests. The decision to decentralize the administration of Canadian ODA was 
taken in response to public criticism of the failings of the aid programme. The stated 
purpose of decentralization was to improve the quality of aid offered to poor 
countries. The key question to be addressed here in the context of an examination of 
the causes of aid failure and CIDA’s capacity to learn from experience, is why did this 
particular attempt at innovation fail? As will be outlined below, early reports from 
the field suggested that decentralization was having a positive effect on the aid 
programme. Yet it was cancelled almost before it had begun and the $150 million
be warranted. The issues raised and views expressed in available sources are consistent to an extent 
which, it is felt, justifies the claims made here.
3 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Decentralization, Vol.13. Memo #EA(FILE 2-5-CIDA-D) May 16, 
1990.
4 Morrison, 1998:311.
5 Gerald Helleiner et al, 1995.
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dollars spent moving operations to the field written off. In the first instance, its 
demise was the result of the Conservative government’s deficit cutting agenda which 
hit the foreign aid budget particularly hard. However, opposition to the 
decentralization of aid administration came from various other sources as well, 
namely the Canadian commercial sector, elements within the Department of External 
Affairs and International Trade, from the Treasury Board, and to a lesser extent, but 
nevertheless somewhat surprisingly, from some Canadian NGOs and elements within 
CIDA itself.
There are other factors to consider. Decentralization was implemented in a 
piecemeal fashion, rapidly and unevenly. The result was the proliferation of multiple 
layers of bureaucracy which compromised the realization of any potential benefits. It 
was a stillborn strategy, cancelled before its full effects could be felt. As such, it is 
impossible to make an assessment of the impact of the decentralization exercise on 
the quality of Canadian ODA. Nevertheless, its examination here is meant to shed 
light on the decision-making process and forces at work within the institutionalized 
aid system which once again took a noble policy objective, mangled it in the process 
of implementation, and abandoned it before its objectives could be fully achieved. 
Bearing in mind the theoretical explanations of bureaucratic failure outlined in 
Chapter One, the almost complete lack of public interest in the issue when compared 
with other matters which became controversial, raises questions about the functioning 
of oversight mechanisms for the aid programme. While decentralization and 
recentralization were topics of vociferous debate within CIDA and between the 
agency and other Canadian government departments, the events described here passed 
with minimal discussion in Parliament and largely unnoticed by the Canadian press. 
Compare this with the attention paid to a $4.5 million failed bakery project in 
Tanzania funded by CIDA which was the subject of a nationally televised 
documentary.6 Four and a half million dollars is a lot of money, but $150 million is a 
lot more. Similarly, the cancellation of decentralization, a policy which seemed to 
have some positive potential value, while CIDA chose to persist with a failing project 
over a period of twenty-five years which its own experts had advised would not work
6 CIDA Project no. 902/00127
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even before it had begun (the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project described in Chapter 
Five), also seems indicative of a curious internal logic which merits examination.
This case raises a number of other issues with respect to the determinants of 
aid policy and the constraints on the effective use of aid resources. The late 1980’s - 
early ‘90’s was a period of crisis and flux in the Canadian aid programme. Deep 
budget cuts coincided with a Parliamentary review of aid policy and a comprehensive 
management review of CIDA. In accordance with Ikenberry’s idea of ‘breakpoints’ 
in history, it could be argued that this volatile set of circumstances created a window 
of opportunity for major changes to entrenched aid practice.7 As the events described 
below indicate, there were initiatives both at CIDA and the Department of External 
Affairs (EAITC) to redirect the aid programme at this time. Decentralization was 
initiated as a means to improve the quality of aid. In the end, the government chose to 
revert to a method of administration which had previously been perceived as 
ineffective.
Through a consideration of the range of options open to policy-makers at each 
juncture, and by tracing the process of decision-making, this chapter attempts to 
identify the factors which led to this outcome. It first considers the rationale for 
decentralizing the administration of aid. The next decision bureaucrats faced was 
how to implement this policy. Their chosen course of action highlights both concerns 
about accountability and the unresolved conflict between CIDA and the Department 
of Foreign Affairs for control over aid policy. How government officials responded 
to budget cuts imposed by Cabinet and to external opposition to decentralization 
following its implementation reveals constraints on the effective use of aid resources 
embedded in the way the aid programme is managed. The conflict between CIDA 
and EAITC was not just a turf war, but a clash between two opposing conceptions of 
the purpose of the aid programme: as an instrument for poverty reduction in recipient 
countries, or a legitimate means for advancing Canadian interests abroad. This 
conflict is inherent in the administrative structure of the aid programme which sets 
CIDA’s mandate to assist development efforts overseas in direct conflict with 
EAITC/DFAIT’s responsibility to protect Canadian interests abroad. CIDA’s
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subordination to EAITC meant that in this case, (and in others, it is argued), private 
sector opposition to decentralization was accorded more importance in the decision to 
recentralize aid administration than was the impact of the policy on the supposed 
beneficiaries in aid recipient countries.
This case provides a clear demonstration of how the avowed objectives of the 
aid programme as stated in official policy documents can be sidelined by reality. 
Government members and the bureaucrats charged with implementing government 
policy chose an administrative model for decentralized field offices, identified the aid 
programme as a target for the deficit cutting exercise, and then had to decide how to 
deal with a reduced budget. The evidence presented below suggests that in each 
instance, possible options were weighed against a number of considerations, of which 
how to maximize the benefits of Canadian ODA to its intended recipients appeared 
low on the list. More important appear to have been bureaucratic politics, and private 
sector opposition to the policy. The official rationale for reversing decentralization 
was that it was too costly. However, this decision was made on the basis of limited 
information as to the actual costs and the impact of the policy on the quality of 
Canadian assistance. In addition to the unreliable nature of the available figures, the 
identification of aid delivery costs as the primary measurement of performance 
highlights the contentious focus on inputs rather than outputs in monitoring the aid 
programme. This approach does not allow for an accurate assessment of Canadian 
ODA in meeting its objectives.
2.2 THE DECISION TO DECENTRALIZE
The decision to decentralize CIDA’s administration of aid to overseas field 
offices in 1987 originated as a response to mounting public criticism of Canada’s aid 
programme. CIDA suffered through a spate of negative publicity in the late 1970’s 
and early ‘80’s.8 Its management of aid funds, and the sometimes spectacular failure 
of Canadian assisted projects overseas were criticized in the press, by the Auditor-
7 Ikenberry:318.
8 See Morrison, 1998, particularly chapters 4 - 7 .
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General of Canada9, and public interest groups. These events coincided with a shift in 
the international donor consensus on aid priorities. As reflected in aid policy 
documents released in 1975 and 1988, new issues were placed on the aid agenda in 
this period: basic human needs, the environment, the role of women in development, 
as well as structural adjustment. From the international research community came 
critiques of ‘development tourism,’ and the detrimental effects of aid projects 
implemented by donors on the basis of an inadequate understanding of the recipient 
community.10 There was a recognition within CIDA (concentrated by sharp external 
criticism) that old administrative practices designed to deliver the big infrastructure 
projects which formed the foundation of the Canadian aid programme were 
inappropriate in light of this new agenda.
Prior to 1988, the administration of the aid programme was concentrated in 
Canada, with all projects managed from headquarters in Ottawa. The ratio of Ottawa 
based staff to field staff was 10:1 in 1987.11 The 1987 SCEAITC Report noted that 
while project implementation was contracted to a large body of agents in the field,
17decision-making was highly centralized. According to a CIDA document from 
1990, this administrative structure had developed to facilitate an “engineering” 
approach to aid projects, “including the application of elaborate control mechanisms, 
the procurement and transfer of Canadian goods and services and enforcement of 
agency policy ... and to factor the Canadian ‘policy context’ into project design.”13 
However, according to the same document, in the 1970’s and ‘80’s, “the 
dysfunctional aspects of centralization became apparent.” The elaborate planning 
cycle led to extended delays in project implementation and “an inability to make 
quick mid-course corrections on projects. Canada began to acquire a reputation as a 
well-meaning but excessively slow donor.”14
9 Auditor-General of Canada, 1984, paragraphs 9.46,9.70; c.f. SCEAIT,1987:80.
10 Chambers.
11 SCEAT, 1987:79.
12 SCEAIT, 1987:79.
13 CIDA Decentralization (DRAFT), June 30 1990, DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol.13 - 
Decentralization.
14Ibid.
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Numerous examples of an inefficient and cumbersome aid process can be 
found in Canada-Tanzania bilateral project reports. The commodity agreements 
discussed in Chapter Four provide an illustration of some of the consequences of this 
inefficiency -  shutdowns in Tanzanian industries, missed planting dates while 
necessary equipment and inputs made their way through the system and across the 
ocean, and the difficulties inherent in managing from Ottawa the funds generated by 
the sale of the commodities in Tanzania. Under the administrative structure for aid 
projects which existed prior to decentralization, the bulk of the decision-making 
process was centered at CIDA headquarters in Canada, with considerable 
transcontinental referral and consultation between the headquarters and the field post 
necessary throughout the design and implementation cycle.15 As the Winegard Report 
observed, “at virtually every step in the decision-making process, Canadian officials 
in the field wait upon decisions and action by headquarters. In turn, they spend most 
of their time performing work related to the administrative and procedural 
requirements of headquarters.”16 The Report cited a CIDA survey of field officers 
which indicated that “an average of only 7 per cent of their time is spent in 
negotiations with the recipient country and 10 per cent in planning, programming and 
intelligence gathering. Some 47 per cent of their time is spent on administrative tasks,
17most of which are head-quarters oriented, and only 8 per cent on project site visits.”
Recipient country involvement in the process was largely restricted to 
approving plans developed by CIDA and CIDA selected consultants and executing 
agents. The managing director of Tanesco, the Tanzanian electricity authority which 
was then receiving Canadian aid, addressed the Parliamentary Committee on their 
fact-finding mission to Tanzania and expressed his opposition to the aid recipients’ 
exclusion from this process. “Contracts are negotiated and signed by CIDA.
Although the contractors are working with us, we have no control over the terms and
1 ftconditions.” The project identification, design, approval and contracting process 
was also painfully slow, with generally more than two years passing between the
15SCEAIT, 1987:81.
16 Ibid, pg. 82.
17 Ibid, pg.80.
18 Ibid, pg 83.
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identification of a need, an official request for funding and the disbursement of aid 
funds.
It was in response to public criticism of the aid programme as a whole that in 
1987 the Conservative government appointed the special Parliamentary Committee 
chaired by William Winegard to examine the Canadian aid programme and to make 
recommendations for its improvement. Among its numerous recommendations, the 
Committee called for the decentralization of aid to the field. This was an option that 
CIDA had already begun to investigate. A 1987 agency study examining the 
experience of other bilateral donors reported “an increasing conviction among 
donors” that decentralizing aid staff and authority to the field improved the quality of 
aid as planners living in the recipient country developed a deeper knowledge of the 
local environment. It also allowed for better monitoring, the prompt resolution of 
problems as they arose, and sped up the project cycle.19
In its submission to the Winegard committee, the North-South Institute argued 
on the basis of case studies of Canadian aid which it had recently conducted -  the 
Tanzanian programme among them -  that aid delivery could be improved by moving
90more aid staff with authority to the field.
Often overwhelmed with administrative detail and visiting consultants, 
these field staff should have the most intimate knowledge of the 
recipient country and CIDA activities there. They can be well placed 
to influence aid programming and to respond to changing local 
circumstances by approving changes within project budgets or even 
between activities.2
Noting that several other donors had decentralized their operations to the field 
in some form, the Institute submission stated:
We saw no evidence that accountability suffered as a result of 
decentralized responsibility. What we often saw was detailed expertise 
at a country and sectoral level, and flexibility in project administration.
It was not unusual for Canadian aid personnel to be dependent upon
19 Quoted in SCEAIT, 1987:85.
20 See: Young, 1983.
21 SCEAIT,1987:83.
99
this expertise in trying to establish priorities and approaches to the 
Canadian program without of course the benefit of a particular 
Canadian view.22
Based on its observations of field operations in Africa and on the evidence 
brought before it in its public hearings, the Winegard Committee recommended to the 
government that “substantial decentralization to the field” be made a priority, and that 
“decentralization be undertaken comprehensively and involve the transfer of 
significant numbers of senior officials and decision-making authority from 
headquarters to the field.”23
It is important to note that the model of decentralization of aid administration 
put forward by the Winegard Committee was envisioned as a heavier Canadian 
presence in the field, not a delegation of responsibility and authority to an increased 
staff of recipient country nationals. The committee considered several models for the 
proposed decentralized field offices. One option was to allow decentralization to 
proceed on an ad hoc basis, as it was currently doing, with individual country desks 
and regional branches transferring elements of the project cycle to the field as they 
saw fit, within existing regulations governing project approval authority. A second 
option was to take a more proactive approach to maximizing existing decision-making 
authority in the field in all posts and to make more intensive use of field support units 
(largely staffed by locally contracted personnel) to handle administrative, logistical 
and technical matters. A third model proposed the direct transfer of aid staff from 
headquarters to the field with no changes made to their job descriptions, just the 
location where the tasks were carried out.
The committee also considered the establishment of semi-autonomous aid 
offices along the lines of those of USAID, operating separately from consular 
activities, using more locally engaged personnel than currently employed. The 
establishment of a new crown-owned investment bank for development projects 
coupled with a technical assistance programme was considered with the 
implementation of projects to be privatized. However, the model recommended by
22 Ibid.
23 SCEAIT, 1987:90.
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the Committee was the establishment of a number of regional programme offices 
staffed by CIDA’s sectoral specialists, programme and project officers, placed in the 
field to deal quickly and efficiently with the matters which were their responsibility.
A key component of this reorganization, the Committee stressed, was the transfer of 
significant decision-making authority to this field staff.
2.3 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION
The government determined that policy-making must remain in Ottawa, but 
Cabinet approval for decentralization of aid administration in principle was received 
in August 1987 on the grounds that
Effective and efficient management of the program requires that 
decision-making authority and responsibility for program 
implementation must be placed as close as possible to the development 
problems which the program is designed to alleviate.24
The government pledged itself to a three-pronged strategy to achieve this end. 
The first was to increase the size of mission-administered, quick disbursing Canada 
Funds for small projects. In addition, the government said it would transfer additional 
decision-making authority to the field, and transfer and increase aid staff overseas.
The objectives of decentralization were identified as:
1. A more rapid and sensitive response to the increased needs of aid recipient 
countries.
2. Improved consultation with recipient governments on social and economic 
policies, and a greater coherence between these policies and the development 
cooperation programme.
3. Increased participation of developing countries in the planning and 
implementation of projects.
4. Improved monitoring of programmes and projects in progress.
5. Increased visibility and credibility for Canada within developing countries.
24 Government of Canada, September 1987.
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6. Improved programme coordination with recipient countries and with other 
donors.25
In April 1988, the Treasury Board authorized a budget of $233 million over 
five years to pay for the decentralization of six aid missions in the first year, the 
Tanzania programme among them, and fourteen in the second.26 As Morrison 
recounts, the time lag between Cabinet approval of the plan and the Treasury Board 
authorization of funds and the release of a new Canadian aid policy document Sharing 
Our Future in March 1988 outlining the government’s commitment to decentralize 
aid administration, was due to interdepartmental disputes over how it was to be 
implemented and managed. It was on these grounds that an earlier attempt to 
decentralize the Caribbean programme had foundered in the 1970’s.27 In this latest 
attempt, Treasury Board turned down the first plan submitted jointly by CIDA and 
DEAIT as too costly, and conflicts over the management of field personnel took
98months to resolve. In the end, the administrative model for decentralization 
approved was not that recommended by the Parliamentary Committee.
The chosen model was based on a compromise reached between CIDA and 
DEAIT and was to be jointly administered by the two departments within the 
financial limitations imposed by the Treasury Board. It comprised the transfer of aid 
personnel overseas with some enlargement of their decision-making authority, and the 
creation of new staff positions in the field and in Canada to oversee the process at 
CIDA and External Affairs. As of February 1990, an additional four hundred and 
forty-four locally engaged personnel had been hired, of whom fifty-two were 
programme officers. Management of aid personnel posted overseas was to be the 
responsibility of External Affairs. This responsibility was to be exercised in 
consultation with CIDA, which retained authority over aid staff in Ottawa.
25 Ibid; c.f. CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
26 Treasury Board Minute #807086, 5 April 1988. The nine posts decentralized were: Barbados; 
Senegal; Tanzania; Philippines; and Singapore in 1988; and Ivory Coast (with satellite offices in 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger); Zimbabwe (with satellite offices in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia); Indonesia; and Costa Rica (with satellite offices in Guatemala 
and Honduras) in 1989. Other country programmes were to have been decentralized over the next 
three years, but the ‘streamlining’ of the programme and its subsequent cancellation meant that never 
occurred.
27 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.13, 30 June 1990.
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Under decentralization, approval authority for projects worth up to five 
million dollars was delegated from CIDA HQ to the head of the mission. All other 
approval authorities remained as before. The Head of Mission was in turn responsible 
to the President of CIDA (in practice the vice-presidents of the geographical 
branches) for the delivery of bilateral aid. Significantly, approval for projects worth 
more than five million dollars as well as recruitment and selection of consultants for 
all contracts valued at $100,000 or more remained with the Minister in Ottawa. 
Morrison suggests this last provision was at the insistence of the Minister of External
*?QRelations responsible for aid, Monique Landry.
2.4 CIDA EVALUATIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION
Early reports on the progress of decentralization were on the whole 
favourable. A 1990 External Affairs internal memo reported that “indications from 
the field (particularly Jakarta and Abidjan) are that the decentralized program is in 
fact achieving results of more rapid and better quality aid delivery on the ground.”
A 1990 report drafted at CIDA concluded that decentralization had cut the amount of 
time required to design projects and that “Mission staff have developed a more acute 
understanding of local absorptive capacity and the human dynamics of local decision­
making. Project design is shaped less by the internal bureaucratic concerns of
1headquarters and more by project need and environment.” It reported that 
decentralized missions were reducing the costs of aid delivery by simplifying project 
analysis and reducing the sum spent on consultants fees by doing some of the ground 
work themselves, and by hiring local experts. “Taken in combination, these trends are 
beginning to lower the costs -  sometimes dramatically -  of both the preparation time 
and the overall financial commitment needed to bring new projects on stream.” It 
said that increased hiring of local professional staff “has allowed for the injection of 
local knowledge directly into the planning process” and that “The continuous
28 See Morrison, 1998: 285-286; 303-311.
29 Morrison,1998:304.
30 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Decentralization Vol.14.
31 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Decentralization Vol.13, 30 June 1990.
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presence of aid staff (as opposed to visits from HQ) provides for a more realistic 
appraisal of the flow of events on projects.”32
This glowing assessment was tempered, however, by a recognition of some of 
the weaknesses in the new administrative process. The evaluation reported that while 
local hiring had increased somewhat,
The implementation of the untying provisions of Sharing Our Future 
have not resulted in dramatic increases in the use of local consultants 
by decentralized programs due mainly to reductions in the availability 
of uncommitted funds and the lack of local expertise in many 
countries. To date [two years after the policy was introduced], only 
about 100 local contracts worth $2.3 million have been awarded 
compared to [contracts worth more than $2 billion] awarded in 
Canada.33
The report noted that the retention of some key authorities at HQ “has 
resulted, in certain instances, in a more fragmented approach to project management.” 
This gradually emerged as the most serious flaw in the design of the scheme.
The 1991 CIDA/DFAIT evaluation of decentralization, conducted two years 
after implementation, found that despite initial growing pains due to the hasty and 
massive scale of the changes, “decentralization has already brought about significant 
improvements in the management of the program/project management cycle.”34 The 
report claimed that decentralized aid administration had improved the sensitivity of 
Canadian aid to the needs of recipient countries. Field officers reported increased 
contact with their counterparts in recipient governments and with other aid donors. 
The evaluation reported that “There is near unanimity that there has been an 
improvement in the monitoring of programs and projects” and claimed that “projects 
have been corrected sooner, and on the basis of better intelligence.” With reference to 
the deep cuts to the aid budget over the previous three years, the report highlighted an 
additional benefit of decentralized aid. “Decentralization has helped to offset the
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. This is a draft document and the figure denoting the value of contracts awarded in Canada is 
missing. The sum of more than $2 billion is an estimate based on the fact that total Canadian ODA in 
1988 and 1989 was roughly six billion dollars, and bilateral aid comprised approximately one third of 
that amount.
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greater losses in credibility that might otherwise have occurred under centralized 
programming because of the ability to do more with less” The evaluators continued:
The evidence so far suggests that, for most types of programs, 
decentralization is likely to have high pay-offs at the beginning and 
ends of the program/project management cycle. This is because 
decentralized personnel are positioned to identify, design, and plan 
more relevant programs and better projects, and can monitor more 
effectively in partnership with local people. Tighter project design and 
planning also provides better preconditions for more relevant and 
useful project evaluations.35
CIDA evaluations of the decentralization of individual country programmes 
(including the Tanzania mission) are either unavailable or non-existent. One report 
submitted by the Philippines office after three years of decentralized operations is 
found in DFAIT files. Its assessment of the transition was generally positive. It 
reported that the policy’s stated objective of improving consultation and coordination 
with the host government had been met.
We consult both formally and informally much more than in the past, 
both with the Government of the Philippines, other donors, multilateral 
institutions, and non-governmental bodies. This is an on-going process 
which started with the CPR [Country Programme Review], and has 
carried through into our regular day to day work. The result has been 
our ability to target our assistance for maximum impact, knowing what 
other donors are doing, and where our assistance makes the most
37sense.
On the monitoring of projects and programmes, the mission reported that
CIDA’s greater presence through decentralization [has] meant that we 
have had a greater understanding of the problems and difficulties 
facing a project, and consequently have moved earlier to ensure 
corrective measures are taken...our decentralized monitoring capacity 
influences the type of programming we undertake, as well as the 
quality of its implementation.38
34 CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
35 Ibid.
36 See footnote 1.
37 DFAIT File no. 38-1-1-CIDA (1) Decentralization Vol. 15. Philippines Mission: 1991 
Decentralization Evaluation Report Year III.
38 Ibid.
105
The mission report did highlight some problems associated with the changes 
in administrative procedure, for example the difficulty in keeping up with policy 
changes at HQ which affected the direction of the programme. The hiring of more 
local professional staff was hampered by the difficulty of competing with the salaries 
offered by other aid agencies. Most significantly, the mission noted that as most 
projects would likely continue to be worth over the five million dollars * most project 
decisions would still made in Ottawa. The time needed for project identification and 
planning had been shortened by an increased field presence, but
There have definitely been cases where things have slowed down as a 
result of decentralization. This has been particularly the case where we 
have to rely on centralized services in headquarters over which we 
have no control and where desk officers may not be as effective in 
piloting things through the system because of a lower level of 
familiarity with the project (this relates to consultant selection and 
advice from the Professional Services Branch in particular).39
The evaluation suggested that “There is a need to look at the various functions 
we carry out and decide at which stage in the project cycle the lead should be taken in 
the field or at HQ.” However, the authors hastened to add that decentralization was 
not necessarily to blame for these problems.
There is no doubt that delays in finalizing project designs or getting 
Executing Agencies in place don’t help our credibility. This has been 
a long-standing problem even prior to decentralization. Some of the 
problem lies in the way that certain procedures operate at CIDA (and 
consultant selection is a prime example). While the greater distance 
from Hull does hamper our ability to get things through ‘the system,’ it 
is not necessarily decentralization that is the culprit, but ‘the system’ 
itself.40
2.5 CONFLICT BETWEEN CIDA AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
The Philippines post evaluation highlighted weaknesses of CIDA’s 
decentralization as voiced by aid officials who worked at other decentralized posts.41
39 Ibid. CIDA’s Professional Services Branch (now disbanded) housed the agency’s sectoral experts.
40 Ibid.
41 Interviews.
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The Winegard Committee had recommended a substantial transfer of aid staff and 
decision-making authority to the field. The administrative model adopted by the 
government (based on the CIDA/EAITC/Treasury Board compromise) did move 
important staff positions to the field. It did not, however, significantly alter decision­
making authority, which remained for the most part in Ottawa. Field staff were 
required to spend a significant portion of their time keeping their managers at HQ up 
to speed on the projects Ottawa would be required to make decisions about, and 
putting through the documentation required to contract consultants and executing 
agents in Canada. The 1991 Annual Report on Decentralization found that:
Some personnel, especially development officers have complained that 
due to pressures of the CIDA system, they do not have time to take 
advantage of their presence in the field. For instance the PTLs [Project 
Team Leaders] and the one PRO [Professional Resource Officer, a 
sectoral specialist] in Indonesia claimed that they spent 80 per cent of 
their time feeding the CIDA administrative system, and 20 per cent on 
activities for which they thought they had been decentralized (e.g. 
research, and developing ideas based on contacts with counterparts and 
Other partners, etc.42
A time use study conducted in the Sahel mission determined that the sectoral 
specialists spent two thirds of their time on ‘development’ work and the rest on 
administrative tasks, while programme managers and project team leaders spent over 
half their time on administration. A similar pattern was found in Central America 43
While CIDA’s convoluted project cycle was a monster of its own creation, the 
failure to give aid field staff the decision-making authority which would allow them 
to make optimal use of their presence in the aid recipient country was largely the 
result of a long-standing and unresolved turf war between External Affairs and CIDA 
over control of the aid programme. Morrison’s authoritative history of CIDA reveals 
a pattern of numerous attempts by the agency over the past thirty years to assert its 
autonomy and assume a leadership role in formulating Canadian policy in developing 
countries only to be reined in by the more powerful departments of Foreign Affairs,
42 CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
43 Ibid.
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Trade and Finance.44 Since its inception, the aid programme has fallen under the 
jurisdiction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or International Trade and 
Commerce. The Minister for International Cooperation was and is a junior cabinet 
post occupied, according to one long time observer, by a politician either on the way 
up or on the way down, with a correspondingly limited voice in Cabinet45
In interdepartmental negotiations over how decentralization was to be 
implemented, CIDA management favoured the establishment of semi-autonomous aid 
offices along the lines of USAID’s overseas operations, separate from the diplomatic 
posts. External Affairs, on the other hand, asserted its right to maintain authority over 
Canadian overseas personnel under the External Affairs Act of 1983 and the Foreign 
Service Consolidation Agreement of 1981.46 The Agreement, then as yet to be fully 
implemented, set out the conversion of CIDA field staff into an aid stream of the 
Canadian Foreign Service, placing it under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
External Affairs. EAITC was adamant that final authority over all Canadian activities 
in the field including the aid programme should rest with the head of mission (the 
Ambassador or High Commissioner). Rather than shift significant decision-making 
responsibilities to the field and into the hands of diplomatic staff and EAITC, CIDA 
management determined that they would be retained by CIDA HQ. Thus was one of 
the primary objectives of decentralization scuttled in the process of implementation.
This did not dispel the conflict between CIDA and EAITC over 
decentralization. The integration of the aid staff into the foreign service was not 
popular among CIDA employees, particularly the requirement to serve in the field on 
a rotational basis, and there was general celebration when the conversion process was 
abandoned in January 1990. Marcel Masse replaced Margaret Catley Carlson as 
CIDA president in mid 1989. His unilateral decision not to proceed with the 
conversion of CIDA field staff to foreign service officers was interpreted at External 
Affairs as an attempt to recover some control over the aid programme from it.47 
There was likewise resentment among diplomatic staff of what they saw as the ‘gold-
44 Morrison, 1998U19, 312; Berry,1981.
45 Interview
46 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l)- Decentralization, Vol. 13, memo CMD-116 March 26,1990.
47 DFAIT File no. 38-1-1-CIDA (1) Decentralization vol. 13. Memo # CMD-116, March 26,1990.
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plating’ of the decentralized aid programme in comparison with the diplomatic 
missions. For example, “The aid program has personal computers and air conditioned 
Toyotas while other mission programs can barely get local travel funds.”48 A 
December 1990 EAITC audit of expenditures on decentralization reported that “There 
was evidence on our tour of the missions that CIDA and EAITC operated as two 
solitudes, in varying degrees from one mission to the next.”49 The two offices were 
sometimes physically separated, as they were in Tanzania until the building of the 
new chancery to house both (subsequently sold to the EU when decentralization was 
revoked). Several officials interviewed cited the Tanzania CIDA office’s possession 
of a dedicated fax line not open to the scrutiny of EAITC officials as a bone of 
contention.
Centralized aid posts also resented the resources lavished on the decentralized 
programmes. This phenomenon highlighted another problem created by 
decentralization. Rather than simplifying the bureaucratic process, CIDA struggled 
under the burden of administering bilateral aid through a multiplicity of 
administrative structures: centralized and decentralized missions; missions with field 
support units and those without; and newly established regional offices operating 
along side individual country programmes. In the decentralized missions, the 
compromise which determined that CIDA and EAITC would share management of 
the field offices created confused lines of accountability. The aid programme director 
reported to the Head of Mission (ambassador or high commissioner) and to the Vice- 
President of the relevant geographic branch at CIDA HQ. The Head of Mission, in 
turn, reported to both the Under-Secretary of State for the relevant geographic region 
at EAITC and to the President of CIDA. The problem was that not all of these parties 
were in unanimous agreement on every issue, nor were the lines of communication 
between them untrammeled. A 1992 CIDA evaluation of decentralization argued that 
each mission was left to hash out a workable chain of command as best it could. In
48 DFAIT File no. 38-1-1-CIDA (1) Decentralization vol.15, Memo # EEA-1046 June 22, 1990. A 
1990 External Affairs audit of decentralization expenditures reported that “In some missions it was 
only because of Decentralization that EAITC staff were provided with VCRs and microwave ovens 
when they were, as these expenditures had not originally been planned for.” DFAIT File no. 38-1-1- 
CIDA (1 ^ Decentralization vol.14, Internal Audit o f CIDA Decentralization Expenditures, December 
1990.
49 Ibid.
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some instances, the Head of Mission took a hands off approach to the aid programme, 
letting the aid programme director exercise his/her authority. Some ambassadors with 
knowledge of the development field were more involved in the management of the aid 
programme. Some, with limited knowledge and experience, tried to assert their 
authority anyway to the detriment of the aid programme.50 A CIDA internal post 
mortem on decentralization written in 1993 argued that in implementing the policy, 
the government had missed an opportunity to try a new approach to aid delivery. 
Instead of delegating authority to the field, it duplicated the existing administrative 
structure there without dismantling it at HQ.
Le modele retenu prevoyait, pour les Chefs du poste, une delegation 
d’autorite limitee, mais ou chacun des postes decentralises opererait 
avec un ensemble complet de services, c’est-a-dire avec des chefs 
d’equipe de projets, des analystes de programme, des conseillers 
financiers, des agents de contrats. En somme, une modele moins 
innovateur, c’est-a-dire une sorte de replique du modele de gestion du 
siege social en 20 exemplaires.51
A brief discussion of decentralization written in CIDA’s Evaluation and 
Performance Branch in 1994 placed the blame for this not on Foreign Affairs 
meddling in the aid programme, but on the CIDA hierarchy.
Le siege social de l’ACDI maintient ses directives habituelles, ignore 
ce qui se passe sur le terrain, empeche les remises en question basees 
sur la connaissance des equipes decentralisees et, done, bloque toute 
tentative d’innovation et d’experimentation.52
50 Blanchet, 1992.
51 Blanchet, 1993. Translation:
“ The model chosen gave the Heads of Mission a limited delegated authority, but each of the 
decentralized posts operated with a complete compliment of services, that is to say with project team 
leaders, programme analysts, resource officers, financial advisors and contract agents. In sum, a model 
less innovative, that is to say a kind of replication of the management model found at HQ, in twenty 
locations.”
52 CIDA Evaluation and Performance Branch, 1994. Translation:
“CIDA HQ maintained its habitual practices, ignoring what was happening in the field, prevented any 
reassessment based on the knowledge of the decentralized teams and finally, blocked all attempts at 
innovation and experimentation.”
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2.6 TWO VIEWS OF THE PURPOSE OF AID
HQ’s intransigence might be explained in part by the fact that back in Ottawa, 
the agency was under siege. One observer has described CIDA’s response to 
progressive budget cuts beginning in 1989 and continuing for the next decade as the 
adoption of a bunker mentality, taking a defensive rather than a proactive stance and 
becoming unreceptive to new ideas.53 However, as it became clear that
decentralization was not going to survive the government’s cost-cutting programme,
o
the agency made a final play for control over aid policy. A detailed consideration of 
the voluminous findings and recommendations of the Secor Strategic Management 
Review of 1991 is beyond the scope of this paper.54 However, the coincidence of a 
comprehensive management review with deep cuts to the aid budget and a loss of 
momentum in the decentralization process created an opportunity for significant 
structural changes to aid administration. Both CIDA and EAITC sought to take 
advantage of this period of flux to advance their claims on the aid programme. CIDA 
lost. EAITC memoranda illustrate both External Affairs’ perception of the objectives 
of the aid programme and the tenor of the relationship between CIDA and the 
Department of External Affairs and International Trade at this time. In February 
1992, just before the federal budget which formally finished off decentralization, a 
EAITC official wrote:
CIDA is neither a government department nor an independent 
operating agency but an integral part of the [foreign policy] portfolio.
Our role is to ensure that CIDA remains accountable to the government 
for broad policy directions. CIDA’s role is to ensure that these policy 
directions are effectively implemented and executed.... Secor’s 
recommendation that CIDA increase its policy analysis and strategic 
thinking would effectively make CIDA responsible for Canadian 
foreign policy in the developing world. We would argue strenuously 
that what is required by CIDA is rather the ability to coordinate and 
implement our broad foreign policy objectives across its geographic 
‘fiefdoms.’ This must be linked closely to our policy analysis and 
strategic planning capabilities to ensure that CIDA’s focus remains 
implementation rather than the development of parallel policy.55
53 Interview.
54 See Morrison, 1998: Chapter Nine.
55 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol.58. Memo #CPD-1028, 5 February 1992.
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That there was a deliberate, calculated attempt to assert its control over aid 
policy by EAITC post-Secor/mid-decentralization is evidenced by internal 
memoranda. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., 
Eastern Europe became a recipient of Canadian aid. This was initially managed by 
EAITC and provided for in a separate allocation within an International Assistance 
Envelope (IAE) which included the allocations for ODA and humanitarian relief 
managed by CIDA as well as allocations for the IDRC and couple of other 
government agencies. This development combined with the release of the Secor 
Report and a hiatus in decentralization was perceived as an opportunity to act at 
EAITC. A EAITC official wrote:
The establishment of the IAE means we now have a greater 
opportunity to influence the implementation if [sic] international 
assistance programmes (ODA and non-ODA) and to alter the 
allocation and use of resources so as to reflect foreign policy 
objectives. There are two fundamental issues for EAITC: a) How 
should we pursue our long term objective to make the International 
Assistance Programme an integral part of foreign policy? b) What 
organizational structure will best ensure that foreign policy interests 
and values are reflected in programs and projects?... The door is open 
to seek organizational and other changes which could expand our 
ability to utilize Official Development Assistance (ODA), a component 
of the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), as a foreign policy 
instrument.56
The memo outlined battle tactics for a looming skirmish with CIDA.
Also, we must prepare to ward off post-Secor proposals from CIDA for 
organizational reform which will seek to give it a greater capability 
and role in policy and decision-making. CIDA will likely seek to 
‘download’ project administration onto contracted entities so as to 
devote greater personnel resources to policy formulation and dialogue 
with development partners...Our best defense [sic] will be a strategic 
offense and a long-term plan.57
These manoeuvres at External Affairs were based on the conviction that 
Canada’s foreign policy in all its facets should be integrated and cohesive. The goal 
of policy coherence between Canadian aid, trade and diplomacy abroad is one
56 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.59. Memo #EEA-1310, 10 April 1992.
57 Ibid.
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pursued by the non-governmental international development lobby in Canada as well. 
However, whereas CIDA and the NGO lobby perceive policy coherence as the most 
effective means to pursue ‘developmental’ objectives in poor countries, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is charged first and foremost 
with protecting Canadian interests abroad. Policy coherence from this perspective 
means that aid, trade and diplomacy must all accord with this objective. This view 
does not exclude the pursuit of developmental objectives through the aid programme, 
but the opportunity to advance Canadian interests abroad must be maximized. There 
was concern at External Affairs that if unchecked, a renewed bid for autonomy by 
CIDA would jeopardize these opportunities.
If successful in downloading accountability for project 
implementation, focusing on policy and reducing the number of 
recipients, CIDA will have substantially greater scope to determine 
bilateral and multilateral policy. Indeed, CIDA has already taken steps 
to strengthen its policy role in areas within the traditional domain of 
EAITC, continuing a decade long trend which has eroded the role of 
this department.58
Drawing selectively on a series of recommendations contained in the Secor 
Report, CIDA senior management headed by President Marcel Masse put a proposal 
before Cabinet which outlined the transformation of CIDA into a ‘knowledge-based’ 
agency to be focused on policy analysis and development and extensive policy 
dialogue with developing countries. EAITC forecasts that CIDA would attempt to 
offload aid delivery proved accurate. Corporate management would be centralized, 
but programming and aid implementation in its entirety would be contracted outside 
the agency on large long-term agreements.
Proposal calls to a short-list of private sector firms and organizations 
would define program objectives and provide an indicative level of 
financing over a ten year period. Interested firms would then describe 
how they would propose to achieve those objectives by submitting a 
more detailed project planning document with specific and measurable 
performance indicators. CIDA would manage the contract...59
58 Ibid.
59 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A (l) Vol.60. Memo #PSD-0060, 17 August 1992.
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The traditional ‘project’ approach was to be discarded in favour of the 
organization of the aid programme around thematic units, although it is unclear how 
this was to be implemented.
EAITC took a hard line against this proposal. In addition to its opposition to 
an increased policy-making role for CIDA, it objected to the Tocking-in’ of resources 
on a long-term basis. Notes for Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara 
MacDougall (Senior minister responsible for Foreign Affairs and International Trade) 
for her impending meeting with Monique Landry (junior minister responsible for the 
aid programme) stated that “We need to show our Cabinet colleagues that the aid 
programme is also a valuable tool to achieve our domestic economic objectives.”60
In this vein, there was a counter proposal from EAITC for the establishment of 
a two tier aid programme, a notion which later emerged as a central component of the 
Development Assistance Policy Update leaked to the press in January 1993 (discussed 
in Chapter Four). In this early incarnation, it was proposed that two separate agencies 
be established to administer ODA. One would be a ‘development’ agency serving the 
LDC’s. “The focus would be on a grant assistance for poverty reduction and basic 
social activities and humanitarian programs.” The second agency would be devoted 
to ‘economic cooperation’ with Central and Eastern Europe, North Africa, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (then in relatively better economic shape), the Pacific Rim, the 
Middle East and most of Latin America. Programme activities would be designed for 
mutual gain. Among the advantages foreseen in this type of arrangement was that “it 
puts the management of programs in these countries now handled by CIDA into an 
agency where development is not the dominant ethos... It also offers a home for the 
growing programs of Eastern and Central Europe without adding to the monolithic 
control of CIDA.”61 Other advantages cited were improved responsiveness to private 
sector interests and the provision of a “diversity of channels which are more open to
ffldirection in response to foreign policy interests and objectives.”
60 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol.60. Memo #EEA-1704, July 28,1992.
61 Ibid. Emphasis added.
62 Ibid.
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Ultimately, this plan for two new aid agencies never saw the light of day, and 
the more tacit division of aid recipients into economic ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
contained in the Development Assistance Policy Update of 1993 let loose such a 
storm of public protest that the government was forced to backtrack on some of its
(\*Xmore blatantly commercial points. However, neither could CIDA claim victory in 
this engagement. Its proposal to restructure the aid programme around thematic units 
rather than projects was abandoned following Masse’s departure in 1993. Despite 
apparent EAITC opposition, the privatization of aid delivery did accelerate rapidly in 
the early 1990’s. However, the anticipation at CIDA that the removal of this 
responsibility would enable it to concentrate on policy development and coordination 
was not realized. In fact, it could be argued that the privatization of aid delivery has 
lessened the agency’s capacity for policy analysis and development as it has been cut 
off from direct access to valuable knowledge gained in the field, the type of 
knowledge reported by decentralized staff as being so useful to them in making sound 
management decisions. The agency’s decision to privatize project identification, 
design, implementation and evaluation, particularly in light of evidence presented in 
the Secor Report that heavy use of consultants increased aid delivery costs cited in 
Chapter One, and the subsequent impact of this policy on the quality of Canadian aid 
suggested by anecdotal evidence from Tanzania project files, is a topic in need of 
further research. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper. With regards to the 
matter at hand, CIDA’s ambitions proved no match for the more powerful Department 
of External Affairs, which if it did not succeed entirely in seizing control of the aid 
programme at this time, at least thwarted another attempt from CIDA to assert its 
autonomy.
2.7 POLICY REVERSAL: RECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION
This long saga has been presented in an effort to describe the political 
atmosphere which provided a backdrop to the decentralization of aid administration 
which began in 1989. In December 1989, just a little more than a year after the first 
cohort of decentralized aid staff had been sent overseas, the Expenditure Review 
Committee (ERC) of Cabinet decided that the funds allocated for CIDA’s
63 Dave Todd, January 26,1993.
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decentralization would be reduced. CIDA was asked to consult with External Affairs 
and Treasury Board to look for ways to cut costs. Their June 1990 report presented 
three options to the government: recentralization, the resubmission of the proposal to 
semi-autonomous aid offices, and a ‘streamlining’ option with reduced Canadian staff 
and more out-sourcing of activities. At this time, neither CIDA nor EAITC favoured 
recentralization. The report stated:
while such a policy does generate some short-term savings from the 
administration budget...it also returns the Agency to a system of 
program delivery whose inefficiency and ineffectiveness has been 
consistently demonstrated during the 1970’s and ‘80’s.64
It would also entail explaining to the Canadian public, and to recipient 
countries which had welcomed decentralization, the expenditure of $100 million on a 
policy that was reversed within 18 months of inception. CIDA senior management 
was known to favour the aid office model, but EAITC did not support it. “This 
approach would clearly jeopardize both the authority and the accountability of the 
Head of Mission.”65 It favoured the ‘streamlining option’ which met Treasury Board 
instructions to cut thirty person years and sixty-six million dollars from the 
decentralization budget.66 A comment made by an EAITC official one day before the 
submission of the report provides a brief insight into how bureaucratic battles are 
waged.
The presentation of the argument in favour of the streamlined option is 
quite contrived and anyone reading the summary will realize that Doug 
Lindores [CIDA Vice-President], who wrote the section on the aid 
office model, is only half-heartedly on board and that CIDA’s 
preference (Lindores’ at least) is for the aid office model.
The Cabinet chose the streamlining option, but this soon became 
recentralization as subsequent federal budgets reduced, then cancelled, the allocation 
for decentralization. Morrison quotes senior aid staff comments that decentralization 
had been implemented quickly and without consultation due to CIDA President
64 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A (l) Decentralization, Vol.13 CIDA Decentralization (DRAFT), June 30 
1990
65 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Decentralization, Vol.14. EA Memo # EEA-1046, June 22, 1990.
66 Ibid.
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Margaret Catley Carlson’s desire to seize the opportunity presented by the 
government’s acceptance of the Winegard Report’s recommendations before it
/■ o
disappeared. However, in 1989, returning CIDA President Masse was more guarded 
in his enthusiasm for the policy.69 He expressed concern that the Office of the 
President of CIDA was losing control over aid delivery and that “one could eventually 
see CIDA’s transformation into little more than a funding agency” as a result of the 
decentralization of CIDA staff to the field and External Affairs’ legal authority over
7 0all Canada’s activities overseas. As Catley Carlson’s rapid implementation of 
decentralization was interpreted by some as a play to assert CIDA’s autonomy,
Masse’s tacit acquiescence to the recentralization of aid administration seems to have 
been in defense of the same autonomy. A meeting of the President’s Committee on 
January 27, 1993 formally put an end to the decentralization experiment and this was 
reflected in the budget Estimates for that year.71
While CIDA/DFAIT power struggles must be counted as a significant 
contributing factor in the reversal of decentralization, there were other forces working 
against it as well. In contrast to the optimistic and enthusiastic assessments of 
decentralization found in early reports, subsequent accounts were highly critical in 
tone. Their criticisms centered on the costs of decentralization and its overly complex 
and confused administrative structure. There was also strong opposition to the policy 
emanating from the private commercial sector.
2.8 EXPLANATIONS OF POLICY REVERSAL: COSTS
Ostensibly, CIDA’s plans for decentralization were a casualty of the 
government budget deficit reduction exercises begun in 1989. Treasury Board 
President Robert de Cotret was charged with finding places to trim spending, and he 
fingered decentralization as a policy the government could not afford to keep. 
However, CIDA’s own internal audits of the costs of decentralization, the 
independent strategic management review of CIDA conducted in 1991, as well as the
67 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Decentralization, Vol.14. EA Memo # EEA-1079, June 29, 1990.
68 Morrison, 1998:306.
69 Morrison, 1998:310.
70 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Decentralization, Vol.13. EA Memo #CMD-116, March 26, 1990.
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underlying rationale for decentralized aid espoused by the government at the outset, 
suggests that the explanation is not that straightforward.
Decentralization was undertaken with the understanding that Canadian aid up 
to that point was failing to meet its objectives and that it could only be made more 
effective by moving the design and implementation process closer to the intended 
beneficiaries. There seemed to be a recognition on the part of the government and of 
CIDA that the costs involved were necessary and that “By definition, decentralized 
aid delivery is more costly than centralized delivery. The increased costs of 
decentralized delivery must therefore be regarded as an investment in getting better 
results from each aid dollar expended.”72
It is not possible to make a solid cost/benefit analysis of decentralized aid as 
available cost figures are sketchy in the extreme. However, it seems fairly safe to 
conclude that overall aid delivery costs did rise during the period of decentralized aid 
administration. The 1991 Secor Strategic Management Review of CIDA estimated 
that the cost to disburse $1000 of bilateral aid increased by thirty-seven per cent from 
$52.9 in 1986/87 (before decentralization), to $72.6 in 1990/91 (during 
decentralization), though the provenance of these figures is not given. Whatever its 
precise magnitude, the increase in aid delivery costs to roughly double the OECD 
donor average earned CIDA a chastisement from the DAC in November 1990.74 
Based on available documentation, the increase in delivery costs appears to have 
varied wildly from country to country. The Secor Report stated that the Anglo-Africa 
Branch experienced only a three per cent increase in delivery costs during this period, 
while in the Asia Branch costs rose by fifty-five per cent. This variation was 
attributed to the fact that the Africa programmes contained a greater proportion of big 
budget projects which were comparatively less costly to administer. The 
CIDA/DEAITC 1991 report on decentralization stated that preliminary cost studies of
71 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.61. Telex 25 Feb 93 CIDA to all Posts.
72 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Decentralization, Vol. 13. CIDA/EAITC. CIDA Decentralization 
(DRAFT), June 30 1990.
63/1 of the Groupe Secor Report, 1991:63/1.
74 Cited in Morrison, 1998:310.
75 Secor, 1991.
118
three decentralized programmes indicated that “the total non-capital gross costs of aid 
delivery have been estimated to have increased between 36 and 104 per cent.”76
In 1990 CIDA reported that, with nine decentralized country programmes, ten 
smaller satellite aid missions and twenty-five centralized aid programmes in 
operation, the overall cost of administering Canadian ODA was $206 million. $103 
million of that amount was under the direct control of CIDA, which manages seventy- 
six percent of Canadian ODA. The remainder was and is disbursed through various 
programmes administered by the IDRC, the Department of Finance (which deals with 
the International Financial Institutions) and the Department of Foreign Affairs. In 
1990, during decentralized aid, DEAITC controlled $90 million of the aid 
administration budget to cover its support to CIDA field staff and the decentralization 
process. It was reported that CIDA’s administrative costs of $103 million represented
773.5 per cent of Canadian ODA or 4.6 per cent of CIDA’s budget. It should be noted 
that these figures are at variance with the DAC estimate for CIDA of 8 per cent of
78ODA spent on administration in 1990. However, if the total administrative costs of
the aid programme disbursed through all responsible departments were included, the 
figures would roughly accord.
Most of this sum (sixty-three per cent) was accounted for by employee 
salaries.79 In 1990, there were two hundred and twenty-eight Canadian aid officials 
working in forty-five CIDA missions overseas (nineteen of which were at that point 
decentralized). One hundred and seventeen of these officials had been deployed as 
part of decentralization. In addition, forty-two field support units providing technical 
and logistical support to the aid programme employed an additional sixty-eight
OA
Canadians. In 1990, the Canadian aid programme employed four hundred and forty-
o I
four locally engaged employees.
76 CIDA/EAITC, 1991. The three country programmes were Indonesia, the Sahel and Senegal.
77 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Decentralization, Vol.13. CIDA Decentralization (DRAFT), June 30 
1990. No explanation for how these figures were determined is given.
78 Morrison, 1998:310.
79 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A (l) Decentralization, Vol.13. CIDA Decentralization (DRAFT), June 30 
1990.
80 Ibid.
81 CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
119
The cost of maintaining an increased Canadian field staff has been cited as a 
contributing factor in increasing aid delivery costs to an unsustainable and impractical 
level. A 1992 CIDA evaluation reported that each Canadian official placed in the field 
in Indonesia represented $177,000 in additional costs, in the Sahel it meant $171,000, 
and in Senegal $126,000 (c.f. 1991 Evaluation).82 These figures presumably include 
insurance, the institutional support required for the official to do his/her job (office 
space, vehicle, etc.), as well as the subsidized housing with which Canadian overseas 
staff are provided. It is not clear if this sum is an annual or a one-off relocation cost, 
or if the figures include salaries, which in some cases would not be an additional cost. 
Figures are not available for all country programmes, but as an example, the 
decentralization of the Ivory Coast/Sahel CIDA office which administered four 
country programmes, included the posting of an additional thirty-five Canadians to 
the field and the recruitment of one hundred and fifty-nine people locally.83 However, 
if one considers that decentralization entailed the placement of one hundred and 
seventeen additional person years in the field by 1991, plus twenty-two additional 
Canadian support staff, the start up costs were in any case considerable.
CIDA/EAITC officials had anticipated this additional initial expense, allocating $233 
million for the transition, and estimating that maintenance costs for decentralized 
administration would thereafter drop to around $50 million a year.
These transition costs were compounded by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
‘Buy Canada’ policy, as auditors noted in an internal audit of CIDA’s decentralization 
expenditures in 1990. All Canadian missions overseas are furnished with Canadian 
made goods, down to the paper towel dispensers in the toilets. The auditors noted that 
this policy resulted in the expenditure of $527,000 in shipping costs alone to transport 
office furniture to the newly decentralized mission in Harare. The rapid dispatch of 
field staff to Zimbabwe also resulted in a hotel bill of $78,000 while staff awaited
82 Blanchet, 1992.
83 Ibid. Note: again there are discrepancies in reported figures. The figures cited are from an internal 
CIDA document from 1992 which says staff at Sahel office increased from 103 to 302. They are at 
variance with the figures cited in the Secor Starategic Management Review of 1991 and those reported 
in Morrison, 1999:308, which indicate that the Sahel office had a staff o f255 not 302 in 1990. While 
this is not a matter of central importance, the discrepancy on this issue makes the veracity of all other 
statistics and conclusions reported in the CIDA/DFAIT documents and memoranda related to 
decentralization an unreliable basis on which to draw definitive conclusions.
84 Morrison,1998:306.
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preparation of their quarters.85 Similar costs were incurred in Tanzania, where seven 
new houses were built to house additional staff, and a new chancery, completed in 
1991. Reviewing expenditures between April 1988 and December 1989, the auditors 
said “The decentralization model was implemented hastily and within extremely tight 
deadlines, with little consideration given to the financial aspects of the project.”86
Evaluators also suggested that decentralization was a very labour-intensive 
way to administer aid. The 1992 evaluation of the Senegal, Ivory Coast and Indonesia 
programmes noted that annual aid disbursements had fallen over three years of 
decentralized administration. This was attributed in part to aid budget cuts over the 
same period, but also to the difficulties attached to the transition to decentralized 
administration. In Senegal, a twenty per cent increase in the number of projects
87initiated coincided with a twenty per cent decrease in their average size. However, 
various CIDA reports and evaluations refer to the financial benefits of decentralized 
aid administration. The 1990 report on decentralization drafted at CIDA noted that 
decentralization was proving to be less costly to implement than anticipated, with 
$30.2 million of the $106.6 million allocated for the first two years not spent, and 
objectives nevertheless achieved. The report also claimed that “Experience to date 
indicates that not only is decentralization achieving its basic objective of more 
effective programming, but that administrative cost increases are being more than
OQ
offset by savings in the cost of programs.” These savings were estimated at between 
ten and fifteen per cent over previous years, or between $32.2 and $48.3 million, 
versus an expenditure on decentralization over the same period of $42.6. However, 
there is no explanation given for how these figures were determined. On their 
strength, the report concluded that “The recentralization model [then under 
consideration] is not attractive because there are no real cost savings and because all 
the program quality benefits of decentralization would be lost.”89 However, 
presumably on the basis of the same evidence, the 1992 brief cited above, also
85 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l), Internal audit o f  CIDA Decentralization Expenditures April 1988 
-  December 311989, December 1990.
86 Ibid.
87 Blanchet, 1992.
88 CIDA Decentralization (DRAFT), June 30 1990, DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A (l) Vol.13 - 
Decentralization.
89 Ibid.
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prepared within CIDA, concluded that “Finalement, on reconnait maintenant qu’il est 
sans doubte possible d’atteindre les memes resultats de fa9 on differente et a meilleur 
compte.”90
The 1991 Secor Report which reported the rise in aid delivery costs between 
1987 and 1991 did not place the blame on decentralization which it called ‘a false 
issue.’ While it identified decentralization as a significant factor in the rising costs, it 
also cited the aid budget cuts as contributing to a decrease in disbursements while 
administration overhead costs remained fixed.91 The report also suggested that it was 
another recent change in aid delivery, that of contracting out the planning and 
implementation stages of the aid process, which was responsible for the inflation of 
aid delivery costs. This is an issue which merits further investigation.
On the basis of the suspect accounting presented above, it is not possible to 
make an accurate cost/benefit analysis of CIDA’s decentralization 1988-1993. 
However, the shakiness of the figures found in CIDA and DFAIT documents and the 
limited time the policy was in force make it difficult to accept the argument that the 
cancellation of decentralization was based wholly or primarily on any such 
cost/benefit analysis. There were certainly other factors taken into consideration in 
the decision to recentralize CIDA operations, including the political fallout from the 
decision to decentralize aid administration in the first instance.
2.9 OPPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Internal CIDA evaluations of the decentralization process and Department of 
Foreign Affairs memoranda indicate that the Canadian private sector opposed CIDA’s 
decentralization of aid administration to the field. Canada’s highly tied aid 
programme and policy of hiring Canadian companies/organizations to implement 
bilateral aid projects overseas translates into millions of dollars in aid contracts up for 
grabs annually to Canadian contractors (both commercial and non-profit). The view
90 Blanchet, 1992. Translation: “Finally, it is recognized now that it is without doubt possible to obtain 
the same results in a different way and at a better cost.”
91 Groupe Secor, 1991
92 Ibid: 83/2.
within the Canadian business community was that the changes in aid policy outlined 
in Sharing Our Future, particularly the untying of aid to LDCs, the shift to 
programme aid at the expense of capital goods-intensive projects, and the 
decentralization of aid administration to the field all threatened the private sector’s 
access to these contracts. A report on CIDA’s decentralization made by the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Decentralization in June 1990 outlined the 
implications of the policy for Canadian commercial enterprises. It reported that the 
combination of a reduction in the aid budget in recent years with “The steady growth 
in the number of consultants seeking work with CIDA and shifting patterns of 
demand (e.g. toward environmental protection and against engineering) have all led to 
a declining share of business for those Canadian firms used to pre-decentralization 
levels of activity.” These trends in the aid programme were not welcomed by the 
business community. The report continued:
Decentralization -  meaning the transfer of authority to the field -  has 
made it more difficult for Canada-based representatives of the 
Canadian private sector to deal directly and easily with CIDA decision­
makers. In one sense, this is an encouraging development which has 
compelled Canadian consultants and suppliers to spend more time in 
the field, a trend foreseen and encouraged by the Winegard Committee 
(pg 84) in order to ‘draw Canadians out into the world.’ In other cases, 
the separation has led to inconvenience and uncertainty in the private 
sector. CIDA is now making particular efforts to both explain 
decentralization to Canadian firms and to lessen any negative
94impacts.
CIDA field offices claimed some progress on this front. Three years after its 
decentralization, the Philippines mission reported that “We have been successful in 
associating parts of the Canadian constituency with our work.” It noted however that 
“At the same time, it is quite clear that smaller firms that used to ‘cruise’ CIDA in the 
hopes of getting information that would lead to contracts [find it] is harder with 
decentralized programs than is the case in Hull.”95
93 CIDA Decentralization(DRAFT), June 30 1990, DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol.13 - 
Decentralization.
94 Ibid.
95 DFAIT File no. 38-l- l-C ID A (l)- Decentralization, Vol.15.
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In May 1990, representatives of the Canadian Exporters Association requested 
a meeting with officials at the Department of External Affairs to express its 
opposition to CIDA’s decentralization. An External Affairs official present reported 
that:
Our discussion expanded to cover the strongly held view of the CEA 
[Canadian Exporters Association] that a number of decisions over the 
past three years have undermined the opportunities for private sector 
involvement in the work of CIDA and die overall trade, business and 
investment opportunities in the developing world.96
Of Canada’s pledge to untie fifty percent of aid destined for LDCs for local 
procurement as outlined in the 1987 policy document Sharing Our Future, the CEA 
expressed its concern that “The untying of aid meant that there were less opportunities 
for Canadian exporters. The CEA does not believe CIDA has the ability to monitor 
local purchases to ensure they have the necessary domestic content: thus we may
07unwittingly subsidize European exports to these countries. The CEA also 
registered its opposition to the recent shift to programme aid as it entailed a loss to 
Canadian exporters selling consulting engineering services and manufactures through 
the aid programme. Further, it claimed that the Lines of Credit mechanism for 
making Canadian commodity and equipment grants to recipient countries 
administered by the federal Department of Supply and Services, was “doing little to
QO
establish a long-term buyer-seller relationship.’
The CEA’s opposition to decentralization was grounded in the belief that the 
policy would “undermine Canadian corporate interest and capabilities in LDCs. 
Decentralized staff are less likely to be aware of Canadian capabilities and therefore 
project selection and design, done in the field, will not be as responsive... CEA are 
extremely disappointed that CIDA has not followed up on their repeated suggestion 
that officers about to be posted to decentralized posts have briefings on Canadian
96 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A (l) Decentralization Vol.13, Memo EEA-0757 May 4,1990. In this 
memo the acronym CEA refers to the Canadian Exporters Association and not to Canadian Executing 
Agencies, its common usage in CIDA documents.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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expertise and competitiveness.”99 In this meeting the CEA told government officials 
that it was pleased with the increased level of aid work contracted out to private sector 
executing agencies and with the CIDA Inc. programme which funds project 
development and feasibility studies for businesses investigating expanding production 
to developing countries.
But these paled when considered against the value of traditional project 
activity, the difficulties caused by the absence of sufficient Section 31 
money [funds available to Canadian firms from the Export 
Development Corporation], poorly utilized Lines of Credit, the absence 
of an aid/trade provision of some sort, and the negative impact of 
decentralization. 00
The following year, a CIDA internal evaluation of the decentralization process 
reported on the results of a survey of thirty five Canadian executing agencies located 
in Canada, canvassed for their views on decentralization. The respondents were from 
both commercial firms and non-profit organizations. The evaluators determined that 
these organizations had a limited knowledge of what decentralization was as well as a 
predominantly negative attitude toward it. Canadian businesses resented the expected 
increase in cost to them in seeking aid contracts and in maintaining relationships with 
CIDA representatives now posted overseas. They expressed the concern that 
companies with overseas offices would have an advantage over Canada-based firms 
in seeking out contracts. They also expected delays in the awarding of tenders and in 
payment as parts of the decision-making process were moved to the field. The 
evaluation reported that “NGOs tend to be most favourably disposed to 
decentralization, field staff more so than their HQ counterparts.” However, the report 
noted the “fears of Canadian NGOs that they will be by-passed to the advantage of 
local NGOs.” Of both non-profit and commercial contractors the report concluded 
that “Indirect evidence from the field suggests that Canadian partners there are more 
informed, and for the most part, more positive about decentralization.”101
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
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These observations highlight a disturbing conflict of interest inherent in the
* Iaid process. Where decentralization was actually succeeding in fulfilling its 
developmental objectives -  in involving the nationals of aid recipient countries in the 
design and implementation of projects and in untying aid resources for local 
procurement -  it was opposed most vociferously by those Canadian firms which form 
the pool of executing agencies hired by CIDA to meet its development objectives.
Decentralized teams.. .were placed in the field to respond better, and to 
provide better service to recipient countries. This often involves 
greater development and use of local resources for both developmental 
reasons and for reasons of economy. Thus decentralized teams are not 
only distanced from Canadian partners, but will tend to substitute their 
own internal and or local resources for Canadian resources. This is a 
trade-off which is implicit in decentralization, and helps to explain 
some of the negative attitudes to decentralization on the part of some 
Canadian partners.103
In any case, by this point CIDA’s experiment with decentralized aid 
administration was already in wind down mode. In fact, two weeks after the above 
cited meeting between government officials and the Canadian Exporters Association, 
an internal government memorandum reported that after months of assurances to 
CIDA staff that decentralization would proceed as planned, “CIDA was advised late 
yesterday that the cancellation of decentralization was a real option.”104 The memo 
noted that CIDA was now preparing for that possibility based on the premise that the 
policy could founder on the inability of CIDA and the DEAITC to resolve the matter 
of which department was responsible for aid field staff; on the high financial costs 
attached to decentralized aid; and/or as a result of an understanding that “the private 
sector lobby is more than significant.”105
It would be a mistake to conclude on the basis of this evidence that 
decentralization was cancelled as a result of pressure from the Canadian commercial 
sector. Just as there are no solid data to substantiate private sector claims that they 
were suffering financial losses as a result of the policy, there is, perhaps not
102 c.f. Putzel, 1998 on EU aid.
103 CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
104 Memo EA (File 2-5-CIDA-D), May 16, 1990. DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Decentralization
Vol. 13.
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surprisingly, no written record stating that the decision to re-centralize aid 
administration was made in part or in whole in response to pressure from the private 
sector. The project was beset by other problems which combined to shorten its 
lifespan. Primary among these were the perceived high costs of the programme, 
unpalatable in a period of federal government belt-tightening, and perhaps more 
significantly in terms of a discussion of the aid agency’s ability to innovate and 
improve development practice, the conflict between CIDA and other government 
departments and between the headquarters and the field offices which resulted in a 
mishmash of regulations governing aid and a highly complex administrative structure. 
An internal CIDA document evaluating four years of decentralized aid in 1992 placed 
a large measure of the blame for its failure on an interdepartmental power struggle for 
control of CIDA and of the aid budget which compromised any potential gains to 
improving the quality of Canadian aid that decentralized administration might offer. 
Again, it is important to note that this evaluation, like the few others carried out and 
cited here, was not based on a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of the policy -  
impossible due to the short time it was in effect -  but on the strongly held views of 
those intimately involved in the process.
Le modele adopte etait le reflet d’un compromis negocie entre l’ACDI, 
AECEC et le Conseil du Tresor. II repondait avant tout aux 
preoccupations du siege social de chacune de trois organisations 
impliquees. Mais il repondait peu aux preoccupations d’efficacite 
exprimees dans les principes de la decentralisation fixes par le 
govemement, notamment les principes suivant: ‘eviter le creation de 
niveaux hierarchiques supplementaires, eviter les duplications 
d’autorite et de responsabilite. Et il ne repondait pas a la 
problematique terrain en ce sens qu’il n’etait pas consequent avec les 
imperatifs singuliers de livraison strategique de chaque programme.106
106 Blanchet, 1992. Translation:
“The model adopted reflected a compromise negotiated among CIDA, DFAIT and the 
Treasury Board. It addressed above all the preoccupations of the headquarters of each of the three 
organizations involved. But it responded little to matters of efficacy outlined in the principles of 
decentralization set by the government, notably the following: ‘to avoid the creation of additional 
levels of bureaucracy, to avoid the duplication of authority and responsibility.’ And it did not consider
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2.10 THE FAILURE OF POLICY OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
The manner in which decentralization was implemented and its subsequent 
silent demise raises the question of the effectiveness of the oversight and corrective 
mechanisms installed in the Canadian political system. Ignoring the fact that the aid 
programme had been permitted to balloon into a hugely inefficient operation 
throughout the 1970’s, the combined attentions of the Office of the Auditor-General, 
Parliamentary Committees, the press and a vigilant academic and NGO lobby seemed 
to have fulfilled the oversight function as outlined by Brett admirably in detecting 
inefficiencies and proposing corrective policy changes.107 However, as Hirschman 
observed, for oversight mechanisms to be effective, there must be consequences for 
disregarding such evidence of policy failure and subsequent advice.108 There are no 
such incentives to place development objectives before all others in the Canadian aid 
programme, and no sanctions beyond public rebuke for failing to meet them.109 The 
government paid lip service to the concept of decentralization, then revoked its 
commitment altogether.
Perhaps not surprisingly, CIDA’s decision to decentralize aid administration 
and rapid about face on the issue did not spark much media or public interest in 
Canada. While the spectacular failure of Canadian aid projects overseas is 
periodically deemed a sufficiently newsworthy topic, the struggle between CIDA, 
EAITC and the business community over the bureaucratic process through which aid 
is administered and where project approval authority rested was not especially 
telegenic and did not provide riveting copy. The expenditure of $150 million on a 
policy aimed at improving the quality of Canadian aid and its cancellation only 
months after implementation failed to spark the public imagination, although it did 
receive some press coverage in July 1992, long after the decision had been taken.110 
Again, it is interesting to contrast this expenditure of $150 million dollars with the
the problematic setting, in the sense that it was not in accordance with the unique demands for strategic 
delivery in each programme.”
107 Brett, 1988.
108 Hirschman,1970.
109 c.f Putzel,1998.
110 Morrison reports that disgrunted CIDA field staff informed the press in the summer of 1992 that the 
policy had been cancelled. The decision, already a fait a complet but not yet official, did receive some 
press coverage at that time.See: Morrison, 1998:311.
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Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project which was worth approximately half as much in 
monetary terms. The Wheat Project has been the subject of numerous newspaper 
articles, documentaries and academic research, and CIDA has conducted several 
evaluations of the project over the course of twenty-five years. CIDA never 
conducted a final evaluation of the decentralization experience.
This raises, finally, the question of CIDA’s capacity to learn from experience. 
Initial reports that decentralization was having a positive impact on aid did not seem 
to have much bearing on the government’s decision to cancel the programme and re­
institute an administrative system which had proven ineffective and inefficient in the 
past. In the Foreign Policy Review of 1994 from which the government’s next 
statement on aid policy emerged, decentralization was not an issue. There is a 
feeling, expressed by some aid officials, that decentralization is an idea whose time 
has passed. The practicality of re-instituting a similar administrative structure to 
manage a programme like that in Tanzania, with a budget of approximately $12 
million a year, is questionable. However, decentralization has not disappeared 
entirely, various country programmes including Thailand, Costa Rica and the 
Philippines have decentralized some of their activities. The lack of a detailed final 
evaluation of the decentralization process of 1988-93 suggests that should the agency 
ever decide to pursue a similar approach to aid delivery (as suggested by Helleiner et 
al) in the future, the lessons of the past will be difficult to unearth if they have not 
already been lost.
2.11 CONCLUSIONS
The decision to decentralize the administration of Canada’s aid programme 
was the result of the overwhelming support for the policy voiced in the public 
hearings of the SCEAIT on development assistance in 1987. The government’s 
decision to accept the committee’s recommendation to shift management of the aid 
programme overseas can only be interpreted as acquiescence to public pressure, or 
perhaps in a more edifying light, to a genuine desire on the part of elected politicians 
and their advisors in the public service to improve the aid programme’s ability to 
assist development in poor countries. Why then did this attempt at innovation fail?
129
Although the process of decentralization was halted before it was complete, as the 
material presented above suggests, there was at least a perception at CIDA and in the 
Department of External Affairs that the policy was beginning to have a positive 
impact on the aid programme. However, it was also becoming apparent that there 
were major flaws in the new administrative structure. Chief among them was that in 
reality, it was not much different from the old one. Overseas staff had doubled, and 
knowledge of the local situation in each programme country had improved, but the 
bulk of management decisions were still made in Ottawa. Therefore, if CIDA’s 
experiment with decentralization is said to have failed, a distinction must be made 
between the model implemented and the concept itself, which was never truly put to 
the test.
The government officials charged with implementing decentralization had 
several options open to them in doing so. They could have transferred responsibility 
for administering aid funds directly to recipient country nationals. They could have 
moved all operations to the field. They chose to retain most of the decision-making 
authority in Ottawa, reducing the potential benefits to be gained by placing additional 
staff in the field. Where did resistance to any real innovation come from? As the 
material presented above describes, this choice was the result of an unwillingness on 
the part of both CIDA and EAITC to cede any control of the aid programme to the 
other. If the CIDA officials Morrison quotes are right, it was at least in part due to 
Minister Landry’s refusal to relinquish significant approval authority for decisions for 
which she would ultimately be responsible in Parliament. Given the most generous 
possible assessment, the administrative confusion which resulted could be interpreted 
as growing pains, and it is conceivable that it might have corrected itself 
eventually.111 However, subsequent events revealed that the conflict between CIDA 
and EAITC over the implementation of decentralization was more than just a turf war. 
It was a struggle over whether aid was to be used as an instrument for poverty 
reduction or for maximizing Canadian interests abroad. This conflict has been 
institutionalized in the bureaucratic structure of the government which subordinates
111 The ‘deconcentrated’ administrative structure developed for the Thailand programme in the same 
period has been cited as a more successful approach to moving the aid process closer to the intended 
beneficiaries CIDA/EAITC, 1991.
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CIDA and aid policy to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
whose primary responsibility is to protect Canadian interests abroad.
In addition to bureaucratic politics, these events highlight other pressures 
which shape Canadian aid policy and ultimately its outcome. While the expressed 
views of the commercial lobby were considered by government officials to be “more 
than significant” in the decision to recentralize aid administration, the supposed 
beneficiaries or ‘principal’ clients of Canadian ODA in aid recipient countries were 
not consulted on this matter. The economic interests of the commercial sector in this 
case were advanced by direct access to decision-makers, but also indirectly by EAITC 
as a matter of course. As detailed above, the official explanation for recentralization 
of unsustainable costs is a dubious one given the lack of reliable figures on costs and 
benefits. Whatever the merits or defects of decentralization as a concept may be, in 
all of these calculations, finding the best way to deliver effective aid appears to have 
come last. The botched process of implementation and the perceived strengthening of 
External Affairs control over the aid programme left the policy with few ardent 
supporters at CIDA in the end. Dependent on the Treasury for funding and 
subordinate to EAITC in the formulation of policy in a period of fiscal restraint,
CIDA did not have the autonomy necessary to implement decentralization effectively. 
Decentralization threatened powerful interests protected by the institutional structure 
of the aid programme, and this attempt at innovation was squelched.
When considered together with the other policy decisions described in this 
thesis, the decentralization and recentralization of aid administration contributes to a 
picture of an aid agency very vulnerable to politicking and the pursuit of Canadian 
commercial self-interest. The aid programme emerges as one where poverty 
reduction is often relegated to a secondary or tertiary objective, and expert advice 
(often from within the agency itself) is ignored, either willfully, or because lessons are 
lost through poor communication. We now turn to a consideration of Canada’s tied 
aid regulations as a further illustration of these claims.
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CHAPTER THREE
Tied Aid: Domestic and International Pressures on Canadian Aid Policy 
An examination of Canadian Balance of Payments Support to Tanzania 1976- 
1993, andfailed negotiations on the untying of aid in the DAC 1996 -1999.
“Widely divergent views o f delegations continues to pre-empt any 
substantive progress... ”
— Report o f  Canadian delegation at the OECD on negotiations for a new agreement 
on untying aid, 22 January 1991.1
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Tied aid is the hoary old chestnut of Canadian aid policy debates. Canadian 
aid has always been heavily tied to the procurement of Canadian goods and services. 
In fact, according to DAC calculations, Canadian bilateral aid remains the most 
heavily tied of all OECD donors at 68.5 per cent. This figure excludes technical 
cooperation, which is nearly one hundred per cent tied to the provision of Canadian 
expertise.2 The Canadian government has long been under pressure both domestically 
and internationally to loosen its restrictions on procurement for aid contracts, and it 
has done so to a limited degree over the past thirty years. This chapter will examine 
the issue of tied aid with a view to assessing the relative strength of conflicting 
domestic and international pressures which have shaped Canadian policy in this area. 
Bearing in mind the competing interpretations of Canadian aid policy presented in 
Chapter One, the emphasis here is on assessing the disciplinary power of the 
international aid regime when confronted with fierce resistance to the untying of aid 
from powerful domestic interests. The issue also highlights some of the constraints 
inherent in the international aid system.
Two examples have been chosen for this purpose. The first is a review of a 
series of Canadian commodity grants made to Tanzania between 1976 and 1993. The 
bulk of these were made in the mid 1980’s when Canada in concert with other
1 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2 Vol.85. Telex POECD to EXOTT 22 January 1991.
2 From: Table 23(A50), Development Cooperation. Efforts and Policies o f  the Members o f  the 
Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 1999 Edition; reproduced in Chinnock and Collinson, 
1999:11. Note: Accurate figures on tied aid are notoriously difficult to obtain given the variety of
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bilateral donors shifted a significant proportion of its aid to Tanzania into programme 
aid in support of the IMF/World Bank led structural adjustment programme.
However, Canada resisted World Bank efforts to alter the way in which Canadian 
balance of payments support was administered in Tanzania. The manner in which this 
pressure was applied and resisted offers an insight into the functioning of the 
international aid bureaucracy. It must be emphasized that the focus here is on policy 
negotiation and implementation and that no attempt has been made to assess the 
overall impact of Canadian balance of payments support on the Tanzanian economy.
It is hoped however, that the details of the implementation of these commodity 
agreements as presented here will highlight some of the constraints on the effective 
use of aid in this case.
The second example is that of the most recent round of negotiations in the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC) which sought but failed to 
reach an international agreement on the further untying of bilateral aid. By describing 
the domestic political and economic climate in the period leading up to these 
discussions (also dealt with in the chapter on decentralization), the final articulation of 
the Canadian position taken to the DAC may be understood. However, the hard-won 
interdepartmental approval for a Canadian position in support of the proposed 
resolution which the Canadian delegation took to the DAC in 1999 was all for naught. 
Shifting political winds in other capitals resulted in the collapse of an expected 
consensus. This example highlights the myriad of bureaucratic constraints on 
improving aid efficacy. Before looking at these two cases, a brief review of Canada’s 
policy on tied aid, the extent of aid tying in the Canadian aid programme, and the 
arguments made for and against it is presented.
3.2 CANADIAN RESTRICTIONS ON PROCUREMENT FOR AID 
CONTRACTS
Until 1968, all Canadian aid was one hundred percent tied to the procurement 
of Canadian goods and services. In that year the government decided to permit 
twenty-five per cent of a project’s allocated funds be untied for local costs and
compilation formulas employed by donors. However, an exact calculation is not central to the 
argument presented here. For a detailed discussion of this statistical issue, see Jepma, 1994.
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shipping in special circumstances.3 In Canada’s first aid policy document, released in 
1970, the government authorized the untying of up to twenty percent of total bilateral 
allocations to cover the local costs of aid projects across the board, and the 
channelling of up to twenty-five per cent of ODA through multilateral institutions.4 
The next ODA policy statement, made in 1975 stated that “The government will 
liberalize the CIDA procurement regulations by immediately untying its bilateral 
development loans” so that developing countries could compete for contracts and 
‘would consider’ untying aid for procurement in other industrialized countries “where 
this can demonstrably bring significant results to the development program”5 This 
position was taken in response to an internal study done by the Treasury Board which 
concluded that the untying of aid would have a minimal effect on Canadian industry 
or exports, while the practice of tying aid had in the past reduced the purchasing 
power of ODA by up to twenty-five per cent.6 In 1975 Canada also signed a 
memorandum of understanding at the DAC which required participants to untie aid 
for procurement in developing countries. This seemed to open the door for the 
gradual untying of Canadian aid. However, the new policy provoked an immediate 
and furious response from the powerful business, manufacturing and agricultural 
lobbies and was never put into practice. The negotiation and reception of the 1975 
Strategy is documented in detail by Berry.7 His argument is that CIDA’s junior status 
in the government bureaucracy allowed the commercial interests represented by the 
Departments of Finance, External Affairs , and Commerce and Industry to prevail 
over arguments for more effective aid.
CIDA’s next formed statement in 1987, Sharing Our Future authorized the 
untying of up to fifty per cent of bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan Africa and to 
other LDCs, and 33.3 per cent to all other recipient countries. It also committed the 
government to channelling of up to thirty-five percent of ODA through multilateral
Q
institutions. This remains Canadian policy to date. To be considered Canadian 
under these regulations, a firm must be at least fifty-one per cent Canadian owned and
3 Reported in Morrison, 1998:81.
4 Canada, 1970.
5 CIDA, 1975.
6 Cited in Morrison, 1998:90
7 Berry,1981.
8 CIDA, 1987.
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the goods or services provided must have 66.6 per cent value added in Canada. 
However, two things must be noted;
i) The regulations governing tied aid are not applied on a project by project basis, or 
to a whole country programme, but agency-wide, with the result that the bulk of aid to 
Tanzania, for example, has remained tied. With no formal requirement that a specific 
percentage of each project be untied, the Tanzania programme, heavily based in 
industrial infrastructure projects begun with Canadian equipment, has had little 
incentive to find suppliers in developing countries or elsewhere. Nor would it have 
been desirable to compound the difficulties experienced by recipient organizations 
forced to deal with a multiplicity of product types from various sources.
ii) In addition, the actual use of the untying authority has fallen far short of the 
permitted level. The untying of a portion of aid is permitted, but not required. In his 
1983 study of Canadian aid to Tanzania, Young found that up to 1980, eighty-two per 
cent of project aid and eighty-four per cent of programme aid was tied at the signing 
of the aid agreement commitment stage.9 According to CIDA Corporate Memory, 
Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania between 1961 and 1999 totalled $775,500,000 of 
which approximately $110,000,000 or roughly fourteen per cent was untied.10 A 
study done in 1994 revealed that approximately thirty per cent of Canadian bilateral 
disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs in 1991/92 and 92/93 were untied, 
twenty percent below the permitted threshold.11 As noted above, according to DAC 
statistics, this figure holds true for Canadian bilateral ODA overall in 1999. The first 
eight Canadian commodity grants to Tanzania as outlined below were fully tied to the 
purchase of Canadian commodities with the exception of $1 million in goods 
purchased from Zimbabwe and Britain and an emergency purchase of $404,000 in 
materials from Kenya. Under the ninth and final commodity agreement and in line 
with CIDA’s newly articulated policy of supporting regional integration in Africa, 
fifty per cent of funds or roughly $7.5 million was untied for procurement in the 
region. However, less than $2 million of this allocation was in fact spent outside of
9 Young: 88.
10 Source: CIDA Corporate Memory. Please note: unless otherwise specified all figures are given in 
Canadian dollars.
11 Morrison, 1998.
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12 •Canada. Writing in 1986, one year before the most recent change in policy, Hendra 
concluded: “As a result of commercial and corporate pressure on CIDA, tying has 
become a standard operating procedure and untying even within the 20 per cent limit 
has been interpreted as a deviation from the norm.”13 The figures above seem to 
suggest that practice has not altered significantly in the intervening years.
It should be noted, however, that although Canadian aid is heavily tied, it is 
also highly concessional, given exclusively in the form of out right grants. Canada 
stopped making development loans in 1986 and forgave all outstanding bilateral 
development loans to Least Developed Countries in 1987. In addition, despite 
periodic exhortations from the Canadian commercial sector for the institution of a 
mixed credit facility as found in other donor countries, Canada does not tie its aid in 
this way. Mixed credits, which combine concessional financing with commercial 
loans are denigrated by critics as subsidies to western commercial enterprises to give 
them a leg up on the competition at the expense of the efficient use of available 
resources for poverty alleviation. In this respect Canadian aid compares favourably 
with that of several other donors.14 In fact, due to its highly concessional nature, 
many of the Principles of Effective ODA articulated by the DAC with respect to tied 
aid financing have not affected the Canadian aid programme.15 For example, the most 
recent agreement on Guiding Principles on for Associated Financing and Tied and 
Partially Untied Aid adopted by the DAC in 1987 prohibits the tying of aid with a 
concessionality level of less than fifty per cent to LLDC’s and thirty-five per cent to
12 CIDA Project 902/17914, Project Termination Report.
13 Hendra:267.
14 It is interesting to note, however, the comments of an External Affairs official in response to 
evidence of resistance from other donors in the DAC to the proposed ban on mixed credits for large 
projects being considered in 1991:
“This trend may also be a signal to CIDA. The stretching of aid resources by the use of mixed 
credits appears to be establishing itself as a legitimate development tool, particularly in a time of 
shrinking resources. Mixed with pressure from exporters squeezed out of markets for lack of 
competitive financing, CIDA may need to re-examine its general aversion to mixed credits.” DFAIT 
File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol. 92. In December 1991 CIDA established the Private Sector Development 
Initiatives Fund which “enables the private sector to play a proactive role by identifying and 
formulating development projects that can be incorporated in CIDA’s programs for these countries.” 
DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.61, CIDA, Prosperity Initiative: Portfolio Consultations Final 
Report, 1992.
15 Canada has lobbied in the DAC for the maintenance of exemptions for highly concessional aid. 
DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.84.
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all other aid recipient countries and therefore does not apply to Canadian ODA.16 It is 
interesting to note in a discussion of the strength of the international aid regime that 
other donors have found ways of escaping regime discipline in this area without 
blatantly flouting the agreement. As Jepma explains, “The underlying philosophy 
was to increase the costs of aid tying and to discourage the offering of tied aid credits 
as export promotion.”17 But the DAC Secretariat reported three years later that “It 
appears that the effect of the successive tightening of terms discipline was that a 
significant portion of tied aid transactions clustered just above the permissible
1Rconcessionality level.” Although Canadian aid is heavily tied, its impact on total 
international development assistance resources is comparatively small. Eighty per 
cent of tied aid in that year was accounted for by the U.S.A., Japan, France, Italy and 
Germany.
3.3 THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST TYING AID
The economic arguments surrounding tied aid can be quite easily disposed of.
Official Canadian aid documents make much of the fact that a reported thirty-six
thousand Canadian jobs are supported by the Canadian aid programme.19 On the
basis of his research on OECD donor countries, Jepma reports that the impact of tied
aid on the donor’s domestic economy is generally minimal, with its contribution to
*)(\employment approximately 0.01 per cent. Wyse’s organizational audit of CIDA at 
the end of the 1970’s suggested that direct government investment in manufacturing 
concerns would have created the same number of jobs as the aid programme at 14.3 
per cent of the cost. Regional development programmes could have done so at 12.9
91per cent of the cost. Jepma estimates that the impact of a multilateral agreement to 
untie aid on Canada would be a loss of 0.45 per cent of its current exports to LDCs.22 
These findings concur with the Canadian Treasury Board study referred to by
16 Agricultural products and, curiously, ships are exempted. DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.83. 
OECD-DAC/ FA (89)2, Review o f DAC Terms Recommendation: A Survey o f DAC Members ’ Recent 
Performance, note by Secretariat, 13 October 1989.
17 Jepma: 137.
18 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.86. OECD Document DAC/FA(90) 1, Improved Disciplines for  
Tied Aid: Note by the Secretariat, 20 February 1990.
19 CIDAa, 1996:2
20 Jepma: 15.
21 Wyse cited in Hendra:268.
22 Jepma: 47
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• 9TMomson. While the advantage to be gained by individual companies who secure 
aid contracts may be great, the overall contribution to the Canadian economy is 
minimal.
The impact of tied aid on recipient countries, however, can be significant. It is 
generally accepted that the direct costs of tied aid to the recipient can be 
conservatively estimated to be a ten to twenty per cent reduction in its value.24 This is 
because some goods provided through tied aid agreements may cost more than the 
same goods purchased at prevailing world market prices. Jepma estimates that in 
1989-90, this translated into $870 million U.S. worth of resources lost to developing
9  ^countries. Tying aid to donor country manufactures may result in the provision of 
technology inappropriate to the recipient’s needs, as the Tanzania Canada Wheat 
Project described in Chapter Five illustrates. Jepma argues that there are other non­
price factors which can reduce the efficacy of tied aid: the perhaps inferior quality of 
the product, the length of the delivery period as determined by the location and 
schedule of the chosen supplier, the attached guarantees and maintenance conditions 
and the quality of installment instructions, health and safety aspects, and the cost of 
spare parts and repairs. To this may be added the administrative costs incurred by the
• • • 9  f \recipient organization in accommodating the tied aid conditions of various donors.
3.4 DONOR INCLINATION TO UNTIE AID
Jepma argues that in the pro-economic liberalization climate which prevails in 
the industrialized west at the turn of the century, “There is a growing belief, just as 
with various other protectionist devices, that it is probably better in the long term to
9 7collectively reduce or even abolish the tying of bilateral aid.” Evidence that this 
view is gathering support can be seen in proposed negotiations on liberalizing 
international procurement regulations in the WTO, and in renewed efforts in the DAC 
to further untie bilateral aid. Jepma argues that donor countries are motivated to seek 
such agreements not only out of a desire to improve the efficacy of aid, but because of
23 Morrison, 1998:90.
24 Jepma
25 Ibid: 63.
26 Jepma: 63-72.
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the distortion of free trade which tied aid represents. He suggests, for example, that 
donors are wary that tied aid may subsidize non-viable commercial enterprises in the 
donor country which could not survive when faced with open competition. It is 
interesting to note that after forty years of development assistance, virtually all of 
Canada’s exports to Tanzania are aid related. Normal trading relations have not been 
established. There is also a generalized concern that with tied aid regulations in force, 
aid might be used where a commercial sale might have been made. The Helsinki 
Package agreed among donor countries in 1991 was meant to redress this problem. It 
states that
Tied and partially untied concessional or aid credits except for credits 
to LLDCs, shall not be extended to public and private projects that 
normally should be commercially viable if financed on market or 
Arrangement terms.28
The agreement exempted projects worth less that SDR 2 million as well as 
projects funded on highly concessional terms (more than eighty per cent grant 
element). As all Canadian aid is in the form of out right grants, Canadian ODA was 
not affected by this agreement. Canada is a signatory to the accord in any case.29 
DAC donors also agreed that large aid projects worth more than $50 million US 
would be subject to international vetting to make sure the project couldn’t attract
on
funding on the open market. It was also agreed that the World Bank should be
consulted on all aid projects of this size. In voicing its support for this idea, the
Canadian delegation at the DAC stated that even where the World Bank is not
involved in the financing of the project, “bilateral donors should consult with the
World Bank to ensure that the project is consistent with any discussions between it
and the recipient government concerning policies and allocation in the sector 
11
concerned.” This seems to indicate at least a willingness to let the World Bank 
assume a leadership role in the international aid system. In contrast to the weak
27 Ibid: 15
28 Quoted in Jepma: 141
29 DFAIT File nos 38-4-OECD-2 Volumes 84 through 89,
30 This threshold was determined by bargaining amongst donors. Initial suggested thresholds ranged 
from $10 million proposed by the Netherlands to $150 million proposed by Japan. DFAIT File no. 38- 
4-OECD-2, Vol.85, Telex POECD to EXOTT 22 January 1991.
31 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.92, memo 4 April 1991.
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disciplinary force of the 1987 agreement on associated financing and tied aid outlined 
above, Jepma reports that
Thus far the effect on credits covered by the Helsinki Package seems to 
have been profound. The rising trend of aid credits to the relatively 
rich among the less developed countries has stopped and the total value 
of ‘Helsinki’ type credits has dropped considerably. In sum, although 
the total value of aid notifications is more or less in line with previous 
years, there has been a shift away from ‘Helsinki’ type aid credits, 
possibly towards untied aid.32
It is interesting to observe that this is a formalization of an agreement among 
donors which Wood identified as a norm of the international aid regime back in 1985 
(see Chapter One). It seems one of his claims concerning the nature of international 
aid practice has come true after the fact. The relative success of this agreement when 
compared to the 1987 DAC agreement on tied aid might be explained at least in part 
by the greater benefits accruing to adherents in the form of maintaining a level 
playing field for competition for commercially viable projects in developing 
countries. If it is true that there is growing international support for the idea of
*5 <3
untying aid, it is also true that donors are generally not willing to go it alone.
Jepma says this poses a ‘prisoner’s dilemma.’ Unilateral untying would reduce the 
market share of domestic firms and expose them to increased external competition.
As the economic evidence indicates that the economic impact of untying on donor 
countries would be slight, taking the first step is a question of political will. Jepma 
concludes that
Therefore, the real issue vis-a-vis tying is not to what extent it has a 
positive or negative impact on the donor economy, but how 
international policy can be coordinated so that this prisoner’s dilemma 
can be resolved.34
32 Jepma: 143. The phrase ‘aid notifications’ refers to the agreement among donors to notify each other 
of all proposed tied aid transactions with a concessionality level of less than fifty per cent (‘Helsinki’ 
type) to give competing exporting countries the option of matching the offer. Agreements with 
concessionality levels o f more than fifty per cent only have to be reported after the fact.
33 U.K. Minister o f International Development Clare Short has suggested that the U.K. might take this 
course, but U.K firms are not likely to suffer much from increased competition from other donor 
countries. See J. Chinnock,1998.
34 Jepma: 16.
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We now move on to a consideration of two recent instances where such 
attempts were made, and the formulation of the Canadian policy position in response 
to domestic and international pressures. It will be observed that the two cases are not 
directly comparable. In the case of Canadian commodity agreements to Tanzania, the 
issue of tied aid was combined with a question of appropriate administrative 
structures for aid delivery. The common theme pursued is the exertion of pressure 
from international sources.
3.5 CANADIAN COMMODITY GRANTS TO TANZANIA
In the 1960's, Canadian aid to Tanzania was mainly in the form of technical 
assistance. In the 1970's, the focus shifted to a concentration on the development of 
industrial infrastructure and mechanized agriculture with the bulk of Canadian aid 
invested in railway, hydroelectric projects and the mechanized wheat project in 
Hanang. The direct transfer of financial resources was negligible, restricted to the 
income from some non-emergency food aid. The 1977 Country Programme Review 
noted that balance of payments support comprised only seven per cent of Canadian 
ODA to Tanzania.35 Between 1982 and 1986 it accounted for forty per cent of total 
Canadian aid to Tanzania,36 a figure in line with other donor programs at the time.37 
It continued to be a central component of Canadian ODA until balance of payments 
support to Tanzania was suspended in 1992 and then cancelled in 1993. These figures 
indicate a significant redefinition of programme objectives in the 1980’s as the share 
of resources devoted to projects decreased and programme assistance in support of 
structural adjustment increased. The connection between this shift in the Canadian 
aid programme and the development of an international consensus on structural 
adjustment is outlined in Chapter Four.
35 CIDA, Tanzania Country Programme Review, 1977.
36 CIDA, Tanzania Country Programme Review, 1987.
37 Import support to Tanzania comprised eight per cent of total aid to Tanzania in 1981/82 but had risen
to forty-four per cent by 1986/87. Source: Mbelle and Karamagi, 1992:18 cited in White, 1995:41.
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Canadian balance of payments support to Tanzania was made in the form of 
nine commodity agreements concluded between 1976 and 1992 as outlined in Figure 
3.1. Together these agreements account for approximately twenty per cent of 
CIDA’s total bilateral assistance to Tanzania since aid began, though the bulk of this 
was made in two grants concluded in 1986 and 1987 which together totalled $80 
million. It is noteworthy that these agreements coincided with Tanzania’s agreement 
in principle with the IMF and adhered to World Bank directives that donors should 
make a larger percentage of their aid in this form. Overall, between 1986 and 1996, 
total Canadian ODA to Tanzania was roughly $270 million of which $95 million or 
thirty-five per cent was in the form of commodity agreements. However, by 1996 
after several years of donor dissatisfaction with the administration of balance of 
payments support in Tanzania, the percentage of Canadian aid to Tanzania in the form 
of balance of payments support was nil.
The rationale for the provision of commodity support was to ease the effects 
of a serious foreign exchange shortage which had caused the drastic reduction or 
elimination of many essential imports. In 1980, the Tanzanian industrial sector was 
operating at thirty percent of capacity, with a lack of materials a major contributing 
factor.39 The stated objectives of the commodity agreements were to provide goods 
which would support the ‘financial and operational viability’ of several industries as 
well as the agricultural sector. These goods came in the form of aluminum, used in 
the manufacture of cooking pots; kraft paper to make bags for cement, and zinc for 
corrugated roofing, both of which were vital to the construction industry; as well as 
consignments of fine paper for text books, plastics, chemicals, steel wire, 
telecommunication equipment, spare parts and machinery, hand hoes, veterinary 
vaccines and various other sundry items.
38 Between 1974/75 and 1980/81, Canada supplied Tanzania with $31 million in food aid, 
approximately $16 million of which was sold in Tanzania for balance o f payments support, the 
remainder being emergency relief.
39 Source: Termination Report CIDA Project no. 902/10819-902/08013.
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Figure 3.1 Canadian Commodity Agreements with Tanzania
Agreem ent Year Value (Cdn S) Goods provided Suppliers Recipients
I 1976-82 $10 million 
100% tied
aluminum, kraft 
paper
Alcan, Eurocan Aluco, Kibo Paper
n 1981-85 $21 million
$20 703 830.99 disbursed 
100% tied
aluminum, kraft 
paper, fine paper, 
zinc
Alcan, Eurocan, 
Canfor, Domtar, 
E.B. Eddy, Inco- 
Noranda, Cominco
Aluco, Kibo Paper, 
SARUJI, Steelco
m 1982-84 $404 000
untied for emergency purchase
kraft paper Kenyan supplier Kibo Paper
IV 1984 $3 million
$2 931 547.09 disbursed 
100% tied
aluminum, kraft 
paper
Aluco, Kibo Paper
V 1984-87 $7 million total 
$1 million untied
urea, tyres and 
tubes, handhoes, 
truck chains, a 
computer system
UFI, Tanzania 
Fertilizer Corp.
VI 1984-85 $ 7 million 
100% tied
aluminum, kraft 
paper, wood pulp, 
tyres and tubes
Aluco, Kibo Paper, 
General Tyre
vn 1986-89 $20 million 
100% tied
aluminum, plastics, 
tyres and tyre- 
making materials, 
poultry and cattle 
vaccines, poultry 
feed, agricultural 
chemicals
vm 1987-93 $60.1 million 
100% tied
aluminum,steel, 
fertilizer, tyres and 
tyre making 
materials, 
agricultural inputs
IX 1992-96 $14 643 671.57 
50 % tied
50 % untied for procurement in 
region, but in the end, less than 
$2 million worth procured 
outside o f Canada
aluminum, 
telecommunication 
equipment, 
chemicals, steel, 
graders and spares, 
skids
Alcan, Mitel, 
Bamberger 
Polymers, 
Champion, Thomas, 
Mineral Marketing 
Corp. (Harare), 
Lancaster Steel 
(Harare)
Aluco, TTCEL, 
SIMBA, JEJE, 
Blackwood Hodge, 
Dar City Council
Source: information from CIDA project files
A review of the negotiation and implementation of these commodity 
agreements provides some insight into the forces which conspire to undermine the 
developmental objectives of aid. Commodity grants, as direct transfers of resources 
would seem to be the most straightforward and easily accomplished form of aid, and 
Canada's commodity grants to Tanzania were certainly more successful than many of 
- its other aid projects there. All of the agreements ultimately met their stated 
objectives and provided necessary materials for Tanzanian industry. But as the
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following summary describes, for several reasons, their potential benefits were 
compromised.
Canadian balance of payments assistance to Tanzania began in 1972 with a $2 
million short term open line of credit for Canadian commodities. Negotiation of the 
first commodity grant agreement between Canada and Tanzania began in 1976 with a 
request from the Tanzanian government for a list of commodities which Canada might 
be able to supply on credit.40 CIDA’s menu consisted of aluminum, iron and steel, 
potash, fertilizers and insecticides. From this list in late 1976 Tanzania requested a $2 
million dollar line of credit for insecticides. In January 1977, CIDA asked the 
government of Tanzania “to look again at their paper and aluminum products 
requirements in preference to insecticides/pesticides.”41 Seven months later, an 
agreement was drafted for a ten million dollar grant for pesticides, aluminum and 
paper on the grounds that the raw materials for pesticides have to be imported into 
Canada and are expensive to manufacture while Canadian producers had ample paper 
and aluminum stocks for sale, as the Department of International Trade and 
Commerce had informed CIDA.
At this point, CIDA HQ considered scrapping the whole project “since the 
administrative burden makes it a highly unattractive project.” In addition, it was 
determined that Canadian prices for insecticides were not competitive, and only the 
tender for aluminum coil was drawing any interest from Canadian suppliers. The 
CIDA mission in Tanzania objected, but suggested limiting the agreement to 
aluminum and paper. A Memorandum of Understanding for $10 million worth of 
aluminum and paper was signed in 1978. However, having transformed the 
Tanzanian request for $2 million of insecticides into $10 million worth of paper and 
aluminum, CIDA was unable to deliver on the agreement within the specified time 
frame, with severe consequences for Tanzanian industry. Several factors contributed 
to this delay. By 1978 the world supply of aluminum and paper had contracted and 
the Canadian suppliers gave preference to their established customers over the 
Tanzanian orders. The fact that the grant was tied to the purchase of Canadian goods
40 CIDA Project 902/00501 Project Termination Report.
41 Ibid
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also posed several logistical problems. The standard sizing of paper and aluminum 
sheeting in Canada is different from that used in Tanzania and Europe with the 
consequence that production machinery in Canada had to be reset to process the 
Tanzanian orders. There was a labour dispute at Alcan, the Canadian supplier of 
aluminum, and then a strike in the pulp and paper industry in British Columbia where 
the paper tender had been awarded, both of which caused further delays.
In 1979, still waiting for shipments from Canada, the Tanzanian government, 
faced with a critical balance of payments deficit, moved to restrict import licenses and 
foreign exchange allocations severely. The parastatal companies Aluco and Kibo 
Paper were instructed to obtain most of their raw materials from the Canadian grant 
rather than purchasing them commercially. Delays in Canada contributed to “a virtual 
shutdown of the parastatals until supplies were received.”42 The final delivery was 
made in 1981, five years after the commencement of negotiations. The CIDA 
assessment of the project concluded that “The balance of payments (BoP) effects were 
positive but not large in the context of total Tanzanian BoP problems. They could 
have been greater if other types of industries had been supported.”43
Subsequent agreements encountered similar difficulties. Commodity Grant II 
which received approval in 1981 supplied $21 million in materials.44 Again there 
were delays in the supply of kraft paper from Eurocan. A shipment originating on the 
west coast of Canada was delayed en route and the main cement plant in Tanzania 
was forced to shut down for want of bags in which to transport its product. This in 
turn affected the construction industry. An emergency shipment from Kenya was 
arranged and delivered within two months (Commodity Agreement III).45 Later 
shipments, the last made in April 1984, were delayed by a strike at the port of 
Vancouver and a storm at sea. The project termination report indicated that CIDA 
was not happy in its role as middle man sorting out these problems and wished to 
establish “normal trade relations and procurement practices between Tanzania and its 
Canadian suppliers.” Such a relationship was difficult to build under procurement
42 Ibid
43 Ibid.
44 CIDA Project 902/10819-902/08013 Project Termination Report.
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regulations which not only tied aid to the goods offered by Canada, but in which the 
Canadian government awarded the tenders, in the above cases to a company on the 
opposite side of the North American continent from Tanzania. This added time, 
distance and shipping costs to a process which already took several years to complete.
Commodity Agreement IV was signed in February 1984 and again provided 
$3 million in kraft paper and aluminum. Eurocan was again awarded the tender for 
kraft paper and again, due to a strike at its B.C. plant, missed the agreed shipment 
date. Also in 1984, the Tanzanian Minister of Finance made an urgent request to the 
Canadian government for agricultural inputs and supplied CIDA with a list of 
necessary materials: fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides, steel for hand tools, sacks or 
bags, tyres, batteries, and corrogated metal for roofing. This list was reviewed by a 
CIDA project officer who annotated it to the effect that pesticides and herbicides 
would be difficult to obtain in Canada, aluminum would be ‘no problem,’ and tyres 
and batteries would be considered. A consultant advised CIDA that sulphur might be 
a better commodity to send for fertilizer than urea “as the c[ost] and freight] prices 
[of urea] are far greater than world prices.” In the end it was determined that 
Canadian sulphur and urea were equally expensive and the grant included a shipment 
of $6 million worth of urea from Canada. Commodity Grants V and VI both signed 
in 1984, provided in total $14 million in industrial and agricultural inputs. Of this, $1 
million was untied to purchase hand hoes and truck chains from Zimbabwe and a 
computer system from the U.K., the required goods not being available in Canada. 
Apart from the inflated cost of Canadian urea, there were no problems reported with 
the supply of goods to Tanzania. A few logistical problems occurred on the receiving 
end where there was no storage space for the hoes and chains, meant to support the 
Canadian funded oxenization project in Mbeya, or firm orders from distributors, the 
responsibility of the UFI, a Tanzanian parastatal company. There were also reports of 
the theft of goods awaiting distribution. The history of these agreements indicates 
that commodity assistance was fraught with logistical problems on both the sending 
and receiving end.
45 CIDA Project 902/08207
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Two large grants totaling $80 million were made in 1986 and 1987 following 
the conclusion of an agreement in principle between the Government of Tanzania and 
the IMF. In the midst of the negotiation of these agreements, Canadian aid officials 
reported a meeting at the Tanzanian Treasury “where we were somewhat dragged 
over the coals for inconsistency re commodity commitments.. .The meeting at the 
Treasury resulted from an incident wherein we almost simultaneously advised Kilimo 
that we could not provide chicken feed this year while asking Treasury/Aluco if they 
could take more aluminum... GOT [Government of Tanzania] made it abundantly 
clear that chicken feed and vaccines were the priority not more aluminum.” Next on 
its list were steel sheets and tyres, with aluminum “a distant last.”46 As recorded in 
Table 4.1, chicken feed, tyres and vaccines were provided in addition to aluminum.
Canada's final commodity grant to Tanzania (Commodity Agreement IX) was 
agreed in 1992.47 Preliminary project documentation stated that “the positive impact 
of the structural adjustment program, coupled with Tanzania's consistent adherence to 
the terms and principles of the IMF agreements, fully justify continued balance of 
payments support.” This seems a curious conclusion for aid officials to have drawn 
given the tenor of Canadian comments at the Consultative Group meetings in the 
same time period. Canadian officials had voiced their displeasure with the Tanzanian 
government’s record on collecting payments for commodity grants and with the pace 
of reform in general. Nevertheless, an agreement for $14 million was signed. The 
materials to be provided were more diverse than previous agreements as will be noted 
in Table 3.1. Primary among them were aluminum and telecommunications 
equipment, worth approximately $4.5 and $5 million respectively. The termination 
report for this project seems to indicate that CIDA had become more proficient in the 
administration of this type of aid. Between the first agreement and this last, the 
project development process had been trimmed from approximately three years to 
eighteen months. As noted above, this grant was fifty percent untied for procurement 
in East and Southern Africa.
46 DFAIT File no. 38-6-1-TANZ-l, Vol.2. Telex from Dar to CIDA HQ, 9 January 1987.
47 CIDA Project 902/17914 Project Termination Report.
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The project evaluation done by a consulting firm in 1993 concluded that the 
project had been a success despite the potential for major problems due to its 
complexity. It involved not only the provision goods but also training in the use of 
telecommunications equipment. The evaluation concluded that “Probably the most 
significant factor in making this project successful was a highly motivated 
contractor.” CIDA project files contain numerous examples of projects which fell 
into difficulty when contractors failed to meet the requirements of aid projects, a 
problem highlighted by the most recent report of the Auditor-General of Canada.49 In 
this case, the contractor won a CIDA sponsored award for its efforts: the Engineering 
Prize of the Canadian Awards for Private Sector Contribution to International 
Development. However, Commodity Agreement IX was not without its problems. 
The Canadian High Commission was still involved in chasing down delinquent 
accounts from the previous agreement and outstanding bills from this latest agreement 
added to the load. In 1992, CIDA was informed that Gentyre did not wish to take up 
its $3 million allocation as it could get its requirements elsewhere more cheaply. 
According to aid officials, the efficacy of the agreement was further undermined by a 
problem common to many Canadian aid projects in Tanzania: the inefficiency of the 
many parastatal corporations set up to manage various sectors of the Tanzanian 
economy. Speaking in this case of the Tanzania Telecommunications Company 
Limited (TTCL), CIDA officials blamed “the lack of responsibility being devolved to 
middle management, as promised in the TRP [formal agreement]” for problems with 
spare parts inventory and delays in establishing a technical service center. Though 
these problems were soon to be resolved, the progress report added that “middle 
management is generally of good calibre, but de-motivated because of the 
bureaucratic process.”50
Commodity Agreement IX was cancelled along with most of Canada’s other 
aid projects in Tanzania in 1993 with less than two thirds of the grant disbursed. In a 
letter to the Vice President of the Africa Middle East Branch protesting the aid cuts, 
the High Commissioner for Tanzania in Ottawa noted the “devastating effects” of the 
cancellation of the aid projects including commodity and import support. In addition
48 CIDA, Termination Report for Project 902/17914
49 Auditor-General o f Canada, October 2000.
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to reducing the supply of vital industrial inputs, “Total elimination of this project 
implies that there will be no spare parts for Canadian-imported machinery and 
equipment already in the country.”51 Over thirty years of capital assistance, the list of 
Canadian-made equipment which needed to be maintained was long -  rail track and 
switches, locomotives and carriages, hydroelectric machinery, tractors and other farm 
equipment as well as the new telecommunication system, among other things. 
Tanzania officials were now in the position of having to purchase Canadian spare 
parts commercially, in some instances above world market prices, or find another 
donor willing to untie funds to buy them if compatible replacement parts couldn’t be 
found from another source. In October 1993, the High Commissioner made a formal 
request for the grant to be reinstated and the Canadian High Commission in Dar es 
Salaam recommended that the “restoration of Commodity Grant IX will improve the 
Canadian relationship with the Tanzanian Treasury whose resentment at budget cuts 
still lingers.” In January 1994, the project was reactivated to disburse the remaining 
funds. This agreement marked the end of Canadian import support to Tanzania.
3.6 CANADA’S TIED AID POLICY AND THE OPEN GENERAL LICENSE 
FACILITY IN TANZANIA
As outlined in Chapter Four, the bulk of Canadian commodity grants to 
Tanzania were made in the 1980’s in support of the IMF/World Bank structural 
adjustment programme. The decision to provide balance of payments support in the 
form of goods rather than foreign exchange was contrary to World Bank guidelines 
but in accordance with Canada’s stringent tied aid policy. The manner in which 
income from the sale of Canadian commodity grants was to be administered was also 
determined by Canada’s tied aid regulations, and throughout the 1980’s and early 
1990’s, CIDA came under pressure from the World Bank and at the DAC to adopt a 
less restrictive administrative structure. That Canada resisted this pressure illustrates 
both the intransigence of the Canadian position with respect to tied aid, and the 
limitations of the international aid regime in disciplining donor behaviour. However, 
as both of the examples presented in this chapter demonstrate, there have been
50 Ibid.
51 Letter from His Excellency Fadhil D. Mbaga, High Commission for Tanzania to Mr. Pierre Racicot, 
Vice President, Africa Middle East Branch, CIDA, 11 March 1993.
52 Termination Report for CIDA project 902/17914
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tentative steps toward untying Canadian assistance in the past decade. That they have 
not resulted in any significant alteration in Canadian policy is the result of a 
combination of circumstances in Canada, in other donor countries, and in recipient 
countries as well.
As Howard White has explained, individual donors have elected one of two 
methods of delivering their import support: i) administrative systems or commodity 
import support (CIS) or ii) market based systems, which he subdivides into Open 
General License systems and foreign exchange auctions. Canadian support was of 
the first type. Subject to the approval of Canadian officials, a Treasury Committee of 
the Tanzanian government allocated Canadian commodities to individual firms, 
mainly parastatal corporations. The successful applicants were then required to pay 
the cash cover to the Treasury as the object was to provide budgetary support to the 
government not a grant to individual enterprises. The arrangement between Canada 
and Tanzania specified that twenty percent of this revenue was to be set aside in a 
government of Tanzania administered counterpart fund. These funds were to be used 
to cover the local costs of Canadian funded projects — i.e. counter part staff, 
vehicles, housing, locally procured materials — as well as to finance mutually agreed 
upon small projects. This system accommodated Canada’s tied aid restrictions and 
provided significant control over the end use of Canadian grants.
When the World Bank renewed its involvement in Tanzania in 1986 it 
advocated the establishment of a market-based system as a conduit for import support. 
Removing the government from the allocation process was seen as a means to avoid 
corruption and the misallocation of resources.54 In 1988 the Tanzanian government 
established an Open General License facility to administer balance of payments 
support and the World Bank urged all donors to redirect their aid through this 
channel. White explains how an OGL system works:
Under an OGL system importers buy the foreign exchange from a 
commercial bank, which is meant to consider applications on a first- 
come first served basis... The importer pays the bank local currency for
53 White:43
54 Ibid.
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the foreign exchange as a regular commercial transaction and the 
commercial bank pays the countervalue to the Central Bank which 
passes on the funds to the Treasury. These transactions take place at 
the official exchange rate and donors place restrictions on the goods 
procured.55
Despite repeated exhortations from the World Bank to support the OGL 
facility Canada and several other donors resisted pressure to do so. Among major 
donors, the U.K., the Netherlands, Norway and the EEC contributed to the fund. 
Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and the U.S.A. did not.56
In 1988 the World Bank outlined guidelines for bilateral donors to use when 
programming aid for Tanzania stating “The composition of external flows needed to 
support the Economic Recovery Program and the terms under which they are supplied 
remain as important as the absolute volume.” The Bank advised donors that the 
current allocation of twenty-five percent of ODA for technical assistance was too high 
and should be reviewed. It stated that the current ratio of 50:50 balance of payments 
support to other types of assistance was satisfactory, but again urged donors to untie 
their aid and channel it through the OGL, a recommendation reiterated in a brief 
prepared for the Special Program for Africa multi-donor meeting in October of that 
year.58 In November, CIDA received a letter from the World Bank inviting Canada to 
co-finance a new Agricultural Adjustment Credit to support reform in pricing and 
marketing policies for food grains, export crops and agricultural inputs. The funds 
would be channelled through the OGL facility and used for balance of payments 
support.59 CIDA rejected the request claiming “the untied nature of the facility 
provides some complications.”60
In 1991 the World Bank informed donors that the “continued use by bilateral 
donors of parallel, tied, windows for importers is hampering the pace of sectoral 
reform and has resulted in significant differences in the effective exchange rates
55 Ibid.
56 Source: CIDA Tanzania Programme files; White:44.
57 World Bank. Report to the Consultative Group for Tanzania on the Government Economic Recovery 
Program, mimeo, June 1988.
58 Ibid.
59 Letter from World Bank to Vice-President Anglo-Africa Branch, CIDA, 3 November 1988.
60 CIDA files, Tanzania-Consultative Group Meetings, 1988
151
depending on the windows used.”61 The ratio of project aid to balance of payments 
support had shifted to 60:40, and the Bank and Tanzanian government expressed 
concern that the OGL was underfunded. Speaking of the ninth commodity agreement 
which was under discussion at the time, the CIDA mission head indicated that there 
was a softening of the Canadian position in favour of the World Bank approach. “It is 
our intention to align the new project much more closely with the OGL system 
although not to untie our funds completely or funnel all funds through the OGL.”62 
That an effort was made in this direction is evident in the terms of Commodity 
Agreement DC which permitted fifty percent of the grant to be untied for procurement 
outside of Canada. In the end, less than $2 million worth of goods were purchases 
from other sources, but the authority for up to $7 million had been approved. In April 
1992 at the SPA multi-donor meeting, Canada took another step in this direction when 
it signed a resolution adopting new SPA guidelines for managing import support 
programs advocating contributions to market based systems.63 This soon proved a 
moot point as the OGL became engulfed in controversy. Balance of payments 
support from all donors was suspended in 1992 pending an audit of the facility. The 
audit confirmed suspicions of mismanagement and corruption and in August 1993 the 
OGL was replaced by a foreign exchange auction. By then Canadian balance of 
payments support to Tanzania had been cancelled in the wake of budget cuts.
In addition to the problems outlined in the summary of commodity 
agreements above, the balance of payments support programme operated by the 
Canadians had weaknesses of its own. Primary among its faults in the eyes of 
Canadian officials was the lack of any means to enforce the collection of payment 
from recipients of granted commodities, particularly from parastatal corporations. A 
1982 study revealed that $16, 036, 038 worth of food aid sent to Tanzania as balance 
of payments support between 1974 and 1980 should have yielded Tsh 142 096 080.80 
in revenue for the government. However, in September 1980, the National Milling 
Corporation, a parastatal notorious for its inefficiency, still owed Tsh 60 921 678 in
61 Source: telex from CHC Dar to CIDA HQ 12 June 1991 re donor meeting,
62 Ibid
63 (World Bank 1994: Appendix C of Special Program for Africa: Launching o f the Third Phase. D.C. 
Africa Region, World Bank; c.f. White:56).
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backpayments to the Treasury.64 CIDA was also displeased that Canadian aid was 
sustaining the operation of unproductive and dysfunctional enterprises. The same 
study found that collection of payments for other commodities was better, but that 
none of the twenty percent counterpart funds had been put to use. Disposing of these 
funds has remained an unresolved issue between Canada and Tanzania to this date. 
Collection of cash cover payments became an increasingly sore point between Canada 
and Tanzania until balance of payments support was finally cut off in 1993.
The most recent CIDA agency wide policy statement on balance of payments 
support issued in 1994 stated that balance of payment support would hence forth be 
available only in exceptional circumstances. “Given CIDA’s experience and existing 
expertise the potential that exists to exert influence and add value to the reform 
process is not in ‘gap-filling’ exercises, but at the sectoral level.”65 In the words of 
Yogi Berra, it was deja vu all over again. Following the donor consensus of the 
1980’s that balance of payments support was the best way to support structural 
adjustment, this return to a sectoral approach reflected perhaps not only problems 
with the administration of balance of payments support, but also the shrinking aid 
budget and the necessity to maximize limited resources. The Liberal government 
foreign policy statement issued in 1995 named CIDA’s priorities as sustainable 
development, private sector development, good governance, women, poverty 
reduction and human rights. Structural adjustment is not listed among them.66
3.7 CANADIAN RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO 
UNTIE AID
The debate over the possibly ill effects of tied aid is contentious, long standing 
and voluminous. However, like the debate over the respective merits of the OGL 
versus CIS systems, it is not central to the discussion at hand. Of current importance 
is the fact that Canada found and finds itself on one side of the debate, maintaining a 
policy of highly tied aid, while on the other side the World Bank and the
64 Source: CIDA Tanzania project files, “Food aid and Commodity Grant Counterpart Fund 
Evaluation” Project Termination Report, January 1982.
65 Quoted in Morrison, 1998:394.
66 Government of Canada, 1995.
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Development Assistance Committee advocate the untying of aid, and this position is 
formally stated in the guidelines issued by both organizations. Canada sits on the 
Board of Governors of the Bank and is a member of the DAC. It is a signatory to the 
DAC Principles o f Effective ODA, but its policy runs contrary to the spirit of its 
recommendations on the administration of balance of payments support and tied aid. 
The spirit rather than the letter of the law because as all policy positions of the DAC 
are agreed by consensus, their wording is vague or flexible enough to accommodate 
some diversity among member policies. For example, the regulation governing 
procurement in balance of payments support agreements reads as follows:
In a context of market-oriented adjustment and policy reform, 
programme assistance in the form of freely available foreign exchange 
helps to promote the development of commercial and financial markets 
and institutions. Restrictive procurement requirements are not 
consistent with the longer run objective of liberalising, and making 
more market oriented, the foreign exchange and trade regimes that are 
essential for achieving private sector-led growth and efficiency, with 
resource allocation through market mechanisms rather than through 
administrative processes. Without an increase in the supply of freely 
available foreign exchange, it is difficult for competitive market 
processes and institutions to develop. Therefore, programme 
assistance to support structural adjustment and policy reform, or to 
provide general economic support within an effective policy 
framework should not, in principle, be linked to specific import 
purchases.68
The document notes institutional weaknesses on the recipient side and donor 
concerns surrounding the diversion of resources to “unproductive and inappropriate 
uses” and recognizes some donor preference for CIS systems. “The establishment of 
these rules and requirements often predates the priority now given to the fostering of 
market processes, the private sector and good governance.” It goes on to say, 
however, that “the longer-run objective of relying on market mechanisms rather than 
administrative processes should be kept clearly in view” and states that “programme 
assistance should be untied to the maximum extent possible.” With regard to the 
establishment of counterpart funds as Canada has done, a practice which is known as 
“double tying,” the DAC Principles note that these funds do not represent additional
67 see for example Sanger; Singer; Hendra; Gillies.
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resources for the recipient country and that “Their existence on any significant scale 
therefore raises important issues both for macroeconomic management (the 
inflationary potential) and for public expenditure management (transparency, 
consolidation of public budgets, and conformity with overall expenditure priorities).” 
The guidelines outline measures to be taken by donors to minimize the ill effects of 
these funds, leading to the phasing out of their use altogether.69
When these guidelines were under negotiation at the DAC in 1991, the 
Canadian delegation raised objections to successive drafts on several occasions with 
respect to the section on counterpart funds. In September, they said “Canada would 
want to see some major redrafting” of the section which would reflect the potential 
benefits of counterpart funds in financing poverty reduction or social sector projects, 
and in assisting NGOs and private sector development efforts. “If such a re-drafting 
is not possible we should then suggest its deletion.”70 In October, External Affairs in 
Ottawa wrote to the Canadian mission at the OECD:
We wish to reiterate position taken in previous telex on the subject.
We cannot accept the most recent secretariat proposals as we 
understand them and are unable to support a consensus on this basis 
even if it delays the adoption of these principles. Grateful you also 
canvas other delegations to ensure that we are not isolated...CIDA
n  1
intends to continue this practice.
In November, Ottawa told the OECD mission that the “Latest version of draft 
principles represents a quantum improvement over previous drafts.” While the 
proposed agreement was not perfectly in line with Canadian views, the section on 
counterpart funds had been toned down and the delegation was instructed to sign the
79resolution. A decade later, Canada is gradually trying to dispose of its counterpart 
funds, now considered an archaic form of aid in development circles.
68 OECD. Development Assistance Committee. DAC Principles fo r Effective Aid, Paris: OECD, 1992. 
Principle XI: 294.
69 Ibid, Principles XI:295 and XI:296, X:286.
70 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.93, Telex EXOTT to POECD 6 September 1991.
71 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.94, Telex EXOTT to POECD 22 October 1991.
72 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.94, Telex EXOTT to POECD 6 November 1991.
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3.8 THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL AID REGIME
The above example of Canadian commodity grants to Tanzania has been 
outlined to raise the issue of donor compliance with international norms in the 
provision of foreign aid. What must be stated immediately is that there is no 
automatic or consistent correlation between DAC , World Bank, UN or CIDA written 
policy and the actual norms which govern international aid practice and it would be 
mistaken to automatically cite noncompliance with DAC agreements, for example, as 
evidence of a weak or non-existent regime, or stated another way, a lack of consensus 
on acceptable and appropriate practice. Rittberger makes this distinction between
71‘paper regimes’ and ‘operating regimes.’ An obvious example taken from aid 
practice is the 0.7% GNP target adopted at the U.N. several decades ago. Most 
donors, including Canada, have never met this target. Canada’s most recent policy 
statement reconfirms commitment to the target, but no longer sets a deadline for 
meeting it, as it has in the past, but states its intention to “make progress” toward 
reaching this level “when Canada’s fiscal situation allows it.”74 The DAC average is 
much lower than 0.7% and has fluctuated in the past. So, it would be more accurate 
to locate the regime norm at a much lower level and say it is widely accepted that it 
should be contingent on domestic pressures as well as the international commitment. 
However, as Robert Keohane has observed “it would be circular reasoning to identify 
regimes on the basis of observed behaviour, and then use them to ‘explain’ observed
nc
behaviour.” Keohane reasons that it is necessary to base the argument that a regime 
is in place on formal international agreements in addition to evidence of active and 
consistent compliance on the part of actors in an issue area. “Thus, establishing that a 
regime exists is an issue for descriptive inference, based on publicly available texts, 
rather than psychological insight or causal inference.”76
As the discussion of structural adjustment and the dramatic reduction in aid to 
Tanzania in 1993 in Chapter Four, and the example of Canadian commodity support 
to Tanzania presented here reveals, Canadian policy has mirrored very closely World
73 Rittberger, 1993.
74 Canada in the World, pg.43
75 Keohane:27.
76 Ibid:28.
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Bank and DAC policy as well as the policies of other bilateral donors in its embrace 
of structural adjustment and the adoption of balance of payments support as a strategy 
to meet this universal objective. Canadian policy does, however, violate international 
guidelines on tied aid. Nevertheless, as the quotation from the 1992 CIDA policy 
brief and the terms of Commodity Agreement IX indicates, there were moves afoot to 
bring Canadian policy in line with World Bank dictats over the OGL system. If one 
argues that external forces exert an influence on Canadian aid policy, as this paper 
does, there must be evidence of compliance with international norms for Canadian 
policy to be interpreted as anything other than a straightforward calculation of 
national interests and material might. The World Bank has no means of forcing 
donors to comply with its policy positions, but it is hoped that it has been 
demonstrated in this chapter and the next that its influence is exerted through its 
control of information, the leadership role it plays in the donor community at the level 
of macro-level policy consultations and at the programming and project level in the 
field, as well as by persuasion through the multiplying channels of communication 
and coordination which connect aid donors and have become an institutionalized part 
of the aid system.
Likewise, there are no formal sanctions against non-compliance with DAC 
principles. Agreements are adopted by consensus, and Canada as a member of all 
working parties in the OECD is presumably involved in the negotiation of each policy 
position and is at least nominally bound to adhere to them. At the moment both the 
Chairman of the OECD and the Director of the DAC Secretariat are Canadians, but 
what influence, if any this has on the attention Canada pays to DAC pronouncements 
is an open question. Pressure to comply with DAC recommendations is exerted 
mainly in two ways. Firstly, every donor country is subjected to a major external 
review of its aid policy every four years, the results of which are published and placed 
in the public domain. The most recent review of Canadian aid was done by New 
Zealand and the Netherlands and released in June 1998. The Vice President of the 
Policy Branch at CIDA is then required to appear before the other members of the 
DAC to answer questions on Canadian aid policy for a full day. It seems that the 
DAC’s most powerful means of obtaining compliance with its principles is public 
embarrassment. There is possibly even an unwillingness among members to employ
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this means too heavy-handedly. As an example, a meeting of the Working Party on 
the Financial Aspects of aid in the DAC in 1988 was devoted to a consideration of a 
U.S. study of six tied aid projects funded by France, the U.K. and Japan. The 
Canadian delegation reported that
Although the cases did highlight blatant aid and trade distortions, 
namely the introduction of mixed credits very late in the transaction 
process [ ]; donors not stating clearly development merits [ ]; and tying 
combined with low concessionality making projects very expensive to 
recipients [ ],ensuing discussion was rather moderate in questioning, 
members obviously fearing to be the next target for criticisms.77
However, it was suggested in interviews that members use other means to 
bring along recalcitrant countries. For example, in the most recent round of 
negotiations around tied aid, some countries threatened that they would untie their aid 
for procurement in every country except countries (like Canada) which maintained 
tied aid policies, unless they signed on to the agreement under debate. Countries have 
also reportedly used bilateral negotiations in unrelated fields as bargaining chips in 
getting signatures to DAC agreements. These negotiations over tied aid in the DAC 
will now be considered with the intention of shedding more light on the domestic 
factors which have shaped the Canadian position on tied aid as well as the effect of 
international pressure to untie aid on Canadian policy. That they failed can only be 
interpreted as the weakness of the DAC as a means of altering donor behaviour. The 
lack of sufficient incentives to donors to untie aid and the absence of the means to 
impose penalties for the abrogation of agreements has resulted in the persistence of an 
international norm condoning the continued tying of aid.
3.9 DAC NEGOTIATIONS TO UNTIE BILATERAL AID 1996 -1999
Moving away from a focus on Tanzania in particular to consider aid policy 
more generally, this section will examine briefly the most recent round of negotiations 
among aid donors aimed at a more comprehensive agreement on untying aid to 
developing countries. These attempts ended in failure at the DAC High Level 
Meeting in 1999 when donor countries could not reach agreement on the proposal
77 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2, Vol.78, Telex POECD to EXOTT 12 October 1988.
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(very limited in scope) under discussion. Both the formulation of the Canadian 
position and the discussions among donors in the Working Group on the Financial 
Aspects of Development Assistance of the DAC will be considered. The manner in 
which this extremely contentious issue has been perceived and handled by various 
interest groups in Canada and by individual donor countries provides a good 
illustration of the forces which shape Canadian aid policy as well as the forces which 
conspire to inhibit innovation in aid practice.
3.9.1 The Canadian domestic political context
Despite quite conclusive evidence that the untying of ODA would have an 
almost imperceptible impact on the Canadian economy, the Canadian commercial 
sector has been tenacious in its opposition to any perceived movement in this 
direction. Hendra quotes a statement from the chairman of a large corporation in 
1985: “Canadian businessmen have fought for tied aid in Canada, and we do not
n o
intend to see the policy changed.” While commercial sector opposition to untying 
dates back to the initiation of the aid programme, a consideration of the nature of 
business lobbying activities and the support they garnered in the relevant government 
departments in the period leading up to the most recent debate in the DAC is 
instructive. It also gives some sense of the domestic environment in which Canadian 
officials were working at the time the World Bank and the DAC were exerting 
pressure on Canada and other donors to remove restrictions on balance of payments 
support as described above.
It is very difficult to make an accurate assessment of the extent of these 
lobbying activities and their impact on government decision-makers and planners 
where the aid programme is concerned. It has become a truism of debates 
surrounding Canadian aid policy that it is shaped in large measure by Canadian 
commercial interests.79 A review of Canadian aid allocations over the past forty years 
certainly reveals a heavy emphasis on large, capital intensive infrastructure projects 
requiring large quantities of Canadian manufactures. The review of Canadian
78 Camille A. Dagenais, Chairman o f the Board, The SNC Group, Montreal, in a letter to the Editor of 
The Globe and Mail, June 1995, cited in Hendra:261.
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commodity grants to Tanzania presented above suggests that there have been 
occasions when Canada has sought to relieve a surplus of Canadian goods by offering 
them to aid recipient countries. However, finding concrete evidence that commercial 
interests have consistently shaped individual aid projects and the aid programme in 
general is difficult. Rhetoric from DFAIT in particular as detailed throughout this 
paper would certainly lead one to that conclusion, but the tenders and details of 
negotiations with prospective contractors is information protected from public access 
and such discussions (if any took place) of how to maximize Canadian commercial 
interests in the design of aid projects would most likely be found here. In any case, 
several sources indicated that business sector lobbying activities are concentrated at 
the ministerial level, not at the project level. The general conclusion to be drawn 
from a review of files related to Canadian aid projects in Tanzania is that whatever the 
motivations of Canadian Executing Agents in seeking aid contracts may be, CIDA 
project planners and managers are primarily occupied with trying to achieve their 
stated development objectives within the constraints imposed on them by the system 
in which they work.80
An attempt was made for the purposes of this paper to assess Pratt’s argument 
that the commercial sector enjoys preferential access to decision-makers which gives 
it undue influence on the aid programme.81 Ascertaining the extent of lobbying 
activities at the ministerial level and in the office of the president of CIDA is difficult 
due to government legislation in this area. Industry Canada (a federal government 
department) does maintain a register of private sector, lobbying activities and it does 
list some of the commercial firms which have approached CIDA and DFAIT to 
discuss some aspect of the aid programme in the past year. However, this is a 
voluntary register and it is estimated that it covers approximately one third of the
on
lobbying activity on Parliament Hill. A request was made under the Access to 
Information Act to review the daily appointment schedule of both the Minister of 
International Cooperation and the President of CIDA for a six month period in 1999
79 See: Pratt, 1996; Hendra; Gillies; Freeman, 1982.
80 In addition to the detailed case studies presented here, a review of approximately one hundred 
Project Termination Reports for CIDA bilateral projects in Tanzania 1964 -  1994 was made.
81 Pratt, 1996; 1989.
82 Posted at www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/cgi-bin/lobbyist-bin/bin/lrs.e/lrsmain.phtml?
83 Interviews.
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in an attempt to assess the extent of lobbying activities at this level.84 Despite the 
fact that these are public officials conducting public business on publicly paid-for 
time, this request was refused under Section Nine of the Access to Information Act 
which protects third parties from the exposure of information which might damage 
their market position in relation to that of their competitors. Another possible means 
of assessing attempts by private sector enterprises to influence aid policy is to look at 
campaign contributions for the ministers responsible for the aid programme - the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Minister of International 
Cooperation and to cross-reference this with the award of aid contracts. However, the 
manner in which this information is reported to the public obscures the identity of the 
donor in many instances.85 When donations are made through the local constituency 
association, their provenance is lost to the public record, In any case, such evidence 
would not be conclusive. On the basis of these foiled attempts to obtain information, 
one can at least conclude that commercial sector lobbying activity does at least 
receive preferential protection from public scrutiny.
CIDA holds regular annual consultations with various ‘stake-holders’ in the 
aid process including both private sector representatives and the NGO lobby and 
meets periodically with their representatives on other occasions as issues arise. It has 
already been noted in Chapter Two that the Canadian Manufacturers Association 
requested a meeting at DFAIT to make known its disapproval of several policies 
outlined in Sharing Our Future, namely decentralization, the shift to programme aid, 
and the untying of up to fifty per cent of aid to LDC’s. DFAIT files suggest other 
instances in which private sector opinion has been ‘more than significant.’ As an 
example, in 1992, a proposal was made to the Minister that NGO’s be able to compete 
head to head with commercial contractors for bilateral aid contracts. A memo to the 
Minister stated the rationale for NGO exclusion up to this point:
To ensure fairness in the contracting process, it is CIDA’s policy to 
prohibit competition between for-profit (firms) and non-profit 
organizations (non-profit organizations and institutions and 
government agencies)... The existing policy was established to ensure 
that we encourage fair competition and was premised on the notion
84 This was a suggestion made by Ann Weston of the North South Institute.
85 www.elections.ca
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that a non-profit organization might be advantaged in the bid process 
because it is not expected to realize a reasonable financial return. A 
for-profit firm on the other hand is responsible to its shareholders.86
The ‘principal’ whose interests are being protected under this regulation is not 
the supposed beneficiary of Canadian ODA in a poor community in Africa as one 
might hope, but Canadian commercial contractors. The occasion for reviewing this 
regulation was not to redress this error, but an increase in interest among Canadian 
NGOs who wanted to bid on consulting contracts as a means to raise funds to support
* * • • C7their other activities. It was recommended to the minister that they could be 
accommodated by amending the eligibility criteria for submitting a tender to cover all 
organizations liable to pay corporate income tax. The Minister agreed. However, the 
proposed change in policy unleashed an angry letter campaign from private consulting 
firms and their professional associations,88 and the decision was put off until 1996. 
The new regulation, which came into force in December 1996, requires that all 
agreements worth over $100,000 be put to tender in an open competition among for- 
profit and not-for-profit contractors. It also opened funding for unsolicited project 
proposals to commercial firms. This channel had previously been restricted to NGOs. 
The rationale for these policy changes was stated by the Auditor-General in his most 
recent report: “The Agency emphasized that a competitive contracting environment is
O Q
to be the chief mechanism for delivering the assistance programme.” However, the
submission of bids is still restricted to Canadian contractors and excludes firms based 
in the recipient country, for example.. The comparative success of non-profit versus 
commercial contractors as executing agents for Canadian bilateral aid projects is a 
question requiring closer and more rigorous examination than it can receive here. 
Anecdotal evidence from a review of CIDA bilateral projects in Tanzania and the 
above cited evidence of how contracting regulations have been determined suggests it 
is a topic which merits further study.
Frequently in conversation with observers both inside and outside of the 
government, it has been suggested that the current emphasis at CIDA on the Canadian
86 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol.60. Memo to the Minister 1 June 1992
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid. Letters from the public.
89 Auditor-General of Canada, October 2000, Section 14.21.
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private sector’s role in fostering international development was not the result of 
deliberate collusion between government officials and the private sector to design aid 
projects in its interests. One official commented “Conspiracy theories are generally 
not true because we are not that organized.”90 Observers have suggested that there is 
widespread support within CIDA for a focus on the entrepreneurial sector as the 
engine for development, as advocated by the World Bank. There is also a degree of 
self-censure evident in CIDA documents. Despite consistent public opinion polling 
which indicates that the majority of Canadians think that aid should be used to 
eliminate poverty and towards no other purpose, there is a long-standing belief among 
politicians and civil servants in positions of authority that the maintenance of tied aid 
is necessary to maintain public support for the aid programme as a whole, and that 
mutual benefit does not necessarily compromise the efficacy of aid projects in 
combating poverty. Aid policy makers do not necessarily have to be told to consider 
commercial sector interests; they tell themselves. Within the government 
bureaucracy, DFAIT has traditionally been more openly in support of maximizing 
Canadian commercial interests through the aid programme than CIDA; a logical 
position given its principal mandate to protect Canadian interests abroad. An internal 
memorandum from late 1991 stated:
ODA has made and will continue to make a significant contribution to 
the Government’s prosperity agenda by strengthening the international 
experience and contacts of Canadian companies and individuals, and 
thereby their competitiveness and sales. Six thousand Canadian 
businesses obtain ODA contracts each year. Many winners of 
Canadian export awards report their first breakthrough came from aid 
related contracts.91
The same sentiment is expressed in a negative External Affairs response the 
following year to CIDA’s new Southern Africa Regional Policy Framework which 
emphasized regional development cooperation through SADCC.
If in Sharing Our Future we could indulge in the conceit that aid 
somehow floated free from broader policy objectives, we must now 
realize that the wheel has come half circle and the development
90 Interview ,
91 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol. 57, internal memo re: International Assistance Envelope, 22 
November 1991.
programme is now much more tightly tethered. The PM has indicated 
that respect for human rights is a sine qua non of the Canadian aid 
program. In these hard economic times our trade objectives cannot be 
eschewed. The harmonization of development and other foreign policy 
goals can be more readily achieved in a bilateral framework, rather 
than through a regional programming approach.92
This statement is interesting not only because it indicates a continued 
commitment to pursuing commercial objectives through the aid programme, but also 
because it hints at a ‘divide and conquer* approach to aid delivery which inhibits 
effective aid coordination. However, this view was not and is not universally held 
within the Department of Foreign Affairs. A briefing document prepared for External 
Affairs re a CIDA Africa field reps meeting in 1990 stated that “Domestic political 
factors have to be factored into our strategies if we are not to be marginalized in the 
budget allocation process.” — a statement indicative of the pressures on the aid 
programme engendered by its bureaucratic structure. The brief goes on to say, 
however, that
The bottom line of Canadian interest in Africa is development. There 
are no short-term potential trade bonanzas in Africa. What this means 
is that, increasingly, there is a willingness to put money and effort into 
Africa only so long as development happens. There has to be a sense 
that development assistance is actually doing some good, and is not 
being vacuumed into a black hole.
However, another view was expressed by a senior DFAIT official, later to be 
appointed High Commissioner to Tanzania. She was speaking with reference to a 
convoluted rating matrix which had been proposed in 1991 to determine which 
countries were appropriate aid recipients
Africa is an area in which Canada can make a difference in political as 
well as developmental terms. Influence with African countries impacts 
positively on our broader middle power role. The judicious use of 
moderate amounts of much needed and well deserved assistance to a
92 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol. 58. EA Telex from Lusaka to Harare and CIDA Hull, 11 
February 1992.
93 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol. 58 EA briefing document, November 22, 1990.
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number of non-core Tier One and Tier Two countries...will serve 
important foreign policy objectives.94
Just as there are a diversity of views as to the primary objectives of the aid 
programme in the Department of Foreign Affairs, there has always been resistance 
within CIDA to the pursuit of economic advantage through the aid programme. The 
agency is not the monolith it is sometimes perceived to be. A report from a CIDA 
field representatives meeting in Harare in 1991 illustrates this point. After a ten hour 
debate of the Secor Report, which had just been released, the discussion moved on to 
another contentious topic.
An issue which generated a degree of unease among field reps was the 
presentation by CIDA’s Partnership Division on private sector 
participation. Most participants were expecting a presentation on how 
to involve the African private sector in development efforts: what they 
got was a lengthy presentation on how CIDA is trying to involve the 
Canadian private sector in CIDA’s activities. There was much 
controversy over the perception among some field reps that CIDA is 
turning into an export development agency, which was only partially 
allayed by VP Lindores’ sobering concluding presentation on the 
political realities in Ottawa and the need to build a domestic 
constituency outside of the NGO community for development . 
assistance efforts.95
That report was made in 1991 around the time of the launch of the 
Conservative government’s “Prosperity Initiative” for Canada which included 
“strengthening prosperity, through a more competitive development assistance 
programme.”96 This included beefing up the role of the private commercial sector in 
the aid programme and there followed a rapid acceleration in the contracting out of 
the identification, design and implementation of aid projects, a trend promoted within
94 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CIDA(l) Vol. 56. Verona Edelstein, Director of Anglophone Africa Affairs, 
Department o f External Affairs.
95 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.58, EA Memo EEA-3508, December 17, 1991.
96 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.61. See: Government of Canada, Inventing Our Future: An 
Action Plan for Canada’s Prosperity, October, 1992. The Private Sector Development Initiatives Fund 
established in 1991 to fund proactive private sector efforts to identify and plan projects which could be 
incorporated into CIDA’s project portfolio was part of this. Already in existence was CIDA Inc., the 
Industrial Cooperation programme established in 1978 “to provide incentives for Canadian 
entrepreneurs to study new investment opportunities in developing countries and implement viable 
investment projects.” DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A(l) Vol.61. Between 1978 and 1999 CIDA Inc. 
disbursed $850 million to Canadian companies, which is, incidentally, approximately $80 million more 
than the sum total of Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania 1961-1999. See: “Internal Audit Sheds Little 
Light on $850 Million CIDA Offshoot” in The Globe and Mail, 24 January 2000.
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CIDA for other reasons as described in Chapter Two. The leaked Policy Assistance 
Update of 1993 discussed in Chapter Four revealed that the desire to use the aid 
programme to promote Canadian commercial interests abroad was alive an well in 
DFAIT. A change in government in that year has not brought any perceptible 
alteration the government position on the role of the commercial sector in the aid 
programme, although where the Conservative government used the language of 
‘prosperity’ and ‘sustainable development,’ the Liberals have cast their objectives for 
the aid programme in terms of the promotion sustainable development and 
‘security.’97
3,9.2 Negotiations in the DAC
With some sense of the lay of the political landscape in Canada in the 1990’s, 
we can now turn to consider the most recent attempts to untie bilateral aid launched in
Q O
the DAC. In a statement which hints at the sometimes frustratingly slow pace of 
events in the international aid bureaucracy, in 1990 the Chairman of the DAC 
proposed topics for future consideration among members. He suggested that a review 
of tied aid policies might be placed on the agenda for discussion in late 1991 or 1992 
with the rationale that
With the internal untying within the European Community expected to 
take place in 1992 or 1993, with more liberal Japanese procurement 
policies and with the greater competitiveness of North America 
resulting from dollar devaluation, it should be a propitious time for a 
new look at our policies on tying.99
The following year, some months before the conclusion of the Helsinki 
agreement in the Participants Group within the OECD Trade Directorate which 
limiting the use of tied aid for commercial viable projects, the Canadian delegation at 
the OECD reported that
97 Government of Canada. Canada in the World, 1995.
98 This discussion is based on a review of DFAIT files related to the DAC 1989-1992, and interviews 
with Canadian government officials and other participants in the consultation process which shaped the 
Canadian position taken to the DAC in 1999. Although the minutes of the Working Group on 
Financial Aspects of Development Assistance were not reviewed for this paper, if these documents 
were open to the public, a review of the process which created the initial proposed resolution would 
provide interesting insights into the way in which aid policy is negotiated at the international level.
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Widely divergent views of delegations continues to pre-empt any 
substantive progress as long as no agreement is reached on ‘global 
untying.’ For the Japanese delegation, agreement on tied-untying is an 
ideal for which a consensus remains ‘remote’...France and Italy both 
suggest that greater emphasis be given to the quality of tied aid rather 
than untying. In their view, tied aid is here to stay. Recognizing the 
difficulty in reaching agreement on aid untying, the Chairman 
suggested that there was a consensus on improving tied aid quality and 
value for money. The issue of aid untying could nonetheless remain in 
WPFA future work program.100
One year later, the Canadian delegation reported on a meeting of the WPFA 
where donors were “Again unable to agree on new measures in the field of tied 
aid.”101 Italy, Spain and Portugal were cited as the primary sources of resistance.
The Italian DAC delegation informed the Canadian delegation that 
Rome authorities are resisting further disciplines (i.e. DAC WP/FA 
new measures) coming on the heels of those of the export credits 
Participants Group. As a result, they are attempting to thwart progress 
in the working party by calling for the resolution of implementation 
procedures, clarification on the date of effectivity and transitional 
arrangements before agreeing to new measures.102
According the report, the U.S.A. delegation, one of the major proponents of 
further untying, was not pleased and expressed concern at “the inauspicious beginning 
for the two newest DAC members [Spain and Portugal] on an issue which has been
11 llunder discussion for two years.” Regarding future discussions in the WPFA, 
France, Japan and Switzerland reiterated their preference for ‘global untying,’ that is, 
that the new measures should apply equally to all projects including technical 
assistance, and including agreements with a concessionality level of above eighty per 
cent, exempted under the 1987 resolution. This would encompass Canadian ODA 
projects for the first time. The Canadian delegation stated that “it is clear that several 
members will push for an inclusion of this issue under future work. If they succeed,
99 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2 Vol.88. OECD DOC. JCW(90)603 ca/2302,11 October 1990.
100 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2 Vol.85. Telex POECD to EXOTT 22 January 1991. The phrase 
‘global untying’ refers to a difference of opinion among donors as to whether aid should be untied by 
sector, in countries above or below a certain income level or across the board, to large and/or small 
projects, and at what threshold of concessionality the tying of aid should be prohibited.
To1 DFAIT File no. 38-4-OECD-2 Vol.94, Telex 31 January 1992.
102 Ibid.
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Canada and U.S.A. will need to mobilise [sic] their respective financial and 
development arguments to preserve present exemption for large projects.”104
Little progress was made towards an agreement over the next four years. The 
proposal to revisit the issue was put forward by the U.K. and Norway at the DAC 
High Level Meeting in 1996. The Working Group on the Financial Aspects of Aid 
was asked to draw up a resolution on tied aid to LDC’s which would ultimately be put 
to members for approval at a subsequent High Level Meeting. Canada was a 
participant in this working group which finally reached a consensus on a draft 
agreement in 1998. The proposal under discussion was very limited in scope. Its 
application was restricted to aid to Least Developed Countries (which comprises 23 
per cent of Canadian bilateral aid). It exempted much of what comprises bilateral aid: 
food aid, the inclusion of which would not have been acceptable to the major grain 
exporters Canada, U.S.A. and Australia; and technical assistance, which accounts for 
forty per cent of all aid to Africa (and thirty per cent to Tanzania)105, but was 
excluded at the insistence of Japan. The proposed agreement was also restricted to 
projects with a value greater than SDR (Special Drawing Rights) two million or 
approximately 4.6 million Canadian dollars, a threshold determined by ‘horse-trading’ 
among donors.
With the imposition of these limitations on the proposed agreement, its affect 
on the Canadian aid programme would have been minimal. Following the reduction 
of the Canadian aid programme by thirty per cent over the past decade, there are not 
that many Canadian projects worth more that $4.6 million being funded these days. 
For example, the entire annual budget for CIDA’s programme in Tanzania is 
approximately $12 million. Nevertheless, there was still opposition to Canadian 
support for the resolution within Canada. Throughout the period of international 
negotiations on the substance of the resolution, Canadian government officials at 
CIDA and DFAIT organized consultations with policy ‘stakeholders’ in the private 
sector and from non-governmental organizations. Evidence presented elsewhere in 
this paper suggests that the Canadian commercial sector through its various lobby
103 Ibid.
104 t u ;A
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groups has historically been very vigilant in monitoring even subtle shifts in 
Canadian aid policy and in taking immediate, well organized steps to counteract 
policies perceived to be detrimental to its interests. Given this historical pattern, it 
seems somewhat surprising that the negotiations on tied aid going on in the DAC after 
1996 did not initially rouse much interest among big business, even to the extent of 
participating in government consultations on the matter.
However, in a discussion of this most recent round of negotiations over 
untying Canadian aid in accordance with a proposed international agreement, a 
distinction must be made between the two elements of the business community which 
have profited from the aid programme over the course of its existence. In the early 
days of the aid programme and throughout the 1960’s, ‘70’s and early ‘80’s, big 
Canadian manufacturers like Massey-Ferguson and Bombardier won large contracts 
to provide the capital goods required for the large infrastructure projects which made 
up the bulk of Canadian commitments in Tanzania and elsewhere. Hendra cites a 
study which claims, for example, that Massey-Ferguson, (which provided the first lot 
of tractors and heavy equipment for the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project), was 
dependent on aid contracts to stay solvent until it finally went bankrupt in the 1980’s. 
Also that approximately one quarter of the locomotives produced by Bombardier up 
to the mid 1980’s, (including those supplied to the Tanzania Railway Corporation), 
were sold to African countries with the assistance of CIDA and the Export 
Development Corporation.106 This supports evidence from Burch’s study of British 
aid to mechanized agriculture which reveals ODA contracts to have been important in 
sustaining British manufacturers of farm machinery.107 The structure of the Canadian 
economy has, however, changed significantly in the past twenty years. There are far 
fewer firms manufacturing locomotives and heavy farm machinery in Canada. This 
alteration is reflected in the aid programme, which has begun to shift from a heavy 
preponderance of infrastructure projects to involvement in the social sector -  
education in particular. While this shift should not be attributed in its entirety to a 
desire to accommodate Canadian commercial interests, you can’t sell tractors if you
105 Helleiner,1999:18.
106 Hendra: 271.
107 Burch, 1989.
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don’t have any. It could be argued that Canada has developed a ‘comparative 
advantage’ in social service provision in the health and education sectors.
This shift does explain to some extent the lack of interest of Canadian ‘big 
business’ in the negotiations over untying aid in the DAC in recent years. Not only 
are traditional Canadian manufactures in decline, but more importantly, the proposal 
under discussion at the DAC was limited to projects worth less than $4.5 million, and 
therefore not worth the effort of those still left standing or of newcomers in the high- 
tech field, for example. As one Canadian official put it, “We are talking about loose 
change here.” In addition, as a result of deep cuts to the aid budget over the past 
decade, there are relatively few bilateral projects above the $4.5 million mark being 
initiated. The Canadian Alliance of Manufacturers did eventually muster up a pro 
forma statement of opposition to any proposed loosening of tied aid regulations. The 
most vociferous opposition, however, came from those small and medium-size 
consulting firms (engineering, management and others) which rely on aid contracts 
for an important part and sometimes all of their income. According to a 1993 Audit 
and Evaluation of CIDA Inc., (the industrial cooperation programme designed to 
foster Canadian investment in productive enterprises in developing countries through 
the provision of funds for feasibility studies), consulting firms received fifty-eight 
percent of programme funds, manufacturers eighteen per cent, and the remainder went 
to various services and associations.109 There are no comparable statistics available 
for the bilateral aid programme, but a review of the list of CIDA bilateral projects in 
Tanzania indicates a similar pattern in the award of bilateral aid contracts. In this 
quarter the proposed resolution, while limited in scope, was regarded as the thin edge 
of the wedge which would reduce the market for their services. The 1998 ActionAid 
report which argued that the U.K. would be a winner under an Open Bidding System 
for procurement on aid contracts had suggested that Canada would be among the 
losers.110 This coincided with the poor record of Canadian firms in securing World 
Bank contracts1 n . The prospect of competing with American, European and recipient 
country firms for Canadian aid contracts was not welcomed.
108 Interview.
109 DFAIT File no. 38-l-l-CID A (l) Vol.62. Memo EEA-0313,28 March 1993.
1,0 Chinnock, 1998.
111 Hendra:278.
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The non-governmental community’s response to the proposed resolution was 
ambivalent. While most NGOs advocate untying of bilateral aid on the grounds that 
tying reduces the potential economic impact of aid, it has been suggested that 
adopting an Open Bidding System for procurement contracts would not necessarily 
change the balance of power between aid donors and aid recipients. Having a 
European firm implementing a CIDA funded aid project rather than a (perhaps) less 
qualified, more expensive Canadian one may gamer some financial savings, but it 
would not increase the level of involvement of qualified locals in the aid process or 
foster local industry and development expertise. NGO’s also suggest that open 
market procurement would jeopardize the building of long-term relationships between 
organizations in Canada and those in aid recipient countries. However, given the 
limited scope of the proposed agreement and their support in principle for the concept 
of untied aid, the proposal received general approval from this quarter.
Within the Canadian government, reactions to the agreement under discussion 
were likewise mixed. The Department of Finance, the most powerful department in 
the government system, was in favour of supporting the proposal, arguing that as the 
Canadian government had chosen to pursue the liberalization of economic relations, it 
must take the good with the bad. DFAIT initially opposed the agreement on the 
grounds that it compromised Canadian commercial interests, but according to a 
DFAIT official, by April 1998, it had come around to share the Finance position. 
Within CIDA, the response to the proposed agreement was divided. The Vice- 
President of Policy Branch (who is responsible for Canadian participation in the 
DAC) said that the Canadian negotiating team had exceeded their instructions and 
vetoed Canadian support for the proposed resolution. His view was that (in the 
words of another government official) “Canada would be good boy scouts and be 
taken to the cleaners” by other donor country contractors, and that accepting such an 
agreement would be courting controversy at home. However, following the Senior 
Level Meeting of the DAC in December 1998 where the views of other donors were 
canvassed, it was decided that Canada would support the resolution as a step towards 
improving the efficacy of aid.
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With Canadian support in hand, the Canadian delegation went back to Paris 
for the High Level Meeting in June 1999 where the proposed resolution was put 
before member countries for their approval. However, although a tentative consensus 
had been achieved in the working group, the agreement was scuttled within the DAC 
plenary by renewed opposition from several member countries -- Japan, France and 
Portugal in particular, who faced significant opposition to the proposal at home. 
Belgium pressed for technical assistance to be included, an amendment unacceptable 
to several donors. France argued that EU aid should be exempted from the agreement 
as already subject to internal regulations. Heavy pressure was brought to bear on 
recalcitrant members by the U.K. and the U.S., which France countered with a 
demand that food aid be included, a proposal unacceptable to the U.S. among others. 
As a result, the matter was set aside for reconsideration at a later date. While Britain 
has stated that it may pursue the unilateral untying of its aid, there is no plan to pursue 
such a course in Canada.
3.10 CONCLUSIONS
The discussion of Canada’s tied aid policy presented in this chapter provides 
an illustration of the non-linear, decidedly un-straight forward nature of aid policy­
making. It also highlights the numerous obstacles to enhancing aid efficacy through 
policy innovation found both in within the Canadian political environment and in the 
international aid bureaucracy. The fact that untying aid is on the policy agenda in 
organizations like the DAC and the World Bank, and that donors are willing to meet 
to discuss the issue and to make some adjustments to their ODA practices illustrates 
that international organizations can and do exercise a certain degree of influence on 
bilateral aid policy. However, the negotiations within the DAC around tied aid show 
the considerable time and effort required to make even incremental changes to regime 
disciplines. Despite a general willingness to proceed with the further untying of aid 
(if Jepma’s assessment of donor inclination is correct), little real progress has been . 
made in the past thirty years.
Furthermore and somewhat dishearteningly, it appears that even hard won 
consensus on principles designed to improve the efficacy of aid may have little
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perceptible impact on donor practice. These agreements are not legally binding, and 
no international authority has the means to compel compliance, monitor adherence on 
a regular basis, or to apply sanctions against donors who abrogate the agreed 
principles of ODA. The peer review mechanisms of the DAC are weakened by the 
unwillingness of individual bilateral donors to condemn another agency for practices 
-  like using aid to support domestic industry -  in which the majority of them indulge.
This divergence between international agreements and donor practice suggests 
that the actual norms which govern the international aid system are sometimes 
contrary to formal agreements and official policy statements. International 
organizations like the World Bank and the DAC secretariat advocate the untying of 
aid, yet the international consensus which has been achieved to untie aid funds has 
been very limited in scope, affecting only a small proportion of bilateral aid 
agreements. Donor countries may be willing to consider the loosening of restrictions 
on procurement under aid contracts, but not to compromise their own interests in the 
process. Over the past fifty years, there appears to be a tacit concurrence among 
donors that this is an acceptable position.
In addition, there seems to be no guarantee that agreements made and 
honoured by donors, for example, to institutionalize Open Competitive Bidding, 
would necessarily benefit recipient countries, or more precisely, the poor communities 
within them. As the troubled history of the OGL facility in Tanzania demonstrates, 
the World Bank is not omnipotent in its leadership of the international aid system, and 
World Bank/D AC exhortations of donors to support OGL type administrative 
structures for balance of payments support were ill-founded, at least in this instance.
Despite increased Canadian participation in international donor coordination 
discussions and in international conferences on various poverty related issues, 
domestic interests remain paramount in defining aid policy, especially with respect to 
the controversial issue of tied aid. These interests are predominantly shaped by 
powerful interest groups in Canada, of which the private commercial sector is most 
significant. The protection of lobbying activities and campaign contributions from 
public scrutiny inhibits the effective oversight of the aid programme. As the cases
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discussed in Chapters Four and Five will demonstrate, the public airing of policy 
decisions in parliamentary committees, through the office of the Auditor-General, or 
through more informal mechanisms like journalistic investigation, scholarly research, 
or NGO activities, plays an important role in preventing, identifying and correcting 
policy failure. Civil servants and elected officials cannot be held to account for 
actions of which no one is aware. Whether or not they make their public policy 
decisions in response to pressure exerted by lobby groups or the expectation of 
political favours in return for financial contributions to election campaigns, the 
shielding of these interactions and transactions from public scrutiny makes it possible 
for them to do so with relative impunity, and leaves their motives open to question. 
Further, with respect to lobbying activities around ODA policy, it should be noted that 
the interests of the intended beneficiaries of aid overseas are represented by proxy in 
Canada by the Canadian government and by international development NGOs. The 
evidence of pressure from the NGO community to open the tendering process for aid 
contracts to Canadian NGOs suggests conflicting interests in this sector as well, as 
they become both a principal beneficiary and an agent in the aid relationship.
Finally, the history of the negotiation and implementation of Canadian 
Commodity Agreements with Tanzania suggests that constraints on the effective use 
of aid resources are not limited to the level of policy-making, but extend to the 
programming and implementation stages of the aid process as well. The nature of 
these constraints is explored in subsequent chapters. As a final demonstration of how 
domestic and international pressures shape Canadian aid policy, the following chapter 
examines another dramatic policy change: the cancellation of bilateral aid to Tanzania 
in 1993.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The 1993 Cancellation of Canadian Bilateral Aid to Tanzania:
The embrace of structural adjustment and the collective application of policy
conditionality
"In the interests o f sustaining the bilateral relationship, while at the 
same time promoting our new economic focus on investment and trade,
I  undertook a series o f high level calls to explain the rationale o f the 
decision to cut the bilateral CIDA program in Tanzania...It was not 
until today’s call on the Minister o f Industry ...that I  heard the real 
frustration and broader based concern in the Cabinet with the 
Canadian decision...How, he said, in the case o f East Africa, could 
Canada cry deficit reduction as an excuse to make what in CIDA’s 
total budget amounts to a small cut when Canada has just announced a 
major new assistance package for Russia... The Minister referred to an 
evident loss o f supporters andfriends in Canada. I  explained that 
because o f Tanzania’s historic choice to keep out foreign business and 
foreign investment, Tanzania did not have one lobby group enjoyed by 
other countries, i.e. the business community o f Canada. ”
— The Canadian High Commissioner to Tanzania, telex to External Affairs Ottawa,
29 April 1993.1
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine further how Canadian aid policy is 
determined by focusing on two related policy decisions: Firstly, CIDA’s embrace of 
structural adjustment as an aid priority and the acceptance of policy conditionality as 
appropriate ODA practice in the 1980’s. Secondly, CIDA’s decision in 1993 to 
terminate bilateral aid to Tanzania and the rest of East and Central Africa.
The period between the early 1980’s and the mid 1990’s saw a shift in 
bilateral donor programmes to an emphasis on economic structural adjustment and the 
adoption of policy conditionality as common practice. The wholesale embrace of 
structural adjustment by donors as the latest aid wonder drug is apparent in a quick 
perusal of aid policy documents produced in the mid 1980s to early ‘90s. What is not 
so obvious is the extent to which the consensus which emerged on these issues and
1 DFAIT File no. 20-1-2-TANZANIA, Vol. 15, Telex YNDA0278 29 April 1993 re: “The Bilateral Aid 
Program -  Dead and Gone.”
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the similarity among donor programmes was the result of a conscious decision to 
follow a uniform policy; the result of pressure from the World Bank, the laboratory in 
which structural adjustment was concocted; or the convergence of independently 
constructed positions. This distinction is important because the extent to which 
Canadian aid policy has been or is shaped by international norms and the structural 
forces embodied in the institutions of the international aid system affects the degree of 
autonomy CIDA is able to exercise in formulating Canada’s response to poverty in 
other countries. It is also important in determining how broad the scope for 
innovation and how much flexibility or inclination Canadian policy makers have to 
seek new solutions to intractable problems.
As the circumstances surrounding the advent of structural adjustment in 
Tanzania as outlined below illustrate, the shifting of the international aid agenda to 
the level of macro-economic policy required greater coordination among donors than 
had previously been the case. This facilitated the assumption of leadership by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions for establishing and controlling aid doctrine. Bilateral 
donors, including Canada, gradually fell into line on structural adjustment, and the 
provision of bilateral assistance was made conditional on adherence to the terms of an 
IMF agreement.
In a discussion of the influences shaping Canadian aid policy and their impact 
on policy outcomes, the development of an international consensus among donors on 
this issue is interesting not only because it represents a major policy shift in recent 
years, but also because in contrast to the debates surrounding tied aid, in this instance 
domestic pressures do not appear to have played any direct role in policy formation. 
As outlined in previous chapters, there was a generalized dissatisfaction in Canada 
with the perceived inefficiencies of the aid programme in this period, but no public 
clamour for structural adjustment as a solution. The language and the plan of action 
came from the World Bank. In fact, as noted in Chapter Two, the business lobby was 
actively opposed to the shifting of a greater proportion of ODA into balance of 
payments support, a primary mode of donor assistance to structural adjustment 
programmes in Tanzania and elsewhere.
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It is argued here that the adoption of structural adjustment programmes with 
attached policy conditionalities as a principles of international aid practice in the 
1980’s set the stage for the decision to end Canadian bilateral assistance to Tanzania 
and the rest of East and Central Africa in 1993. In that year, CIDA cut its aid to 
Tanzania by seventy percent and informed the government of Tanzania that the rest of 
the bilateral programme was to be phased out. At the time, Tanzania was CIDA's 
largest programme in Africa as well as the third poorest country in the world. The 
decision caught many observers by surprise, and was roundly condemned within 
Canada. At first glance, it would appear that it was made in direct response to federal 
budget cuts in Canada, but this begs the question of why Tanzania and the rest of East 
Africa, arguably the poorest region of the world, was singled out to bear the brunt of 
these cuts.
An examination of these events, and in particular the activities of the World 
Bank led donors’ Consultative Group for Tanzania in the period leading up to 1993, 
reveals that the decision taken by Canada to terminate its bilateral programme in 
Tanzania, while contrary to the mass of expressed public opinion in Canada, was in 
accordance with an international consensus among donors that Tanzania was failing 
to adhere to the conditions attached to its structural adjustment loans from the IMF 
and related assistance from bilateral donors. Several donors made drastic cuts in their 
aid to Tanzania in the same year. However, it is also true that when weighed against 
the competing objectives of the Canadian aid programme as identified in previous 
chapters, the application of the principle of conditionality in Tanzania was predicated 
on a consideration of Canadian interests there. Again, it is suggested that this 
calculation of interests was facilitated by the lack of protection for the interests of the 
supposed beneficiaries of Canadian ODA in the institutional structure of the aid 
programme.
The decision to end bilateral aid to Tanzania was an abrogation of the non- 
legally binding Canadian ODA Charter of 1987 which committed CIDA to assisting 
the poorest people in the poorest countries of the world. The decision was made 
without prior consultation with recipient countries as to what projects would be 
affected, and with disregard to the views of elected members on all sides of the House
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of Commons. That this could occur suggests a weakness in the formal mechanisms of 
policy oversight for the aid programme. The restitution of bilateral aid to Tanzania as 
a result of protracted public outcry provides an illustration of the significance of 
informal mechanisms of policy oversight.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: It will first consider the 
development of an international donor consensus on structural adjustment and policy 
conditionality and its impact on Canadian bilateral aid policy in Tanzania. This is 
done through a consideration of CIDA programming documents and Canada’s 
participation in the Consultative Group meetings for Tanzania in this period. In an 
attempt to understand why CIDA decided to cancel bilateral aid to Tanzania in 1993, 
this chapter will then describe the events surrounding this decision. There are actually 
four policy decisions at issue in this case:
i) the Conservative government’s decision to reduce the ODA budget in late 
1992.
ii) the redefinition of aid policy objectives as outlined in the International 
Assistance Policy Update prepared by External Affairs and leaked to the press 
in January 1993.
iii) the decision taken by the Africa Middle East Branch of CIDA to excise 
Central and Eastern Africa from the aid programme in February 1993.
iv) The decision to recommence bilateral aid to Tanzania in 1994.
Having addressed the issue of international influences on Canadian policy, we 
will then consider several other possible explanations for CIDA’s actions in this 
instance, including Tanzania’s limited strategic and economic importance, and the 
constraints imposed on the aid programme by domestic political imperatives.
4.2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD 
BANK IN SHAPING BILATERAL AID POLICY
In 1979 the Executive Board of the World Bank adopted a policy which would 
permit long term project aid to be extended to countries which agreed to submit to a
178
structural adjustment programme.2 This type of loan became an important component 
of World Bank programmes in the 1980's and established conditionality as a norm of 
the international aid regime. Structural adjustment also became a central priority of 
bilateral aid donors including Canada in the 1980's and was enshrined in the 
Principles for Effective O.D.A. produced by the DAC. This reorientation of policy is 
illustrated in a review of the four major O.D.A. policy documents CIDA has produced 
to date. In 1970 the emphasis was on large infrastructure projects and technical 
assistance as a means to spur economic growth.3 The next policy statement made in 
1975 outlined CIDA’s commitment to basic human needs as had been articulated by 
World Bank President MacNamara in the international arena.4 Canadian aid was to 
focus on rural development, health, shelter, population growth and food production.
In fact, this policy was never enacted due to interdepartmental conflict over the 
objectives of the aid programme and the constraints imposed by Canada’s tied aid 
policy, but this was the stated orientation of the programme in 1975.
In CIDA’s next policy document issued in 1987, aid priorities had changed: 
they were now stated as poverty alleviation, structural adjustment, the increased 
participation of women, environmentally sound development, food security and 
energy availability.5 In 1989 Marcel Masse returned to the CIDA Presidency after a 
stint at the IMF a convert to structural adjustment. Canada’s 1989 memorandum to 
the DAC reported a ‘significant’ reorientation of bilateral aid “in many of the poorest 
countries to provide balance of payments support and structural adjustment 
assistance.”6 Balance of payments support comprised a large percentage of Canadian 
aid to Tanzania as described in Chapter Four. The Sharing Our Future policy 
document in 1987 stated that Canadian aid would be increasingly dependent on 
adherence to an IMF agreement where one was in force. To bring the story full circle, 
Canada’s most recent foreign policy statement cited the priorities for ODA as basic 
human needs; women in development; human rights; democracy and good
2 See Wade; Toye,Moseley and Harrigan.
3 Canada, Foreign Policy fo r Canadians, 1970.
4 CIDA. Strategy fo r International Development 1975-80, 1975.
5 CIDA Sharing Our Future, 1987.
6 Morrison, 1998.
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governance; private sector development; infrastructure services; and the 
environment. Structural adjustment is not listed among them.
In examining the question of how World Bank policy became bilateral aid 
policy in the 1980's, Ikenberry’s analysis of the establishment of the post-war 
economic system in the Bretton Woods Institutions is instructive. He argues that two 
important conditions prevailed at this time which allowed the establishment of a new 
economic regime. Firstly, a group of intellectuals had formulated an acceptable 
compromise of the preferences of the American State Department and the British 
government. Ikenberry also cites the end of WWII as a ‘breakpoint’ in history, a 
volatile period “when the possibilities for major change are particularly great and the 
scope of possible outcomes is unusually wide ... The end of a major war or the
Q
aftermath of large-scale economic crisis alters the parameters of policy-making.” 
Whereas after WWI there had been a general desire to reestablish the prewar laissez- 
faire economic system, following WWII the global political climate had changed.
The Peace of Versailles had been a failure and there was a recognition that a new 
basis for stability had to be found. Europe was financially dependent on the U.S. The 
U.S. had abandoned its isolationist stance and there was a revival of American 
internationalism. The welfare state had been bom. Ikenberry concludes: “In this 
sense, the ‘demand’ for new ideas was greater the second time around.”9
One could argue that a similar situation existed in the aid system in the early 
1980's. Many southern countries were in extremely precarious states and two oil 
shocks had wreaked havoc. There was palpable frustration among donors with the 
failure of aid to make any perceptible impact on poverty and pressure for reform 
building within Tanzania. The intractable nature of poverty had revealed itself with 
sobering intensity in the horrific famines in Ethiopia and the Sudan, the alarming 
build up of Third World debt, and in reports of failed aid projects in Tanzania and 
elsewhere. Conservatism was on the rise in the west, with the election of Margaret 
Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the U.S.A. and Brian Mulroney’s Conservative 
government in Canada. In this atmosphere, the ready-made solution presented by the
7 Canada. Canada in the World, 1995.
8 Dcenberry:318.
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World Bank in the form of structural adjustment had understandable appeal. The 
Bank brought its considerable resources to bear in analyzing Tanzania’s problems. It 
conducted economic surveys and comprehensive sectoral studies at a time when 
budget cuts and an organizational restructuring in CIDA were diminishing the 
agency’s capacity for independent research and policy-making. World Bank 
documents are routinely used in the preparation of CIDA programming strategies for 
Tanzania. One CIDA official commented “There is no point in reinventing the 
wheel”10
Prior to 1986 and particularly during the decade long standoff between the 
IMF and the government of Tanzania, the bilateral donors were pretty much left to 
their own devices in designing their aid programmes in Tanzania. Canada and 
Tanzania negotiated bilaterally to fit Canadian interests and capabilities to Tanzanian 
priorities as outlined in the five year plans. CIDA also sought to identify areas of 
intervention by conducting sectoral studies of its own (such as those done for the 
water, power and rail sectors). With the conclusion of the IMF agreement in principle 
in 1986, the World Bank presence in Tanzania increased significantly, with the Bank 
financing several new large scale projects and co-financing projects with bilateral 
donors. It also assumed a leadership role in the donor community in Tanzania, 
chairing not only the annual Consultative Group (CG) meetings, but also the monthly 
donor meetings in Dar es Salaam and a number of the sectoral consultative groups 
which have been established in the past decade. In fulfilling its leadership role, the 
World Bank sets the agenda for meetings and its documents and economic analyses 
form the basis for discussions. The existence of the IMF agreement, the conclusion of 
the Policy Framework Paper, Public Expenditure Reviews, and the ES AF agreements 
created a framework of development objectives towards which donors subsequently 
directed their aid. In these ways World Bank policy has shaped Canadian aid policy 
at a fundamental level.
There is no sense that the World Bank has usurped this authority from other 
donors. In fact, events indicate that the bilateral donors delegated/deferred leadership
9 Ibid: 321.
10 Interview.
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on certain elements of aid coordination quite willingly. The bilateral donors have not 
ceded control to the World Bank in all fora, and various donors have taken the lead in 
coordinating assistance to various sectors of the Tanzanian economy. Further, while 
universally in support of structural adjustment in Tanzania since the mid 1980’s, there 
is evidence that the bilateral donors have acted to temper the hard line approach 
advocated by the IMF. Nevertheless, the World Bank has shaped aid to Tanzania in a 
fundamental way and instigated a major redefinition of objectives and strategies. This 
clearly seems to have been the case with CIDA’s embrace of structural adjustment as 
a programme priority and the transfer of resources to programme aid. However, a 
review of Canadian programme documents and interviews with CIDA officials 
indicate that efforts to bring Canadian aid into line with World Bank objectives or 
DAC guidelines on less elemental points occurs sporadically, unevenly, and often 
after the fact as a confirmation of current Canadian policy.
4.3 THE IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONALITY
The imposition of conditions attached to aid flows to Tanzania in the period 
leading up to 1993 offers another perspective from which to gauge the comparative 
influence of international norms and other forces on Canadian aid policy. It is 
significant that the imposition of policy conditionality on Canadian aid to Tanzania 
preceded the conclusion of the IMF agreement in principle in 1986 at which time 
World Bank and continued bilateral aid was made conditional on compliance with an 
IMF agreement. As described below, the decision to attach conditions to Canadian 
ODA to Tanzania was made within the African Middle East Branch at CIDA after the 
consideration of several policy options in 1982 and 1984. However, conditionality 
was a standard feature of IMF agreements at the time, so the precedent was well set, 
and it was not a Canadian invention by any means. Also significant was the later 
extension of the principle of policy conditionality to include political reform. The 
centrality of this goal in the Canadian aid programme and the consensus of donors on 
this point is revealed in the review of the proceedings of the annual consultative group 
meetings presented below.
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The 1982 CIDA Tanzania Country Programme Review contains the first 
reference to the imposition of conditions on Canadian aid to Tanzania.11 The 
document noted the deteriorating economic situation in Tanzania, particularly that in 
the aftermath of the oil shocks fifty seven percent of foreign earnings were going to 
purchase oil and nineteen percent went to servicing debts.12 Foreign exchange 
reserves and economic growth rates were in the negative and inflation was running at 
thirty percent. Industry was operating at twenty to thirty percent capacity and 
agricultural production had declined. Tanzanian efforts towards achieved equity and 
self-reliance had been considerable, but “hard won social gains are jeopardized” by 
the precarious economic conditions. The analysis concluded “Today Tanzania is 
leading a hand to mouth macro-economic existence,” a statement which reflected the 
renewed attention on macro-economic policy in development circles at the time. The 
CIDA analysis of Tanzania’s ills cited a combination of external and internal factors: 
the oil shocks, increasing prices for imports and declining commodity prices, the 
break up of the E.A.C., invasion by Amin, and a drought, as well as “a number of 
dysfunctional government policies” — the pricing of agricultural products, 
insufficient emphasis on material incentives, inefficient parastatal companies and the 
villagization programme. However, CIDA noted with approval “an overdue 
realization that world economic structures will not change to Tanzania’s advantage in 
the near future and therefore solutions must be enacted internally (though not without 
external assistance)” and “a distinct trend toward a more pragmatic approach to 
economic problem-solving.” CIDA identified a role for itself in urging Tanzania to 
make economic policy reform.
As a ‘friendly’ donor, Canada has an opportunity and obligation to 
encourage Tanzania’s economic liberalization and recovery through 
influence, through concerted action with other donors, and through 
increased elements of conditionality. We therefore propose that future 
adjustments in the IPF [the indicative planning figure — a five year 
budget] be commensurate with GOT efforts to implement programs of 
practical economic adjustment.13
11 CIDA, Anglo Africa Branch. Country Programme Review: Tanzania, 1982.
12 For an analysis of Tanzania’s political and economic history, the government’s development 
initiatives, and the evolution of the crisis in the 1980’s, see: Brett,1973; Pratt,1976 and 1979; 
Coulson,1982; Barkan,1994; Lofchie,1994; Campbell and Stein,1992; Boesen,1986; Bagachwa,1997; 
and Sobhan,1996.
13 CIDA, Country Programme Review: Tanzania, 1982.
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Canada and other bilateral donors had not yet tied aid disbursements to an 
IMF agreement, but were urging Tanzania to settle with the Fund. The 1982 Review 
contained a survey of the degree to which other donors were employing conditionality 
in Tanzania. Among major donors, Norway and the U.K. attached few conditions to 
their assistance. Swedish aid had little but increasing conditionality, the U.S. imposed 
‘some’ conditions, German conditionality was ‘implied.’ Both the Netherlands and 
Denmark imposed considerable conditionality. It was also noted that “All major 
donors are concerned with the same basic economic issues including an IMF 
agreement, Tanzanian capacity and recurrent costs.” Donor programmes were 
responding to these problems with broadly similar strategies. “In general, greater 
emphasis is being placed on liquid program transfers, productive sectors of the 
economy, rehabilitation and consolidation.”14
The 1982 CIDA policy review determined that the volume of future Canadian 
assistance “should be conditional upon the implementation by the GOT of an 
appropriate economic recovery program... this will allow Canada to show positive 
support for positive initiatives.”15 Such initiatives would include the adoption of an 
IMF structural adjustment programme, the commitment of more resources to 
agricultural development and particularly to support small scale farmers, as well as 
measures specifically related to Canadian aid projects — i.e. letting the market 
determine wheat prices and imposing realistic tariffs on rail freight.
With lips pursed a little tighter in disapproval, the 1984 CPR Update noted 
Tanzania’s continued economic decline with no IMF agreement in sight. It records 
the dissatisfaction of CIDA officials with Tanzanian progress on economic reform.
Lately the GOT reaction to this economic crisis at the political 
level...appears to be increasingly characterized by dependence on 
ideological rhetoric in lieu of effective economic management.16
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 CIDA, Tanzania Country Programme Review Update, 1984.
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The update referred also to the recent enactment of the Economic Sabotage 
Act and the Human Resources Redeployment Act which gave the government 
authority to, respectively, detain horders, and to redeploy to rural areas ‘non­
productive’ urban elements such as peanut vendors and shoe shiners. This legislation, 
it was suggested, “raises questions relative to human rights issues while doing little to 
address real economic problems.” However, political conditionality was not 
considered in 1984. The document’s authors cited “the growing perception that good 
development is hampered by current Tanzanian policies” but cautioned that
Overt attempts to criticize or change that policy, perhaps even some of
its ramifications at the project level, could be detrimental to our
objective of maintaining friendly and thus, hopefully, influential
relations with the government of Tanzania. The same could be said of1 ^any precipitate withdrawal from current commitments.
With this in mind, CIDA considered three different courses of action in 
Tanzania in 1984. Firstly, the gradual scaling down of the entire programme. 
Secondly, a shift in programming to a level and to sectors less directly affected by 
government policy — i.e. small scale community development projects. Finally, 
increasing conditionality at the project and sector level. Management chose the third 
option which left the basic contents of the programme intact, with its emphasis on 
mechanized agriculture, rail transportation and energy distribution. Canadian officials 
stated a desire to maintain good diplomatic relations with Tanzania, a leader in the 
region and within the Group of 77, which made the first option particularly 
unattractive. They reasoned that rerouting aid through the NGO sector or a similarly 
low key, low cost approach to development would not have been favoured by the 
Department of External Affairs and International Trade or the commercial interests 
which profited from bilateral aid contracts.
We therefore propose to develop and apply a conditionality based 
strategy at the project and sectoral levels that will address our 
developmental concerns while taking into account any managerial or 
interdepartmental concerns relating to Canadian political/economic 
objectives. This will include working with other donors where 
appropriate.18
17 Ibid:2.
18 Ibid.
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Within current projects, conditionality was to be “applied gradually but 
increasingly stringently, and at increasingly higher levels.” Future programming 
would move away from the allocation of resources to non-responsive parastatals to 
direct assistance to the private farming sector (large and small), and from project aid 
to more commodity assistance, a transfer which “would both reward agricultural 
policy improvements and aid development.” Conditionality was to be implemented 
through specified measures to be taken in relation to Canadian funded projects within 
an established timetable with predetermined milestones at which progress would be 
assessed and subsequent action decided. Compliance would be encouraged through 
“continuing sectoral dialogues” with the appropriate, and if necessary, increasingly 
senior Tanzanian officials.
In the railway sector, CIDA funding was to be dependent on: i) the 
development and implementation of incentives and productivity programmes; ii) the 
implementation of realistic financial structures, including the collection of appropriate 
fees from users; iii) the allocation of funds for spare parts. Future involvement in the 
Hanang wheat farms and any other agricultural initiatives was made conditional on 
government efforts to restructure and improve the management of the farms, 
including increasing their autonomy from the parastatal NAFCO, and the 
implementation of the new national agricultural policy. Commodity grants and the 
spare parts projects were to be conditional on the realistic pricing of the goods 
imported and the collection of fees from the buyers. Interestingly, the program 
review determined that the scope for applying conditions to Canadian aid in the 
energy sector was limited due to the involvement of other countries in the sector and 
in co-financed projects, as well as the difficulty and cost involved in stopping and 
starting large construction projects. This assessment indicates that the application of 
conditionality at the project level was not standard practice among bilateral donors at 
this time and that donor coordination in this regard was still in its nascent stage.
The decision to pursue a policy of conditionality was accompanied by a 
retrenchment of Canadian aid in Tanzania. The review determined that the emphasis 
of the programme should be on protecting past investments and rehabilitating
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salvageable projects. It recommended that CIDA cut its losses on disastrous projects 
like the semi-automatic bakery in Dar es Salaam and concentrate support on those 
“absolutely critical in the current context.” Conditions would be applied to these 
rehabilitation efforts, which were to consist of training programmes and technical 
assistance with policy reform. It was recommended that “any new capital investment 
scrupulously be avoided.”19 It should be noted that this decision came after the 
fivefold expansion of the wheat project discussed in the next chapter. Finally, the 
review proposed the preparation of contingency plans for revising the programme if 
conditionality did not prove successful in stimulating reform within two years.
Two years later, the Country Programme Review of 1986 reported that 
“During the past five years, it has proven difficult to maximize the effectiveness of 
development resources under the economic conditions which have prevailed in 
Tanzania.” The most favourable assessment of the impact of Canadian aid which 
could be offered was that it “has been effective in moderating Tanzania’s economic 
decline.” Despite minimal success overall, the report expressed satisfaction with the 
implementation of the policy of conditionality. It stated that “CIDA has successfully 
used project level conditionality” citing “informed pressure” from Canada as key in 
securing from the government major tariff increases on the railways and greater 
access to foreign exchange for the Tanzania Railway Company.
Despite the fact that Canadian aid made up less that six percent of Tanzania’s 
total ODA intake in this period, Canada claimed a degree of influence 
disproportionate to the resources it provided on the basis of an historically close and 
cordial relationship. Noting in a self-congratulatory tone the recent agreement in 
principle between the IMF and the Tanzanian government, it was suggested that 
“Canada’s insistence on economic reform — coming from a friend and moderate — 
no doubt influenced the government of the inevitability of coming to terms with the 
IMF.” In bilateral consultations between Canada and Tanzania held earlier that year, 
Canada had informed Tanzania that “there would be no further programme growth 
and that the provision of commodities for balance of payments support was being
19 Ibid:4.
20 CIDA, Tanzania Country Programme Review, 1986:9.
187
discontinued until economic policies had been reformed in conjunction with an IMF 
agreement”21 This condition was subsequently met and CIDA pledged $30 million 
for balance of payments support in June of 1986, with the proviso that
It should be clear that the future of CIDA’s Tanzania programme is 
dependent upon internal developments in Tanzania. If the Tanzanian 
government continues to address the country’s problems in a realistic 
and pragmatic manner, CIDA should maintain, and even expand, its 
level of support. Alternatively, if the macro-targets under the ERP are 
not substantially met and the IMF programme is suspended, support 
should be reduced accordingly... If steps are not taken to restore
economic stability within a reasonable time frame, the entire
00programme would be scaled down.
Thus in 1986, conditionality, still not an agency-wide policy within CIDA, 
was, in the Tanzania programme, extended from the project level to include specific 
conditions at the macro-policy level. In addition to the unilaterally imposed 
conditions attached to Canadian projects, Canada in concert with other donors made 
bilateral aid conditional on compliance with the IMF agreement. The above quoted 
statement is likewise significant in that it marked the second point in time at which 
CEDA officials considered phasing out Canada’s involvement in Tanzania altogether. 
This is significant in light of the sudden cancellation of Canadian aid to Tanzania in 
1993, an action which at the time seemed to many members of the public and the 
development community in Canada to have come out of the blue.
However, the donor community was in a jubilant, triumphant and enthusiastic
mood at the 1986 annual Consultative Group meeting for Tanzania held following the
0*\signing of the agreement in principle. CIDA’s memorandum to the Minister of 
External Relations on Canada’s position at the CG that year declared
21 Ibid: 12.
22 Ibid: 13.
23 The World bank sponsored Consultative Group (CG) for Tanzania was first convened in 1968 when 
Tanzania’s aid requirements were considered jointly with those of Kenya and Uganda. In subsequent 
years each country has been dealt with individually. In 1977 the CG met for the last time until 1986, 
the intervening decade characterized by a standoff between the Tanzanian government and the 
international financial institutions over the appropriate strategy for development in Tanzania. IMF 
funding was cut off in 1980 for Tanzania's failure to comply with the terms of the current loan. 
Meetings resumed in 1986 with the conclusion of an agreement in principle between Tanzania and the 
IMF on a structural adjustment plan which reopened the flow of World Bank funds to Tanzania.
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This is an event of major significance in Tanzania’s post-colonial 
history; it signifies their recognition that there are limitations to their 
socialist model and paves the way for pragmatic economic policies, 
market-oriented decision-making and a resumption of economic 
growth.24
This event was deemed significant for international development in general
because as “one of the last and most prominent hold-outs against ‘IMF imperialism,’
Tanzania’s decision will have a demonstration effect on other Third World countries
still resisting market-oriented economic policies.” The Canadian delegation
reported that the 1986 CG meeting for Tanzania was “the most well attended in recent
history. Twenty-eight multilateral and bilateral delegates arrived to witness the fall of
the last domino. Delegates were not disappointed. The meeting was held in an
atmosphere of high drama, last minute suspense and occasional comic relief.” There
was a night meeting to reach the agreement in principle. “Donors then put on an
impressive display of support for the Tanzanian economic recovery programme
although all pledges were conditional on GOT concluding and adhering to the IMF
programme.” The U.S., having pushed hard for an IMF agreement, pledged no new 
26money.
It is interesting that any reference to any external sources of Tanzania’s woes 
had by this point been dropped, and the emphasis was solidly on internal policy 
reform. Tanzania’s predicament was attributed to a “well-intentioned but poorly
The meetings are convened and chaired by the World Bank, which sets the agenda, calculates 
the estimated aid requirements each year, and circulates its economic briefs and policy documents 
among donors in advance of the meetings. Between 1986 and 1997, the agenda for the CG for 
Tanzania centered on the consideration of various Tanzanian policy documents drawn up in 
consultation with the World Bank to affect economic structural reform, and the country's progress in 
meeting these objectives. The meetings are divided into two parts. One session is devoted to a 
discussion of substantive issues. In the annual pledging session, donors commit to providing a specific 
sum of aid over the next year to make up the total funding requirements as determined by the World 
Bank. Debate of the contents o f individual donor programmes does not occur in the formal 
proceedings of the CG's, though donors typically use the delivery of their formal statement at the 
opening session to raise concerns related to their particular projects in Tanzania. The importance o f the 
CG in the formulation o f bilateral aid policy is as a forum in which the overall policy objectives are 
debated and agreed between Tanzania and its donors. The CG also performs a useful function in 
providing an opportunity for informal discussion and coordination among donors.
24 Memorandum to the Minister, 16 May 1986.
25 Ibid.
26 Telex POCD to EXOTT 12 June 1986, DFAIT File no. 38-6-1-TANZ-l, Vol.2.
189
conceived economic ‘dirigisme’” which had weakened individual initiative, 
misallocated scarce resources and created a large and inefficient public sector. The 
responsibility for implementing the reforms which would free Tanzania from 
desperate poverty was placed with the government. There was, however, an 
acknowledgement of the responsibility of donors to hold up their end of the bargain, 
having chosen to impose conditions on their aid. “Tanzania’s economic future as well 
as the economic remedies of the IMF and the West will be on public trial.”27
Despite the continuing dispute between the IMF and the Tanzanian 
-government over the contents of a structural adjustment agreement, the celebratory 
mood among donors continued into 1987. CIDA officials were content that the 
current ERP (introduced in the 1986/87 budget) was “obviously on track and 
becoming one of the very few recent African success stories.”28 Their view was 
more circumspect the following year as Tanzania and the IMF still had not come to 
terms. President Nyerere gave a speech criticizing the IMF and Canadian aid moved 
into a holding pattern. The CIDA mission in Dar stated “We would wish to keep our 
options open until we see policy plans beyond the ERP, given the somewhat uncertain
•J Q
outcome of current party/government, ideologue/pragmatist debate.” The World
Bank itself was cautiously optimistic about the reform process in Tanzania claiming
“The government has been successful in implementing the bulk of its economic
reform program and economic activity has already responded.”30 But its enthusiasm
was tempered, “recovery is still incipient: the nature of existing infrastructural,
institutional and administrative constraints indicate that it will be some time before
^  1
the benefits of policy reform are fully realized.”
CIDA officials showed a moment of doubt over the tying of Canadian aid to 
IMF policy, as the Fund continued to have trouble bringing the Tanzanian 
government to heel and structural adjustment remained in any case an unproven 
antidote. “Given the political context of Tanzania and the fact that the IMF has not
27 Ibid
28 Telex CIDA HQ to CHC Dar, 1987.
29 Telex CHC Dar to CIDA HQ 19 May 1988
30 World Bank. Report to the Consultative Group fo r Tanzania on the Government’s Economic 
Recovery Program, mimeo, 1988.
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yet proven its infallibility, we may wish to consider conditionality tied to something 
like ‘rational and progressive economic policies’ rather than IMF conditions.”32 
However, an IMF agreement was signed in November 1989 after long, arduous and 
acrimonious negotiations.33 The consultative group meeting held immediately 
following the conclusion of the agreement was judged by CIDA officials as “highly 
successful” with donors pledging “more financial support than even optimists would 
have expected.”34 The meeting was not a love-fest, though. The Nordic countries 
were extremely critical of the operation of the large network of government sponsored 
cooperatives which they believed had become merely inefficient party organs.
Donors in general urged Tanzania to place greater emphasis on private sector 
development. There was at the same time a new awareness among donors of the 
“social dimensions of adjustment” and the limitations of economic structural 
adjustment as a cure-all. The Canadian delegation reported that
The meeting served to raise some real ‘structural’ structural adjustment 
issues such as the role of cooperatives and made at least this participant 
question whether in some cases we and the IFIs are over emphasizing 
die importance of macro indicators to the detriment of real structural 
problems that cannot be fully addressed with the economic tools we 
have at our disposal such as exchange rates, money supply and
35prices.
The Canadian statement contained a low key admonition for the slowness of 
management reform at the TRC. “We believe that it has the potential to render much 
greater service to the country if the spirit of structural adjustment is brought to bear on 
its operations.” The Canadian delegate also reiterated once more Canada’s desire that 
the wheat produced by the Hanang farms and by small-holders be sold at market 
prices rather than below them.
31 World Bank. Special Program o f  Assistance Status Report fo r Tanzania, prepared for multidonor 
meeting, Washington, D.C., mimeo, October 1988.
32 Telex CHC Dar to CIDA HQ 31 May 1988.
33 “One participant in sessions with Bank described them as the most difficult he had ever experienced” 
from telex CHC Dar to CIDA HQ 6 December 1989.
34 Telex CIDA HQ to CHC Dar 6 December 1989.
35 CIDA. Report o f  the Canadian Delegation to the Consultative Group Meeting fo r  Tanzania, 
December, 1989.
36 Statement o f  the Canadian Delegation at the Consultative Group for Tanzania meeting, Paris, 
December 1989.
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The honeymoon between Tanzania and its donors was well and truly over by 
1991. The 1991 CG marked the onset of disillusionment among donors with the 
progress of structural adjustment in Tanzania. All donors expressed concern over the 
pace of reform and for the government’s heavy reliance on external aid. The country 
was at that point almost entirely dependent on donor financing for its development 
budget and for a high percentage of the recurring budget as well.37 In addition to 
chronic concerns over the inefficient operation of parastatal companies, there was 
general concern expressed by donors that aid to the social sectors intended to ease the 
impact of structural adjustment was instead being used to cover the recurrent costs of 
unsustainable health and education programmes which were themselves in need of 
reform. The pervasive sentiment among donors was that the will for reform had 
dissipated in Tanzania and the whole project lacked direction and was foundering. A 
CHC Report summarized the mood among donors following a pre-CG meeting in Dar 
in 1991.
Most remain concerned and committed to supporting meaningful 
change and development of this resource rich country, but frustrated by 
the enormous difficulty of getting anything done in it. There was a 
sense of frustration at not knowing who, if anyone, was managing the 
larger agenda for change for Tanzania. One outcome of the discussion 
was a strong sense that no one, not GOT, not IMF/IBRD and certainly 
not the bilaterals, had the ‘big picture’ fully in mind much less under 
control.38
Prior to the CG meeting in 1992, the IMF representative in Dar urged donors 
to stay the course in support for Tanzania saying “It needs to know that donors are 
still there and can be counted on.” Structural adjustment continued to dominate the 
agenda that year as donors and Tanzanian officials discussed reform initiatives in the 
financial sector and the civil service. As in previous years, the problem of parastatal 
inefficiency was raised and there was much debate over the shortcomings of the Open 
General License facility set up to administer balance of payments support. Donors 
also reiterated their concerns over the overall pace of reform and of Tanzania’s 
dependence on aid. A significant new addition to the agenda in 1992 was the matter
37 Report of the Canadian Delegation to the 1-991 Consultative Group Meeting for Tanzania, telex from 
the Canadian High Commission in Dar es Salaam to CIDA Ottawa.
38 Ibid
39 Telex CHC-CIDA HQ June 9,1992
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of democratic reform as donors lobbied for the legalization of opposition groups. The 
inclusion of this issue was significant because it marked the expansion of the reform 
agenda beyond economic institutions to encompass political institutions as well.
Memos related to the preparation of the Canadian position at the 1992 CG 
meeting make it clear that Canadian aid to Tanzania was henceforth to be conditional 
on both economic and political reform. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
gave a speech at the Commonwealth Heads of State conference in Harare that year in 
which he stressed the importance of democratization and good governance and 
Canada’s support for both. In departmental discussions held to formulate the 
Canadian position for the CG in 1992, the Vice-President of the Africa-Middle East 
Branch at CIDA stressed the importance of emphasizing Canada’s desire for the 
evolution of democratic government (i.e. a multiparty electoral system) in Tanzania 
and to have this position supported in the final press communique. The Canadian 
delegation was instructed to canvas other donors at the head of delegation dinner to 
ensure that all were on board. It was suggested that “Although Canada’s intervention 
in this regard should be delivered in a supportive manner, the real meaning should be 
clear, i.e. ODA flows to Tanzania are linked to continuing progress on the political 
front.”40 The instructions for the Canadian delegation from the Department of 
External Affairs stated that Canada should congratulate Tanzania for its 
accomplishments “but put them on notice that the pace of reform must increase and 
that they must increasingly look to their own resources.”41
In the event, the statement given by the Canadian delegate had the tone of the 
‘I think we should see other people’ stage of a relationship. Canada noted the new 
emphasis on regional development in its aid programme as outlined in the Africa 21 
strategy, congratulated Tanzania for the role it had played in responding to regional 
crises in Rwanda and Uganda, and urged further economic integration with Kenya 
and Uganda. The delegate voiced support for democratic reform in Tanzania and 
declared that Canada “shall be increasingly channelling its development assistance to
40 Telex CIDA HQ to CHC Dar, June 18, 1992
41 Memo from the Department of External Affairs to the Canadian permanent representative at the 
OECD in Paris, June 1992.
those countries that show a respect for the fundamental rights and individual freedoms 
of their people.” The Canadian delegate when on to say
Tanzania has for a long time been the darling of the bilateral aid 
community in Africa. This situation should not continue indefmately: 
the time must eventually come when Tanzania no longer requires 
financial assistance as its development will have reached the point of 
self-sustaining growth. Indeed it is what we are all aiming for.
In making Canada’s financial pledge for the coming year, the Canadian 
delegate referred again to the problem of uncollected fees for Canadian commodities 
imported under grant agreements and said
I want to stress that this high level of Canadian assistance to Tanzania 
can only be sustained if these resources are used in the full spirit with 
which they were given. We expect the government to take all 
necessary measures to ensure that all existing and future beneficiaries 
of import assistance will meet their full cash cover obligations.43
The sentiments expressed by the Canadian delegation were echoed in other 
donor interventions. There was praise for the ‘impressive array of fundamental policy 
and institutional changes’ and some sympathy for the government’s predicament 
shown in strong recommendations from Sweden, Italy and Finland that all official 
bilateral debts be cancelled and that donors should assist in covering the IMF/IBRD 
debt service load and initiate a commercial debt buy-back scheme,44 but the mood was 
characterized by the Canadian delegate as ‘distinctly critical.’45 The final 
communique made explicit the connection between economic reform, progress 
towards democratization, respect for human rights and the continued provision of 
assistance at significant levels. Ironically, as noted by a CIDA official, after making 
statements chastising Tanzania for its heavy dependence on aid, donors had proceeded 
to pledge twenty-percent more funds than the World Bank forecast had indicated were
42 Statement o f  the Canadian Delegation, Consultative Group Meeting for Tanzania, June 29-30 1992, 
Paris
43 Canadian Pledge Statement Consultative Group meeting for Tanzania, June 29-30 1992, Paris.
44 Canada had forgiven all its loans to Tanzania in 1987.
45 Telex CIDA HQ to CHC Dar es Salaam July 7, 1992 reporting on CG meeting held June 29-30, 1992 
in Paris
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required.46 This suggests that donor coordination of aid programming was not smooth 
or complete, even in terms of sharing out the financial burden, let alone in allocating 
areas of intervention for each donor.
In February 1993, Canadian aid to Tanzania was cut by seventy percent, to be 
phased out entirely, with the exception of access to the three small projects funds 
noted above. Relevant to the discussion at hand is the fact that Canada was not alone 
in making substantial aid cuts at this time. Between 1992 and 1993, Finland reduced 
its aid to Tanzania by sixty per cent, Swedish commitments declined by forty-eight 
per cent, aid from the U.K. fell by twenty-eight per cent, from Norway by eighteen 
per cent and from Japan by twelve per cent. Germany and Denmark increased their 
commitments by twenty-two and twelve per cent respectively, but overall, total 
bilateral assistance pledged at the 1993 CG was down by thirty-two per cent from the 
previous year, from $710 million US to $538 million US 47
The reasons for these cuts were multiple. In Canada, Sweden and Finland 
ODA had been reduced overall and there were extenuating domestic factors at play in 
each case. However, the significant reduction in bilateral aid to Tanzania on the part 
of the majority of its major donors at the same time cannot logically be attributed to 
mere coincidence, particularly in light of the general dissatisfaction with the pace of 
policy reform in Tanzania and the threats of the withdrawal of support voiced by 
donors over a period of several years. There is no evidence of an organized, 
collective agreement among bilateral donors to reduce aid in this manner, and in fact 
Canadian documents indicate that the decreases from the U.K., Norway and Sweden 
were unexpected. However, as all donors had frozen balance of payments support to 
Tanzania in 1992 pending an audit of the OGL system, and bilateral aid to Tanzania 
was subsequently frozen for a time in 1994, the 1993 cuts must at least in part be 
attributed to a solidifying consensus among donors that the impetus for reform had
46 Telex CHC Dar es Salaam to CIDA HQ August 20, 1992 re monthly DAC/IBRD/UNDP aid 
coordination meeting.
47 Source: telex CHC to CIDA HQ 19 August 1993 from Lome E. Heuckroth Head of CIDA mission in 
Tanzania. These figures refer to annual pledges made at the CGs rather than the annual disbursements 
of aid as recorded in the DAC tables. The discrepancy between the two sets of figures is attributed to 
the uneven disbursement of previously pledged project funds over several years.
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dissipated in Tanzania and it was unable to use aid effectively. In accordance with the 
principle of conditional assistance, aid was reduced.
However, while bilateral assistance fell by more than a third, multilateral 
assistance was up by two thirds in 1993, the increase coming from the African 
Development Bank and the CEC. Thus total aid pledged to Tanzania in 1993 was 
eight per cent more than in 1992, $1204 million US from $1110 million US.48 This 
reconfiguration of aid was significant for two reasons. Firstly, as noted by the CIDA 
head of mission in Dar at the time, Tanzania’s already overwhelming debt burden 
worsened with the acquisition of new multilateral loans to replace lost grants. 
Secondly, rather than acting in accordance with the bilateral donors and reducing their 
pledges likewise, the multilateral banks acted to offset the bilateral cuts. This 
possibly indicates a weak international policy regime, uneven consensus over the 
appropriate course of action, and/or the mitigating influence of domestic factors not 
experienced by the multilateral institutions.
Despite its abrupt withdrawal of resources from Tanzania, the Canadian 
government evidently still felt entitled to lecture the Tanzanian government at the 
1993 CG declaring “We are following very closely Tanzania’s ongoing moves to 
multiparty democracy,” ‘applauding’ and ‘encouraging’ legal reform while at the 
same time expressing concern that local elections had been postponed by a year.49 
The Canadian delegate acknowledged the sizeable reduction in support but said
Nevertheless we see this as an opportunity to change our relationship 
to a more mature one, where we encourage the cooperation of our 
private sectors [nil at the time] as well as support your movement to a 
more democratically based political system.5
The delegation reported that the Tanzanian officials did not respond to the 
Canadian statement either in the sessions or in the corridors.
48 Ibid
49 Statement o f  the Canadian Delegation at the Consultative Group Meeting for Tanzania 12-13 July 
1993, Paris.
50 Canadian Pledging Statement at the Consultative Group meeting for Tanzania 12-13 July 1993, 
Paris.
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The critical tone of the previous year continued in 1993 as donors again 
expressed dissatisfaction with the pace and substance of policy reform in Tanzania.
In informal discussions some donors conceded that although progress was slow, the 
government was on the right track, but, as the German delegate stated “It is time for 
Tanzania to pass from strategies and plans to reality and action if the country wants to 
keep donors’ support.” The Canadian delegate reported that “there is an aid fatigue 
expressed by even the most committed donors.”51
With its new status as one of Tanzania’s smallest donors, Canada took a 
backseat at the CGs in subsequent years. Certain issues had become perennial topics 
of discussion -  parastatal inefficiencies and privatization, economic reform and the 
OGL facility. Democratization had assumed major importance as a donor priority and 
there was a new emphasis in donor statements on social issues including health, 
education, population growth, support for women and the ‘empowerment’ of the poor. 
The reappearance of these issues last raised in other incarnations in the 1970's, 
represented a shift in the focus of donor priorities away from strictly economic policy 
reform to reform of political and then other social institutions. In the wake of the 
SPA Joint Evaluation Mission to Tanzania in 1992 which confirmed suspicions of the 
mismanagement of the OGL system, commitments for pure balance of payments 
support became ‘noticeably scarce’ after having comprised approximately fifty per 
cent of total ODA in recent years. Smaller aid budgets were increasingly channelled 
into projects to rehabilitate and maintain existing investments. The atmosphere of the 
annual CGs became increasingly critical and hostile. Following the 1995 CG, the 
Canadian delegate reported that it was “evident that there was much strain between 
Tanzania and the IFIs” and characterized the closing statement from the World Bank 
as “hard-hitting.” The chair warned Tanzania that “if trust was broken once more, 
consequences for aid would be serious indeed.”
Statements from the bilateral donors were delivered in the same vein. “All 
donors emphasized at great length and repetitively that GOT had to demonstrate
51 CIDA files, Report o f  the Canadian Delegation on the 1993 Consultative Group Meeting for  
Tanzania.
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political commitment with action or risk an inevitable large reduction in donor 
funding.” The same report went on to say that the “pledging session was strange, 
leaving the Canadian delegation feeling that although pledges were given, they were 
given grudgingly.” Most new bilateral aid was, in fact, frozen at this point while 
negotiations over the latest Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility between 
Tanzania and the IMF stalled. Negotiations recommenced in mid-1996 and the mood 
of the 1996 CG meeting was summed up by the Swedish delegate as “It was time to 
ease up on Tanzania a little and to give the GOT some encouragement instead of 
raising only negative points.”54 Nevertheless, most pledges that year were made 
conditional on the approval of and adherence to the new ESAF. The government was 
also urged to adhere to the twenty/twenty principle adopted at the Copenhagen 
International Conference on Poverty55 and to meet its debt repayment obligations.
These recommendations, reiterated the following year in Dar es Salaam, 
provoked an exasperated response from Tanzanian officials. They sought to impress 
upon donors the extremely difficult constraints within which they were operating.
The President himself expressed resentment at the imposition of cross-cutting 
conditionalities by which means funding in one sector was “held hostage” to 
performance in another sector.56 Several donors, including Canadian officials, 
confidentially opined that the numerous conditions included in the Policy Framework 
Paper of 1991 were too arduous. The World Bank sponsored Special Program for 
Africa Joint Evaluation Mission to Tanzania in 1992 had made thirty-four 
recommendations for public policy reform and while they had been accepted by the 
Government of Tanzania under the hand of the World Bank, the government freely 
confessed that it did not have the capacity to deliver on all of them.
52 Quotation from the Closing Statement from the Chair at the February 1995 Consultative Group 
Meeting for Tanzania, Paris cited in the Report o f  the Canadian Delegation on CG meeting February 
1995, CIDA files.
53 Ibid
54 CIDA files. Report o f  the Canadian Delegation on the 1996 Consultative Group Meeting for  
Tanzania.
55 Participants agreed that donors would allocate twenty per cent of their aid budgets to poverty 
reduction and recipients were meant to allocate twenty per cent of their general budgets to social 
programmes directed at the poor.
From: Talking notes fo r  speech by His Excellency Benyamin Mkapa at preliminary discussions with 
representatives of the donor community, Dar es Salaam 6 December 1997.
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political commitment with action or risk an inevitable large reduction in donor 
funding.”53 The same report went on to say that the “pledging session was strange, 
leaving the Canadian delegation feeling that although pledges were given, they were 
given grudgingly.” Most new bilateral aid was, in fact, frozen at this point while 
negotiations over the latest Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility between 
Tanzania and the IMF stalled. Negotiations recommenced in mid-1996 and the mood 
of the 1996 CG meeting was summed up by the Swedish delegate as “It was time to 
ease up on Tanzania a little and to give the GOT some encouragement instead of 
raising only negative points.”54 Nevertheless, most pledges that year were made 
conditional on the approval of and adherence to the new ESAF. The government was 
also urged to adhere to the twenty/twenty principle adopted at the Copenhagen 
International Conference on Poverty55 and to meet its debt repayment obligations.
These recommendations, reiterated the following year in Dar es Salaam, 
provoked an exasperated response from Tanzanian officials. They sought to impress 
upon donors the extremely difficult constraints within which they were operating.
The President himself expressed resentment at the imposition of cross-cutting 
conditionalities by which means funding in one sector was “held hostage” to 
performance in another sector.56 Several donors, including Canadian officials, 
confidentially opined that the numerous conditions included in the Policy Framework 
Paper of 1991 were too arduous. The World Bank sponsored Special Program for 
Africa Joint Evaluation Mission to Tanzania in 1992 had made thirty-four 
recommendations for public policy reform and while they had been accepted by the 
Government of Tanzania under the hand of the World Bank, the government freely 
confessed that it did not have the capacity to deliver on all of them.
52 Quotation from the Closing Statement from the Chair at the February 1995 Consultative Group 
Meeting for Tanzania, Paris cited in the Report o f the Canadian Delegation on CG meeting February 
1995, CIDA files.
53 Ibid
54 CIDA files. Report o f  the Canadian Delegation on the 1996 Consultative Group Meeting fo r  
Tanzania.
55 Participants agreed that donors would allocate twenty per cent of their aid budgets to poverty 
reduction and recipients were meant to allocate twenty per cent of their general budgets to social 
programmes directed at the poor.
6 From: Talking notes fo r  speech by His Excellency Benyamin Mkapa at preliminary discussions with 
representatives of the donor community, Dar es Salaam 6 December 1997.
57 Quote from files
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Hectoring from donors over social spending must have goaded Tanzanian 
officials as a recent UNICEF report had cited Tanzania as the top performer relative 
to income level (above all of its bilateral donors) in meeting children’s needs in 
health, education and nutrition. Addressing representatives of the donor community 
in Dar es Salaam in 1997, President Mkapa said
An African saying has it that you cannot sow and reap at the same 
time. In Tanzania we are hardly beyond the sowing stage. We, and 
our well-wishers, need to have the patience to wait for results, and at
c  o
the same time the will to weed, water and tend the crop to fruition.
The President stated that the government of Tanzania was spending one third 
of its revenue on debt repayments, one third on salaries, with one third left over for 
everything else, including social services and funding for new development efforts. 
He noted the criticism made by donors that Tanzania is chronically delinquent in 
meeting its counterpart financing obligations for aid sponsored projects. As noted in 
the Introduction, in 1992 there were fifteen hundred active foreign aid projects in 
Tanzania, all with their attendant requirements and conditions.59 By fiscal year 
1996/97 this number had been pared down to six hundred which had been given top 
priority, but the demands they made on Tanzanian resources were still formidable. In 
1996/97 the government was required to set aside Tsh 7.8 billion as counterpart funds 
for the implementation of twenty-one IDA financed projects. On the basis of revenue 
estimates, only Tsh 20 billion could be set aside for the entire development budget. 
That left Tsh 12.8 billion for the remaining five hundred and seventy-nine projects 
financed by other donors which also required counterpart funds.60 The President 
concluded
I ask you to look again at these figures while you are here and perhaps 
you can show us the magic of how we can raise sufficient counterpart 
funds to utilize fully all donor funds.
58 op. cit. speech by His Execellency Benyamin Mkapa, 6 December 1997.
59 Source: CIDA files
60 op. cit. Speech by President Benyamin Mkapa
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The donor community in Tanzania is dominated by the Nordic countries and 
other ‘like-minded’ countries such as the Netherlands and (until 1993, at least)
Canada who have historically been supportive of the objectives of the Tanzanian 
socialist project and sympathetic to the difficulties it faced in pursuing this goal. 
However, there is a belief, certainly expressed in Canadian documents, that the 
Tanzanian government is in large part responsible for its current predicament. By 
1997, Tanzania’s relationship with its donors, and perhaps particularly with Canada, 
once characterized as ‘Tanzanophilia,’ had deteriorated badly with a loss of faith on 
both sides. Over the past few years, the donor community and the government of 
Tanzania have devoted considerable energy to repairing and improving cooperation 
on the basis of the recommendations of an independent group of advisors. 61
With an awareness of the nature of international discussions around aid to 
Tanzania and the tenor of Tanzania’s relationship with its donors including Canada 
leading up to 1993, we now turn to a more detailed examination of the decision to end 
Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania in that year.
4.4 THE DECISION TO CANCEL BILATERAL AID TO TANZANIA
On December 2, 1992, the Canadian Finance Minister delivered a mini-budget 
in the House of Commons which detailed further cuts to government spending in 
support of the Conservative's deficit reduction programme. Among the casualties was 
ODA, which was to be cut by 10 % in 1993 and a further 10 % in 1994. The 
International Assistance Envelope was heavily hit in comparison to other government 
departments, taking 8.2% of all spending cuts announced in the budget despite 
accounting for less than 2% of total government spending.62 CIDA's share of 
government spending had been progressively reduced since 1989, but for the first 
time the budget was reduced in real terms. ODA shrunk by 7.4% overall; bilateral 
assistance by 4.6%.63 This immediate loss of funding left CIDA with some difficult 
programming decisions to make. At the same time, the cuts suggested a reorientation 
of aid policy priorities. The government announced that an increased share of the
61 Helleiner et al, 1995; 1997; 1999.
62 North-South Institute Review, Spring 1993:1.
200
smaller ODA budget would be devoted to humanitarian assistance, as it subsequently 
rose by 16%, while aid to the former Soviet bloc, drawn from the same envelope, 
increased by 50%.64
Subsequent events illustrate the existence of competing policy objectives and 
the tension inherent in a bureaucratic structure which places the mandate of CIDA as 
stated in the ODA Charter in conflict with the foreign policy and trade enhancement 
responsibilities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which 
maintains ministerial authority for CIDA. The cancellation of aid to Eastern and 
Southern Africa is also informative in terms of understanding where and how policy 
decisions are made within the government structure. The case also demonstrates the 
shift in aid policy priorities which has taken place over the past decade.
It was determined within CIDA that the task of absorbing the cuts would be 
borne equally by the three bilateral branches ~ Asia, the Americas, and Africa and the 
Middle East, with Africa retaining its existing 45% share of the total bilateral 
budget.65 It was left to each branch to decide how to cope with its reduced funding. 
The Vice-President of the Africa Middle East Branch embarked on a tour of the 
region to consider where cuts might be made. At the same time, within the 
Department of External Affairs,66 officials were considering new directions for 
Canada's aid policy. Canadian aid policy was at that time formally approved by a 
now dormant Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Relations with Developing 
Countries composed of the president of CIDA, representatives from the Ministry of 
Finance and the Export Development Corporation and chaired by the Department of 
External Affairs. On January 23,1993, CIDA staff members, alarmed at the new 
strategy developed at External Affairs to be implemented by CIDA, leaked a policy 
document to development NGO's and the media.
63 Morrison: 371.
64 Crosby, 1993.
65 Minutes and Proceedings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 
1993:61, April 21 1993.
66 Brian Mulroney's Conservative government had created the Department of External Affairs and 
International Trade out of the former Departments of Foreign Affairs and of International Trade and 
Commerce. Jean Cretien's Liberal government renamed it the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade in 1993. This accounts for the use of both titles in the above narrative.
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This document entitled ‘International Assistance Policy Update’ was based on 
the 1991 DEAITC policy proposal discussed in Chapter Two. The significance of this 
earlier document is that it indicates that moves were afoot to redirect aid policy prior 
to the December 1992 budget cuts. The January 1993 Policy Update reiterated the 
intention to use aid more aggressively to pursue Canadian economic interests abroad. 
It quoted from a Memorandum to Cabinet which stated the underlying principles of 
Canadian ODA in the following terms:
Canadian assistance is predicated first on our national interest, 
including the enhancement of our security and the development of 
democratic regimes and market economies compatible with our own.
And second, on burden-sharing responsibilities as a member of the G7 
and the G24 [the Paris Club].67
The Update outlined the government's intention to reduce the number of aid 
recipient countries from one hundred and thirty-six to something less than fifty. 
Significantly in light of subsequent events, Tanzania was cited a country where core 
funding should be maintained. The concentration of aid on fewer countries had been 
advocated by CIDA as well as several parliamentary commissions in the past. 
However, previous efforts in this direction had been scuttled by domestic and foreign 
policy considerations which dictated a wide global dispersal of Canadian aid. While 
the geographical concentration of Canadian aid was a popular objective both within 
CIDA and the larger international development lobby in Canada, there was 
widespread criticism for the perceived reorientation of the aid programme to focus on 
countries where commercial opportunities for Canada were greatest. As suggested by 
the December 1992 budget, the January Policy Update outlined a redirection of aid to 
Eastern Europe and stated that Canada would “intensify its cooperation with those 
developing countries which are making economic and political progress.”69 It stated 
“We have to make sure that reduced funds effectively support the highest priorities in
7 0the foreign policy agenda.” A CIDA employee, disgruntled with the diversion of 
aid to Eastern Europe and fearing the substitution of emergency relief for
67 quoted in Valpy, 1993.
68 Therien,1994; Morrison, 1994.
69 Policy Update quoted in Michael Valpy, March 4,1993.
70 Policy Update quoted in Dave Todd, February 3,1993.
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development assistance, was quoted in the press saying “Canadian assistance in the 
Third World is going to be cut back to a bag of grain and a peace keeper.”71
The leak of this document occurred just before International Development 
Week in Canada with the (perhaps intended) consequence that international 
development organizations used previously arranged events to protest both the budget 
cutbacks and the newly defined policy objectives. NGOs waged a letter writing 
campaign in the press and to members of Parliament. The tone of press coverage was
nodistinctly critical.
On February 25,1993 it was revealed how CIDA would absorb the cuts made 
to its bilateral programme. On that day, the day before the House rose for a two week 
break, the government tabled its Main Estimates which outlined spending for the 
coming fiscal year. On the same day, a letter was sent to the Ambassadors and High 
Commissioners of seven African countries from the Vice-President of the Africa 
Middle East Branch informing them that Canadian aid was being withdrawn. The 
Americas Branch had imposed cutbacks across the board and maintained all of its 
country programmes. The Asia Branch had eliminated its small aid programmes in 
seven small scattered states and extracted the remainder of its budget shortfall by 
cutting across the board in the rest of its programme countries. In the Africa Middle 
East Branch, the decision was made to excise the whole Eastern and Central African 
region from the programme -- Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Madagascar. This decision was approved by the Secretary of State for External 
Relations and International Development, and the Estimates submitted to Parliament 
by the government stated that bilateral assistance to Eastern and Central Africa, which 
totalled $125.5 million in fiscal year 1991/92, and $98.2 million in 1992/93 would be 
cut from a pre-budget cut allocation of $118.2 million for 1993/94 to $81.3 million, a 
reduction of $36.9 million73. With the exception of three regional funds which made 
small grants for community development projects, all current and planned projects 
were to be terminated.
71 quoted in Jeff Sallot, January 25,1993.
72 As listed in bilbiography.
73 Minutes and Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
International Trade 61: Appendix Exte-3- Africa Middle East Branch Budget reductions, April 21,1993.
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In comparison, West Africa received $143 million in 1992/93 and was to 
receive $142 million in 1993/94, a cut of $500,000 from the previously approved 
allocation. With the exception of Canadian projects in Namibia, aid to southern 
Africa was untouched. The Middle East and North Africa was to lose $1 million in 
total. Tanzania, which received 32.6 million in fiscal year 1991/92 and 28.3 million 
in 1992/93, had been allocated 30.4 million prior to the December cuts. As a result of 
the AMEB decision, it would receive $10.8 million in 1993/94, $19.4 million less 
than anticipated. The cuts to Tanzania accounted for more than half of all funding 
withdrawn from the region.74
The government of Tanzania was informed of this decision in a letter from the 
Vice President of AMEB to the Tanzanian High Commisioner to Canada. The letter 
cited the budget cut of December and said
We recognized that an equal and across-the-board reduction in each of 
the more than twenty countries in which we now have bilateral 
programs would lead to a decrease in both developmental effectiveness 
and administrative efficiency. We therefore had no choice but to 
concentrate our programming.75
The letter explained that CIDA's decision had been guided by its 1991 long 
term strategy for Africa, Africa 21: A Vision o f Africa for the Twenty-first Century. 
This strategy stressed a regional approach to economic development and support to 
the private sector.
Consistent with the regional approach implicit in this strategy, it was 
decided to give greater priority to those regions within sub-Saharan 
Africa in which there already exists greater opportunity to support 
regional cooperation and integration -- Southern Africa and West 
Africa.77
74 Ibid.
75 Letter to His Excellency Fadhil D. Mbaga, High Commissioner of the United Republic of Tanzania from 
Pierre Racicot, Vice President, Afica Middle East Branch CIDA, February 25,1993.
76 CIDA, AMEB. Africa 21: A Vision o f Africa in the Twenty-first Century, mimeo, 1991.
77op. cit. letter to F.D. Mbaga
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The letter informed Tanzania that CIDA would be unable to proceed with the 
already initiated Hanang Community Development Project. Likewise, a planned 
small business development project and commodity and import support would end 
immediately with the exception of $1 million in telecommunication equipment. The 
construction of housing at the Selian Agricultural Research Institute would be 
completed, but no further operational funds or technical assistance would be made 
available. A Power Systems maintenance project and power sector study update 
would be wound up sooner than planned. Students studying under CIDA’s Training 
Fund for Tanzanian Women would be allowed to finish their courses, but no new 
students would be sponsored. Technical assistance and a spares project for the 
Tanzania Railway Company would be completed as agreed, but no new projects were 
to be initiated. These projects accounted for all of CIDA's bilateral commitments in 
Tanzania at the time. It was stressed that Canada would continue to provide aid to 
Tanzania through its sponsorship of UNICEF's AIDS prevention programme, through 
future grants to SADC, and the continuation of the mission administered $500,000 
Canada Fund for small community projects. The Vice President's letter also stated 
that Tanzania would be eligible for funding from two new regional funds designed to 
foster private sector development and “to provide support in the areas of human 
rights, democratic development and good governance.”78
The response of the Tanzanian government to the withdrawal of Canadian aid 
was surprise and dismay. In his reply to the Vice President, the Tanzanian High 
Commissioner referred to Canada as “an all-weather friend of Tanzania” for the past 
thirty-two years and said
I have to let you know that the recent drastic reduction in areas of 
cooperation between our two countries has created an impression that 
Canada is no longer interested in Tanzania. This move will have a 
negative psychological effect on the minds of those in the Canadian 
private sector who have been thinking that Tanzania is a place to invest 
and a new market to watch. The sudden deep cuts will also cause 
severe strains in our planning exercise.79
78 Ibid.
79 Letter to CIDA Vice President Pierre Racicot from Fadhil D. Mbaga, High Commissioner for Tanzania, 
March 11,1993.
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The letter noted that Tanzania had embarked on its current economic and 
political reform programme “with the encouragement of countries like Canada” 
suggesting that these objectives were jeopardized by the withdrawal of Canadian aid. 
It went on to outline the “devastating effects” of the elimination of CIDA projects. As 
previously noted, the loss of commodity and import support would mean no spare 
parts for Canadian equipment already in use by the National Urban Water Supply 
Authority, the Tanzania Harbour Authority, Air Tanzania, the Ministry of Works and 
the National Milling Corporation, as well as a shortage of building supplies for rural 
housing projects. The cancellation of the training fund for women during a continued 
critical shortage of scientific, technical and managerial skills was lamented.
Regretting the cancellation of the small business development project, the letter 
referred to the role of aid in easing the hardship that accompanies structural 
adjustment. “In our experience, as the economy liberalizes, income gaps widen. If 
the poor, who are the majority, feel left out of the changes, there is created a very 
explosive situation.” The possible benefit accruing from Tanzania's continued access 
to SADC aid was acknowledged, but the High Commissioner wrote “this has not been 
so in the past, and is unlikely to be so in the future. Indeed CIDA's policy document 
Southern Africa Regional Policy Framework asserts that Tanzania ‘is unlikely to 
derive significant benefits from free interregional trade in Southern Africa’”
In an unprecedented event, the ambassadors and high commissioners of all 
African countries affected by the budget cuts requested permission and were invited 
to give testimony to the SCEAIT subcommittee on Development and Human Rights. 
The Tanzanian High Commissioner was not present, but those diplomats who were 
had been designated to represent the interests of all affected countries. They protested 
the fact that they had not been consulted prior to the decision to cut funding. The 
Ambassador of Senegal, where some Canadian projects were affected, though not on 
the scale of those in Tanzania, said “What we find most noteworthy is the lack of 
consultation to decide which projects will be affected. Projects have been designated
OA
unilaterally.” The Ambassador of Ethiopia reported that aid recipient governments 
had not been consulted during the formulation of CIDA's new regional approach to
80 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence of the Subcommittee on Development and Human Rights of the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (37:16), March 31,
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development which had informed AMEB's decision of where to cut. “Africa 21 was
O 1
distributed as having been approved.” Several speakers intimated that African 
support for Canada's campaign for a seat on the Security Council could be in 
jeopardy.
Because the House of Commons rose for a two week break the day after the 
aid cuts were announced to the recipient governments, the matter was not discussed in 
Parliament until it resumed sitting March 8. Nor was the event immediately front 
page news, coming to light in the national media on March 3. As protests from 
outraged development NGOs and politicians from all political parties including that of 
the government continued, the story became front page news. The tenor of the press 
coverage was emotionally charged and highly critical of the government's withdrawal 
of aid from several of the poorest countries in the world. Several commentators 
claimed the cuts were proof that Canadian ODA was becoming more commercial in 
orientation.
The nature of the regionally based cuts suggest a two-tiered approach 
toward Africa: an arbitrary division into winners and pemetual losers, 
with the latter seen as worthy mainly of humanitarian aid. 2
All of the fourteen countries completely excised from the aid programme were 
on the World Bank's list of forty-three least developed countries. It was suggested as 
ironic that CIDA was cutting aid to countries which had adopted the structural 
adjustment prescription pushed by Canada and other donors. Stephen Lewis, 
Canada's former ambassador to the United Nations and then Special Advisor to the 
U.N. Special Programme for Africa called the cuts an “act of such astonishing 
international delinquency that it takes one’s breath away.”84
The official government explanation stressed that the decision to cut aid to 
Central and Eastern Africa had been consistent with the regional approach to 
assistance adopted in 1991, by which priority was given “to those regions in Sub-
1993.
81 Ibid, 37:15.
82 Todd, April 12,1993.
83 Stackhouse, March 3,1993.
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Saharan Africa in which there is now greater opportunity to support regional 
activities. In our view, Southern Africa and West Africa are the two regions in which 
there has been the most significant progress toward regional cooperation and in which 
there is the greatest potential for Canada to play a catalytic role in the support of such
Of
cooperation and intergration.” The government was quite candid about Canada's 
other interests in Africa. “We also considered the potential political and commercial 
importance of the regions for Canada.” West Africa encompasses a number of 
important members of la Francophonie and the Commonwealth “as well as the most 
heavily populated and potentially the most powerful and important economic state in 
Sub-Saharan Africa -- Nigeria.” Likewise the emerging democracies of southern 
Africa, a region of considerable economic potential.
Appearing before the SCEAIT, the Minister for External Relations defended 
the continuation of high levels of aid to middle income countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa on the grounds of the government’s desire “to promote the 
establishment of long-term, mutually beneficial economic links while also working to 
support the peace effort.”87 Speaking of the implications of the budget cuts outside of 
Africa, the Minister elaborated on the government's pursuit of Canada’s economic 
interests through the aid programme and the priority attached to private sector 
development in recipient countries. According to her testimony, the Americas had 
been ‘sheltered’ from the budget cuts because of Canada’s long term economic 
interests in the region related to the North America Free Trade Agreement, with the 
Caribbean states and the poorer small states of Central America bearing the brunt of 
the cuts. While funding to NGO’s had been substantially reduced, the Industrial 
Cooperation Program which provides financial and technical assistance to Canadian 
entrepreneurs investing in the Third World was largely spared “because of the priority 
attached to developing strong economic ties between the private sector and
OQ
developing countries.” However, when the Liberal International Development critic 
(soon to be Minister) noted that approximately the same sum which had been cut from
84Quoted in Crosby, op.cit.
85CIDA, AMEB. “Questions and answers on the cuts exercise” mimeo, 1993.
86Ibid -
87Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International 
Trade (61:6), April 21,1993.
88Ibid, (61:8).
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Eastern and Central Africa ~ $47 million — had been pledged to Eastern Europe in the 
same period, the Minister called this “pure coincidence.”88
In response to the question of why CIDA was withdrawing aid from countries 
like Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia which had been improving their economic 
performance and becoming more politically democratic, CIDA’s written notes for the 
press were at pains to stress that “Our decisions in this regard were based on regional
OQ
criteria and not on the performance of individual countries.” Actual statements to 
the press were slightly less tactful, one official claiming that the cuts to Tanzania had 
“nothing to do with Canada liking them less. Unfortunately, it is part of a region that 
is not going anywhere for some time.”90
At the Minister’s appearance before the parliamentary committee to account 
for the cuts, members were unanimous in their criticism of the decision. Government 
member Walter McLean argued that the issue was the process of decision-making, 
saying that the African ambassadors’ testimony indicated that “none of the major 
players feel any sense of ownership for Africa 21. ”91 He suggested that “we are 
sending mixed messages” to new democracies like Ethiopia and Namibia. Lloyd 
Axeworthy, later to become the Liberal Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that 
CIDA was becoming “a business finance trade agency... I suggest to you that this is 
not the mandate of CIDA. That is a fundamental policy shift done with no 
consultation, no public debate, no public examination.” Quoting from the 
International Assistance Policy Update, Axeworthy claimed that the policy’s objective 
was market penetration, and aiming at the ten o’clock news said “Well, to be blunt 
with you, we know who’s getting penetrated under this program.”93 Liberal Charles 
Caccia argued that the policy was economically unsound, stating that “to promote 
activities of the private sector you need basic infrastructure.”94
88Ibid, (61:9).
89CIDA, AMEB. “Questions and answers on cuts exercise” mimeo, 1993.
^Todd, 12 April 1993, pg A8.
9'Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International 
Trade, April 21 1993(61:16).
^Ibid, (61:17)
93Ibid, (61:20).
94 Ibid, (61:25).
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In response to criticism that neither the affected countries nor the Canadian 
public had been consulted on a policy shift of such magnitude, the Minister, new to 
the job, argued that she had been forced to act quickly between being sworn in on 
January 15 and tabling the Estimates on schedule by February 25. Revealing a 
limited knowledge of the subject matter under grilling by the parliamentary 
committee, the Minister stoically bore responsibility for a policy she had not much 
part in developing. Referring several times to a statement by Boutros Boutros Ghali 
on the merits of regional cooperation, the Minister claimed she had based her decision 
on her own favourable impression of regional development in her home province of 
Quebec. She said “I thought there was a social, cultural and international consensus 
in favour of a regional approach, and that this could be acceptable to the NGO’s, our 
partners and Africa.” 96
The Minister’s lacklustre performance before the Commons Committee hints 
at the limited role of parliament in the formulation of Canada’s aid policy. The 
reorientation of aid policy in 1993 bears the stamp of the Conservatives’ neo-classical 
economic agenda, but also of the struggle between CIDA and DEAITC for control of 
the aid programme as described in Chapters Two and Three. The Policy Update was 
part of DEAITC’s play to incorporate the aid programme in support of its wider 
foreign policy objectives. The refinement and implementation of these objectives was 
left to the bureaucracy with Parliament and the public having little input to the 
process. CIDA’s financial allocations and objectives are laid out in Part III of the 
Main Estimates submitted for approval to the Priorities and Planning Committee of 
Cabinet each year. Although all government spending must be approved by 
Parliament in three readings, there is no requirement that specific allocations like the 
aid budget be debated in the House. Theoretically, years could go by without
07development assistance policy being discussed on the floor of the House. The time 
available for debate on the wide range of issues which concern Parliament is 
constrained by set allocations of time to discuss money supply bills and other 
legislation in process. Each party is given a certain number of days on which they can 
determine in advance the topic to be debated, for example environmental policy or
96 Ibid, (61:14)
97 Interview.
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national defence. However, development assistance is not a priority issue for the 
elected members, and these descretionary days are infrequently given over to it.
Between the announcement of the budget cuts on December 2,1992 and the 
adjournment of Parliament on June 23,1993, the subject of aid was raised in the 
House in a total of thirty statements by members. Some members brought the matter 
into debates on the budget itself, on defence mismanagement,98 and environmental 
policy, but most members spoke under Standing Order 31 which permits private 
members to make personal statements of less than one minute in the House. The 
government is not required to respond to these statements or to respond in the House 
to questions from members, though a written reply must be given if requested, and is 
entered into the record. Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara MacDougall 
gave only two brief responses to questions on the matter, reiterating that the decision 
was based on “the regional concept recognized by NGO's as well as the U.N.”99 and 
that “We will be appearing before Committee. There will be normal consultations 
with the NGO community and others once we have approved the document.”100
The cuts were first discussed in committee on March 31 when the African 
ambassadors presented their case. External Affairs Minister Monique Vezina (the 
minister responsible for CIDA) did not appear before the parliamentary committee to 
account for the decision until April 21, nearly two months after the fact. Secretary of 
State MacDougall addressed the matter in her appearance before the subcommittee on 
Human Rights and International Development on May 27. Each of these sessions 
lasted approximately three hours and together accounted for the total time devoted to 
the matter by Parliament. In his study of the Canadian parliamentary system, Franks 
makes the point that because much of government policy is not debated in the house 
and is subjected to often superficial scrutiny in committee, parliament does not 
perform effectively the function of mobilizing public consent for policy or 
legitimizing it.101 Despite strong opposition from elected members on all sides of the
98The government's controversial purchase of high tech helicopters for $5.8 billion was a hot topic at the 
time and several members linked the $4.3 billion cuts to ODA made by the Conservatives over the previous 
five years to this expenditure.
"House of Commons, Debates, (18180) 20 April 1993.
100House of Commons, Debates. 26 March 1993 (17637).
101 Franks:218.
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House, the NGO lobby, the press and the public, the budget Estimates outlining the 
termination of aid to East and Central Africa were accepted by the Standing 
Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, and approved by the 
government majority in Parliament.
The promised consultations with the NGO community on this subject did not 
materialize. Parliament was adjourned for the summer break on June 23 and 
dissolved on September 8. A Liberal government was elected in October, and 
heeding public calls for an open review of foreign policy, established a special joint 
committee of Parliament to hold public hearings and report to the government. After 
serving as the issue which prompted the government to initiate broader consultation 
on aid policy, references to the cancellation of aid to East Africa were strangely 
absent from the presentations to the Parliamentary committee reviewing aid policy in 
1994. Liberal Minister for International Cooperation Christine Stewart restored aid to 
Tanzania in May of 1994, at a level of approximately $10 million per year, a level it 
has maintained since then.
4.5 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CUTS: TANZANIA’S DECLINING 
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
CIDA's explanation that it terminated aid to Tanzania on the basis of a new 
regional approach to development is questionable on several points, apart from the 
merits of the approach itself. As noted above, several countries in the region, 
including Tanzania and Uganda, were in fact engaged in economic and political 
reform, and were at the very least no more delinquent in this respect than many other 
countries where aid was maintained. Critics have suggested that had the ODA 
Charter continued to be the guiding policy for Canadian aid as Minister MacDougall 
reconfirmed in her appearance before parliamentary committee in May 1993, aid to 
East Africa should have been preserved.102 The ODA Charter states that the first 
priority of Canadian aid policy is to help the poorest people in the poorest countries of 
the world. According to this criteria, even allowing for Canada’s foreign policy
102Minutes and Proceedings of the SCEAIT Subcommittee on Human Rights and International 
Development (68:25), 27 May 1993.
212
interests in West and Southern Africa, relatively more prosperous North Africa would 
have been a more logical choice to absorb cuts.
Further, despite intermittently hostile relations between Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda in the past and the violence which engulfed Rwanda and Burundi soon after 
the decision to cut the aid budget was made, and therefore the possibly limited 
potential for regional cooperation in the immediate future, a strong argument for the 
preservation of aid to Tanzania could have been made on the basis of its historical 
role in the struggle for liberation in southern Africa. Tanzania has played an 
important leadership role in African affairs. The 1967 Arusha Declaration outlined the 
Tanzanian government's commitment to a socialist approach to development. In this 
statement and in other essays Nyerere expressed the belief that it is possible to build a 
prosperous society based on equality and mutual assistance. In doing so, Nyerere, a 
respected statesman, dared to espouse ideals of social justice that most of the leaders 
of the western world had abandoned as naive or unattainable. Nyerere's vision was 
heady stuff in the late 1960’s and was embraced not only by the Tanzanian public, but 
also by a body of Western academics who took up the cause, and by donors from east 
and west. In this period Nyerere, representing Tanzania, became a voice of moral 
authority in global forums like the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the OAU. 
Nyerere asserted the autonomy of ‘Third World’ states, and pressed for a fairer global 
economic structure. Tanzania provided an outlet to the sea for landlocked states; a 
base for liberation movements in its own territory and military support at great cost — 
both human and material -- to itself. Further, although the East African Community is 
now defunct, Tanzania remains a member of SADC. Tanzania’s strategic importance
in Africa has in the past been cited in CIDA documents as a factor in CIDA’s
• 10^maintenance of a large aid programme there.
Gordon's examination of Tanzania’s foreign policy offers a plausible 
explanation of why CIDA did not spare Tanzania on these grounds in 1993. Whereas 
in the late 1960’s and throughout the 1970’s Tanzania played an active role in world 
politics, Gordon argues that the late 1980’s and early 1990’s saw the economic and
103 CIDA, Tanzania Country Programme Review, various years.
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political marginalization of Tanzania and of Africa in general.104 This he attributes to 
three factors:
i) The end of the Cold War, which removed an entire dimension from international 
relations in Africa. Despite Nyerere’s indignation at the machinations of East and 
West in Tanzania and the rest of Africa, the Cold War kept Africa on the map, 
provided donors with an incentive to maintain ties, and allowed Tanzania to play its 
donors off against one another to its own advantage. The end of the Cold War 
removed this leverage.
ii) A reconfiguration of regional issues, namely the end of apartheid in Southern 
Africa and resolution of conflict in Uganda, which reduced Tanzania’s importance as 
a regional leader and mediator. In 1990, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the 
legalization of the ANC which decamped from Dar, Western interest in Tanzania 
declined.105
iii) Tanzania’s depressed economic state and its increasing dependence on aid has 
limited both its inclination and ability to play an active role in international affairs.
As discussed in previous chapters, aid in the 1980’s and 1990’s became increasingly 
conditional on policy reforms which limited the government’s political autonomy. 
Illustrative of this point is the contrast between western political support for 
Tanzania’s interventions in liberation struggles in the 1970’s, and the lack of support 
for its military action against RENAMO forces in Mozambique in the late 1980’s.
Out of money and under pressure from the IMF and World Bank to end the campaign, 
Tanzania withdrew its troops from Mozambique in late 1988 without achieving its 
objective.106
Gordon notes that Africa as a whole produces a declining share of world 
output. Its share in world trade in the mid 1960’s was 4%; in 1990 it was 1%.107 
Tanzania’s return on investment, highly favourable at independence, now lags well
104 Gordon:327.
105 Ibid:261.
106 Ibid:252.
107 Ibid:237, IMF figures.
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behind the rest of the Third World, After the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania forbade 
direct foreign investment. Following the adoption of the structural adjustment 
programme in the mid 1980's, Tanzania went looking for investors, but few jumped at 
the chance. Gordon says
Africa was the only area of the world that was neither an existing nor
an ‘emerging’ market. For the international private sector (i.e.
commercial banks, investment houses, and multinational firms), Africa
1 HRhad quite simply ceased to be part of the picture.
Gordon’s research adds credence to the view that CIDA’s decision to end aid 
to Tanzania was based primarily on Canada’s economic and foreign policy interests 
abroad. However, it is suggested that other factors as outlined in Chapter One, 
including domestic political issues and a donor consensus on aid doctrine emerging in 
international organizations also contributed to the decision.*
4.6 QUEBEC SEPARATISM AND CANADIAN AID TO TANZANIA
As the African continent has been the stage for political manoeuvering 
between the superpowers, it has also served as one front in Canada’s cold civil war 
waged between the federal government of Canada and Quebec separatists. The Quiet 
Revolution in Quebec in the 1950’s and ‘60’s saw French Canada emerge from its 
economic and political subjugation to English Canadian interests and loosen the 
repressive control of the Catholic Church. However, as Schlegel observes, until the 
late 1960’s, the French part of Canada’s national identity (approximately 35% of 
Canadians speak French as a first language) was not reflected in Canada’s foreign 
policy or in the image of Canada projected abroad.109 The Department of External 
Affairs remained a largely Anglo preserve until Pearson initiated a programme to 
biligualize it in 1965. A bias towards Canada’s ties to the Commonwealth was also 
reflected in Canada’s early aid programme. In 1961, aid to French Africa amounted 
to $300 000 while Commonwealth Africa received $14 million.110
108 Ibid:239.
109 Schlegel:23.
110 Ibid:223.
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While the low priority accorded French Canadian heritage in Canada’s aid 
programme was criticized in Quebec, the separatist faction was not interested solely 
in better representation for French Canada in federal policy. From the early 1960’s, 
successive nationalist governments in Quebec have sought to assert the autonomy of 
the Quebecois nation by assuming the role of a sovereign state in international affairs, 
setting up diplomatic missions abroad, signing treaties without prior approval from 
Ottawa, and initiating aid programmes in West Africa. In 1961, Quebec opened a 
diplomatic mission in Paris. In 1964, President de Gaulle elevated this delegation to 
full diplomatic status and the Premier of Quebec was received in France as a Head of 
State. In 1968, federal Justice Minister Pierre Trudeau and the provincial premiers 
met in Ottawa to negotiate constitutional reforms intended to address Quebec’s 
concerns as to its status in Confederation. At the same time, Quebec was participating 
as a full delegate at a conference of l’Agence de cooperation culturelle et techniquelle 
in Gabon, a meeting to which Ottawa had not been invited.111
In light of events of this nature, in the 1960’s the federal government moved 
rapidly to establish diplomatic missions and aid programmes in Francophone Africa 
in an effort to pre-empt an independent Quebecois presence there and to demonstrate 
to French Canadians that Canada’s bicultural origins were reflected in its foreign 
policy. Maintaining parity between development assistance to la Francophonie and 
Commonwealth Africa became a bedrock principle of Canada’s aid programme.
It might be said that if French Africa had not existed at this point in 
time [after de Gaulle's rallying cry of “Vive le Quebec libre” in 
Montreal], Ottawa would have had to invent it. It was imperative for 
the Federal government to find some French-speaking ambience upon 
which to turn its attentions and lavish its aid dollars.11
The Trudeau government elected in 1968 advanced the concept of the ‘Just 
Society’ in developing a constitutional structure which would protect the rights of 
minority groups within the Canadian nation while maintaining the principle of the 
equality of all citizens and regions of the country. This idea of social justice was to be 
extended to Canada’s development assistance programme. The Liberal government’s
111 Morrison, 1998:76.
1,2 Schlegel:223.
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1970 foreign policy statement declared that “A society able to ignore poverty abroad 
will find it much easier to ignore it at home; a society concerned about poverty and 
development abroad will be concerned about poverty and development at home.”113
As 1967 marked a turning point in Tanzania's political orientation, the election 
of the Trudeau government in 1968 also marked a shift in Canadian foreign policy 
from “Pearsonian internationalism” to “Trudeau nationalism.”114 Pearson had sought 
to create a role for Canada on the world stage as a moderate, mediating influence, 
pursuing its objectives through international institutions like the United Nations. Up 
to 1968 the Foreign Aid Office was a relatively small branch within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and functioned as a reactive agency, responding to generally 
unsolicited requests for assistance from sovereign governments.115 As Pearson had 
been preoccupied with international affairs, Trudeau’s major concern was the 
domestic political situation. Federal-provincial negotiations over constitutional 
reform had begun while Trudeau was Minister of Justice in the Pearson government 
and continued after he became Prime Minister. At the time of Nyerere’s Arusha 
Declaration and embarkation on the pursuit of Ujamaa, Canada was in the throes of 
fractious and increasingly polarized constitutional wrangling and separatism in 
Quebec was reaching fever pitch. Schlegel argues that the Liberal government’s 
foreign policy statement of 1970 embodied Trudeau’s desire to employ foreign policy 
in pursuit of his domestic political objectives, i.e., to assert the primacy of a Canadian 
identity above the regional differences and inequality represented by Quebec’s claim 
to special status.116 One means of enabling Canadians to discern a strong national
117identity would be to project it onto the global stage. As Canadian participation in 
two world wars had enhanced its independent profile in world affairs, likewise the aid 
programme could be used to demonstrate the character traits of a uniquely Canadian 
nation. As noted in Chapter One, some writers have identified this idealized version 
of Canada’s international persona as the ‘humane internationalist’ occupying the 
moral high ground, mediating the interests of the large western industrialized
113 Canada, 1970.
114 Schlegel:324.
1,5 Morrison,1998:42.
,J6Schlegel:324.
117 Morrison, 1998:14.
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countries and the so-called ‘likeminded’ states of northern Europe, and demonstrating 
empathy with the aspirations of the newly independent countries.
But Schlegel suggests that Trudeau’s policy had a harder edge to it. In 1968, 
CIDA was established as a more proactive, interventionist aid agency with a growing 
budget. As the research reviewed in Chapter One suggests, the Canadian aid 
programme had its origins in Canada’s opposition to communism and subsequent 
governments had used it to serve domestic policy objectives, for example to unload 
grain surpluses in the 1950s.118 However, in the late 1960s, the Canadian government 
began to use the aid programme systematically to pursue Canadian interests abroad, 
thus demonstrating to Canadians that there were such a thing as discernible 
‘Canadian’ interests. In Tanzania, this translated into the provision of paper and 
aluminum from British Columbia, locomotives from Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the 
reproduction of a Saskatchewan wheat farm on the plains of Hanang.
In addition to influencing the geographical allocation of Canadian ODA in the 
first instance, Quebec’s ever immanent succession from Canada has continued to 
affect the Canadian aid programme. In 1970 Trudeau appointed Paul Gerin-Lajoie 
president of CIDA. Gerin-Lajoie was a former cabinet minister in Jean Lesage’s 
nationalist Liberal government in Quebec and the devisor of the concept of Quebec as 
a ‘distinct society’ which advocates a policy of separate development for Quebec. 
Morrison quotes a former CIDA official who claimed the significance of this 
appointment was that “the aid programme was being subordinated to the interests of 
national unity.”119 Gerin-Lajoie’s tenure is noted primarily for his ill fated attempt to 
reorient aid policy towards a basic needs agenda in the 1975 Strategy for 
International Development Cooperation and for his flamboyant style of leadership
19ftrather than any attempts to subvert the Canadian state. However, his political 
background enhanced the aid programme’s susceptibility to domestic politicking. 
When Gerin-Lajoie made French the working language of the Latin American
118 Charlton.
119 Morrison,1998:103.
120 Morrison, 1998; Berry, 1981.
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Division, disgrunted Anglo staffers responded by leaking sensitive documents 
concerning Canada’s reaction to the recent coup in Chile to the press.121
With respect to Tanzania’s role in this ongoing domestic drama, Schlegel 
suggests that the rapid growth in Canadian ODA to Tanzania in the 1960’s and ‘70’s 
was at least in part due to the necessity of finding another outlet for aid dollars in 
Anglo-Africa after aid to Nigeria was withdrawn as a result of the civil war. And as 
the Quebec question was a determining factor in the origins of Canada’s aid 
programme in Tanzania, it played a role in its demise. The central drama of Canada- 
Quebec relations has been played out in several rounds of negotiations over the 
division of federal-provincial jurisdiction and language laws. The issue has 
nonetheless affected aid policy, primarily in terms of the geographical distribution of 
assistance and its volume. The Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, an
English speaking Quebecker, was elected in 1984 and re-elected in 1988 by securing
10')the support of the sovereigntist vote in Quebec. In 1992, a separatist provincial 
government was elected in Quebec with a mandate to take the province out of 
Confederation pending the results of a referendum, subsequently held in 1995. When 
deep cuts were made to the aid budget as part of the Conservative government’s 
deficit reduction exercise of December 1992, the volatile political situation in Quebec 
made it inconceivable that CIDA would make significant cuts to its aid programmes 
in French speaking countries. Tanzania, no longer strategically important, part of an 
region of marginal economic importance, and having already irritated its donors with 
its failure to fully implement a structural adjustment programme, was deemed among 
the most expendable.
4.7 THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AMONG DONORS
On the basis of public statements made by government officials alone, it 
seems clear that an assessment of Canadian political and economic interests in 
Tanzania did play a significant part in the decision to end bilateral aid there.
However, the events recounted in the first part of this chapter support the argument
121 Morrison, 1998:488, footnote 12.
122 Johnson, 1994.
219
that CIDA's decision to withdraw aid from Tanzania did, despite Canadian officials’
protestations to the contrary, have much to do with CIDA’s assessment of the
progress of reform in Tanzania, and that the budget cuts were seized as an opportunity
to extricate CIDA from Tanzania. Canada’s major commitments in Tanzania were all
experiencing problems. The railway project had for years been having trouble
fulfilling its objectives due to equipment and management problems. The transfer of
technical knowledge from expatriate staff to Tanzanian trainees was not occurring.
As previously discussed, the Canadian High Commission in Dar es Salaam was
involved in tracking down delinquent accounts for commodity assistance. The
Canada-Tanzania Wheat Project, for years a target of much criticism within Canada
and Tanzania, continued to be surrounded by controversy as a government
commission investigating human rights abuses had been called. As outlined in some
detail above, Canadian officials placed the blame at the feet of the Tanzanian
government and shared the dissatisfaction expressed by many donors at the state of
policy reform in the country. It was felt that Canadian projects were being
compromised by the government’s inaction. As indicated by the tone of Canadian
interventions at the annual Consultative Group meetings, the once cordial and
supportive donor-recipient relationship between Canada and Tanzania had
1 0 1deteriorated badly by 1992. CIDA’s negative perception of the prospects for its 
programme in Tanzania was compounded by the unflattering attention of the 
Canadian media on CIDA projects in Tanzania. Perhaps more than any other aid 
recipient country, Tanzania has been a favoured destination for journalists looking to 
expose the failures of the Canadian aid programme and they have found there a rich 
vein of material.124
According to several Canadian officials, due to the perception among field 
staff that CIDA aid was not being used effectively, the High Commission in Dar es 
Salaam had been recommending to CIDA headquarters for some time before 1993 
that aid to Tanzania be reduced. The 1992 budget cuts provided an out. Canada 
was able to attribute the cancellation of most of CIDA’s commitments in Tanzania to 
a sudden decrease in Canadian ODA overall, and to the recentralization of CIDA staff
123 C.f. Helleiner et al, 1995.
124 Valpy,1985; Walsh,1993; CBC.1982.
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in Ottawa in 1992 which reduced the field staff from eighteen to six and resulted in 
the lay off of most of the Tanzanian field support staff. According to one official, 
“That’s how we sold it.”126 In cutting aid to Tanzania on these grounds, CIDA was 
not behaving like an ‘international delinquent’ as charged by Stephen Lewis, but in 
accordance with the internationally sanctioned principle of conditionality. As 
described above, the majority of Tanzania’s other donors took similar steps at the 
same time. Tanzania’s pursuit of African socialism and its tentative embrace of 
liberal economic principles were distinctly out of fashion and donor attention moved 
elsewhere.
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
The first part of this chapter described the development of an international 
consensus among donors on support for structural adjustment and policy 
conditionality as norms of international aid practice in the 1980’s. It also detailed the 
adoption of these policies within CIDA and in its bilateral aid programme in 
Tanzania. It has been argued that it was the identification of macro-economic policy 
as an appropriate area for donor intervention that necessitated and facilitated the 
development of donor consensus on this issue. It also facilitated the concentration of 
control over aid doctrine in general in the hands of the Bretton Woods institutions.
The agreement among donors, including Canada, to make the provision of bilateral 
assistance conditional on adherence to the terms of an IMF structural adjustment loan 
permitted the World Bank a degree of influence over Canadian bilateral aid policy 
which it continues to exercise, though as the discussion of the OGL system in the 
previous chapter suggests, this authority is not absolute. The World Bank orchestrated 
a donor consensus on the right prescription for Tanzania’s ailments, and there was a 
collective perception evident in the proceedings of the CG meetings that Tanzania 
was not making sufficient progress on institutional reform. It is argued that this 
played a significant role in the drastic reduction of aid from several bilateral donors, 
including Canada in 1993.
125 Interviews.
126 Interview.
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However, the second part of this chapter has outlined the events within 
Canada which surrounded CIDA’s decision to withdraw aid from Tanzania and the 
rest of East Africa in 1993. A range alternative explanations for this sudden drastic 
measure have been offered. It now remains to assess the relative importance of each 
of the factors cited. In making this analysis, it should be remembered that there are 
actually four significant policy decisions involved: the government’s decision to 
reduce the ODA budget in the first instance; the redefinition of aid policy objectives 
in the Policy Update; CIDA’s choice of East and Central Africa to absorb the cuts to 
the Africa programme; and finally, the government’s decision to reopen bilateral aid 
to Tanzania the following year.
The options open to decision-makers at each juncture were weighed against 
the competing objectives of the aid programme; a process in which, it has been argued 
in the preceding chapters, using aid resources in the most effective manner possible to 
help the poor has been relegated to a secondary or tertiary consideration. There 
appears to be little evidence to support the ‘humane internationalist’ interpretation of 
aid policy in this instance. The decision to cancel aid to several of the world’s poorest 
countries is a blatant abrogation of this principle. The contents of the International 
Assistance Policy Update, the minister’s comments before the parliamentary 
committee and the subsequent pledging of substantial sums of assistance to Russia 
lend considerable credence to the view that the advancement of Canada’s economic 
interests is an underlying principle of the aid programme. Likewise, there appears to 
be evidence that Canada’s political interests, both at home and abroad and Tanzania’s 
declining strategic importance internationally made CIDA’s programme there more 
expendable than elsewhere. However, the decision cannot be adequately explained by 
a straightforward calculation of Canadian interests. The consensus among donors on 
development priorities and Tanzania’s failure to pursue them with adequate vigour 
were a significant consideration in the decision-making process. Whereas Tanzania’s 
priorities had coincided with the objectives of its major donors in the 1970’s, by the 
1990’s donor interests had shifted elsewhere.
In examining the factors which contributed to CIDA’s withdrawal from 
Tanzania, it is also necessary to consider structural influences on policy; that is those
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exerted by the institutional framework in which the decision was taken. This includes 
a consideration of both CIDA’s position within the larger Canadian government 
structure, as well as the internal bureaucratic structure of the aid agency, and the 
process of decision-making in both contexts. Viewed from this perspective, it could 
be argued that the cancellation of aid to East Africa in 1993 was at least in part the 
result of CIDA’s ambiguous mandate. Although there may have been legitimate 
concerns among donors about the Tanzanian government’s commitment to reform and 
its capacity to use aid funds effectively, the same would apply to many states where 
aid was maintained. Consideration of Canada’s large aid programmes in Nigeria or 
China with their poor record of human rights abuses (but huge potential markets) 
enfeebles the argument that Tanzania was being punished for not moving quickly 
enough on democratic or economic reform. It at least suggests an uneven application 
of the principle, enunciated by the Canadian government in the early 1990’ s, of tying 
aid to democratic reform. In the event, Tanzania’s failure to meet IMF conditions was 
not given as an explanation for the cuts either to the Tanzanian government, or in 
public statements in Canada. So, if CIDA wanted to send the Tanzanian government 
a message, it did not say it in so many words.
The more logical explanation for targeting Tanzania and the East African 
region to bear the brunt of the budget cuts appears to be its limited economic and 
strategic importance. As suggested by the other cases reviewed in this paper, CIDA’s 
ambiguous mandate has permitted the pursuit of competing objectives through the aid 
programme. In this case, as in others, Canada’s commercial interests, and political 
concerns -- both domestic and international — took primacy over its stated obligation 
to assist the poor. Thus, although CIDA’s ODA Charter, which was created in 1987 
and according to Foreign Minister MacDougall still government policy in 1993, stated 
that the foremost priority of Canadian aid was to help the poorest people in the 
poorest countries, the government was not legally bound to abide by this principle. 
The cancellation of aid to several of the poorest countries in the world in 1993, while 
morally repugnant to many, was not illegal.
This interpretation of events does not negate the significance of the 
international donor consensus on making aid flows to Tanzania conditional on its
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adherence to the IMF reform programme. Rather, it suggests that donors are more 
willing to apply these conditions in cases where they have a limited material or 
strategic interest. The drastic reduction of aid flows to Tanzania in 1993 was in 
accordance with international norms, but the decision appears to have been predicated 
on a consideration of Canadian interests at that time. As noted above, similarly 
dissatisfied with the status of its projects in Tanzania in 1984, CIDA had considered 
either terminating its assistance or channelling it through NGOs. It had rejected these 
options because of Tanzania’s strategic importance at the time, and because it was 
believed that either would be unacceptable to DFAIT and to the Canadian commercial 
sector. Tanzania’s importance in this regard had waned a decade later.
It is significant that the termination of aid to East Africa occurred in the midst 
of the reorientation of the aid programme to serve more commercial objectives as 
embodied in the International Assistance Policy Update of 1993. The leak of the 
Policy Update demonstrated the interdepartmental friction which exists. The Update 
originated in External Affairs and was handed to CIDA to implement. The 
reorientation of aid towards fostering trade and investment in Eastern Europe reflects 
the interests of DEAIT. The decision to end aid to East Africa, while taken within 
CIDA, was in accordance with this new policy position and provides another 
illustration of the aid programmes vulnerability to politicking.
It might also be argued that the policy options open to aid officials were 
constrained by the institutionalized processes of aid, adding to the other pressures 
which divert aid policy from its developmental objectives. These were alluded to in 
Vice-President Racicot’s letter to the Tanzanian High Commissioner when he referred 
to the high overhead costs of the aid programme making it inefficient to impose 
across the board programme cuts. This hints at a systemic bias which sanctions 
certain modes of responding to poverty overseas -  technical assistance, food aid and 
capital assistance -  and precludes the use of other policy instruments which might 
enable Canada to aid development efforts more effectively even with its reduced 
ODA budget.
224
CIDA’s decision to reinstate aid to Tanzania following a sustained public 
protest by the international development lobby in Canada illustrates the strength of 
organized public opinion as a means of monitoring the aid programme. However, the 
ability and willingness of the government to override opposition to the termination of 
aid emanating from many quarters in the first instance suggests the limited capacity of 
Parliament to fulfil its duties in monitoring public policy.
Chapters Two through Four have examined the various factors which 
influence the aid policy-making process in Canada: domestic and international; 
philosophical, political, economic and structural. It is obvious, however, that the 
articulation of objectives and the policy statements which emerge from this process 
are not the end products of the aid cycle, and cannot in themselves answer the 
question of why aid so often fails. Much more can be learned from also examining 
the way in which policies are implemented in the form of programmes and projects. 
The following two chapters examine this phase of the aid process. They illustrate 
how the constraints on the effective use of aid funds continue to pile up through the 
project design and implementation stages.
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PART II
INTRODUCTION
The Aftermath of Aid: The Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project, The Hanang 
Participatory Development Fund, and CIDA’s Capacity to Learn from
Experience1
Previous chapters have examined the forces which shape Canadian aid policy 
in the formulation of general policy objectives and the identification of programming 
priorities. These stages involve macro-level policy decisions -  the volume of aid, its 
geographical distribution and sectoral allocation. The case study presented in the 
following two chapters examines the final stages of the aid process: the identification, 
design and implementation of aid projects. It focuses on Canadian assistance to two 
projects located in Hanang District, Northern Tanzania: the Tanzania-Canada Wheat 
Project (TCWP) which ran from 1969 to 1993; and the Hanang Participatory 
Development Fund (HPDF), which was initiated in 1989, implemented in 1996, and is 
ongoing. Including all ancillary projects as listed in Appendix II, together these 
projects represent a Canadian investment of around eighty million dollars.
Canadian involvement in Hanang began in 1967 with a request from the 
Tanzanian government for assistance in increasing domestic wheat production in 
support of the goals of food self-sufficiency and self-reliance set out in the Arusha 
Declaration. After considering several possible sites for development throughout the 
country, Canadian experts recommended establishing large-scale mechanized farms
1 This discussion o f CIDA involvement in Hanang District is based on material obtained from several 
sources. A review of relevant documentation was conducted: CIDA project files and programming 
documents; files and documents related to Hanang made available by various NGOs; the related 
academic literature; and popular press coverage. Observation at project sites in Hanang was conducted 
in June 1999; and interviews with CIDA staff, Tanzanian government officials and other involved 
parties were conducted in Canada and Tanzania between January and December 1999.
It will be noted that the chapter contains extensive quotations drawn from memoranda and 
reports contained in CIDA files. They were included as illustrative of the thought processes which 
informed CIDA’s policy decisions and reveal a vigorous exchange of views among generally well- 
informed, thoughtful and committed aid officials. Though the decision-making process within CIDA 
appears ultimately to be rather autocratic, the articulation of motives and the diversity of opinions 
expressed serve to dispel the image of CIDA as a monolith in the service o f one interest group or 
another. It also serves as a reminder that policy decisions are in the end made by human beings. This 
statement does not negate the principle argument of this paper: that aid policy is shaped to a significant 
degree by structural and systemic influences inherent in the aid process. Rather, it highlights the sites - 
of contention within the institutions of aid where the perceptions and actions of individuals are shaped 
by the structure of the process they manage.
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on the fertile Basotu Plains in Hanang as the best way to increase production to meet 
anticipated demand. Canadian assistance in support of the project was comprised of 
research assistance in adapting northern wheat varieties to grow in Tanzania, capital 
assistance in the form of farm machinery and agricultural inputs, and technical 
assistance in establishing and maintaining farm operations. After some initial 
setbacks, Canadian and Tanzanian scientists were successful in creating a wheat strain 
which would flourish in Hanang. Following an overall decline in agricultural 
production in Tanzania and food shortages in the 1970’s, the TCWP was expanded 
fivefold to bring an additional 50,000 acres into production. Yields and overall 
production increased throughout the ‘80’s, but serious problems developed on the 
farms. There were violent confrontations between farm employees and local 
residents, particularly the pastoralist Barabaig people who had traditionally grazed 
their herds on the land on which the farms were established. With the assistance of a 
Canadian NGO, they brought land claims against NAFCO, the parastatal company 
which managed the farms, before the courts. The farms were also operating at a 
financial loss. In addition, the transfer of technical knowledge was not occurring, and 
this, compounded by a shortage of foreign exchange to buy spares and fuel resulted in 
problems with maintaining the Canadian supplied heavy machinery. Alerted to a 
CIDA project gone bad by Canadian NGO’s and academic researchers, Canadian 
media coverage and public opinion has been highly critical of CIDA’s involvement in 
Hanang, both with respect to the heavily tied machinery and technical assistance 
components of the project and because of the displacement of the Barabaig 
population. Until Canadian involvement in the project ended in 1993 with the 
cancellation of Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania and even since, the project has been 
a chronic source of embarrassment for CIDA.
It was because of this intense criticism at home that CIDA began in 1989 to 
investigate the possibility of setting up a rural development project in Hanang as a 
means to redress the negative impact of the wheat project on the local population, 
particularly the Barabaig. The outcome of extensive planning missions and 
consultations over the next seven years was the establishment of the Hanang 
Participatory Development Fund in 1996. The HPDF makes small grants to local 
groups and individuals in support of income generating projects and efforts to
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improve community services like building classrooms, digging clean water wells or 
setting up village medical dispensaries. Facilitated by a Canadian cooperant and his 
Tanzanian counterpart, project proposals are assessed and funds allocated by an 
independent committee drawn from the community. In addition to fostering local 
economic development, the other stated objectives of the project are conflict 
resolution and the improvement of local management capacity. The HPDF made its 
first disbursements in 1999.
Although these projects are very different in terms of objectives, scope, and 
means, they are considered together here because the HPDF was a direct result of 
CIDA’s involvement in the Wheat Project. Canadian assistance to both projects 
comprises a substantial portion of total Canadian aid to Tanzania and spans a period 
of thirty years and thus provides a good vantage point from which to examine how 
policy is made and remade. Canadian assistance in Hanang also encompasses a 
dramatic shift from support to a large, heavily tied mechanized agriculture project to a 
small community development project with its emphasis on local participation, a shift 
in emphasis which is reflective of the gradual redefinition of priorities within 
Canadian programme in Tanzania as a whole over the years.
CIDA’s involvement in Hanang District makes an interesting case study for 
other reasons. Within Canadian public discourse on aid in both the academic and 
popular press, the TCWP has come to symbolize all that is wrong with Canadian 
ODA and has served as a lightening rod for critics of aid in general. It was a high 
profile project, discussed on the floor of the House of Commons, in Parliamentary 
committees, academic journals and the international media. In Tanzania, it led to the 
formation of a presidential commission to examine allegations of human rights abuse 
on the farms. While these chapters will address the genesis and outcome of the wheat 
project, the focus will be on how CIDA responded to the problems created by the 
project and the criticism it engendered. It is meant to be an examination of how an 
aid agency like CIDA learns or fails to learn, and the factors which influence policy­
making in an atmosphere of heightened sensitivity to the possible consequences of 
each and every action.
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The history of Canadian assistance in Hanang comprises a microcosm of the 
aid process. The cast of players includes a good cross-section of the aid community 
and thus affords the opportunity to study their relative influence on Canadian bilateral 
aid policy and on the manner in which aid projects are implemented in the field. In 
addition to numerous CIDA officials and consultants involved in the projects both in 
Ottawa and Tanzania, several other actors played important parts in the unfolding of 
events in Hanang. The central government of Tanzania is represented in the District 
by the Prime Minister (formerly the Minister of Agriculture) who is the local MP, and 
he took an active interest in Canadian interventions there, as did representatives of 
various line ministries. The local District Council is responsible for the 
administration of social services and community development in the district and 
played a significant role as a sometimes reluctant partner in determining how the 
CIDA funded community development project would be implemented. The 
expansion of the wheat project in the 1980’s brought the local Barabaig population 
into conflict with the state owned wheat farms and prompted CIDA’s decision to fund 
a community development project in the area. The response of NAFCO, the 
parastatal corporation which owned the farms to evidence of violent and illegal acts 
perpetrated by its employees against local residents, and the activities of Bulgalda and 
KIPOC, local organizations established to advocate for pastoralist rights in Hanang 
were both of primary importance in the determination of the nature and scope of 
subsequent Canadian interventions in the area.
Two Canadian NGOs were engaged in activities in Hanang during the period 
discussed: CUSO (Canadian University Service Overseas) and the Canadian Lutheran 
World Relief (CLWR), and both came into conflict with CIDA over their respective 
actual and proposed interventions in the area. A number of other foreign development 
organizations operate in Hanang: NOVIB, a Dutch-based NGO; the American Peace 
Corps; and a few other voluntary organizations which played a less direct role in the 
events described here. Also significant in shaping the course of events in Hanang in 
the past twenty years have been a number of academic researchers and representatives 
of the international media. Add to this lots of money -  close to $80 million dollars 
invested by Canada in the Wheat Project followed by $4.5 million dollars currently 
allocated for the HPDF, in addition to Tanzanian government resources in support of
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both projects (estimated by one source to be greater than the sum of Canadian aid)2 -  
and one has a good opportunity to observe the dynamics of aid policy implementation 
in the field and the manner in which each of these actors and other, more systemic 
factors have affected Canadian bilateral aid policy. To this end, this Chapter Five 
contains an examination of the origins of the TCWP. Chapter Six presents a detailed 
exposition of CIDA’s response to the negative impact of the TCWP on the local 
population through the process of the design and implementation of the HPDF.
Much has been written about the Wheat Project from a political perspective,
■3
and about its social and cultural implications. A number of economic analyses of the 
scheme have also been conducted.4 The work of Freeman and Lane in particular has 
set the tone for the academic debate surrounding the wheat project. Writing in 1982 
before the outbreak of violence on the farms and in the midst of their expansion, 
Freeman analyzed the wheat project from within a framework of marxist theories of 
the state as a means to explain the motivations of the Canadian and Tanzanian 
governments in supporting the project. As outlined in Chapter One, she argues that 
Canada’s desire for political influence abroad combined with the private sector’s 
ability to ensure that Canadian ODA remains heavily tied explains both CIDA’s 
willingness to fund an agricultural development project in Tanzania and its design as 
a mechanized production scheme requiring a large component of Canadian 
manufactured machinery.
To explain the disjunctive between the Nyerere government’s rhetoric of self- 
reliance which advocated communal production using locally available technologies 
to foster economic development, and the government’s establishment of a huge 
capital-intensive mechanized farming complex in Hanang with an increasing 
dependence on external aid, Freeman adopts Michaela von Freyhold’s 
conceptualization of the Tanzanian state.5 Von Freyhold makes a distinction between
2 Freeman, 1982:494.
3 Lane; Freeman,1982; Freeman,1978; Monbiot; P.Walsh. In addition there has been voluminous press 
coverage of the project as listed in the bibliography.
4 Frank; Stone; Prairie Horizons; Hamilton et al. The project has also generated a large body o f 
scientific research related to wheat production in tropical countries and its environmental implications. 
See for example Clarke; and reports held in the National Archives of Canada.
5 Freeman,1982:485.
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the ‘ruling’ and the ‘governing’ classes in Tanzania, arguing that the real ruling class 
in Tanzania is international capital as represented by the World Bank, the bilateral aid 
agencies and multinational corporations, which in the 1960’s and ‘70’s were 
promoting large modernization projects in Africa using western technology. The 
governing elite in Tanzania acts in concert with these interests and under their 
command. Freeman suggests that the Ujaama policies themselves led Tanzania to 
support the establishment of the wheat project in Hanang. She argues that peasant 
producers responded to forced villagization, inappropriate price policies for 
agricultural produce, and the inefficiency of the parastatal organizations responsible 
for supplying agricultural inputs and marketing outputs by retreating into subsistence 
farming and black market trading. This, combined with drought and the oil crisis 
caused a dramatic drop in agricultural production in the 1970’s. According to 
Freeman, the TCWP and the aid supplied by Canada enabled the Tanzanian 
government to circumvent an uncooperative peasantry in its efforts to deal with the 
domestic food shortage.
Freeman claims that the combined political and economic interests of the 
Canadian and Tanzanian governments resulted in an ill-conceived project. She is 
highly critical of the importation of the western agribusiness model applied in the 
project and which she views as inappropriate to Tanzanian conditions. Writing at the 
mid-way point of the project’s life, her major criticisms of the project were of its 
heavy foreign exchange requirements for fuel, spares and replacements; and the fact 
that although it was supported by CIDA as a rural development project, it actually 
bypassed the rural poor and was established as an enclave in Hanang, producing 
wheat for the urban market rather than foodstuffs for the ninety per cent on the 
Tanzanian population which live in rural areas. She also quotes several statements 
from Canadian and Tanzanian officials which suggested that they did not at that time 
regard the dispossession of the local pastoralist population as a very serious matter. 
However, Freeman concludes that “In evaluating CIDA’s contribution to the wheat 
sector in Tanzania, the issues lie in the overall conception of the project, not in its 
execution by Agriculture Canada and NAFCO.”6
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With the benefit of hindsight, the history of the TCWP suggests that in 
focusing exclusively on the determinants of Canadian and Tanzanian policy and on 
the tied aspect of the project, Freeman’s analysis did not accord due importance to the 
process of project implementation in explaining aid failure. The mismanagement of 
the wheat scheme by NAFCO and the resistance of the local residents to the project 
have subsequently been revealed as major contributing factors in the problems which 
developed with the project throughout the 1980’s. In addition, although Freeman’s 
analysis emphasizes the benefits accruing to the Tanzanian government in 
establishing the mechanized wheat scheme, Burch’s study of British aid to 
mechanized agriculture in Sri Lanka identifies local elites as key supporters and 
beneficiaries of this type of assistance.7 This finding resonates with evidence which 
came to light in the late ‘80’s and early ‘90’s that certain government officials and 
large independent farmers in Hanang were using the wheat project’s assets for 
personal gain.
Writing about the wheat project fourteen years later, it is the local dispute over 
land use on which Lane focuses his attention.8 Lane was living in Hanang conducting 
an anthropological study of the Barabaig in the late 1980’s during the worst period of 
local unrest and the sometimes violent confrontation between pastoralists and 
NAFCO wheat farm employees over rights to the land on which the farms were 
established. While he does not probe Canadian motivations for funding the project, 
like Freeman he traces the Tanzanian government’s decision to set up the farms to its 
desire to increase domestic food production. He lays out the Barabaig’s claim to be 
the legitimate owners of the land on the basis of customary use, and suggests that their 
way of life has been severely threatened by the establishment of the CIDA funded 
project. His main argument is a refutation of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons thesis, 
claiming that the Barabaig are in fact very efficient users of local resources, and that if 
the government’s intention in Hanang is to increase food production, cattle raising is 
more economically viable than mechanized wheat cultivation.
6 Freeman, 1982.
7 Burch, 1989.
8 Lane, 1996.
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To address Lane’s central thesis is beyond the scope of this paper, which is 
focussed on the causes of aid failure and CIDA’s capacity to learn from experience. 
The issue raised by his research in this context is the failure of Canadian planners to 
foresee problems in this area and how they handled them when they did arise. 
However, the evidence presented below will demonstrate that whatever the validity of 
the Barabaig’s legal and moral claim to the land on which the wheat scheme was built 
as argued by Lane; and whatever the respective economic merits of pastoralism 
versus mechanized cultivation may be, the TCWP was an economically unsound 
investment in and of itself. While the heavily tied nature of Canadian aid as 
highlighted by Freeman was an important part of this, the primary culprit, as 
identified by numerous independent consultants reports discussed below, was the 
geographic isolation of the farms and the cost of getting Hanang wheat to market.
QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED
Revisiting this case several years on, in the context of a study of the causes of 
aid failure and CIDA’s capacity to learn from experience, the central concerns of the 
research presented here are of a somewhat different nature to those which occupied 
Freeman and Lane. In assessing the TCWP, it must be remembered that the project 
was developed in the late I960’s when modernization through the transfer of western 
technology was almost universally believed to be the best route to economic 
development in poor countries, just as it was believed that economic growth in itself 
would end poverty. That this has not been the case was not foreseen by very many 
thirty years ago; nor is such faith in the technological cure so widely held as it was 
then. A comparison of CIDA’s project portfolio in Africa in the 1960’s -  1970’s and 
today would seem to indicate that the agency’s development philosophy has, in the 
words of one CIDA official, ‘matured’ from its wholesale embrace of modernization 
theory in its earliest years to a deeper understanding of the limitations of this approach 
to development. While CIDA still has many long standing commitments in large, 
tied, infrastructure projects on the continent, there has been a gradual trend away from 
this type of turn-key project assistance. After a certain point, criticizing an aid agency 
like CIDA for an approach it no longer employs is not useful. Again, it is how it 
responds to failure which is of interest here. However, in the face of numerous
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negative assessments of the project made by consultants hired by CIDA, the agency 
continued to fund the TCWP until 1993, and one must ask why.
The initial feasibility study had concluded that expanding wheat production by 
mechanization in remote areas was not economically viable. After the initial success 
of adapting northern wheat strains to grow in Tanzania, Phase I of the project went 
badly with poor crop yields over several years, yet the project was expanded fivefold 
in a second phase. Evaluations of the project conducted during Phase II concluded 
unanimously that the project was not economically sound. In addition, violence and 
social conflict had erupted on the farms over the issue of land rights. Yet the 
recommendations of these reports and the claims of local residents were ignored and 
the project was extended into a third phase. The primary issue examined here is why 
CIDA appears to have been so slow to respond to evidence of project failure and, 
crucially, what finally prompted the agency to change its approach in Hanang? The 
primary conclusion drawn is that structural weaknesses inherent in the aid process 
made it difficult for CIDA to respond quickly to evidence of aid failure. CIDA’s 
main motivation to address the problems its project had created was vocal public 
criticism in Canada.
In light of the troubled history and outcome of the wheat project, Chapter Five 
addresses a number of other specific questions: Firstly, given that the staple food in 
Tanzania is maize, why did the governments of Canada and Tanzania choose to make 
this huge investment in wheat to meet domestic food requirements? Secondly, given 
the conflict which arose over the land on which the wheat farms were built, why did 
the project planners choose to locate the farms in Hanang, and why did they not 
foresee problems on this front? The argument has been made by Canadian and 
Tanzanian government officials that the decision to establish the farms on the fertile 
grazing grounds of the Barabaig was in line with the Nyerere government’s 
philosophy of placing national objectives like food self-sufficiency above the 
individual rights of a minority population. Therefore, the question of how successful 
the project has been in meeting its stated objective of helping Tanzania achieve food 
self-sufficiency must be addressed. Thirdly, based on an economic cost/benefit 
analysis, can the project be deemed an effective use of aid funds. Finally, eight years
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have passed since after Canadian involvement in the project ceased, and this provides 
the opportunity to assess how sustainable has this large Canadian-Tanzanian 
investment proven to be.
The Hanang Participatory Development Fund was initiated by CIDA in 
response to local resistance to the wheat project, and in reaction to public criticism in 
Canada. An examination of the genesis of this project provides the opportunity to 
understand the forces which shaped CIDA’s response to the problems created by the 
wheat project. As the details of this case illustrates, policy-making does not end with 
the formulation of policy statements, or with the allocation of funds, or with the 
identification of specific projects. The process of implementing aid comprises a host 
of decisions which influence the outcome of aid in fundamental ways. The history of 
the TCWP and the HPDF presented here is particularly instructive on this point. The 
decisions made by Canadian aid officials in the 1960’s as to what form Canadian 
assistance to Tanzanian agriculture would take and where the wheat farms would be 
located had enormous repercussions for the outcome of the project. Political 
necessity subsequently determined that CIDA would fund a community development 
project in Hanang District. The rather arbitrarily chosen sum of $4.5 million dollars 
was allocated to the project, drawn from the Tanzania Railway Corporation project 
budget. The decision then had to be made of what to do and how. These decisions 
were not minor or incidental. Nor were the identification of project objectives and the 
delineation of a course of action a straightforward exercise. How these matters were 
resolved were of profound importance to the outcome of the project.
One of the most intriguing aspects of the HPDF is that despite the ardent 
wishes of all the major players involved at the outset, and particularly those of the 
funding agency CIDA, that the HPDF9 be implemented as soon as possible, it was 
nevertheless ten years between the conception of the project and the first 
disbursement of aid funds. During this period, the project objectives were redefined a 
number of times, the identity of the proposed Canadian executing agency changed 
five times, and a variety of administrative structures were considered. Project
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planners also struggled to identify a Tanzanian counterpart agency. The project was 
cancelled once, resurrected, then put on hold again before it finally got off the ground. 
That a project CIDA was so keen to put into place could be delayed for so long is 
illustrative both of the complexity of the aid administration process and of the 
considerable pressure exerted on the aid agency from several quarters during the 
implementation phase. It is also revealing of CIDA’s capacity for self-reflection and 
adaptability to changing conditions in the field. While the administrative structure of 
the wheat project did not give planners much pause in the 1960’s, the identification of 
a Canadian Executing Agency, a Tanzanian counterpart, and an administrative 
structure for the Fund were of central importance in determining the objectives of the 
HPDF and these decisions will be examined in detail here. Given that the conflict 
over land use lay at the heart of CIDA’s woes in Hanang, particular attention will also 
be paid to how this issue was handled in the development of the project.
Addressing the specific questions outlined above through a detailed 
examination of the project identification, design and implementation process in 
Hanang offers insight into CIDA’s capacity to learn from experience and the 
effectiveness of oversight mechanisms for the aid programme. This case points to 
several weaknesses in the aid process as it is currently institutionalized. The combined 
attentions of the NGO lobby, the media and Parliamentarians brought the wheat 
project to public attention and prompted CIDA to redress the problems its first project 
had created in Hanang. However, up to that point, Canadian aid officials seem to 
have ignored the expert advice on the viability of the project it solicited on several 
occasions with little consequence beyond public rebuke. In addition, the lack of a 
provision for conducting evaluations of CIDA funded projects after Canadian 
involvement has come to an end means that the lessons of project sustainability are 
habitually lost. CIDA subsequently attempted to redress the problems created by the 
wheat project through the HPDF. It devoted considerable time and resources to 
laying the groundwork for the new project in an effort to avoid past mistakes. These 
efforts have been rewarded by broad local support and commitment to the HPDF.
9 The Hanang Participatory Development Fund was, in the early stages of planning called the Hanang 
Community Development Project. For the sake of simplicity, its final title is used throughout this 
discussion.
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However, this type of project has its own limitations, bom of the process in which it 
was constructed, and these are addressed in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TANZANIA-CANADA WHEAT PROJECT 1967-1993
“After two weeks here you think you know everything about Africa and 
the wheat farms, and you have all the answers. But after a few months 
you think that maybe some o f the answers won1 work, and after six 
months you realize that none o f them will. After a year you realize 
you 11 never understand the place and you never had any answers in 
the first place... We have tried to introduce a highly capitalized 
operation based on western business principles and cultural values, 
and we tried to impose a little stand o f that on a country with a 
completely different culture and business values. I  just don 1 think it 
will work ”
— Lyle Minogue, Saskatchewan farmer and Canadian technical advisor to the 
Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project, quoted in The Ottawa Citizen. 22 May1993.1
This chapter will examine Canadian assistance to the Tanzania-Canada Wheat 
Project located in Hanang District, Northern Tanzania. To facilitate the discussion of 
its long and complicated history, the first section presents a brief chronology of the 
project from its inception in 1967 to the present. This is followed by a socio­
economic description of Hanang District. In addressing the question of the 
determinants of Canadian aid policy and their impact on the outcome of development 
assistance, the chapter will then examine the actions of the aid agency at four crucial 
junctures in the course of the project: the decision to fund the project and its design; 
CIDA’s decision to expand the project despite initial poor results; the decision to 
continue to fund the project despite several negative evaluations of its potential 
benefits and economic viability; and finally, the decision in 1993 to end Canadian 
assistance to the project after twenty-five years. Eight years after Canadian assistance 
came to an end, we will then assess the long-term impact of the TCWP on Hanang 
and on the Tanzanian economy.
5.1 CHRONOLOLOGY OF THE TANZANIA-CANADA WHEAT PROJECT2
February 1967 -  The Arusha Declaration commits the Tanzanian government to a 
socialist model of development. Self-sufficiency in food production by 1980 made a 
national priority.
1 Quoted in Taylor, 1993.
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June 1967 -  Canadian External Aid Office mission to Tanzania to identify possible 
projects for assistance. President Nyerere identifies large-scale mechanized wheat 
production as top priority.
July 1967 -  Official request from Tanzanian government for Canadian assistance to 
develop appropriate seed varieties and in introducing mechanized cultivation practices 
“as a demonstrator to both smaller producers as well as large-scale producers.”
Late 1967 -  Tanzanian government establishes state wheat farm on 2000 acres at 
Basotu in Hanang.
May 1968 -  Pre-feasibility mission to Tanzania highlights doubts as to economic 
viability of proposed wheat project.
October 1968 -  Feasibility study examines several possible sites for development. 
Notes weak transportation and marketing infrastructure as severe constraints on 
expansion of wheat production in remote areas.
August 1969 -  Review of Canadian aid programme in Tanzania recommends that aid 
be concentrated on promoting Canadian private-sector involvement in Tanzania 
through infrastructure projects (railways, hydro-electric power transmission and road- 
building). Concludes that Canadian expertise relevant to Tanzanian agriculture is 
limited.
November 1970 -  MOU signed between Canada and Tanzania for support to 
increasing wheat production.
1970 -  1975 -  Phase I of Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project ($6.7 million):
Experimental research to develop appropriate seed varieties and cultivation 
techniques in Tanzania. Includes the provision of two Canadian scientists, training 
for Tanzanian staff, and the technical assistance, machinery and chemicals necessary
2 A summary of all CIDA projects related to the TCWP is found in Appendix II.
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for trials at Basotu. Very low yields recorded until adjustment to cultivation methods 
boosts production to North American levels in 1976. Second farm established nearby 
at Setchet.
1975 -  Request from Tanzanian government for continued Canadian assistance as 
Phase I of project comes to an end. CIDA advised that a National Wheat Plan 
“appeared to be a precondition for the allocation of substantially new resources.” It 
funds a wheat sector study ($230,000).4 It was to examine the justification for 
growing wheat in particular areas, the appropriate scale of production, the type of pre­
investment research required, and recommend alternative investment plans. The 
consultants’ final report outlined technical measures and management practices to be 
implemented to improve and increase mechanized wheat production in Northern 
Tanzania. CIDA is not satisfied with the study, particularly with its lack of specific 
recommendations for alternative investment strategies. It argues that the terms of 
reference for the study “did not predetermine that the way we have proceeded in the 
past was or necessarily will be the only way to proceed in the future.”5 The 
significance of this statement is that CIDA appears to have been open to alternatives 
to large-scale mechanized production at this stage. However, the sector analysis was 
not repeated, and CIDA subsequently agrees to continue funding to the TCWP.
1976 -  Large-Scale Wheat Production (1976-81) -  technical assistance ($2,132,200).
Adaptive Wheat Research and Production (1976-79) -  technical assistance 
($2,382,000).
Soils survey to identify areas for project expansion ($2.4 million)
1977 -  Basotu Farm Equipment ($1.5 million) -  provision of spare parts and 
machinery maintenance tools.
1979 -  87 -  Phase II of Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project ($43.9 million):
3 CIDA Project Termination Report 902/00407.
4 Manitoba Pool Elevators, 1977.
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Infrastructure Support ($25,318,458.37)
Research and Production ($ 18,948,446.07)
Technical and capital assistance for the establishment of five new wheat farms at 
Hanang, bringing an additional 50,000 acres into production. Project included 
training for Tanzanians in Canada, a staff of 16 Canadian technical advisors in 
Tanzania, and required farm machinery and agricultural inputs.
By the end of Phase II, CIDA reported that research had provided successfully 
adapted wheat varieties and yields had stabilized at North American levels. The 
Arusha Research Institute and the Hanang Wheat Complex were both under 
Tanzanian management. A Central Maintenance and Service Centre serving all seven 
farms in the scheme was fully operational. The wheat farms were employing 
approximately 1700 people. CIDA felt that Tanzanian management capacity was 
improving, and that it was realistic to look at phasing out Canadian technical 
assistance by 1991.
However, significant problems were encountered during Phase II of the project: Local 
opposition to NAFCO’s seizure of land which had traditionally belonged to the 
Barabaig nomadic cattle herders intensified. Crop yields after 1983 were lower than 
in 1979 for every year except 1985. This was attributed by CIDA officials to “The 
difficulties inherent in assisting the absorption into the Tanzanian context of relatively 
high tech equipment, much of which appeared to have been inappropriately chosen in 
the initial transfers.”6 There was a shortage of spare parts necessary to run farm 
equipment, lack of inventory control at NAFCO, and apparent weaknesses in farm 
management. Further, a series of project evaluations conducted in the 1980’s - ’92 
were unanimous in their conclusions that the project was not economically viable and 
would collapse without continued Canadian assistance.
1980 -  Spare Parts Technical Assistance Project ($117,000)
5 CIDA file no. 902/407, Vol.3.
6 CIDA Project Termination Report 902/10825.
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1982 -  Opening of Line of Credit for Spare Parts procurement for five Canadian 
assisted parastatals including the Hanang Wheat Complex. ($13.1 million in total).
April 1982 -  Reports of private shamhas established on wheat project land and project 
farm equipment being appropriated for private use and therefore not available for 
regular farm work.
1985 -  Barabaig launch first land claim for Mulbadow farm. They win their case 
against NAFCO, but the decision is overturned by the Court of Appeal, and the land is 
returned to NAFCO. Several other claims are brought before the courts.
1986 -  CIDA funded Cost-Benefit Analysis of Phases I and II of the TCWP 
concludes that project is not economically viable. Several other project evaluations 
over next few years reach the same conclusion.
1987 -  1993 Phase III of Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project ($27 million).
Contrary to the recommendations of several project evaluations that the wheat project 
was not economically viable, CIDA agrees to extend the project into a third phase. In 
Phase III, no expansion of production was planned. The objectives are: to provide 
funds for the purchase of replacement equipment and spare parts, technical assistance 
to strengthen NAFCO management and research capacity (51 p/y -  17 full-time 
Canadian staff in Hanang, and 65 p/y of training for Tanzanian staff), and a socio­
economic study to serve as the basis for long-term planning in the wheat sector.
CIDA plans to withdraw Canadian technical assistance in 1991. In fact, Canadian 
technical advisors remained on the project until funding is cut in June 1993 when all 
CIDA bilateral aid to Tanzania is terminated.
1989 -  Canadian NGO CUSO launches media campaign in Canada against impact of 
TCWP on local Barabaig population.
-  CIDA begins to plan a community development project in Hanang.
7 CIDA Project Termination Report 902/00805/10829.
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1989 -  Canadian NGO CUSO launches media campaign in Canada against impact of 
TCWP on local Barabaig population.
-  CIDA begins to plan a community development project in Hanang.
1990 -  Controls on the pricing and sale of Hanang wheat lifted. Due to its high 
production costs, Hanang wheat is significantly more expensive that the going market 
price, and has difficulty finding buyers.
1992 -  Evaluation of project concludes that it is not commercially viable, and 
recommends the privatization of Hanang farms.
1993 -  Establishment of Kisanga Commission to investigate allegations of human 
rights abuse at the Hanang Wheat Farms. Concludes that there have been violent and 
illegal acts committed against local residents by some NAFCO employees. Finds also 
that although it had been granted 72,500 acres, NAFCO is operating illegally on 
100,000 acres. The Commission determines, however, that NAFCO should retain all 
land that it had been allocated.
Decision to terminate Canadian bilateral aid to Tanzania, including assistance 
to the TCWP, which ended in June 1993. NAFCO immediately cancels existing 
arrangements to procure spare parts and agricultural inputs from Canadian suppliers.
1996 -  Commencement of the Hanang Participatory Development Fund.
1996 -  Hanang Wheat Farms identified by Parastatal Review Commission as among 
the enterprises which should be privatized, and they are put up for sale. As yet, no 
buyer has been found. Wheat yields have declined and large tracts of land lie fallow.
Figure 5,1________________________________________________________
Tanzania Canada Wheat Project 1968 - 1993
Total funds approved: $77,299,104.44 (for Phases I, II, III)
Disbursed: $72,102,119.79 
Tied: $69,046,125.36/Untied: 4.24%
Plus related and ancillary projects as listed in Appendix II, accounting for an 
___________________ additional $17.93 million, mostly tied___________________
Source: CIDA Project Files
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5.2 A DESCRIPTION OF HANANG DISTRICT *
Hanang District is located in Arusha Region in Northern Tanzania (please see 
map in Figure 5.2 below). The landscape is a mixture of dry scrub and the fertile 
Basotu plains, which Canadian scientists have described as akin in climate and soil 
composition to the Saskatchewan prairie. The local Barabaig herders call them 
‘Muhajega’ and have traditionally used them as their wet season grazing grounds. 
While there are several lakes in Hanang, they are scattered, some of them seasonal 
and/or saline, with rainfall concentrated between November and March, so that 
scarcity of water is a constant concern for the inhabitants and their livestock. Hanang 
covers a total of 3436 square kilometres with a widely dispersed population of 
approximately 150,000, a projection based on 1988 census figures.8 The population is 
a mixture of ethnic groups, of which Iraqw comprise sixty-two percent, Barabaig 
thirty percent, with the remainder a variety of other ethnic groups.9 Subsistence 
farming is the primary occupation of the majority of the population, though a number 
still practice nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism, often in combination with 
cultivation.
Life, is extremely difficult for the majority of residents. Women spend up to 
six hours a day collecting water from distant and often unclean sources. Apart from a 
few villages along the main road, there is no electricity, no telephones, no sewerage 
facilities and few roads. Infant and maternal mortality rates both are estimated at over 
two hundred per thousand, as compared to infant mortality rates of seventy-five per 
thousand in Tanzania as a whole and 5.5 per thousand in Canada.10 There is only one 
medical doctor in the district and health services as a whole are scarce and 
overburdened. Access to formal education is becoming more important as the 
traditional economy breaks down under the incursion of modem capitalism.
According to a 1991 survey, approximately forty percent of the population is illiterate,
8 Sosovele et al, Hanang District Profile, 1997; Evjen et al, Feasibility Study: Hanang District Small 
Scale Project Facility, 1991.
9 Agriteam, Issues Analysis Report -  Wheat III, June 15 1989.
10 Evjen, 1991; Statistics Canada.
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the percentage higher among pastoralists. Only one quarter of children over the age 
of seven attend school. Due to a shortage of classrooms and teachers, they average 
seventy-five to one hundred pupils to a classroom with little in the way of 
instructional materials.11
Figure 5,2: Hanang District, Tanzania
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5.3 THE ORIGINS OF THE TANZANIA-CANADA WHEAT PROJECT
As grim as the statistics sited above are, CIDA’s initial intervention in Hanang 
District was not focussed on the condition of local residents, but on the nationally 
identified priority of self-sufficiency in food production. It is worth examining the 
origins and history of the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project in some detail as it has 
been singled out by critics of Canadian aid policy as an example of the failure of aid 
to meet its stated objectives, and more particularly, of how Canadian commercial 
interests undermine the aid programme. As noted in the prologue to Part III, the
11 Evjen, 1991; Tenga, The Current Situation in Hanang, September 1998.
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course of events in Hanang were shaped to a significant extent by a series of decisions 
made by Canadian aid officials over a period of thirty years: the agreement to fund the 
wheat project in the first instance; the decisions to expand and extend it into a second 
and third phase despite poor results; and the aid agency’s response to the crisis which 
erupted in the mid-1980’s over the issue of land use rights. In assessing the 
influences shaping Canadian actions in Hanang and their outcome, it is necessary to 
consider the context in which these decisions were made. Therefore, this analysis will 
place Canadian involvement in the Hanang wheat scheme in the context of significant 
policy trends and events in Tanzania and Canada, as well as the prevailing 
international aid doctrine at each juncture in the life of the project.
5.4 THE ARUSHA DECLARATION AND TANZANIAN COMMITMENT TO 
FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Tanzania’s political and economic history can be divided roughly into four 
phases demarcated by significant shifts in its development policy and its relations 
with its aid donors. Barkan characterizes the period from independence to 1967 as an 
era of consolidation for the nationalist government with the continuation of the
19modernization economic policies initiated in the final years of British occupation. 
From the Arusha Declaration in 1967 until the early 1980’s, Tanzania pursued a 
socialist model of economic development. Sobhan labels this the period of ‘local 
ownership’ of the development process when Tanzania defined its own objectives and 
strategies with the enthusiastic support of its foreign donors, including that of its later
ITnemesis, the World Bank. This phase was followed by a period of acute economic 
crisis and a contraction of aid to Tanzania. As described in the previous chapter, the 
years 1980 to 1986 marked a stand off between the government of Tanzania and the 
IMF as the government resisted, then finally capitulated to pressure from the IMF, 
bilateral donors, and from some quarters within Tanzania to implement a structural 
adjustment programme to liberalize the economy.
In the post ERP-I era (1986 to the present), the initiative for plotting 
Tanzania’s development policy has shifted from the government of Tanzania to the
12 Barkan: 8.
13 Sobhan:! 17.
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International Financial Institutions, and issues of economic and political reform have 
dominated the policy agenda.14 A revival of donor support in the late 1980’s was 
followed by a second wave of donor fatigue in the 1990’s when the reform 
programme failed to take hold. Since 1994, there have been renewed efforts to 
improve Tanzania’s relationship with its donors15, and a shift in donor assistance to 
the social sectors, particularly health and education.16
At independence in 1961, Tanganyika embarked on the project of national 
development with a shortage of the resources necessary for the task. The country 
inherited an economic structure which had been created to draw wealth out of the
17region and into the coffers of its colonial occupiers. The establishment of a primary, 
mainly agricultural export oriented economy began with the German occupation in 
the 1880’s. Peasants were compelled to grow cash crops and many were moved onto 
plantations in the most fertile growing areas. Other regions were designated as
1 ftsources of labour, laying the foundation for uneven regional economic development.
The British took over the administration of the territory of Tanganyika 
following WWII under the auspices of the Trusteeship Council of the U.N. However, 
its policies in Tanganyika were not designed with the development of the territory or 
the welfare of the local population in mind.19 To assist in its own economic recovery 
effort, Britain maintained compulsory cultivation and enforced settlement policies to 
boost production of export crops such as cotton, coffee, sisal, tea, tobacco, and 
cashews. The colonial government also attempted to enforce a series of questionable 
conservation and cultivation practices which were resisted by farmers. Faced with 
this opposition and with stagnating agricultural production, in its final years, the 
colonial administration shifted its attention to encouraging progressive individual
farmers as a means to increase production. This was a deliberate policy aimed at
20establishing a rural elite. “It was the intention to increase inequality.”
14 Barkan:8.
15 See Helleiner et al, 1995.
16 See: URT, Ministry o f Education and Culture, March 1999; URT, Ministry o f Health, May 1996.
17 Brett, 1973.
18 Havnevik:12.
19 Brett, 1973.
20 Coulson:55.
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The establishment of manufacturing enterprises in Tanganyika was actively
91discouraged by the British administration. The transportation system had been built 
to carry produce out of the territory, not to connect communities or to foster regional
99development. Little of the physical infrastructure necessary for industrial 
production or to provide basic social services existed at independence, and there was a 
severe shortage of the professional expertise necessary to address these problems on a 
national scale.23 Faced with this set of circumstances, the first autonomous 
government of Tanganyika led by Julius Nyerere chose continuity over a radical 
transformation of the economic structure.24 While espousing a commitment to the 
creation of a socialist state, Nyerere wrote in 1962 that “The basis difference between 
a socialist society and a capitalist society does not lie in their methods of producing 
wealth, but in the way that wealth is distributed.”25
As detailed by Pratt, independent Tanganyika’s early economic development 
plans were drawn up with the assumption that a certain volume of financial and 
technical assistance would be forthcoming, particularly from Britain.26 These 
expectations were disappointed, however, and Tanzania’s relations with its three 
principal donors -  Britain, U.S.A., and West Germany — soured over political issues 
in the mid-1960’s.27 Nyerere was also dismayed at the development of an elite class 
in Tanzania. These events prompted a radical redirection of Tanzanian development
90
policy, enunciated in the Arusha Declaration of February 1967. In this document, 
the Tanzanian leadership committed itself to the pursuit of a socialist state based on 
equality and self-reliance. The steps to be taken to implement this vision in Tanzania 
were outlined in a number of statements and policy documents adopted by the 
government in the 1960’s and early 1970’s 29
21 Brett,1973; Coulson:77.
22 Brett, 1973.
23 Pratt, 1976:93-94.
24 Coulson:121.
25 Nyerere, 1966:161-62
26 Pratt, 1976.
27 Ibid; Coulson,1982.
28 Nyerere, 1968.
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Of central relevance to a discussion of the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project are 
the implications of the Arusha Declaration for Tanzanian agricultural policy. Despite 
the failure of several early government agricultural schemes as described by Coulson, 
agricultural production continued to rise up to 1967. This Coulson attributes to the 
expansion of large-scale private mechanized farms in this period and to sheer hard 
work on the part of small-scale peasant farmers using traditional cultivation 
practices.30 However, speaking in the National Assembly in June 1966, Nyerere 
noted the country’s worsening balance of payments situation, which he ascribed to 
falling prices for Tanzanian agricultural exports. He argued that Tanzania needed to 
reduce its imports of consumption goods so that all available foreign exchange could 
be used to purchase the machinery and other inputs necessary to establish import 
substitution industries and to develop the domestic economy. He said “It is absurd
<31
that this country should still be buying food from abroad.”
The Arusha Declaration stated that agricultural production should provide the 
engine for economic development in Tanzania. It called for an increase in the 
production of both food and cash crops for export. Self-sufficiency in domestic food 
production became a policy objective of the Nyerere government. Of particular 
relevance to subsequent events in Hanang district, the Arusha Declaration stated that 
the major means of production in the country should be owned by the state in order to 
prevent economic exploitation and disparity. Further, it stated that “Because the land 
belongs to the nation, the Government has to see to it that it is used for the benefit of 
the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual or just a few people.” As 
the events described below illustrate, this view, which granted primacy to the rights of 
the majority over the claims of minority groups, was contested in Hanang when the 
state-owned wheat scheme at Hanang was established then expanded with Canadian 
assistance over the objections of the local population.
With respect to how agricultural production was to be increased, Nyerere 
argued in 1967 that Tanzania needed to take advantage of modem technology and
29 URT, Second Five Year Plan 1969-74; Third Five Year Plan 1974-79; Nyerere, Socialism and Rural 
Development, 1968; Education for Self-Reliance, 1967; Basic Industrial Strategy, 1975.
30 Coulson: 162-67.
31 Nyerere,1968:168.
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t • 3 3cultivation techniques. However, he emphasized the government’s commitment to 
social equality, and stated that “there are certain things which we shall refuse to do or 
to accept, either as individuals or as a nation, even if the result of them would be a 
surge forward in our economic development.”34 Among such things as identified by 
Nyerere, was relying on imported foodstuffs even when they were offered for free, as 
this increased Tanzanian vulnerability to external forces. He was also opposed the 
establishment of large, privately owned farming operations in Tanzania.
We have to stop thinking in terms of massive agricultural 
mechanization and the proletarianization of our rural 
population...Instead of aiming at large farms using tractors and other 
modem equipment and employing agricultural labourers, we should be 
aiming at having ox-plows all over the country...The jembe [hoe] will 
have to be eliminated by the ox-plough before the latter can be 
eliminated by the tractor.35
Nyerere qualified this statement, however.
This does not mean that we shall have no tractors or modem machinery 
working in Tanzanian agriculture. We shall have these things to deal 
with special problems, or working on large, highly organized state 
farms where there is all the work discipline of a modem factory. But 
they are not appropriate at the present time for the majority of our 
farming units; and in any case we cannot afford them, nor could we use 
them in such a way as to justify their expense.36
When Nyerere made this statement in 1967, his government was already in 
negotiations with Canadian officials around possible Canadian assistance in 
establishing a large-scale mechanized wheat cultivation scheme in support of 
Tanzania’s objective of food self-sufficiency. It was the attempted reorganization of 
agricultural production into communal villages which was the most significant 
government initiative in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. The proposed wheat project 
may be viewed as one of the ‘special cases’ to which Nyerere referred.
32 Ibid:247.
33 Ibid:305-06.
34 Ibid:317.
35 Ibid:320.
36 Ibid:390.
37 See: Nyerere,1968, Socialism and Rural Development-, Hyden [Beyond Ujaama in Tanzania], Von 
Freyhold, 19XX.
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According to CIDA folklore, the TCWP had its origins in a conversation 
between Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and President N.yerere, who were 
personal friends. In 1967, representatives of Canada’s External Aid Office travelled 
to Tanzania to discuss a variety of possibilities for Canadian assistance there. The 
Canadian delegation reported that “On our last day in Dar es Salaam, we saw the 
President who said that the one project he wanted us to get into was mechanized 
wheat production on a large scale in the Southern Highlands.”38
Wheat cultivation was introduced in the southern highlands of Tanzania by the 
Germans around 1898, and in the north in Mbulu District and near Kilimanjaro 
shortly thereafter. A large wheat scheme was developed west of Arusha by the 
British in 1943, but produced low yields and was subsequently abandoned in 1948. 
Production of wheat continued both in the north and the south on small-holdings 
using hand cultivation or oxen, with the occasional use of rented tractors, and on
• -IQlarger, private, partially mechanized mixed farms in the north. In 1967, the 
Tanzanian government established a state farm on two thousand acres at Basotu, in 
what is now Hanang District. The original plan was that the state farm would serve as 
the nucleus for the development of two hundred acre farms in the surrounding area, to 
be established on a cooperative basis.40 In 1967 there were in total 80,000 acres under 
wheat in Tanzania, supplying sixty per cent of domestic consumption at that time.41 
The Tanzanian government’s objective was to increase this to 200,000 acres by 1970 
to meet the forecasted domestic demand.42
Freeman argues that the Tanzanian government “decided to phase out the 
settler farms and to forestall the emergence of a class of African wheat growers” and 
that “following its decision to make these changes in the structure of wheat 
production, the Tanzanian government turned to Canada for assistance.”43 The
38 National Archives o f Canada RG74 ACC 1980-81/102 Vol.41, File no.l 1-13-28, part 1.
39 Beamish et al: 17-30.
40 Ibid:29,95.
41 Beamish et al, 1968: 84.
42 Notes on meeting between Canadian External Aid officials and Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Minister o f  
Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Ottawa, 21 July 1967, National Archives o f Canada file 
number RG 74 ACC 1980-81/102, vol.41, File 11-13-28 part 1.
43 Freeman, 1982:490-91.
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statements made by Nyerere cited above would seem to support this interpretation. 
However, this is not in accordance with evidence in archived External Aid Office 
files. In July 1967, Tanzanian officials visited Ottawa to discuss possible Canadian 
assistance for a wheat project. They presented Canadian officials with a three­
pronged development strategy by which they hoped to boost wheat production.44
Firstly, efforts would be made to increase small-holder production through the 
provision of extension services and subsidies on agricultural inputs. Secondly, the 
government hoped to encourage existing commercial tractor-using farmers to increase 
the output of their operations by expanding their acreage. Finally, the government 
proposed the establishment of large, mechanized, state-owned farms on a joint- 
ownership basis with overseas governments. It was envisioned that these farms 
would not be devoted exclusively to the production of wheat, but would also grow 
other cash crops in rotation, and raise sheep and other livestock. In the early stages of 
negotiations around possible Canadian assistance, the Tanzanian government 
suggested a fourth development strategy: that of recruiting Canadian farmers to settle 
in Tanzania and produce wheat for the local market in exchange for the right to 
repatriate their profits to Canada. This idea was dismissed early on as politically 
unpalatable to the Canadian government on the grounds that the settlers might later be 
evicted from their land as had occurred with immigrant farmers in Kenya. In July 
1967 Tanzania officially requested Canadian assistance to develop wheat seed for 
Tanzanian conditions and in introducing mechanized practices “as a demonstrator to 
both smaller producers as well as large-scale producers.”45
5.5 WHY WHEAT
Maize is the staple food of the majority of the population in Tanzania. A plan 
to introduce large-scale production of a northern food crop in a tropical zone as a 
means to achieve food self-sufficiency seemed a curious one even to Canadian 
officials at the time. By way of an explanation, Canadian field staff reported that
44 Notes on meeting between Canadian External Aid officials and Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Minister o f  
Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Ottawa, 21 July 1967, National Archives o f Canada file 
number RG 74 ACC 1980-81/102, vol.41, File 11-13-28 part 1.
45 Ibid.
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President Nyerere had been so greatly impressed by Rene Dumont’s book False Start 
in Africa that he had distributed copies of the book to all members of his cabinet and 
had invited Dumont to Tanzania to survey Tanzania’s agricultural problems. Besides 
declaring with the confidence common to the early modernizers that it was possible to 
conquer underdevelopment in Africa in twenty years,46 Dumont recommended that 
Tanzania shift agricultural production from cash crops with an uncertain future like 
sisal, cotton and coffee to a greater emphasis on rice, cattle and wheat. Canadian 
officials surmized that this is where the Tanzanian government’s interest in wheat 
arose.47 It was further suggested that the increased consumption of wheat and bread 
in Tanzania in the years immediately following independence and the government’s 
desire to further increase production was due to the Africanization of the civil service 
with its attendant rise in the standard of living and changing tastes for some, and the 
necessity to provide food for a growing urban population.
5.6 WHY HANANG
In 1968, Canada sent a mission to Tanzania to examine the feasibility of 
establishing a large-scale mechanized wheat project there.49 The terms of reference 
for the mission were to assess the scientific possibility of producing wheat on a large 
scale in Tanzania, to assess existing economic infrastructure to support the project 
(i.e. available labour, storage facilities and housing, transportation), and to scout 
possible sites for the project. The team was also directed to “Outline any significant 
problems occurring to team arising from social customs, e.g. land tenure, tribal 
affiliations, etc.”50 With respect to the technical feasibility of producing more wheat 
in Tanzania, the mission assessed three regions of the country which were believed to 
have the right conditions for wheat production. Of the originally proposed southern 
highlands area, and of the lands around Arusha and Kilimanjaro were wheat was 
already being produced, it reported that the amount of suitable land available for
46 Dumont:23.
47 Memo 21 September 1967, National Archives of Canada file number RG 74 ACC1980-81/102, 
vol.41, File 11-19-10,11-13-28.
48 National Archives of Canada File no. RG74 ACC 1980-81/102, vol.41, File 11-13-28 part 1.
49 Beamish et al, October, 1968.
50 Terms o f Reference for Agriculture Feasibility Study Team-Tanzania, Canadian External Aid Office, 
National Archives of Canada file no. RG74 1980-81, vol.41, file no. 11-13-28, part 1.
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expanded production was limited by steep elevations or insufficient rainfall in some 
areas, and by the fact that these areas were already densely populated and intensively 
cultivated. The report suggested that a substantial increase in wheat production would 
be possible on small-holder farms using hand and oxen cultivation, but that this would 
require the conversion of land currently growing other crops (some of higher 
economic value than wheat), improved farming techniques, and the development of 
an efficient marketing system.51
Of the fertile Basotu area, the mission reported “great potential development is 
possible,”52 and this was the only site for which the consultants submitted a plan for 
development to CIDA. However, their enthusiasm for the proposed site was 
qualified. “Development of land for wheat in this area may be accomplished either by 
a series of large scale operations under central management, or a large number of 
individually operated farms with tractor power. Either form of development cannot 
be safely undertaken at this time with any assurance of continued productivity.”53
Despite the experts’ enthusiasm for the potential of the East African highlands 
to produce vast quantities of wheat, they did foresee other problems with the proposed 
scheme, whether it be located in the south or north of the country. Their reservations 
related to the economic feasibility of the project. It was noted that in a comparison of 
the capital investment requirements in the form of machinery and buildings (land was 
considered to be a free good), the sum spent thus far in establishing the state farm at 
Basotu indicated that the cost per cultivated acre was fifty-two dollars, versus thirty 
dollars per acre on a similarly sized farm in Alberta.54 It was further noted that a 
British supported wheat project inTJpifa in southern Tanzania had not proven cost 
effective, and that other agencies including the World Bank had produced negative 
feasibility studies concluding that attempting commercial wheat production in remote 
areas was impractical.55
51 Beamish et al: 41.
52 National Archives of Canada file no. RG74 1980-81, vol.41, file no.l 1-13-28, part 1.
53 Beamish et al: 31.
54 Beamish et al: 95-96.
55 IBRD Report no. AF-58a, Vol. Ill, Annex A, Tanzanian Agriculture.
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The main problem foreseen was the lack of transportation and storage 
facilities as well as other support services, the absence of which would make the 
production of wheat very costly. The feasibility study noted the importance of an 
effective marketing system as an incentive to expand production to meet the goal of 
food self-sufficiency. “Without an adequate means of marketing, such a goal cannot 
be attained and efforts directed toward increased production would be ineffective, and 
in some cases, entirely wasted.”56 With respect to transportation, the feasibility study 
stated that “Although it is physically possible to move wheat from many of the 
potential areas surveyed, the need for improved roads and better transport services is 
of prime importance.”57 It concluded that “Inadequate transportation and marketing 
facilities present restrictions to ultimate cost reductions to levels which would be 
competitive on the world market.”58
It was suggested that the construction of the southern railway line and a 
highway from Dar es Salaam to Zambia might alleviate this problem somewhat in the 
south, but the proposed site at Basotu was far from the railhead at Arusha, and from a 
proposed rail extension to Singida, still two days journey to the coast.
Among its final recommendations, the project feasibility study team advised 
the government of Tanzania to “develop plans to increase wheat production on 
suitable land in areas now serviced by transportation and marketing facilities,” plan to 
improve transportation services in producing areas, “reassess state farm developments 
for wheat production to make sure that they are not over-capitalized and that their 
function as demonstration centres for local wheat farm development is clearly 
defined,” and to “encourage effective wheat production on small farms to supply the 
local demand and develop experience in those areas which may become commercial 
producers when necessary infrastructure is provided.”59
It is significant that while the feasibility study extolled the potential of the 
Basotu area to grow wheat, it warned of potential local resistance to the scheme.
56 Beamish et al:82.
57 Ibid:91.
58 Ibid:4.
59 Beamish et al: 5-7.
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A large scale wheat development scheme in this area would, 
however, usurp range land presently being used for grazing and could 
cause overgrazing on the perimeter, as well as create a serious social 
problem. These consequences must be recognized by government 
authorities as some dissatisfaction has already been expressed by the 
local people, and attempts to impede development have been reported 
by the staff at the Basotu project. Some amicable understanding will 
have to be reached before an extensive farming development can be 
undertaken successfully.60
As described in detail below, the issue of land tenure in Hanang later became a 
messy problem for CIDA. According to a CIDA official, and in accordance with the 
feasibility study, the decision to establish the farms in Hanang rather than in the 
southern highlands was based on the fact that the southern highlands were more 
heavily populated and placing the wheat scheme there would have been more 
disruptive to established agricultural production.61 Although files indicate that the 
official Tanzanian request was to fund a project in the southern highlands, Freeman 
reports that “According to a CIDA official, Nyerere was sufficiently keen on CIDA 
continuing and expanding its assistance to Tanzanian wheat production that he
fOdeferred to CIDA over its recommendation of suitable sites.”
5.7 THE DECISION TO SUPPORT THE PROJECT: CANADIAN AID IN 
SUPPORT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION
At the time these negotiations were underway in 1967, Canada’s existing aid 
programme in Tanzania was quite modest. At Tanganyika’s independence in 1961, 
Canada’s foreign aid office was only in its second year of operation. In that year, 
Canada disbursed $27,000 is assistance to Tanzania to fund scholarships for 
Tanzanian secondary school teachers to study in Canada. Between 1961 and 1964, 
bilateral disbursements were relatively small, less than $500,000 in total, and 
consisted primarily of scholarships and the provision of Canadian teachers in
(s\Tanzania, a trend which continued up to the Arusha Declaration. In the mid-1960’s,
60 Beamish et al: 32.
61 Interview.
62 Freeman,1982:493,note 62.
63 Pratt,1976:166-67.
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Canada also became involved in hydro-electric power development and an aerial 
survey project.
The Arusha Declaration coincided with the beginning of a decade of rapid 
expansion in the Canadian aid programme. Between 1965 and 1978, Canadian 
assistance to Tanzania increased steadily, as did aid from other sources. In the decade 
of the 1970’s, when the decision was taken to expand the TCWP, ODA to Tanzania 
increased fouteenfold.64 Tanzania became Canada’s top recipient of aid in Africa and 
it occupied a similar position in many other donor programmes. However, Canadian 
aid has never comprised more than seven per cent of Tanzania’s total aid receipts, 
reaching its apogee between 1986 and 1989. Further, it is interesting to note that even 
when it held the status as CIDA’s largest programme in Africa, Tanzania never 
received more than two per cent of Canada’s total ODA budget.65 This is a 
manifestation of the widespread dispersal of Canadian ODA in over a hundred and 
thirty recipient countries.
Young reports that in September 1969, CIDA hired a consultant to review its 
aid programme in Tanzania.66 Tanzania had embarked on a strategy of reducing the 
role of the private sector in its economy through the nationalization of commercial 
enterprises and the establishment of state-owned agencies to oversee every sector of 
the economy. However, the consultant’s report recommended that Canadian aid 
“should be supportive of private sector activities in Tanzania and Canadian business 
interests there.”67 It noted the objectives of the Arusha Declaration, but argued that 
Canadian resources relevant to agriculture in Tanzania were limited. It recommended 
that aid financing be concentrated on infrastructure projects like road-building, hydro­
electric energy, and the railway. The consultant noted Tanzania’s historical ties to 
Europe and Canada’s poor record in establishing trade with Tanzania. He argued that
tying project and procurement financing offered the opportunity to increase Canada’s
68exports despite the non-competitive prices of some of its manufactured goods. As 
outlined in Chapter Three, Canadian regulations on tying aid were quite stringent at
64 Havenevik:123.
65 OEDC,1998.
66 Canada, CIDA, “Canadian Development Assistance Planning", September 1969, cited in Young:45.
67 Ibid.
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this time, and aid officials did not have much room to manouevre on this point in any 
case.
Contrary to the consultant’s advice, Canada agreed in 1969 to assist Tanzania 
in increasing domestic wheat production. A review of CIDA’s projects in Tanzania 
over the past forty years illustrates that the remainder of Canadian aid has been 
heavily concentrated on infrastructure development. All of CIDA’s major 
commitments in Tanzania were initiated in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s -  support 
the Tanzania Railway Corporation, hydro-electric power transmission, water utilities, 
and mechanized wheat production. These projects continued to absorb the bulk of 
Canadian aid to Tanzania over the next three decades. Decisions taken to support 
these projects in the early years of the aid programme committed CIDA to a certain 
path in Tanzania, as it became apparent that they would take decades rather than 
months to come to fruition, if ever. This must be borne in mind when considering the 
subsequent actions of Canadian aid officials in Hanang.
5.8 WHY MECHANIZED PRODUCTION
From the vantage point of thirty years on, with the evidence of an 
underutilized labour force so painfully evident in Tanzania, the decision to pursue 
extremely capital intensive mechanized farming methods to increase food production 
seems counter-intuitive. Dumont had counselled assisting individual farmers to 
increase productivity by introducing incremental improvements to basic hoe 
cultivation, for example animal traction. “If the whole African countryside were 
mechanized at once, the government’s would be completely without the foreign 
exchange to equip factories. Yet factories, safe under their roofs, operate year round, 
while tractors, particularly in the tropics, can often work only a few weeks a year.”69 
Nyerere’s own development philosophy espoused the use of appropriate technology. 
However, he differed with Dumont as to how agricultural production should be 
organized. During Dumont’s visit to Tanzania, Nyerere published Socialism and 
Rural Development outlining his opposition to private ownership of land and the
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid:58.
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development of agricultural capitalism in Tanzania, and advocating instead collective 
farming in Ujamaa villages and state-owned farms, and the cooperative marketing of
70produce. In addition, there was at that time, a trend towards the mechanization of 
agriculture throughout East Africa, part of a ‘transformation approach’ then in favour 
among development planners.
Canadian officials, when presented with the Tanzanian government’s three 
pronged proposal for expanding wheat production, immediately favoured providing 
assistance to the establishment of large mechanized farming operations. According to 
archived documents, this position was based on the opinion of Canadian experts that 
to meet estimated increased demand for wheat in Tanzania, domestic production 
would have to double in the following three years. In addition, Canadian officials saw 
opportunities for exporting Tanzanian wheat to neighbouring countries and argued 
that large-scale mechanized farming of the type practiced in Western Canada was the
n i
only means to increase production and exploit available markets. There is no 
explicit statement in the archived documents that this approach was favoured because 
it offered the greatest commercial advantage to Canada. There is a passing reference 
to the existence of a Massey Ferguson assembly plant in Dar es Salaam which could
77possibly act as a source of farm machinery. The aid office’s rationale for supporting 
the project was laid out in an internal departmental memo. It noted that the project 
had the strong political support of the Government of Tanzania and was within 
Canadian competence to provide assistance. It also argued that “there could be a 
reasonably quick return on our investment” and that involvement would allow Canada 
to ‘pioneer’ a large project with a clear Canadian identity right from the start. It was 
also noted that “although possible approaches have been suggested, officials are 
receptive to our ideas of implementation.”
The evidence presented above that Tanzanian officials were engaged in 
negotiations with the Canadian government over a multi-faceted wheat production
70 Nyerere, 1968.
71 External Aid Office memo,1967, National Archives of Canada file no. RG74 ACC 1980-81/102, 
voL41, file no. 11-13-28, part 1.
72 Beamish etal: 111.
73 Letter dated 23 August 1967, National Archives of Canada file no. RG74 ACC 1980-81/102, vol.41, 
file 11-13-28, Part 1.
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strategy including providing support to private farmers at the same time that President 
Nyerere published an essay denouncing private ownership, gives credence to Von 
Freyhold’s and Freeman’s interpretation of where the balance of power lies in the 
Tanzanian state, i.e. in the hands of local economic elites and with international 
donors and business interests rather than the political leadership. Increasing support 
to private farmers was on the table as an option, but the Canadian government 
recommended a large-scale mechanized operation, and this approach was acceptable 
to the Tanzanian government’s socialist philosophy because it would be owned by the 
state. Further, as Freeman argued, and as has been outlined in detail in Chapter 
Three, it is also a fact that in the late 1960’s and into the 1970’s when the TCWP was 
established, Canadian aid was almost entirely tied to the provision of Canadian goods 
and services. Canada did not produce many oxen, donkeys, handplows or hoes, and it 
is highly unlikely that Canadian assistance would have been available for a project of 
this kind at this time.74
Canadian officials reported that despite the problems anticipated by the 
feasibility mission and previous studies, the Tanzanian government was intent on 
proceeding with its plan. “This is not to say that they were unaware of the economic 
problems involved. It’s just that economics is not the prime consideration at this
nr
stage.” The response of one Canadian aid official to the Tanzanian position betrays 
a hint of the paternalistic approach to assistance for which donors have long been 
criticized, unfortunately ironic in light of the consequences of Canadian assistance.
...other agencies have already produced many negative reports on the 
economic feasibility of developing these lands, but...the Tanzanians 
are determined to open them up, and hence don’t want to be told 
anymore why it can’t be done. They want to know how to go about it. 
Canada’s experience in wheat is respected. If we do not tell them how 
to do it, they will likely go ahead and develop the lands anyway, 
probably making many mistakes.”76
74 It is interesting to note that in the mid 1980’s, after Canada had loosen its tied aid restrictions 
somewhat, CIDA did fund an animal traction project in Tanzania, the Mbeya Oxenization Project, 
CIDA project no. 902/12434.
75 National Archives of Canada file no. RG74 1980-81, vol.41, file no. 11-13-28, part 1.
76 Ibid.
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There was dissention among Canadian aid officials and expatriates working 
for the Tanzanian government on the question of whether Canada should go ahead 
and support an enterprise that seemed destined for failure. It is interesting to note that 
the key negotiator on the Tanzanian side was a Canadian expatriate, then serving as 
Assistant Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, and later, in the 1970’s 
when the project was expanded, as Canadian High Commissioner to Tanzania. In a 
letter to the Canadian consultant who had headed the first feasibility mission, a 
Canadian scientist working at the Njoro Plant Breeding Station in Kenya (who had 
also been consulted on the project) declared of his compatriots who favoured 
supporting the Tanzanian proj ect proposal:
If they are determined to plunge headlong into large scale projects 
almost certainly headed for disaster, then I think we should not provide 
direct help for such schemes [from the research station at Njoro]...We 
could only warn them against too rapid and unplanned expansion.77
In the end a cautious, tentative approach to the project prevailed, at least 
initially. In April 1969, CIDA HQ78 wrote to the Canadian High Commission in Dar 
es Salaam:
We do not wish to become directly involved in an operational wheat 
production scheme. We would not wish Canada to be blamed for any 
resulting failures, debacles or unsatisfactory yields which we feel could 
easily result from a hastily mounted wheat production program.79
The infamous Groundnut Scheme in Tanzania was evoked in support of a 
cautious and methodically planned approach to land development and crop production 
in new areas.80 A consultant hired by CIDA recommended that the Tanzanian 
government be warned against embarking on a wholesale rapid expansion of wheat 
production in the country on the grounds that all the major world producers of wheat 
were currently ‘bothered’ by wheat surpluses and therefore, due to the high costs of 
production in Tanzania, wheat produced for export might yield low or negative
77 Letter dated 25 March 1969, National Archives of Canada
78 The External Aid Office was reorganized and renamed the Canadian International Development 
Agency in 1969.
79 Telex CIDA HQ to CHC Dar 8 April 1969, National Archives of Canada File no. RG74 ACC 1980-
81/102, File no. 11-13-28, vol.2.
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81returns. A caution of a more self-interested nature was voiced by an External Aid 
Office official.
“Given the nature of the present international situation surrounding the sale of 
wheat as it affects Canada, we feel that this factor must be taken into account in the 
implementation of certain projects already operational and in the approval of certain 
future aspects.”82
On the basis of these considerations, Canada’s initial aid project in the wheat 
sector was on a smaller scale than the Tanzanian government had originally sought. 
Phase I of the TCWP, which ran from 1970 to 1975 concentrated on research 
assistance on seed varieties and cultivation practices at Basotu in Hanang, as detailed 
in Section 5.1.
5.9 THE DECISION TO EXPAND THE TCWP IN 1976
As recorded in Figure 5.3, early production figures at Hanang were not 
encouraging. After an initial success in the first year of operation in 1967, yields 
were consistently well below average or expected rates over the next decade.
Figure 5.3
WHEAT PRODUCTION AT THE HANANG WHEAT COMPLEX 1967 -1998
crop year seeded area (ha) production (tonnes) yield
1967-68 121 237 1.96
1968-69 2,226 289 0.13
1969-70 3,326 2,960 0.89
1970-71 3,035 1,821 0.61
1971-72 3,628 3,869 1.06
1972-73 2,717 1,255 0.46
1973-74 3,298 666 0.20
1974-75 810 408 0.50
1975-76 2,894 3,943 1.36
1976-77 6,529 9,391 1.43
80 Wood, 1948.
81 National Archives o f Canada File no. RG74 ACC 1980-81/102, File no. 11-13-28, vol.2.
82 Ibid
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1977-78 8,834 11,153 1.26
1978-79 9,522 18,663 1.96
1979-80 10,648 18,168 1.72
1980-81 16,400 25,256 1.54
1981-82 17,904 26,319 1.47
1982-83 21,502 22,577 1.05
1983-84 22,639 38,033 1.68
1984-85 24,276 46,852 1.93
1985-86 n/a n/a n/a
1986-87 n/a n/a n/a
1987-88 n/a n/a n/a
1988-89 25,689 50,350 1.96
1989-90 26,158 37,929 1.45
1990-91 25,578 43,322 1.63
1991-92 25,890 44,530 1.72
1992-93 26,090 33,395 1.28
1993-94 26,190 28,533 1.09
1994-95 26,390 23,145 0.88
1995-96 26,340 41,263 1.57
1996-97 26,390 27,922 1.06
1997-98 21,721 11,411 0.53
Source: statistics fo r 1967-1985from Prairie Horizons,1986:6; figures fo r  1988-1998from NAFCO 
Hanang Wheat Complex.
At this point, the Tanzanian government considered abandoning the scheme, 
but the application of new cultivation techniques developed by scientists at the 
Canadian-funded Selian Agricultural Research Institute managed to improve farm 
yields to levels comparable to North America. As a result, it was decided to extend 
and expand the project.
The Tanzanian government had other reasons for continuing with the project. 
Since 1968, Tanzanian agricultural production had been in decline. In 1973/74, in the 
throes of a drought, Tanzania was forced to import the bulk of its foodstuffs, 
including seventy per cent of its maize requirements, and forty-eight per cent of its 
wheat, in contrast to no imports of wheat in the previous year. In the following year, 
it imported ninety per cent of its maize, and eighty per cent of its wheat. The 
droughts of 1973 and 1974 coincided with a fourfold increase in imported wheat
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• 83pnces. In 1975, for the first time in its history, Tanzania received emergency grain 
aid shipments from Canada, among other sources.84
The fall in agricultural production in this period can in part be attributed to 
drought. In addition, oil shocks resulted in an eightfold increase in imported oil prices
O f
throughout the ‘70’s , and the 1976 war with Uganda absorbed huge amounts of 
foreign exchange, and combined with falling world prices for Tanzanian exports, 
reduced the sum available to purchase fuel and spare parts for agricultural machinery. 
However, there is a general consensus among commentators that it was primarily the 
result of neglect of the agricultural sector coupled with misguided policy interventions 
on the part of the government, aided and abetted by donor agencies.86 Despite 
Nyerere’s adamant statements in the 1960’s that agriculture had to be the engine for 
development, figures provided by Boesen and Havnevik show that in the 1970’s, 
investment in agriculture was only around ten percent of government expenditure 
versus thirty-five to forty per cent allocated to the manufacturing sector.87 Despite 
this higher level of investment, the Basis Industrial Strategy introduced in 1974 failed 
to spark industrial development. This sector absorbed a lot of foreign exchange, but 
because it was based on import substitution, it did not bring much in. Meanwhile, the 
mass villagization of the rural population which accelerated after 1973, was causing 
major disruption in agricultural production. Declining food production was further 
exacerbated by the government’s unfavourable pricing policies for agricultural 
producers. Prices were well below open market. Peasants responded by retreating 
into subsistence agriculture. Faced with declining agricultural production and an 
uncooperative peasantry, high import prices for foodstuffs and rapidly depleting 
foreign exchange reserves, Tanzania was eager to find a way to rapidly increase food 
production. The expansion of the Hanang wheat farms offered an option to do so.
83 Young: 18.
84 Migot-Adholla:172.
85 Young: 13. It should be noted that statistics on agricultural production do not fully capture 
subsistence production or crops traded in the informal economy, a growing practice in this period.
86 See Lofchie; Coulson; Migot-Adholla; Ndulu and Mwega; Bagachwa; Barkan ct al; Boesen et al; 
Campbell and Stein; Havnevik; Sobhan; Raikes.
87 Havnevik:35-38; Boesen:66-67.
88 Hyden; Von Freyhold.
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Canada had reasons of its own for supporting the extension and expansion of 
the wheat project. The volume of machinery, agricultural inputs and technical 
assistance required for a fivefold expansion of the wheat scheme would provide an 
outlet for aid dollars in a period of rapid growth in the Canadian aid programme. 
While Freeman has stressed the benefit to Canada in aiding an ailing Canadian farm
O Q
machinery industry through this project, DFAIT files indicate that Canada expressed 
a willingness at this time to consider supporting other approaches to producing more 
wheat in Tanzania. In 1977 Canadian officials met with President Nyerere to discuss 
the project.
We noted that we did not wish to appear to be ‘pushing’ large- 
scale mechanized production (i.e. production as practiced in Canada) 
and were quite prepared to look at other alternatives should Tanzania 
identify these possibilities. The President noted that the peasants were 
not particularly oriented toward wheat-growing and that the NAFCO 
approach was preferred in Tanzania.90
As noted in Section 5.1, CIDA commissioned a wheat sector analysis in 1977 
to outline alternative strategies for increasing wheat production. The study did not 
outline any alternatives to continued support to mechanized production in Hanang, 
and CIDA did not investigate further. It appears that given the President’s stated 
preferences, the lack of ready alternatives, and restrictions placed on the content of 
Canadian assistance by its rigid tied procurement policy, despite prior doubts as to the 
economic viability of the venture, Canada agreed to the Tanzanian request for 
continued assistance to and expansion of the established project in Hanang. As 
outlined in the summary of the project above, Phase II of the project provided $43.9 
million for technical assistance, machinery and other inputs, in addition to the $9.3 
million which had been disbursed through other projects following Phase I and before 
the implementation of Phase II in 1979 (listed in Appendix II).
As noted in Figure 5.3, crop yields at the Hanang wheat farms improved 
substantially in Phase II of the project. However, other problems soon became 
apparent at the farms as five new farms were established at Hanang, and an additional
50,000 acres were brought into production. These related primarily to the economic
89 Freeman, 1982.
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viability of the farms, and an increasingly intense dispute over the land on which the 
farms were built.
5.10 THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF THE HANANG WHEAT FARMS
In 1985, a report by a CIDA analyst on Phases I and II of the TCWP 
confirmed the reservations of the initial project feasibility mission as to the 
commercial viability of the project. The 1985 report concluded that “although the 
farms show a favourable profit and loss result, they are not commercially viable, the 
major problem being their remote location and the ‘crushing cost’ of transporting the 
wheat from Hanang to Arusha.”91 In 1986, CIDA hired an independent consulting 
firm to conduct a cost/benefit analysis of project operations between 1968-85.92 In 
light of subsequent events, it is worth noting that one member of the research team 
was later a regional coordinator for the NGO CUSO in Canada. Again, the 
consultants concluded that when subjected to a strict financial analysis which 
assumed that cost-free access to foreign exchange, Canadian grants, spare parts and 
good weather was assured, the farms could be deemed to have been a profitable 
investment. However, without access to the foreign exchange necessary to buy the 
machinery and other inputs (purchased in Canada by CIDA procurement officers), 
and the fuel (purchased in Tanzania) required for mechanized cultivation, and without 
the subsidies provided to the farms in the form of grant aid from Canada, a guaranteed 
price and market from the NMC, and rebates on fuel and transportation costs from the 
Tanzanian government, the farms would operate at a loss. If all investments had been 
made on commercial terms, the farms would not have been economically viable.
Since the project’s inception, its major capital costs had been met by ODA 
grants from Canada. Since 1976, the farms had been fully reimbursed from the state- 
owned National Milling Corporation for transportation and gunny bag costs. The 
1986 study concluded that based on calculations which assumed that half the costs of 
research and crop trials would be bome by the farms, and all of the infrastructure and
90 DFAIT File no. 42-10-2, Vol.l (Transportation -  Railways -  Policies and Plans).
91 From Termination Report CIDA Project No. 00805-10829.
92 Prairie Horizons Ltd., “Final Report o f  the Benefit/Cost Team on the Tanzania Wheat Projecf’ 
submitted to CIDA, November 1986.
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administration expenses (including farm machinery, inputs and salaries, storage 
facilities, and on-site road and water works), the Investment Rate of Return (IRR) of 
the project would be 2.4 %, which was less that the 3% real discount rate. The Net 
Present Value (NPV) of the Hanang Farms would be (-)50 million Tsh, and the 
Benefit/Cost Ratio would be calculated at 0.99. If the costs of transporting Hanang 
wheat to Arusha were included, the IRR would be (-)25%, the farms would have an 
NPV of over (-)1.5 billion Tsh, and a benefit/cost ratio of 0.82.93
The consultants concluded that the costs of production were far too high for 
the venture to be commercially viable, with transportation (as anticipated by the 
feasibility study of 1968) the major problem. Getting the wheat to Arusha (which was 
still a day away from consumers in Dar es Salaam) accounted for close to fifty per 
cent of the costs of production.94 The report noted that Tanzania could import 
Canadian wheat for less than it cost to grow its own. Further, they questioned the 
wisdom of trying to grow wheat for the Tanzanian market in the first place, 
suggesting that other food crops might offer more bang for the buck in nutritional 
terms. The report concluded that “From a technical standpoint the project and the aid 
have to [be] considered extremely successful. On the other hand, judged against 
economic criteria, the Project appeared to be very expensive for Tanzania in terms of 
resources used up and foregone economic opportunities.”95
The report recommended that if Canadian assistance were to be extended for a 
third phase of the project, it should aim to phase out the production of wheat at 
Hanang and to investigate alternative crops and methods of cultivation. This 
recommendation was echoed in an evaluation of the research aspect of the project 
conducted in 1988.96 Interestingly, this report was prepared by a consultant who had 
been involved in the design of the original project in 1969. In 1988, he advised CIDA 
that if the project were to continue, the emphasis should be on the development of 
cultivation practices using animal traction and other intermediate technologies which 
were not so dependent on foreign exchange or on the availability of spare parts. He
93 Prairie Horizons:70.
94 Prairie Horizons:60.
95 Ibid, pg viii.
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also recommended that research on crop diversification be pursued. He was of the 
‘emphatic opinion’ that there was an urgent need to change the focus of the project 
from large scale farming to the problems faced by small and medium sized farmers.
He suggested the possibility of dividing the Hanang Wheat Complex into between 
seventy and seven hundred smaller farms to be operated under private ownership.97
In 1989, CIDA funded another study which compared the relative merits of 
large-scale mechanized wheat production in Hanang with small-holder production as
QO
practiced in Mbeya District in southern Tanzania. The study compared the two 
modes of production in terms of the costs of production; foreign exchange 
requirements; infrastructure requirements including transportation; yields; impact on 
employment; and on local and national income. Using a cost benefit analysis which 
took into consideration the subsidies with which the Hanang farms operated, the 
researcher found that
Results of the analysis show small-holder wheat production to be more 
financially and economically profitable in producing wheat for either 
the inland or coastal market compared to large-scale mechanized 
production based on 1987-88 conditions.99
Addressing the question of what was the most efficient source of wheat overall 
for both the coastal and inland markets, the researcher concluded:
While small-holder wheat production can serve either market at less 
real resource cost than imports, it makes more economic sense for 
Tanzania to import wheat directly for the coastal market rather than 
attempting to use large-scale mechanized technology for serving this 
market.10
The financial ailments of the Hanang farms were exacerbated by the 
government controlled pricing and marketing of wheat. Frank notes that in the 1980’s 
the price paid to wheat producers by the government (the only authorized buyer) was
96 C.F. Bentley, “An evaluation of the research component of the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Program 
Phase II 1979-1987” submitted to CIDA 30 March 1988.
. 97 Ibid.
98 Frank, 1989.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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more than three times lower the going rate on the open market.101 However, these 
were not the only problems confronting CIDA in Phase II of the project.
5.11 THE CONFLICT OVER LAND RIGHTS IN HANANG
The dispute over land rights in Hanang began in earnest with the fivefold 
expansion of the wheat farms in 1976. The root of the conflict was the acquisition of 
the land on which the wheat farms were built by NAFCO. Under Tanzanian law, all 
land is considered public although individuals and corporations can obtain rights of 
usage for periods up to ninety-nine years either by presidential approval or on the 
basis of ‘customary use.’ NAFCO applied for and received from the government 
permission to occupy an additional fifty thousand acres in Hanang. This land is 
extremely fertile and the area sparsely populated. However, the land is also a 
traditional grazing area for Barabaig cattle herders and the establishment of the farms 
upset their seasonal migration patterns and deprived them of access to grazing areas
107and water. The atmosphere in Hanang was tense in 1980’s. There were incidents 
of rape, brutal beatings, confiscation of livestock found on farm land and the 
destruction of Barabaig property by NAFCO employees.103 Workers seeded the fields 
under armed escort. Local people planted maize in the tilled land, and the tractors 
came along behind planting wheat.104 With the assistance of the Canadian NGO 
CUSO and the legal aid services of the University of Dar es Salaam, in the mid- 
1980’s the Barabaig brought land claims for four of the farms before the courts, 
arguing their customary right to the land. The first of these claims, for Mulbadow 
Farm, was initially decided in their favour in 1985, but later overturned by the Court 
of Appeal. According to CIDA files, following the Barabaig win in 1985, President 
Nyerere assured NAFCO that the farm would be returned to it.105 In 1999, some 
matters were still before the courts, but the 1993 Kisanga Commission chaired by the
101 Frank:28.
102 Lane, 1996. Total compensation paid to those occupants/users evicted from the land to make way 
for the farms in the mid ‘70’s was $27,426 (among a population of 33,000 Barabaig). Source: CIDA 
File no. 902/11-835-63.
103 Kisanga Commission Report, 1993; Lane, 1996.
104 Interview with NAFCO official, June 1999.
105 CIDA File no. H902/18705-61 Hanang Participatory Development-Human Rights and Land Claims, 
Vol.l
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Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal had recommended that farm ownership be 
retained by NAFCO.
The violence on the farms created an ugly problem for CIDA. Despite the 
recommendation in the initial project feasibility report in 1968 to address the 
ramifications of existing land tenure before embarking on the project, Canadian aid 
officials failed to consider potential confrontation over this issue in Hanang. Twenty 
years later, they were wringing their hands over how to deal with the matter as reports 
of events on the farms reached the international press. CUSO launched a public 
information campaign in Canada and representatives of the Canadian and 
international media became frequent visitors to the farms. At first critical of the tied 
aid aspect of the project, they now focused on the human rights angle.
CIDA pursued the matter by pressuring the Tanzanian government to take 
action. In 1987 a CIDA representative met with the Tanzanian High Commissioner in 
Ottawa to discuss the matter. The High Commissioner expressed the view of the 
Government of Tanzania that the matter was “a Canadian problem” and that the 
“Barabaig issue was being promoted in part by outsiders.”106 The government finally 
agreed to set up a Commission to review charges of human rights abuses on the farms 
in 1993. In the mean time, CIDA attempted to counter charges that the wheat farms 
had had a detrimental impact on local residents by channeling Canada Fund aid to the 
District to build classrooms, dispensaries, water wells and other small community 
oriented projects. It also began in 1989 to plan for a larger community development 
project in Hanang, discussed in the next chapter.
5.12 THE KISANGA COMMISSION
Under Canadian pressure, in December 1992, the Tanzanian government 
established the Commission on Violations of Human Rights in the NAFCO Wheat 
Farms, Hanang District under the chairmanship of Justice Robert Kisanga of the 
Tanzanian Court of Appeal. The commission delivered its final report in February
106 CIDA File no. H902/18705-61 HPD-Human Rights and Land Claims, Vol.l.
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1993 (just days before Canadian aid to the wheat farms was finally terminated).107 Its 
findings are discussed here as they relate to events which occurred on the wheat farms 
during the expansion of the project in the late 1970’s and early ‘80’s, and both prior to 
and following the extension of Canadian aid to the project into a third phase in 1987.
The Kisanga Commission was mandated to investigate charges of human 
rights abuses perpetrated by NAFCO farm employees against local residents, 
primarily Barabaig pastoralists. It heard testimony from individual residents of 
Hanang as well as from NAFCO management in Hanang and Dar es Salaam, local 
government officials in Arusha and Hanang, CUSO cooperants posted in the area, 
human rights organizations, CIDA officials, and from an Australian 
anthropologist/activist working in the area. The basis of the Barabaig grievance 
against NAFCO as laid before the Commission was that the wheat farms had been 
established on their land without their consent or participation, and as a result, they 
had lost their grazing areas and access to water, and their sacred sites had been 
defiled. NAFCO had then illegally expanded its government approved acreage of
70,000 acres to 100,000 acres with large tracts cultivated as private shambas by 
NAFCO employees. A Barabaig land claim against NAFCO was before the courts at 
the time of the Kisanga inquiry, with legal aid funded by CUSO. Residents also 
claimed that the wheat farms had caused the pollution of local water sources by the 
aerial spraying of chemicals, and that farm cultivation techniques had caused serious 
soil erosion. In addition, the Commission reviewed numerous charges of rape and 
brutal beatings, the destruction of homes, forced removal, impounded cattle, and 
denied access to water. It was also alleged that the Barabaig had been subject to 
‘unjustifiable or repressive charges and sentences’ for committing relatively minor 
crimes, for example, picking up the remains of wheat left in the fields after the 
harvest. There were many instances of trespass and theft of wheat which had resulted 
in stiff sentences.108
107 Hon. Mr. Justice Kisanga, 15 February, 1993.
108 For example, five women had been jailed for a mandatory five years each on the charge of theft over 
5000 TZ shillings from a public corporation (approximately $10) in accordance with the Minimum 
Sentence Act of 1972. The women were subsequently released under Presidential Amnesty in 1993.
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NAFCO admitted that some Bung’eda (sacred sites) had accidentally been 
destroyed and that several employees had set up personal shambas on NAFCO farm 
land without authorization. However, the position taken by NAFCO farm 
management was that most of the allegations made were fabrications. It claimed that 
the impounding of cattle found on farm land and imposition of fines for trespassing 
had ceased in 1985. The parastatal officials stated that they had followed legal 
procedures in acquiring the land on which the farms were built, and that the problem 
in their view was that the District administration had not made arrangements to 
resettle the Barabaig. For its part, the District Council admitted that some people had 
not been compensated for the loss of their land, but argued that this was because they 
were not around when the valuation was done.
The Commission determined that of the ninety-nine cases of alleged human 
rights abuse brought before it, forty-five involved actions taken by NAFCO 
employees against local residents. Reviewing these, the Commission concluded 
there was “no evidence of any repressive charges brought by NAFCO employees 
against any Barabaig.”109 In its view, there had been offences of trespass and theft 
committed, and the sentences imposed by the courts had been in accordance with 
Tanzanian law. However, the Commission did find instances in which residents had 
been subject to double prosecution -  fined both by NAFCO farm management and 
again by the District court. The Commission concluded that the horrific accounts of 
rape, assault and destruction of property by NAFCO employees were true in most 
cases. It also determined that some NAFCO employees were involved in private large 
scale farming on state land, and that the Barabaig were being denied fair access to 
water sources. The Commission stated that these illegal acts had been committed by 
several individuals employed by NAFCO, and were not in accordance with either 
Government of Tanzania or NAFCO policy. The Commission took pains to make 
clear its position that “Despite the many criticisms levelled against NAFCO farm 
employees, NAFCO farms have brought advantages to the nation and the inhabitants 
of the areas around those farms.”110 The Commission made a long list of 
recommendations to the government to resolve the conflict in Hanang and address
109 Ibid.
1,0 Kisanga, 1993:44.
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local grievances.111 As a result of the Commission’s findings, several NAFCO 
employees were transferred out of Hanang, as was the District Security officer.
5.13 THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE PROJECT INTO PHASE III:
Although it was not until 1993 that these issues were given a public airing, 
CIDA officials were not unaware of local grievances against NAFCO, allegations of 
corruption made against farm management, and the sometimes violent confrontations 
between NAFCO employees and local residents. Given the considerable problems the 
wheat project was experiencing throughout the 1970’s and ‘80’s, and the expressed 
opinion of several experts that the farms were operating at a financial loss and would 
never be self-sustaining, the decision made by CIDA in 1987 to invest an additional 
$27 million in the project and to extend its involvement into a third phase does not 
appear to make sense. In searching for an explanation for this course of action, it is 
useful to consider the wheat project in the broader context of Canada’s other aid 
commitments in the country, and the growing economic crisis in Tanzania in this 
period.
All of the consultants’ reports cited above identified a shortage of foreign 
exchange to buy spare parts as a major constraint on the success of the project. This 
problem had become apparent to CIDA officials in the late 1970’s and was in fact a 
difficulty CIDA was encountering with several of its projects in Tanzania and 
elsewhere at the time. Since the initiation of the aid programme, Canadian aid has 
been concentrated in capital-intensive infrastructure development (power 
transmission, water plants, rail as well as mechanized agriculture) of which the supply 
of Canadian manufactured equipment and technical expertise comprised the bulk, 
Canadian aid being heavily tied. As Tanzania’s financial crisis became acute in the 
late 1970’s, much of the Canadian equipment supplied to Tanzania through the aid 
programme was rapidly becoming inoperative. This was seen by Canadian officials 
as doubly bad. Not only was production falling and the economic situation 
worsening, but idle, broken down machinery and failing projects were seen to reflect
111 URT, Kisanga Commission, 1993.
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poorly on Canada’s commercial reputation and aid programme performance.112 By 
the early 1980’s CIDA officials had developed a certain appreciation of the 
shortcomings of the highly tied, capital-intensive project focus of the Tanzanian 
programme. There was a recognition that much of the relatively high tech equipment 
“appeared to have been inappropriately Chosen in the initial transfers...The lesson here 
is the need for the provision, under aid projects, of simpler and more ‘appropriate’ 
technologies.”113 However, it was also felt that “Past tied aid projects conferred a 
moral commitment to provide after sales service.”114 Canadian aid officials faced a 
dilemma.
Pragmatically, it was accepted that development aid represents a long­
term commitment. If five years was inadequate for absorption of much 
donor supplied capital infrastructure and equipment, Canada could 
either commit itself for an unknown period of gradual learning and 
absorption, helping to salvage past aid projects...or it could write off 
years of effort and millions of dollars of investment as a sunk cost, and 
use the resources for a new direction. Rightly or wrongly, Canada 
chose to stand by its past projects.115
This choice sheds some light on the otherwise baffling decision by CIDA to 
extend the project into a third phase in 1987. In 1980, CIDA opened a $13.1 million 
line of credit for spare parts for six parastatal enterprises in Tanzania which had 
received Canadian aid in the past, of which the Hanang Wheat Complex was one. 
Thus, by the time the various evaluations of the Wheat Project were made in the mid 
to late 1980’s concluding that the project was not an effective use of aid funds and 
recommending that CIDA shift its assistance elsewhere, the decision as to the 
direction the aid programme in Tanzania should take had already been made. An 
attempt was made to incorporate some of the consultants’ recommendations into the 
programme, as evidenced by a rural development project initiated in Mbeya in the 
mid 1980’s, and research into crop diversification which formed part of Phase III of 
the Wheat Project approved in 1989. However, at the wheat farms, a huge Canadian
112 CIDA Project Termination Report, Tanzania-Spare Parts Line of Credit, CIDA Project no. 
902/10825. See also CIDA Project Termination Report no. 902/00127, the Siha Semi-automatic 
Bakery in Dar es Salaam (1970-1978); c.f. Coulson, 1980; Young, 1983.
1,3 Ibid.
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investment had yet to be brought to fruition, and over the next several years, CIDA 
pumped millions more into the project. The decision made in 1968 to pursue large- 
scale mechanization to increase wheat production set in motion a chain of events 
which, short of walking away from the project, CIDA found difficult to redirect. 
Echoing those which preceded it, the final CIDA funded evaluation of the project in 
1992 concluded that the farms were not generating sufficient profit even to replace 
worn out machinery. This posed a major problem for the future of the farms as two 
thirds of the major equipment was ten or more years old, and less than half of it was 
then in good condition.116 Respectable crop yields were recorded up to 1991/92, but 
the project’s other problems continued unabated. Canadian assistance to the Hanang 
Wheat farms came to an abrupt end with the cancellation of all Canadian bilateral aid 
to Tanzania in 1993, as discussed in Chapter Four.
5.14 THE LONG TERM IMPACT OF THE WHEAT PROJECT
The official CIDA position on the wheat project is that it was a success. At 
the time of Canadian withdrawal in 1993, the Hanang farms were producing fifty to 
sixty percent of Tanzania’s annual wheat requirements. As a result, Tanzania had 
become one of the few countries in Africa which do not regularly rely on food aid. In 
1993, CIDA estimated that this boost in domestic production had saved Tanzania
117about $140 million in import costs over twenty years. It was claimed that 
subtracting the approximately $87 million Canadian investment in the project from 
this amount still results in a positive net return.
CIDA has also argued that the Hanang Wheat Complex has further benefited 
government coffers by paying corporate taxes, $4 million in 1992, for example. 
According to a CIDA official speaking in 1993, “The farms represent one of the few 
parastatals that are not a drain on but a contribution to the Government of Tanzania’s 
budget.”118 It has also been noted that one hundred and twenty-one Tanzanians have
116 Deloitte and Touche,1992. CIDA File no. H902/18705-64 Hanang Participatory Development- 
Kisanga Commission, Vol.l.
117 CIDA document containing these figures notes that they are expressed in nominal terms, and that in 
current dollars, the figure would be much higher. Fax from Dar post to CIDA HQ, 14 April 1993, 
CIDA file no. H902/18705-01, vol.l.
118 Ibid.
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received training in wheat farming, and that an agricultural research facility has been 
established in northern Tanzania.
CIDA has also argued that contrary to popular press opinion, the farms have
benefited the inhabitants of the District of Hanang. The farms currently provide
employment for approximately four hundred people, though at the time this research
was conducted, many of them had not been paid for some months. When it ran
electrical power lines out to the Wheat Complex in the early years, the Canadian
government paid for the electrification of several villages en route and of the nearest
hospital, which is located thirty-five kilometres northwest in Mbulu District. The
wheat project also incorporated the improvement of roads to the farms, and the
establishment of a reliable water supply for the farms and nearby residents. Schools
and dispensaries were established on the farms and are open to local residents.119 In
addition, the Wheat Farms are required to pay an annual cess to the District Council
of two shillings per kilo of wheat sold. This money is meant to support community
development activities.120 CIDA’s Annual Review of 1980-81 referred to the Wheat
Project as “CIDA’s most spectacular project in Commonwealth Africa” and stated
“On a plateau in Tanzania, where the weather is remarkably like that of a
1 1Saskatchewan summer, Tanzanians thank God -  and Canadians.”
There have been many voices to the contrary, however, among local residents, 
academics, and the international media. As reviewed above, several studies of the 
project conducted by independent consultants have concluded that while the project 
has been very successful in adapting wheat varieties to Tanzanian conditions and in 
improving crop yields, the Hanang farms have never been economically viable and 
have not proved the most effective way to supply the domestic market.
The calculated savings on wheat imports cited above does not include the sum 
of Tanzanian investment. It also assumes that the same quantity of wheat would have 
been imported at official exchange rates, rather than some more economical foodstuff; 
and that the shortfall could not have been met by domestically produced maize, for
1,9 Ibid.
120 Interview.
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example. Bearing in mind the findings of the several evaluations cited above, this 
assessment does not consider the considerable opportunity costs attached to the 
project, and the likelihood that the $87,088,270 CIDA has invested in the TCWP 
could have been invested in a more economically productive enterprise.
The project has also been severely criticized for not taking due consideration 
of the socio-economic impact of the farms on the residents of Hanang, or their impact 
on the natural environment. A spokesperson for a local community group interviewed 
by the Canadian press at the time the project was cancelled in 1993 cited evidence of 
the social upheaval caused by the project and declared “All these will be permanent 
reminiscence of CIDA involvement in wheat growing on the Barabaig plains, just like
199the memory of the USA atom bombing in Hiroshima.” The project has proven a 
chronic source of embarrassment for CIDA, and a CIDA official interviewed at the 
same time stated “With hindsight, if I had had that decision to make back in 1972,1 
would not have touched it with a ten foot pole.”123 Despite CIDA’s official 
insistence that the TCWP was a success, there is at least an unofficial recognition that 
this was not the case.
Seven years after the termination of Canadian assistance to the Hanang Wheat 
Project, it is possible to draw some conclusions as to the sagacity of CIDA’s decision 
to stay the course rather than cut their losses and try a new approach in 1968,1976 or 
1987, and of the long term impact of Canada’s investment in Tanzania’s agricultural 
sector through the wheat farms. Annual production and sales figures at the farms 
have fluctuated over the years, but have fallen off sharply since 1993, the year 
Canadian involvement came to an end, as can be seen in Figure 5.3. In 1999, the 
farms were in dire straits, with yields at their lowest since the experimental stage of 
the project. Large tracts of the farms have lain fallow for two to three years and 
Barabaig herders graze their cattle quite freely where once they would have been 
arrested or attacked for doing so. Without Canadian aid money and suffering from 
managerial problems, the farms are cash poor; some of the seven farms are currently 
unable to pay their workers or to buy the necessary inputs to seed and harvest all of
121 CIDA Annual Review 1980/81:20.
122 Quoted in Walsh, 1993.
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their fields. Farm management attributes this situation to a combination of factors. 
Drought and the climatic upheaval caused by el nino have had a devastating impact on 
agriculture throughout Tanzania in recent years, accounting at least in part for the 
drop in production. Farm officials also suggested that the burden of maintaining 
Canadian supplied equipment has proven too much. It is claimed that the farms are 
overstocked with machinery bought from Canada under the aid project. Farm capital 
is locked up in this equipment whether or not it is used and there is a steady 
depreciation of farm assets. Financing and obtaining spares from Canada is a chronic 
problem, more acute since the withdrawal of Canadian funding and technical
124assistance.
Selling Hanang wheat has also proved problematic. For years, Canada 
pressured the government of Tanzania to remove the restrictions on the sale of wheat 
requiring all producers to sell only to the National Milling Corporation and at a set 
price which did not accurately reflect supply, demand or the costs of production. In 
1990, Tanzania lifted this restriction and trade in wheat was liberalized. However, the 
result for the Hanang Wheat Farms was not what had been hoped for and the sale of 
Hanang wheat has fallen off in the new free market environment where cheaper 
imports undercut Hanang prices. In 1994 it was reported that imported wheat from 
France and Belgium was selling in Tanzania at $120 US a tonne as compared with 
$215 US a tonne for Hanang wheat.126 Sales figures are not openly available, but 
CIDA reported that in 1990 the Hanang farms harvested 38,263 tonnes of wheat of 
which it sold 17,000 tonnes. A similar situation prevailed in 1996. 127 A 1992 
organizational audit concluded once again that the complex “is not currently 
economically viable” and recommended that the farms be consolidated and sold.128 In 
1996 Tanzania’s Parastatal Reform Commission added the Hanang wheat farms to its 
list of public corporations to be privatized and the farms were put up for sale. As of
123 Quoted in Dave Todd, April 13, 1993.
124 An example given by Hanang Wheat Complex official was the fact that two of the seven farms were 
stocked with eight Versatile tractors each. The other five had three tractors each and find this adequate 
to do required work.
125 Sales figures not available. Statements based on interview with NAFCO official.
126 CIDA File no. H902/18705-63, Vol.2, Hanang Participatory Development: Briefing Memoranda
127 CIDA Project Termination Report 902/11835 -  Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project Phase III; 
interviews.
128 CIDA Project Termination Report 902/11835 -  Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project Phase III.
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1999, a buyer had yet to be found. Staff morale in this environment of uncertainty is 
low.
5.15 CONCLUSIONS
The primary accomplishment of the Tanzania-Canada wheat project has been 
the successful adaptation of wheat varieties for production in a tropical climate. 
However, with respect to the long-term benefit of this work to Tanzania, the TCWP 
was worse than a waste of money. It is true that the Hanang Wheat Complex has 
made a positive contribution to the Tanzanian economy by supplying large quantities 
of food over the past thirty years. However, all of the evaluations cited above 
concluded that this production was highly subsidized, and that the country’s food 
requirements could have been met more cheaply by other means. The location of the 
scheme in Hanang dismpted an established pastoralist economy, causing social 
upheaval and land degradation; costs not offset by the meager economic returns of the 
project. Indeed, both the land and the aid money could have been used more 
productively for other purposes. It must be concluded that the farms have proved a 
bad investment of Canadian and Tanzanian resources and one which has not fared 
well since the withdrawal of CIDA funding. Looking across acres of fallow fields in 
1999, it is difficult to see much evidence of the $87 million CIDA invested there. 
Unfortunately, the most lasting legacy of the TCWP seems to be the conflict it created 
between residents and the government of Tanzania over the land itself. It is this 
conflict which prompted CIDA to fund another project in Hanang in the late 1990’s, 
this time a community development project targeting local residents. This project is 
the subject of the next chapter.
The failure of the TCWP is not a great revelation. Africa is littered with grand 
modernization projects which met the same fate. What is of particular interest here is 
what this case reveals about the way aid policy is made and the aid agency’s capacity 
to learn from experience. The most significant finding is that Canadian aid officials 
were able to disregard expert opinions as to the unfeasibility of the project, both 
before it was implemented, and after several negative evaluations made in the 1980’s. 
Again, this points to a weakness in the oversight mechanisms governing the aid
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programme. Canadian political and economic interests abroad were permitted to 
over-ride expert advice and direct evidence of policy failure. It seems clear that the 
decision to fund the project in the first instance was made for political reasons: to 
promote good will between Canada and Tanzania, and to establish a Canadian 
presence in Africa.
As set out in Chapter One, it is also frequently contended that Canadian aid 
and foreign aid in general is used primarily by donor countries to advance their own 
commercial interests abroad. The evidence presented in this thesis thus far (on policy 
decisions re: untying aid, the decentralization of aid administration, and the 1993 aid 
budget cuts) largely supports this view. Certain aspects of the critique of the wheat 
project from this perspective appear to be overdrawn. For example, Freeman’s claim 
that the aid programme has served as a ‘vehicle for capital accumulation’ in Canada. 
The statistics presented in Chapter Three show that in financial terms, the benefit of 
tied aid to the Canadian economy has in fact been almost imperceptible. However, 
we have shown that those who do benefit from aid contracts do appear to have a 
disproportionate voice in determining aid policy and do enjoy preferential access to 
decision-makers.
The history of the TCWP and the HPDF as outlined below demonstrate that 
both were conceived within limits set by Canada’s economic and political interests. 
These parameters are set at a more preliminary stage in the aid process, in the policy­
making and programming stages. There is no evidence in the archived project files 
and related memoranda that the wheat project was a deliberate attempt to promote 
Canadian commercial interests in Tanzania. In fact, there is evidence that CIDA 
specifically did not want to be seen to be advocating mechanized agriculture in 
Tanzania and at least expressed a willingness to consider other modes of assistance. 
That aid officials failed to investigate alternative development strategies (as CIDA 
itself had suggested was advisable prior to the implementation of Phase II of the 
project) is evidence of a flawed planning process rather than a explicit attempt to use 
the project to sell farm equipment. The design of the project is more readily 
interpreted as an example of the unreflective nature of early modernization attempts. 
Even if Canadian aid had been untied, it is unlikely that Canadian planners in 1968
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would have recommended the development of small-holder production of wheat or 
other grains because that was not the Canadian method of food production.
The project may not have been designed specifically to unload Canadian made 
tractors. But, as previous chapters have demonstrated, the pressure to use the aid 
programme to advance Canadian commercial interests abroad has been applied very 
heavily and effectively in the policy-making phase. Canada’s stringent tied aid policy 
and the early emphasis on modernization and infrastructure projects in the Canadian 
aid programme both shaped the original design of the TCWP, and constrained future 
options open to aid officials once problems became apparent. Thus is the scope for 
achieving developmental objectives through aid often circumscribed even before a 
project begins.
In the early ‘80’s, there was a recognition at CIDA that the direct transfer of . 
expensive machinery requiring skilled maintenance and imported spare parts was 
inappropriate for Tanzanian conditions. CIDA faced a choice: to write off the millions 
of dollars which had been invested in the TCWP, the Tanzania Railway Corporation, 
and other infrastructure projects, or to try and salvage these projects. In the case of 
the TCWP, the evidence was so overwhelming that the project was costing more than 
it was producing and could never be self-sustaining that the decision to continue 
funding it appears to have been ill-advised at the least. In trying to explain CIDA’s 
decision to fund the project, its original design, the decision to expand the project in 
1976, and to invest millions more in the scheme after its failure became apparent, one 
is left with a combination of a display of the willful, logic-defying optimism which 
characterized many early development efforts; Freeman’s argument that supporting 
the project served Canada’s interests abroad -  if not its commercial interests, then its 
political ambitions; and the rigidity and path dependence inherent in the aid 
programme which limited the scope for a new approach in Hanang.
Recognition must also be given to the role of local constraints encountered in 
the implementation phase and the failure of Canadian planners to recognize them as 
such in undermining the success of the wheat project. For example, even if ox 
ploughs had been used rather than combine harvesters, the lack of an adequate
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transportation and marketing system would have posed a major challenge wherever 
the scheme was located. The implementation and operation of the wheat project were 
also significantly affected by factors beyond CIDA’s control. As described above, 
several NAFCO employees were proved to be using farm assets for personal gain and 
abusing their authority in other ways. The local District Council appears to have been 
unwilling or unable to resolve the conflict between NAFCO and local residents. 
NAFCO farm management also shared the bureaucratic inefficiencies common to 
other parastatal companies in Tanzania.
This situation raises the issue of donor versus recipient responsibility for the 
management and outcome of an aid-assisted project. Although Canadian research had 
indicated that the wheat farms were not a sound financial investment, CIDA had 
funded them anyway in response to the Tanzanian request. In the 1980’s, CIDA was 
loathe to become involved in the resolution of the crisis on the wheat farms. The 
question in this case and in other cases where aid projects go wrong is whether the 
donor had a responsibility to take a proactive position in resolving the conflict, or if to 
become involved in such a political matter so would be an infringement of Tanzanian 
sovereignty. The Canadian response to the problems created by the TCWP is the 
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Hanang Participatory Development Fund 1989 - 2001
“I'm afraid we are being sucked into a whirlpool ofNORRIP 
proportions, something we cannot afford and do not want... We are not 
doing an integrated rural development project. Our intention was to 
have a small project fund carefully directed to a few projects -  water 
holes, cattle dips, schools, clinics. We want the local population to 
contribute, to feel ownership. We are not going to be responsible for 
the development o f Hanang District or for preparing a plan for its 
development. ”
— CIDA official, internal memo, 14 June 1996}
This chapter examines the planning and implementation phases of the Hanang 
Participatory Development Fund, the project CIDA initiated to address the negative 
impact of its wheat project on the local residents of Hanang. It examines several key 
decisions taken by Canadian aid officials in the course of planning the HPDF: the 
identification of project objectives and the target group; CIDA’s handling of the land 
use issue which had been exacerbated by the wheat project; the identification of a 
Canadian executing agent to implement the project, and of a Tanzanian counterpart 
organization; and the establishment of an administrative structure for the project. 
These are all aspects of project design which did not give project planners much pause 
in the development of the TCWP in 1969. That the HPDF was ten years in the 
planning before its first disbursements were made is a testament to the complexity of 
this process the second time around.
In a discussion of the determinants of donor policy and the causes of aid 
failure, this case raises several issues. Part I of this thesis examined the constraints on 
the effectiveness of development assistance imposed during the policy-making 
process. This chapter provides an illustration of a whole new range of constraints 
encountered in the project implementation phase: local power struggles, the 
administrative capacity of the recipient government, and the administrative practices 
of the aid agency, as well as the economic and political interests of the donor 
government. With respect to international trends in aid practice, and the current
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emphasis on ‘participatory development,’ this case highlights the difficulties of 
implementing this approach -  both in terms of securing local commitment to the 
project, and of the costs attached to this type of assistance versus its benefits for poor 
people.
6.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE HANANG PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT 
FUND
It seems clear from the material contained in CIDA files that the agency’s 
motive in funding the HPDF was purely political in the first instance and that its 
primary objective at the outset was to quell public criticism in Canada of CIDA’s 
involvement in the Hanang Wheat Project. At the time it was originally conceived, 
the project did not fit neatly into CIDA’s established programming priorities. CIDA’s 
project portfolio was composed of assistance to structural adjustment efforts in the 
form of balance of payments support, and major commitments to infrastructure 
development, namely the railway and hydro-electricity. CIDA had little experience 
with rural community development projects, and that which it had was not 
particularly encouraging. As outlined in Chapter Four, even before the big aid 
budget cuts of 1993, there were indications that CIDA was seeking to consolidate its 
commitments in Tanzania rather than expanding into new areas of intervention.
There were also discussions around perhaps reducing the volume of aid as a whole 
because of perceived limitations in Tanzania’s ability to absorb the volume of aid it 
was then receiving. CIDA was also at that time trying to extricate itself from its 
heavy involvement in the Hanang wheat farms, aiming to phase out technical 
assistance to the farms by 1992. Nevertheless, the intense public criticism prompted 
CIDA to investigate the possibility of funding a community development project in 
Hanang, beginning around 1988-89. An internal brief prepared for the minister on the 
subject in 1991 stated that the HPDF originated “partially in the response to a
1 CIDA internal memo HQ to post Dar, 14 June 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01 Hanang 
Participatory Development-General, vol.8. NORRIP refers to an ill-fated integrated rural development 
project.
In particular, CIDA’s rural integrated development project in Tabora, an experience shared by many 
donors who attempted this type of programming when it was in vogue in the 1970’s and ‘80’s. Also, a 
mid-1980’s effort at rural development assistance in the Kimani Irrigation Project in Mbeya District, 
Tanzania failed for a variety of reasons (CIDA project no. 902/12436). It should be noted that CIDA’s 
other rural development project in Mbeya at the same time, to introduce oxen to local agricultural 
practice, enjoyed a reasonable degree of success (CIDA project no. 902/12434).
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backlash from some segments of the Canadian public,” and that despite the success of 
the project in improving wheat yields, “the project has not had a major impact, nor 
made a major contribution to the overall welfare of the District of Hanang.”3
Further evidence that the project was initiated in response to political pressure, 
in this case to act in accordance with international norms with respect to human 
rights, is found in a CIDA memo concerning the Kisanga Commission Report on 
human rights abuses at the NAFCO farms in Hanang in 1993.
There are important policy implications for CIDA that go beyond the 
TCWP. Canada has taken the lead internationally in advocating 
respect for human rights through its development assistance 
programme. It is necessary for CIDA to maintain and be perceived to 
maintain, coherence between its policy and programming.4
In March 1994, the Post conveyed to CIDA HQ the Canadian High 
Commissioner’s wish that the project be speedily approved “given that this 
programme is of a highly politically sensitive nature and that it has a high profile 
amongst a number of Canadian interest groups.”5 A further indication of the 
seriousness with which CIDA officials viewed the influence of the media is found in 
the fact that its response to questions about the farms from a reporter in 1994 went 
through nine drafts and was vetted by several officials at different levels.6 Concern 
for public opinion in Canada remained a constant consideration for project planners 
throughout the project development phase and added a sense of urgency to its 
implementation.
Despite this sensitivity to domestic public opinion, it seems equally clear that 
once CIDA made the decision to fund a community development project in Hanang 
and allocated funds for it -  i.e. once the political and economic parameters of CIDA’s 
commitment there had been established -  the question for staff charged with the
3 CIDA internal memo to the Minister 1991, CIDA File no. H902/18705-63-Hanang Participatory 
Development-Briefing Memoranda, vol. 1.
4 Project Approval Memorandum, Community Development Programme in Hanang District, Tanzania, 
Annex B, CIDA file no. H902/18705-63 Hanang Participatory Development: Briefing Memoranda, 
vol.l.
5 CIDA internal fax from Post Dar to HQ 10 March 1994, CIDA file no. H902/18705-63 Hanang 
Participatory Development: Briefing Memoranda, vol.l.
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planning and implementation of the project became how to maximize its 
developmental impact. While the debate within CIDA over the required level of 
Canadian involvement as determined by its political interests versus its responsibility 
to engage itself deeply enough to ensure the success of the project continued 
throughout the planning stage, development objectives were at least on the agenda at 
this point. Further, as the documentation reviewed below makes plain, although 
extremely sensitive to external criticism, far from shying away from the mess the 
TCWP had created, under the glare of international scrutiny CIDA stayed to face the 
music in Hanang.
It was with urging from CIDA that the Tanzanian government set up the 
Kisanga Commission, and CIDA paid for the printing and distribution of its report. 
The aid agency then undertook to fund the implementation of some of its 
recommendations and invested considerable time and effort in public consultations in 
planning the project in Hanang. On one occasion, the Canadian government found 
itself arguing on behalf of a Canadian film crew who wanted to travel to Hanang to do 
a probably critical piece on the wheat farms and had been refused visas by the 
Tanzanian government. However, as the events described below illustrate, there was a 
limit to the degree of responsibility CIDA and Canada was willing to accept in setting 
things right in Hanang.
6.2 THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
Funds.for a community development project in Hanang were approved in 
1989, four years before Canadian support to the wheat project ended . CIDA hired a 
consulting firm to conduct a feasibility study. However, the project it proposed was 
deemed too expensive and non-participatory, and CIDA commissioned a second 
feasibility study from three other researchers, one of whom had grown up in the area. 
They spent three months in Hanang conducting consultations with local residents to 
identify local priorities and possible solutions and to recommend appropriate activities 
for funding. The consultants proposed an integrated rural development project which
6 CIDA File no.H902/l 8705-63, Vol.2 Hanang Participatory Development: Briefing Memoranda
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would fund activities in several sectors.7 The mapping of village boundaries and 
preparation of land use plans was identified as the top priority for immediate 
assistance “as a basis for all development work in the District.”8 How CIDA handled 
the issue of mapping and land use planning is discussed in a separate section below. 
The consultants also identified a preventative health care programme, improvement of 
the rural water supply, provision of dams, veterinary centres, cattle dips and extension 
services for livestock owners; the introduction of dairy farming, an afforestation 
project and the introduction of energy efficient wood stoves. Noting that agriculture 
was the main occupation of the majority of the population in Hanang, the report cited 
the lack of markets for crops, a lack of storage and transportation facilities, a shortage 
of basic fanning inputs, limited technical knowledge, soil erosion and degradation as 
impediments to increasing income from farm work. It recommended assistance to 
help farmers diversify their crops, and a combination of extension services and 
training in soil conservation and agroforestry, as well as improvements to the road 
network in the district. It also recommended funding the construction of classrooms 
and provision of bicycles for teachers as a means to address the high level of illiteracy 
in the district, as well as entrepreneurial training and a credit scheme to increase the 
income of residents.
The project was conceived of as a small projects fund which would involve 
the beneficiaries in all stages of their projects -  identification, planning, 
implementation, and management. Significantly, the consultants recommended a 
minimum commitment of fifteen years on the part of CIDA to bring the project to 
fruition, stating “We do not find a short term commitment of 4-5 years to be feasible 
if the primary objective of community based sustainable development is to be 
achieved.”9 The project was to be administered through two channels: the District 
Council, and a ‘Hanang Development Trust Fund.’ The Trust Fund, to be established 
under the auspices of the project, would be composed of local representatives and 
would allocate funds in those sectors not within the jurisdiction of the District 
Council. A programme office with a staff of four expatriate sectoral experts and an 
administrator was to provide a ‘facilitation’ role. The allocation of funds and the
7 Evjen et al, 1991.
8 Ibid, pg 21.
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implementation of projects was to be done by the District Council and the Trust Fund. 
This 1991 proposal became CIDA’s working document as it planned its community 
development project in Hanang.
The government of Tanzania made its official request for assistance to fund a 
community development project in Hanang in November 1990. CIDA contracted 
Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) as the CEA for the project in 1992. This 
decision was made on the basis of the longstanding involvement of a family of 
Norwegian Lutheran missionaries in the area going back forty years and the positive 
rapport they had developed with residents. It was hoped that this would be extended 
to the Canadian Lutherans as well.10 The project, with a budget of $4.6 million 
dollars was to be comprised of two components: $400,000 for mapping and land use 
planning to be conducted by MLHUD in consultation with residents, and a $1.2 small 
projects fund. The remainder of the budget would have been absorbed by staff 
salaries, housing and administrative costs.
Before a memorandum of understanding on the aid agreement was signed by
Canada and Tanzania, the project was cancelled along with most of CIDA’s other
commitments in East Africa in February 1993 ( as discussed in Chapter Five). The
termination report for the stillborn project cited the ‘problems encountered’ as ‘none,’
and stated that the agreement had been one of the many casualties of the large budget
cuts made to Canada’s aid programme in December 1992. However, according to a
CIDA official, the project was cancelled because it was deemed “too political” to
pursue at the time.11 The atmosphere at the farms was tense with fresh reports of the
harassment of herders by NAFCO employees. There had also been ‘irregularities’ in
the process of awarding the contract to build the project houses and office, and it was
determined that an alternative to the District Council had to be found as an executing
10agency for the construction work.
9 Ibid, pg.19.
10 Interview with CIDA official, October 26, 1999.
11 Interview with CIDA official, Hull, January 1999.
12 Bilateral End of Project Report, CIDA project no. 902/17171- Hanang Community Development.
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As outlined in Chapter Four, CIDA’s decision to cancel its programme in East 
Africa roused a brief but intense barrage of criticism against the agency from 
Canadian NGOs and the Canadian media. Once again the Hanang Wheat Farms were 
the focus of negative press attention. CIDA was accused of contributing to the 
destruction of the Barabaig way of life and then abandoning the community to the 
problems its project had created.13 The new federal minister responsible for aid 
decided that budget cuts aside, the community development project for Hanang 
District had to be reactivated to quiet the small but vocal international development 
lobby in Canada. Further, the feeling within CIDA was that having pushed the 
Government of Tanzania to establish the Kisanga Commission to come up with a 
solution to the social unrest at the wheat farms, Canada had a responsibility to give 
financial support to implement at least some of its recommendations. So in late 1993, 
just months after it was cancelled, the Hanang Community Development Project was 
reactivated, this time focused on the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Kisanga Commission.
Several of these recommendations related to improving the economic situation 
of the Barabaig in Hanang and ensuring that they had equitable access to basic 
services such as water, education and medical care. The Commission had concluded 
that it was not in the national interest to return the wheat farm land to the Barabaig, 
but that certain steps should be taken to resolve the dispute over land use in Hanang. 
These included the mapping and marking of boundaries and the preparation of a land 
use plan for the district. Of the Commission’s recommendations, Canada agreed to 
support a community development project and mapping and land use planning.
Early on, it was decided that CIDA’s ‘Kisanga project’ would be split into two 
separate components: One to complete the mapping and village boundary 
demarcation, and a second community development project. The community 
development project was perceived by CIDA planners as a much more complex 
endeavour, and the next three years were spent trying to get it off the ground: defining 
project objectives, identifying a Canadian executing agency and a Tanzanian 
counterpart, and establishing an administrative structure for the project.
13 Press reports listed in bibliography.
289
6.3 ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY AN EXECUTING AGENT
Initially, CIDA had hoped to contract the consultant who had drafted the 1991 
project proposal to implement the community development project. Because he was 
not an Canadian, and thus would not qualify as a Canadian Executing Agent or 
cooperant under CIDA regulations, CIDA staff investigated the possibility of 
contracting the Canadian NGO WUSC (World University Service of Canada) to act as 
CEA. WUSC would, in turn, subcontract management of the project to the 
consultant. This arrangement proved impractical, and as discussed in greater detail 
below, the activities of another Canadian NGO in Hanang, CUSO, caused further 
delays the implementation of the CIDA project and as the years passed, the consultant 
eventually became unavailable. A reminder of the sense of urgency CIDA officials 
felt to get the project operating is found in a January 1994 reply from the field post to 
the news from HQ that another mission to Hanang was planned so that new project 
staff could assess the situation in light of recent negative reports in the Canadian 
press.
In a way, CIDA’s credibility is at issue; we have had countless trips to 
Hanang over the last two years to discuss what our intentions are.. .and 
every time we come, it is with the message-that the implementation of 
the project is immanent. Yet, months pass. While we fully understand 
the need for familiarization -  given the arrival of new personnel -  our 
welcome is wearing thin in Hanang.14
In July 1995, CLWR was once again chosen as CEA for CIDA’s community 
development project in Hanang. In January 1996, a representative from CLWR 
visited Hanang on a fact-finding mission. On the basis of this visit, CLWR 
recommended a fundamental restructuring of the project.15 In the first instance, 
CLWR criticized CIDA’s partnership with the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban 
Development (MLHUD) and local government officials to conduct the mapping and 
village demarcation phase of the project on the grounds that it did not sufficiently
14 Fax DAR to CIDA HQ 5 January 1994, CIDA File no. 902/18705-63, Vol.l HPDF Briefing 
Memoranda.
15 Susan Walsh, “CLWR Review of the Hanang Community Development Project January 4 -  January 
22, 1996”, mimeo, February 1996.
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involve residents in the process. In addition, CLWR objected to the fact that the 
mapping, demarcation and land use planning was to be completed prior to CLWR’s 
involvement. The NGO argued that its ability to fulfill the objectives of the 
community development project would be compromised if it were excluded from 
laying what it saw to be the foundation on which development work in the district 
would be built. Most significantly, CLWR argued that CIDA needed to make the 
resolution of the land use issue the top priority of its new project, suggesting that the 
planned community development project would only be successful in involving 
residents
.. .if it builds on concrete, positive experience with the issue that has 
hitherto undermined trust and cooperation: land tenure. Without some 
sense that their current land-holdings are secure, Barabaig leadership 
will likely boycott gatherings designed to promote joint and inclusive 
decision-making in the district.16
CLWR noted that “government sponsored demarcation work in Hanang has 
been poorly received, criticized not only by those affected, but by experts from the 
World Bank.”17 It further recommended that the project should target the Barabaig 
and the protection of the Barabaig way of life rather than identifying the entire 
population of the district as the target group and/or promoting alternatives to cattle 
herding.18
CLWR proposed a participatory review of the issues in Hanang and of the 
proposed project design during a six month inception phase in the field. It also 
recommended a more in depth investigation into the local political and socio­
economic situation.
CIDA HQ and the Post were not pleased with CLWR’s report and its 
recommendations. They saw it as a clear indication that CIDA and CLWR had two 
different conceptions of the project. Whereas CIDA envisioned a modest small 
projects fund for schools, health services and income generation projects, CLWR felt
16 Letter from CLWR to CIDA 4 July 1996, CIDA file ho. H902/18705-01- Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, vol. 8.
17 Ibid.
18 Walsh, 1996:11.
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the project needed to tackle the issue of land tenure head on and adopt an advocacy 
role on behalf of pastoralists in Hanang. CIDA was very uncomfortable with what it 
perceived to be CLWR’s antagonistic stance toward the government of Tanzania and 
felt it might compromise both the success of the project and CIDA’s relations with the 
government.
We do not want to pick up the pieces after some hot shot land rights 
activist with little or no experience or appreciation of the African 
context...We are concerned that there has been little empirical 
analysis/research as to what exists in the region yet a great many 
opinions prevail...It is the post’s view that handing this project over to 
an NGO with a separate agenda when we ourselves have limited 
knowledge of the realities are [sic] is a dangerous approach.19
This marked the end of CLWR’s involvement in the project.
6.4 A REEVALUATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
In March 1996 CIDA representatives again visited Hanang to assess the 
situation and came away recommending that the whole project be put on hold for the 
time being. The field report which contained this recommendation and CIDA HQ’s 
response to it reflect the tension which existed within CIDA with respect to striking a 
balance between action and analysis and in determining the appropriate level of 
Canadian involvement in Hanang. The field officer reported:
I went to Hanang with the hope of moving forward on the HCDP in a 
positive way, and to find out if [CLWR’s] assessment of the situation 
was accurate. Frankly, my findings have surprised me and I have had 
to revise my views on the implementation of the HCDP.20
The CIDA representative reported that in his discussions with residents, local 
government officials, and community group representatives, all expressed the wish for 
CIDA to postpone the start of its project until certain fundamental issues had been 
addressed. The CIDA mission confirmed CLWR’s report that the local community
19 Telex Dar to CIDA HQ 20 March 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01-Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, vol.l.
20 e-mail CIDA Dar to CIDA HQ 7 April 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01 Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, vol.7.
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was divided and anxious about the impact a sudden influx of aid money might have 
on the area. The CIDA official was told “Your money will make it easier for the
agriculturalists to take over our pastureland and our water points for their own use and
0 1chase us away.” The official reported receiving conflicting messages from self- 
identified representatives of the Barabaig community and members of the general 
public. “The Barabaig groups we talked to mentioned their needs to be chiefly water, 
health and education, seldom mentioning the land issue. However, the BULGALDA
leadership stated emphatically that they knew what their people needed, and that was
00resolving the land issue.”
The post reported growing animosity toward the Barabaig among other 
disadvantaged groups in the District due to the attention the Barabaig had received in 
international circles. The other seventy percent of the population wanted its concerns 
considered and its share of the aid money that which was expected to flow into the 
area. There was conflict within the Barabaig community itself over the issue of who 
was the legitimate voice of the Barabaig. The Minister of Agriculture had also 
expressed concern that an influx of money might attract an unsustainable level of
• • O'Xmigration into the district and that care must be taken to prevent this. The post 
referred to a “morass of shifting power networks” encompassing local interest groups, 
the Barabaig and other residents, the District Council and the national government. 
“Add the un-dispassionate watchers from the side-lines -  the academics and press, 
plus the advocacy NGOs and human rights lawyers -  and it results in an environment 
where the perceived success of this project will be evaluated and analyzed from far 
and wide.”24
CIDA had, up to this point, attempted to minimize its involvement in the 
demarcation and land use planning exercise it was funding, not eager to become 
embroiled into local politics. However, at this juncture there seemed to be a 
recognition that this hands off approach was not tenable. The post noted that it was 
common knowledge that CIDA was funding the photomapping and village
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
23 telex CIDA Dar to CIDA HQ, 20 March 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01 Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, vol.7.
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demarcation work. Given the sensitive nature of this work and its importance for 
subsequent community development work, CIDA had a responsibility to monitor it. 
Furthermore, the post recommended that the community development project be 
delayed until the demarcation and land use planning exercise had been completed as 
the only way to quell suspicion and anxiety within the community. It recommended 
holding further intensive consultations with local stakeholders to ascertain their 
wishes and concerns. It also suggested that the complex nature of the situation 
required more intensive research -  a socio-economic study of Hanang, an institutional 
capacity analysis of the local government and community groups, a review of the 
literature on pastoralism and community development projects, a district-wide needs 
assessment to guide the placement of social services, and an analysis of interethnic 
relations in the area. This would, it was believed, better inform the implementation of 
the project.25
Initial responses to this idea from HQ were lukewarm to cold. A former field 
officer now back in Ottawa was skeptical that the CIDA mission had obtained an 
accurate reading of the views of the majority of residents, suggesting that some major 
figures on the local scene had much to gain from the continuation of the status quo in 
Hanang.26 She noted the consistent message coming from villagers over the course of 
the previous seven years was that they wanted water, health, and education facilities, 
and she urged CIDA to act without further delay.
God forbid, we have been inactive long enough to lose all 
credibility...I disagree strongly that more intensive research is 
required; action is.2
The view from higher up in the chain of command was that things were 
getting out of hand and that undertaking such extensive studies would create 
expectations beyond CIDA’s capacity, inclination, and $4.5 million dollar budget to 
fulfill. The field office was instructed to deliver an ultimatum to local stakeholders:
24 Ibid
25 e-mail Dar Post to CIDA HQ 28 May 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01 Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, vol. 8.
26 CIDA internal memo HQ to Dar post, 26 April 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01 Hanang 
Participatory Development -  General, vol. 7.
27 Ibid.
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either agree on what you want, or there would be no CIDA funded project in 
Hanang.28 This message was delivered on an August 1996 CIDA mission to Hanang. 
As of that month, the project was placed on hold pending a reassessment of the 
situation to be conducted “slowly, carefully, and informally.” In the meantime, CIDA 
proceeded with a scaled-down research project, commissioning a socio-economic 
analysis and an institutional capacity analysis of the District, and hiring consultants to 
monitor and evaluate the village demarcation and land-use planning work.29
With $4.5 million dollars on the table along with CIDA’s ultimatum, the 
fractious and politically charged atmosphere which CLWR and CIDA had 
encountered in Hanang in the early part of 1996 had cooled considerably by the 
autumn. Public sentiment was tending toward exasperation with the machinations of 
its community leaders. A CIDA field officer reported a meeting with the District 
Executive Director and local leaders to resolve their differences with regards to the 
project. The DED had been a district planning officer in Hanang until 1991 and had 
helped facilitate the 1991 project feasibility study. He had then been transferred to 
another district, and had recently returned to Hanang, expecting to find the project up 
and running. During the meeting in August 1996, as a member of the District Council 
and a representative of Bulgalda became involved in an argument over who should 
administer the project, he dramatically threw the 1991 feasibility study on the table 
and, according to the CIDA officer, “communicated his dismay that the project was 
still mired in the same old destructive talk; to counter Bulgalda’s suspicion of the 
District controlling the project he pointed out that there was simply a need for
A
coordination of development activities.”
While the matter of how the project was to be administered was not resolved 
at this point, in October 1996 CIDA received a letter from the Arusha Regional 
Commissioner reporting that a meeting of all stakeholders had agreed that the HPDF 
should start immediately, the only voice of dissent coming from an ousted leader of 
Bulgalda. This consensus was reiterated in an open community forum organized by
28 e-mail CIDA HQ to Dar Post 4 July 1996, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01, vol.8.
29 Sosovele and Kauzeni, November 1996; Sosovele, January 1997; Sosovele and Kauzeni, April 1997.
30 Dar post Report to CIDA HQ on August 1996 mission to Hanang, CIDA file no. H902/18705-01 
Hanang Participatory Development - General, vol. 9.
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CIDA to discuss the project in December 1996, the culmination of two weeks of 
intensive negotiations in the District. The gathering included CIDA officers, leaders 
of local community groups, village elders, members of the Hanang District Council, 
and members of the general public. Participants made it clear that they were keen to 
have the project begin and that the small group of dissenters, a faction of the publicly 
discredited Bulgalda did not represent them. They agreed that if another letter of 
protest was sent to CIDA from this group, it was to be ignored, as it subsequently 
was. A representative of a woman’s group rebuked the mostly male leadership who 
had been involved in the power struggle over the past several years which had delayed 
the project. She declared that it was the women and children who were suffering the 
most from the delay. They were the ones who got up at three a.m. to collect water 
and returned home at three p.m.; and who died giving birth because there was no 
hospital. She said “if men were to do only half of what women were doing, they 
would have accepted the project long ago.”31
On the basis of these consultations, the project was approved by CIDA in 
February 1997, and a Memorandum of Understanding for the project was signed 
between Canada and Tanzania in August 1997. However, it was fully two years until 
the first disbursements were made. In between and unresolved lay the matters of 
finding a Canadian executing agency to replace CLWR, identifying an appropriate 
Tanzanian counterpart agency out of the “morass of shifting power networks” in 
Hanang, establishing an administrative structure for the fund, identifying projects to 
support, and significantly, the matter of village demarcation and land use planning 
which lay at the root of the Barabaig conflict with NAFCO, the disastrous history of 
Canada’s involvement in the wheat farms and the origins of the HPDF.
6.5 CIDA’S HANDLING OF THE LAND USE ISSUE
It has been argued by academic researchers and other long time observers of 
the crisis over land use in Hanang that the conflict between the local Barabaig 
population and the CIDA funded wheat farms is part of a much larger and longer-
31 Dar post report to CIDA HQ on meeting between CIDA reps, people’s reps, NGO leaders,
Renowned Elders and Hanang District Council 4 December 1996, CIDA File no. H902/18705-01 
Hanang Participatory Development -  General, vol. 10.
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standing conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary fanners all over the 
world. Human history is characterized by continuous waves of migration and 
settlement. The Barabaig are themselves relative new-comers to Hanang, migrating 
to the area two hundred years ago, displacing the original population by violent 
means. It is probable that even if the Hanang Wheat Complex had not been 
established with Canadian assistance, confrontation between the Barabaig population 
and the growing number of small holding farmers in the area was inevitable, and that 
the result would have been the same: the alienation of the traditional grazing lands of 
the pastoralists. Based on past Government of Tanzania policy on land use, it is 
unlikely that this trend would have been mitigated by government legislation.33
Despite this evidence that the Barabaig way of life was under threat quite apart 
from CIDA’s involvement in the TCWP, the establishment of the NAFCO wheat farm 
in 1969 and its fivefold expansion to encompass 100,000 acres in 1976 enflamed the 
ever present tension between pastoralists and farmers and brought them into direct 
and violent confrontation in Hanang in the 1980s. It is not possible within the 
confines of this chapter to deal adequately with the pastoralist/agriculturalist conflict 
which lay at the root of CIDA’s woes in Hanang. What is of interest here is how 
CIDA responded to the crisis its project had induced in Hanang. An examination of 
CIDA’s actions with respect to the land use issue which lay at the crux of the crisis is 
instructive on several points. It also highlights a number of key issues in the donor- 
recipient relationship more generally.
In the first instance, CIDA’s assessment of the importance of resolving the 
land issue is revealing of the extent to which it had internalized the criticisms raised 
by residents and outsiders. As outlined above and below, CIDA’s reactions to the 
CLWR report and CUSO’s activities were dismissive, rejecting their insistence that 
land tenure be the focus of a CIDA funded community development project in 
Hanang. This rejection was based on three beliefs: Firstly, that the NGOs were 
pushing their own agendas and that this position was not necessarily representative of
32 Lane, 1996.
33 For example, the Villagization Act of 1972; Land Bill 22 of 1992 which extinguished customary title 
to land; and the government’s handling of the Shivji Land Commission Report.
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the true priorities of residents in the area. Secondly, that the resolution of the land 
issue was the responsibility of the Tanzanian government and not of CIDA or Canada. 
Finally, the situation was politically extremely risky for the Canadian government, 
and they wanted to stay as far away from it as possible.
In the course of planning the HPDF, however, CIDA officials came to believe 
that the success of the project depended on calming pastoralist anxiety over insecure 
access to grazing land. The project feasibility study of 1991 had concluded that 
pastoralists would be reluctant to invest their resources in local development projects 
without legal title to the land.34 CIDA urged the government of Tanzania to take the 
initiative on this matter and in 1993 provided funds to the MLHUD for mapping, the 
resolution of boundary disputes and registration of village titles, and for the 
preparation of land use plans. Canadian officials also became convinced that this 
process had to be a consultative process involving the Barabaig and their neighbours. 
In July 1994, a CIDA official observed:
Intellectually the Barabaig recognize the threat to their livelihood 
posed by the flood of small-holder farmers into Hanang District, but 
emotionally NAFCO will always be their principal target...What I 
have consistently underestimated is the perception among the Barabaig 
that District officials are in collusion with NAFCO managers and 
employees to profit personally by seizing plots of land to put into crop 
production. Given the productivity of the land in Hanang District, 
access to land means access to wealth.36
The CIDA field officer concluded that the residents of Hanang, and 
particularly the Barabaig must be part of all aspects of the mapping and demarcation 
exercise.
There is no way that CIDA will gain the trust of the Barabaig for future 
development initiatives in Hanang unless Bulgalda is an integral part 
of the land mapping process from day one...I also think that the 
decision to include Bulgalda in the process may be the smarter [sic] 
money ever spent by CIDA on the Tanzania Programme. If CIDA 
decides to proceed without intensive consultations with the Barabaig,
34 Evjen:10-12.
35 CIDA File no. H902/18705-63, Vol.l.
36 Fax Dar to CIDA HQ 3 August 1994, CIDA File no. H902/18705-63, Vol.l.
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we may as well forget any future development activities in Hanang, 
and CIDA can expect a highly critical media campaign from a network 
of Canadian and international NGOs.37
For reasons outlined below, Bulgalda eventually ceased to be a viable partner 
in CIDA’s eyes, but officials remained convinced that local participation was critical 
to the success of the project.
For a combination of reasons -  a shortage of human and material resources, 
other pressing priorities, as well as a lack of political will, the Tanzanian government 
proceeded very slowly with the mapping, demarcation and land use planning work.
As the project entered the seventh year in the planning stage, the pressure for CIDA to 
act became acute. It was suggested that CIDA needed to take a more proactive role in 
the process. The field office emphasized the dangers associated with CIDA’s 
hands-off approach to the land use issue in Hanang, particularly in light of the District 
Council’s new policy of zero-grazing and the limitation of herds to five cows per 
family.
CIDA could easily be seen as supporting this policy of sendentarizing 
the Barabaig. I, for one, am not keen on drafting purple docket 
responses to queries from MPs in Ottawa on this one.39
However, CIDA HQ expressed a desire to minimize direct Canadian 
involvement in this process.
We do not want to take the lead and we are not in a hurry. We are not 
reponsible [sic] for the land ownership and land use issue and land 
disputes. We want to follow the lead of the government (low-key 
central or district/local) and Tanzanians. We do not want to assume, 
once again, the responsibility for the initiative. As you say...’Let 
people know that we are waiting for them.’ The fact that we follow the 
initiative of the government or the local population and do not move
37 Ibid
38 Memo Dar to HQ 25 April 1996, CIDA File no. H902/18705-01, Vol.7, Hanang Participatory 
Development-General.
39 E-mail Dar to CIDA HQ 7 April 1996, CIDA File no. H902/18705-01, Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, Vol. 7.
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too quickly for the absorptive capacity of Tanzania reflects exactly one 
of the recommendations of the Helleiner Report.40
There was disagreement among CIDA officials on the proposal to make the 
commencement of the community development project conditional on the Tanzanian 
government’s completion of mapping and land use planning in Hanang.
At Post, we wonder whether this represents a major policy shift for the 
entire development assistance programme in Tanzania: before any 
project-related funds are disbursed, regardless of the sector of activity, 
must the GOT or parastatal demonstrate its commitment by financing a 
portion of the activities? Who decides what amount is appropriate?41
This officer argued that the sensitive nature of the Hanang project should lead 
CIDA to be all the more eager to begin it. She noted that land use planning was one 
of the recommendations of the Kisanga Commission and asked if CIDA did not have 
a responsibility to assist it. It was noted that the government of Tanzania’s resources 
were already thinly spread and argued that putting the project on hold until the 
MLHUD completed land use plans would penalize the Barabaig population for a 
decision taken by the central government. It was ultimately determined that CIDA’s 
responsibility extended as far as monitoring the use of Canadian funds and to making 
the implementation of the community development project conditional on the 
completion of mapping, marking and land use planning by the government of 
Tanzania. This position was communicated to the Tanzanian government in June 
1996.42
A CIDA monitoring mission to Hanang three months later reported that none 
of these conditions had yet been fulfilled. The mapping and village demarcation 
component of the project work had been contracted to a Kenyan firm as the MLHUD 
estimated that if it took on the work itself, with its limited resources it would take five 
years to complete and require the provision of new equipment and training for its
40 Internal memo 23 July 1996, CIDA File no. H902/18705-01, Vol.9, Hanang Participatory 
Development-General.
41 CIDA internal memo Dar to HQ 9 May 1994, CIDA File no.H902/l 8705-01 Hanang Participatory 
Development-General, Vol. 2.
42 Letter from Verona Edelstein, High Commissioner of Canada to Tanzania to Mr. Justice Robert 
Kisanga, 7 June 1996, CIDA File no. H902/18705-01 Hanang Participatory Development-General, 
vol.8.
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staff. The aerial photography was completed without major complications, but a 
number of problems arose in the course of surveying and the demarcation of 
boundaries between villages in the district. Despite an understanding between CIDA, 
MLHUD and the contractor that mapping and demarcation was to be done in concert 
with residents, the monitoring mission reported that it was not complete in all fifty- 
three villages in Hanang. Furthermore, in all but two of the villages, local 
participation in the identification of boundaries had consisted of discussions with one 
or two village council leaders. Numerous disputes between villages remained 
unresolved. Most of the funds CIDA had transferred to the Regional government to 
support the dispute settlement process had been spent on a vehicle, ostensibly to 
transport government officials to villages to negotiate resolutions, but in reality kept 
in Arusha much of the time.43 Further, boundary markers and beacons had not been 
fixed for a lack of materials, sufficient funds for their purchase not forthcoming from 
the MLHUD. The preparation of land use planning had not begun at all.44
Three years later, when CIDA made its first disbursements under the Hanang 
Participatory Development Fund (HPDF), boundary disputes were still before the 
courts, but in the process of being resolved. The preparation of district land use plans, 
on the other hand, once viewed as the cornerstone in the foundation of CIDA’s 
community development work in Hanang, had still not been done. Their prior 
completion, adamantly pressed by CIDA at one stage in the planning of the project, 
was abandoned without further discussion. The matter had been sidelined by changes 
in the local political climate and perhaps a loss of interest in the matter among the 
Canadian public, as well as the unequivocal message coming from residents that their 
priorities were access to water, health services and education.
This turn of events offers an example of the constant tension under which 
development planners work. On one hand, it is necessary and desirable for the 
recipient government to take the lead in aid assisted projects, for the donor agency to 
do adequate preliminary research, conduct extensive consultations and have the 
participation of the supposed beneficiaries. On the other hand, aid officials are
43 Sosovele and Kauzeni, December 1996.
44 CIDA File no. H902/18705-01 Hanang Participatory Development-General, Vol.9.
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conscious of the pressure to act quickly to address the pressing and obvious needs of 
poor people without delay, in the interests of political expediency (i.e. to quell 
domestic criticism), or to disburse funds before the budget lapses and allocated funds 
are returned to central account.
CIDA’s decision to proceed with the implementation of the HPDF while the 
land issue remained unresolved is revealing of the priority it attached to each of these 
factors. CIDA’s action in this regard could be interpreted as a demonstration of the 
agency’s flexibility and adaptability as CIDA’s planned course of action was 
overtaken by events in Hanang. This raises an issue particular to this case: as outlined 
above, the volatile political atmosphere that had prevailed in Hanang since the mid- 
1980’s had cooled somewhat by late 1996. A consensus existed within the 
community that the project should proceed despite outstanding land use issues. 
Meantime, CIDA’s involvement in mapping and boundary dispute resolution had 
come to an end with the disbursal of all allocated funds. However, the unresolved 
matter of land tenure remains a potentially explosive problem which could undermine 
the success of community development efforts in Hanang in the future: when the 
impact of el nino on the wheat farms subsides, if the farms are transferred to private 
owners and replanted and the Barabaig are once again excluded from the land, or if 
there is an influx of settlers, perhaps drawn by the water points, schools and health 
services which the HPDF has been set up to provide.
This case also raises again the question of the responsibility donors have for 
the projects they assist. CIDA as a large aid agency with substantial resources had 
access to information which led it to conclude that resolution of the land use issue was 
critical to the success of development efforts in Hanang; information not available to 
the general public, for example, evidence of steady immigration into the district from 
neighbouring areas revealed through the photomapping work in 1996. The existence 
of a land use document in and of itself is unlikely to solve any problem where there is 
a lack of political will to implement it. However, this issue highlights the 
troublesome ambiguity of the line which separates responsible administration of aid 
funds from a an infringement on the sovereignty of the recipient country and the right 
of its citizens to chose the way their communities are ‘developed.’
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6.6 THE IDENTIFICATION OF A COUNTERPART AGENCY
Official development assistance is structured such that each bilateral project is 
designed to be implemented by a Canadian executing agency chosen through public 
tender or solicited as uniquely qualified to administer a project. The CEA can be an 
NGO, a commercial contractor, or an individual cooperant hired by CIDA. After 
failed negotiations with CLWR, WUSC and CUSO, CIDA finally decided to hire a 
Canadian anthropologist with extensive experience in East Africa as the facilitator for 
the project. All bilateral project are subject to an agreement between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of Tanzania, with each side expected to put up a 
portion of the resources necessary for the project. This necessitated the identification 
of a Tanzanian counterpart agency to coordinate Tanzania’s involvement in the 
project, provide the required personnel to implement the project, and to act as a 
conduit for aid funds. In some cases, the central government Treasury receives aid 
funds and then disburses them to the appropriate line ministries to fund designated 
projects. HQwever as outlined in the Introduction, less than thirty percent of the aid 
flow to Tanzania is handled in this way. In some cases, aid funds allocated for 
community development projects are transferred directly to District Councils, which 
are responsible for the delivery of most social services. Sometimes a Tanzanian NGO 
is the designated recipient of bilateral aid.
One of the tasks facing CIDA project officers as they planned the Hanang 
Participatory Development Fund was to identify an appropriate Tanzanian counterpart 
agency and establish an administrative structure for the project. How this matter was 
resolved is significant for several reasons. The question of which Tanzanian 
institutions should serve as counterpart agencies to donor agencies and through what 
channels aid funds should flow into Tanzania is a contentious issue between the 
Tanzanian government and its donors, and is a matter on which there exists a 
significant difference of opinion among donors. This relates to the manner in which 
aid funds are transferred to Tanzania and the various administrative structures donors 
have established for their projects. This issue has been complicated by the recent 
government decision to decentralize the administration of social services to the 
regional and district level and donor assessments of the capacity of local governments
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to administer aid effectively. The 1995 Helleiner Report described the strained 
relationship between the Tanzanian government and its official donors at that time. It 
noted the perception among donors that the central government had lost its 
momentum and direction, had abdicated the leadership role in major public 
programmes, and “is unable to exercise fiscal control because of declining 
administrative capacity and corruption.”45 The Warioba Commission Report of 1996 
confirmed the existence of widespread corruption in government agencies, both petty 
and grand in nature.46 There is also a belief among donors that the Tanzanian 
government has been lax in collecting tax revenues from domestic sources and has 
relied excessively on aid money instead.
Although these views are widely held among donors, the various bilateral 
agencies have responded in different ways to evidence of the limited capacity of the 
Tanzanian government to administer aid efficiently. In part as a result of considerable 
pressure from donors, Tanzania is in the process of transformation to a liberal 
democratic political system. Some donors, Sweden and Norway for example, have 
taken the position that the best way to support the Tanzanian government in its efforts 
at government reform and improving local administrative capacity is to channel their 
aid funds through existing government structures; through the Treasury, the line 
ministries and down to the local governments. Any losses of efficiency and the 
efficacy of aid resources incurred as aid funds make their way through the 
bureaucracy is, from this perspective, the price donors must be willing to pay to build 
Tanzanian administrative capacity. The majority response, however, has been to 
circumvent the central government altogether, as can be seen it the figure of seventy 
per cent of ODA flows entering Tanzania outside of the official budgetary process. 
Some of this money is channelled through the line ministries, and some through local 
governments. The rest is administered by donors either through NGOs, or directly 
through the establishment of autonomous administrative structures for their projects 
staffed by expatriates or locally contracted personnel, creating what the Helleiner 
Report referred to as ‘project islands’ operating in parallel to existing government 
structures. Aid funds are transferred directly to projects through special accounts set
45 Helleiner et al,1995: 2.
46URT, 1996.
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up by donors. Implicit in this decision on the part of donors is the judgement that the 
efficient provision of public services and the accountable use of their tax payers’ 
money takes priority over improving government capacity. In between these two 
extremes lie hybrid administrative structures which seek to balance the effective use 
of aid funds with the building of local capacity to promote economic development.
The Helleiner Report of 1995 expressed concern at the proliferation of entry points 
for bilateral donor involvement in Tanzanian affairs. It cautioned that “the 
strengthening of these channels may be at the expense of adherence to overall 
investment priorities or policy guidelines.”47
The recent decision by the Government of Tanzania to commence the 
decentralization of a number of government functions and decision-making 
authorities to the local governments has created an additional dilemma in the eyes of 
some donors. It is widely acknowledged within government and aid agency circles 
that across the country the District administrations are, in the words of the Helleiner 
Report, ‘barely functioning.’ With decentralization, a greater burden for administering 
social services like health, education, water and sanitation is falling to District 
Councils, institutions with generally weak administrative capacity and limited 
technical and material resources. The government has begun a programme which will 
see the transfer of block-funding to the Regional governments (thirty-five in 1999) 
which will then transfer funds to each District in their region to pay for public 
services. Aid donors have expressed concern about the rapidity with which 
decentralization is to be implemented and about the District Councils’ capacity to 
administer the aid funds which are allocated to programmes under their jurisdiction 
like education, health and rural economic development initiatives. One government 
official acknowledged the problem of accountability stating that the government is 
currently able to trace funds to the district level, but beyond that, their administration 
is opaque, a situation which creates an opening for inefficiency and corruption 48 This 
is not a hypothetical problem. The history of Canadian involvement in Hanang
47 Helleiner et al, 1995:19.
48 Interview.
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District reveals several instances of the misappropriation and inefficient allocation of 
aid funds administered by the District Council.49
The central government is in the process of establishing a new computerized 
financial management system to improve accountability and planning through to the 
district level (PLATINUM). However, in a district like Hanang, where the District 
Council office operates with one telephone line, typewriters and carbon paper, no 
computers or internet connection, where staff would need considerable additional 
training to use this type of equipment and administrative practices, and where the 
elected council representatives have been subordinated to the appointed civil servants, 
there are considerable barriers yet to be overcome. Some donors are not willing to 
swallow the losses of resources which would occur in the course of local government 
growing pains, and at the March 1998 Development Cooperation Forum between 
Tanzania and its official donors, the aid agencies “informed the government that the 
pace towards mainstreaming [channeling aid funds through the Treasury] was 
dependent upon government capacity and readiness.” At the same meeting, the 
Director of the National Planning Commission acknowledged that “effective donor 
coordination at the district level will largely depend on the completion of the local 
government reform process.”50 The negative perception among aid donors of 
Tanzanian government administrative capacity stands as a major obstacle to be 
overcome in the establishment of Sector-Wide Investment Programmes. These 
SWAPs would require the conversion of aid flows from individual project agreements 
to block grants to fund programmes coordinated and administered by the government, 
a responsibility donors are as yet hesitant to relinquish completely.
From the perspective of the Tanzanian government, the donor practice of 
bypassing the central budgetary process and establishing parallel administrative 
structures for aid projects creates its own problems for improving aid coordination. 
Extrabudgetary aid flows undermine the predictability of available resources and the 
utility of the national budget as a tool for managing and planning government 
development efforts. It also implicitly questions the integrity of the budgetary process
49 These instances were revealed in a review of CIDA Canada Fund project files and memoranda and in 
interviews conducted in Hanang.
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and the Tanzanian parliamentary system.51 The 1998 Public Expenditure Review 
condemned the practice, stating that it “undermines attempts to hold managers 
accountable for sector outputs, since the failure to provide resources in accordance 
with budgetary allocations necessarily breaches an understanding on achievements to 
be expected on the basis of budget provisions.”52 The Review described the impact 
of extrabudgetary aid agreements on the government’s ability to plan for the future:
As several sector programmes are pursued with competing demands on 
central government resources, overall budget strategy becomes a 
residual exercise in minimizing the extent of default against 
irreconcilable commitments, driven more by donor reaction to 
shortfalls in counterpart funding commitments than by any long term 
view.53
The establishment of administrative procedures for the HPDF project therefore 
raised the issue of ownership and control over development. Determining the mode 
of administration for CIDA’s assistance to community development in Hanang was 
also a decision as to the objectives of the project: fostering democratic development 
and good governance through the government structure; developing the capacity of 
‘civil society’ groups by seeking a counterpart agency in the non-governmental 
sector; or making the efficient provision of social services the priority -  building 
schools, wells, et cetera, and manage the project directly. CIDA eventually chose a 
hybrid administrative structure, as outlined below.
The feasibility study of 1991 served as the working document for project 
planners until the project was cancelled in 1993 and again when it was resurrected in 
1994. It recommended that Canadian assistance to Hanang be delivered through two 
channels: the District Council and a Hanang Development Trust Fund, an NGO to be 
established to administer projects falling outside the purview of the District Council. 
The feasibility consultants argued that:
Because the program is based in the Hanang District and the overall 
approach emphasizes people participating in the implementation of
50 URT, Development Cooperation Forum, 27 November 1998.
51 Interview.
52 URT/World Bank, Public Expenditure Review 1998.
53 Ibid:23.
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development projects, it follows that the major executive policy 
decisions of the Program should rest with the people of Hanang 
through their elected representatives in the District Council and Village 
Councils. The program should avoid being an independent unit 
outside the influence of the District Council. This implies that a close 
integration between the program and the District Council is necessary.
The program should seek to strengthen the council’s capacity in 
planning and implementation of development projects for the people.54
The 1991 proposal envisioned that a program office would be established with 
four expatriate staff to facilitate the project and offer technical assistance. It was not 
to be responsible for the allocation of funds or the implementation of projects, which 
would be the role of the District Council and the Trust Fund committee. The 
proposed employment of four expatriate field staff for the first five years of the 
project at a cost of $2.44 million out of a total project budget of $4.46 million meant 
that approximately $2 million would be available for community development 
projects.55 Before any decisions were taken at CIDA with respect to the 
administrative structure of the project or the identity of the Tanzanian counterpart 
agency, the project was cancelled in early 1993. When it was resurrected following 
the release of the Kisanga Commission in mid 1993, it was decided that only one 
expatriate project coordinator would be hired. Further, CIDA officials expressed 
reluctance to channel funds through the District Council or to rely on it to implement 
the project. This was on the grounds that there was little transparency in its 
accounting procedures, that it was notoriously slow in acting, and because there was 
no guarantee that it would adequately represent the interests of the Barabaig.56
CIDA officials believed there was a lack of trust between the local population 
and the District Council and that this would hamper project activities. Since 1989, 
CIDA had funded twenty-five Canada Fund projects in Hanang in addition to a small 
number of projects financed by the Tanzanian administered counterpart fund.57 These 
included the construction of classrooms and dispensaries, the provision of maize
54 Evjen et al, 1991:20.
55 Ibid.
56 CIDA internal memo Dar post to HQ, 9 February 1994, CIDA file no. H902/18705-63 Hanang 
Participatory Development -  Briefing Memoranda, vol. 1.
57 As a condition attached to Canada’s balance of payments support to Tanzania in the 1980’s, the 
Government of Tanzania was required to deposit twenty percent of the proceeds of the sale of Canadian
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grinding mills to a number of women’s groups and entrepreneurial training courses. 
Though records are not complete, and not all of these projects were visited in the 
course of research for this paper, a review of Canada Fund project files indicates that 
District Council was not always able to account for the use of funds provided by 
Canada, and that a number of projects under its administration were incompletely or 
ineffectively implemented.58 On the basis of its past experience in Hanang, the field 
office expressed its objection to channeling funds through the District Council in 
strenuous terms.59 It claimed legitimacy for this position in the findings of the 
Kisanga Commission, which recommended the development of non-governmental 
organizations in Hanang as an antidote to local power imbalances. But this posed 
another problem for CIDA: finding an alternative. A CIDA officer stated: “The 
problem in a nutshell is this: there are no viable NGOs in Hanang District who have 
the capacity to implement a large project.”60
The most obvious choice to serve as the administrative conduit for the HPDF 
appeared early on, at least, to be the local organization which had been established to 
advocate for the Barabaig in their fight against NAFCO. In the late 1970’s, a 
traditional council of Barabaig elders was convened to address the problem posed by 
the expansion of the wheat project, known as makchameda NAFCO. In 1991, this 
. group was constituted as a local chapter of Korongoro Integrated People Oriented 
Conservation (KIPOC), an NGO originally established to protect the interests of the 
Masaai. KIPOC was active in pursuing the Barabaig land claims in the Tanzanian 
courts, but was subsequently banned by the central government. In 1994, a second 
organization called Bulgalda was established to represent the interests of the Barabaig 
and was comprised of many of the same individuals. In early 1996, a split occurred 
within Bulgalda over the leadership of the organization, and KIPOC was 
reestablished. However, these organizations appear to have lost the confidence of
donated commodities into a Counterpart Fund which was to be spent on mutually agreed upon projects. 
In Hanang, for example, it funded construction of a stretch o f road.
58 Review of Canada Fund project files, Dar es Salaam, May 1999; CIDA project files, Hull.
59 CIDA internal memo Dar post to HQ, 22 February 1994, CIDA file no. H902/18705-63 Hanang 
Participatory Development -  Briefing Memoranda, vol. 1.
60 Fax post Dar to CIDA HQ 23 November 1993, CIDA file no. H902/18705-63 Hanang Participatory 
Development -  Briefing Memoranda, vol. 1.
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many of the people they claimed to represent and remain mired in organizational 
problems.
6.7 CUSO’s ROLE IN SHAPING EVENTS IN HANANG
The history of Bulgalda/KIPOC in Hanang is inextricably linked to the 
activities of the Canadian NGO CUSO there. CUSO, originally the Canadian 
University Service Overseas, is an organization started in the 1960’s to send Canadian 
volunteer teachers overseas. It’s mission has changed somewhat over the years, and 
in the 1980’s in Tanzania, its Canadian cooperants and locally engaged programme 
director were involved primarily in community development and advocacy work on 
behalf of the Barabaig. CUSO has been a persistent thorn in CIDA’s side in 
Tanzania. The intense public criticism CUSO’s media campaign against the wheat 
project engendered in Canada ultimately moved CIDA to take steps to redress the 
problems its project had contributed to creating, a fact made clear by the repeated 
references to the media, CUSO, and public opinion found in CIDA files. In this way, 
CUSO has had a fundamental influence on Canadian aid policy in Hanang. The NGO 
has continued to act as an advocate for Tanzanian pastoralist rights lobbying the 
Canadian government, funding legal aid for Barabaig land claims against NAFCO, 
placing cooperants in the area to promote community development activities and 
providing funding and technical assistance to Bulgalda/KIPOC. However, CUSO’s 
later activities in Hanang, particularly its involvement with Bulgalda in the early to 
mid-1990s, had a disruptive and destabilizing effect on the local community. In 
attempting to implement its community development project in Hanang, CIDA was 
forced to confront a conflagration of suspicion and hostility fuelled by CUSO actions.
It is apparent from a review of both CUSO and CIDA files related to Tanzania 
that throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the CUSO-CIDA relationship in Tanzania was 
one characterized by mutual suspicion and frequent conflict. At one level, this 
tension can be attributed to the strain inherent in the relationship between the 
Canadian government and Canadian international development NGOs as a whole. 
Canadian NGOs are often critical of the official development assistance programme 
while at the same time dependent on CIDA to provide most of the funds with which
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the majority of them finance their activities.61 In addition, as a group, Canadian 
NGOs engaged in international development work play an informal role in monitoring 
Canadian ODA and CIDA’s activities. Within Tanzania, CIDA and CUSO crossed 
swords over Canadian policy and engaged in turf wars on several occasions over the 
years.62 However, it appears that the poor relationship between the two organizations 
in Tanzania was exacerbated by personality conflicts between CUSO and CIDA field 
staff in the late 1980s -  early 1990s. The CUSO Programme Director appointed in 
1990 in particular seemed to relish intrigue and confrontation.
Both CUSO and CIDA had plans to implement a community development 
project in Hanang in response to the Kisanga Commission’s recommendations. In 
fact, in 1991, CIDA had approached CUSO about the possibility of acting as the 
Canadian Executing Agency for the then planned CIDA project in Hanang.
According to CUSO files, CUSO had refused the invitation because it did not feel that 
CIDA had sufficiently involved the Barabaig in the design of the project.63 CUSO 
Tanzania’s Programme Director repeated this criticism of the CIDA project before the 
Canadian Parliamentary Sucommittee on Financial Institutions in Ottawa in June 
1992.64 CIDA then contracted CLWR as the project executing agency. In January 
1994, CUSO sent two consultants to Hanang to identify possibilities for its own 
project. The proposal they produced outlined continued support to human rights 
advocacy in Hanang, with the economic development component very similar in its 
particulars to that proposed by the CIDA commissioned study of 1991.65 In the same 
period (January 1994), CUSO’s Tanzania office launched a fund-raising appeal in 
Canada, distributing a letter detailing the atrocities which had occurred on the wheat 
farms and outlining CUSO’s plans for its community development project in Hanang. 
This was initially a cause of consternation at CIDA, prompting a number of meetings 
between CIDA and CUSO representatives in Ottawa and Tanzania.66
61 See Brodhead,1988; Smillie,1995; Smillie,1985.
62 See for example CIDA Project no. 902/12436 -  Kimani Irrigation 1987 -  1995.
63 CUSO files, Ottawa office.
64 CIDA Bilateral End of Project Report 902/17171 -  Hanang Community Development
65 See Gabba and Green for CUSO, August 1994; and Evjen et al for CIDA, May 1991.
66 CIDA File no. H902/18705-63, Vol.l Hanang Participatory Development: Briefing Memoranda
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CUSO saw its role in Hanang as that of a catalyst to mobilize residents to 
improve access to water, education, and health services. It planned to support land 
use planning and to continue to fund legal aid for the Barabaig land claimants. It 
envisioned fielding six to seven cooperants in the district. Two cooperants had been 
in place in Hanang since 1991, and had facilitated the construction of a school, the 
provision of maize mills in several communities and entrepreneurial training for 
women. The majority of funds for these projects had come from CIDA’s Canada 
Fund. CUSO officials indicated that they intended to seek funding from CIDA to 
implement their larger community development project in Hanang as well. It wanted 
to establish a consortium of international NGOs to provide the balance of financing 
required. Nevertheless, relations between CIDA field staff and the CUSO programme 
director in Tanzania remained acrimonious.
In April 1994, CIDA received a letter from KIPOC accusing the aid agency of 
trying to shut KIPOC out of development work in Hanang, and of trying to force its 
‘unilaterally’ planned project on the community. In July 1994, CUSO held one of a 
series of workshops in northern Tanzania devoted to discussing the situation of the 
Barabaig in Hanang. The draft project proposal was discussed, but the primary topic 
of discussion was land security, with a day devoted to public testimonials of abuse 
suffered at the hands of NAFCO employees. The CIDA representative (who attended 
with observer status) reported to HQ that she became a “lightening rod for the litany 
of suffering and harassment experienced over the years. I was also perceived as 
principal saviour and benefactor.”
The potentially overlapping activities of the Canadian government and a 
Canadian NGO in Hanang raised the concern of the Tanzanian Minister of 
Agriculture who was the MP for the area (and later Prime Minister). He held 
discussions with CIDA and summoned the CUSO representative to express his 
concern and desire that the agencies work out their problem and get a project on the 
ground.69 In the end, CIDA decided to proceed with its project as planned, reasoning
67 CIDA file no. H902/180705-01 -- Hanang Participatory Development -  General, vol. 2.
68 Fax post Dar to CIDA HQ, 3 August 1994, CIDA file no. H902/180705-01 -  Hanang Participatory 
Development -  General, vol. 3.
69 CUSO files, Ottawa office.
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that CUSO did not have the financial resources to provide the ‘big ticket items’ like 
schools, water projects and hospitals that both project proposals had highlighted as 
priorities. CIDA officers also believed that CUSO’s emphasis on advocacy and 
providing assistance in the form of volunteers would sufficiently differentiate its 
activities from those of CIDA in Hanang so as to avoid major overlap. A CIDA 
officer opined:
I think that CIDA is presented here with a golden opportunity to 
demonstrate some leadership with regards to this project; to be 
proactive, rather than reactive; to stop being afraid of how CUSO will 
portray CIDA’s involvement in Hanang in the media...the Barabaig 
should [be] thought of as the target group with reference to project 
design, not CUSO.70
CUSO’s community development project in Hanang ultimately failed to 
materialize. There were allegations of financial impropriety against CUSO’s 
programme director from CUSO cooperants in the field. The Tanzanian government 
also let be known its displeasure that a Canadian NGO in Tanzania was being 
represented by a Kenyan with an adversarial political agenda. Charles Lane, the 
academic who championed Barabaig rights and was highly critical of the CIDA 
funded wheat project, stated to CIDA representatives his concern over the CUSO 
programme director’s influence on Bulgalda.71 Two CUSO cooperants finishing their 
posting in Hanang in 1993 in their final report to CUSO HQ stated their concern with 
the “potentially disruptive interventions of CUSO and KIPOC in Hanang.”72
One of the major disruptions we have observed has been 
CUSOTanzania’s reliance on representatives of the Barabaig 
community without determining if they are accountable to the real 
leadership.73
The CUSO cooperants suggested that the KIPOC leadership in Hanang was 
perceived by the population at large as educated elites whose authority to speak for 
the Barabaig was not sanctioned by the traditional councils of elders. They also
70 Fax Dar post to CIDA HQ, 9 February 1994, CIDA file no. H902/18705-63 -  Briefing Memoranda, 
vol. 1.
71 e-mail CIDA post Dar to CIDA HQ 16 September 1996, CIDA file no. 902/ [81]
72 Breault and Fraser, 1993.
73 Ibid
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noted KIPOC’s origins as an organization formed to advocate for the Maasai and 
suggested that KIPOC had developed an adversarial approach to its dealings with 
the Tanzanian Government that was not consistent with Barabaig political culture, 
which favoured consensus building.
In 1996 CUSO fired its programme director in Tanzania and froze its funding 
to Bulgalda until the truly representative leadership of the Barabaig could be 
identified; as did NOVIB, the Dutch NGO which had funded Bulgalda through 
CUSO. However, the upheaval CUSO’s activities had wrought in Bulgalda/KIPOC 
had created divisions within the Barabaig community, and exacerbated tensions 
between the Barabaig, other local ethnic groups, and the District Council. In August 
1996 CIDA received a second letter from Bulgalda stating its approval that the 
proposed CIDA project had been put on hold. It said:
Today that money is not wanted by the Barabaig unless their land is 
demarcated participatorily and left to them...We may think that the 
Canadians are now coming up with their money for the final 
slaughtering of the Barabaig community after torturing us with their 
help to the farming interests (NAFCO) in the past.74
It was reported by a former member of Bulgalda that when he refused to sign 
this letter which had also severely criticized CLWR, the job he was supposed to take 
up in the NGO was taken away from him. He suggested that the CUSO programme 
director wanted to discredit CLWR so that CIDA would contract CUSO to implement 
its project.75 However, the programme director’s actions had scuttled not only any 
possibility of CUSO implementing a community development programme in Hanang, 
but had delayed CIDA’s project as well. After his departure, CIDA embarked on a 
series of extensive consultations in the community to reach the consensus necessary 
for the project to go ahead. This culminated in December 1996 which, as described 
above, resulted in the project getting the approval of both the community and of 
CIDA HQ to commence. However, a central dilemma concerning the implementation 
of the HPDF remained unresolved; i.e. the identification of a Tanzanian counterpart
74 CIDA file no. H902/180705-01 -  Hanang Participatory Development -  General, vol. 10.
75 CIDA file no. H902/180705-01 -  Hanang Participatory Development -  General, vol. 9.
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agency through which the project would be administered. If not Bulgalda, if not 
District Council, then whom?
6.8 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE FOR 
THE PROJECT
Based on its assessment of the divisions within the community in Hanang, 
CIDA returned to an idea proposed in the 1991 feasibility study; that of having 
applications for funds assessed by a project committee made up of representatives 
from different segments of the community. However, whereas the initial proposal had 
suggested that this committee would deal only with the residual areas which fell 
outside of the jurisdiction of the District Council, in 1996 CIDA determined that this 
body would handle all allocations of project funds. In addition, to calm local 
tensions, it was felt that it would have to be and be seen to be completely independent 
and not to favour any local faction above another. Part of this meant identifying the 
target group of the project not as the Barabaig, as earlier incarnations of the proposed 
project had done, but as the entire population of Hanang. Accordingly, CIDA 
officials devised a unique administrative structure composed of two voluntary bodies: 
a national Board of Trustees (with representation from the central government, the 
Office of the Chief Justice, the Canadian government and the private sector), and a 
locally selected Project Development Group (PDG) composed of a representative 
cross-section of local leadership.
This two tier management structure was adopted with the objective of 
“ensuring that development activities in the district strike a balance between locally 
felt needs and the national policies of the elected government.” The PDG meets 
quarterly to assess applications for project funding from local residents and 
community groups. The sectors eligible for funding are water, health, education and 
micro-enterprise, priorities identified through public consultations in Hanang. The 
recommendations of the PDG are then reviewed by the Board of Trustees on whose 
approval funds are released. In this administrative arrangement, the Canadian 
facilitator has no vote on the allocation of funds. His job, in concert with the 
Tanzanian village liaison officer, is to assist the operations of the Project
315
Development Group and to offer support to local groups in preparing their project 
proposals for submission to the committee. Much of the first two years the project 
was in operation were taken up with recruiting representatives for both the Board of 
Governors and the Project Development Group, conducting intensive training 
workshops for PDG members and community leaders, and a schedule of village 
outreach visits to familiarize the residents of Hanang with the existence of the Fund 
and their options to access it. Project funds do not flow through the central treasury 
or the District Council, but from a special account established by CIDA; a practice 
which is, as noted above, controversial among donors.
Another matter of controversy which continued to affect the project in 1999 
was the position allocated to the District Council in the administrative structure of the 
HPDF. On the Project Development Group, the District Council has been allocated 
four seats, which does not give it majority control. This remained a contentious issue 
in 1999 with District Council resistance to a reduction in its authority. This resistance 
is manifest in a number of ways which serve to undermine the project. For example, 
one village council representative in an area where women walk six hours a day to 
fetch water reported requesting assistance from the District Council in making a 
technical assessment of the options to improve water sources so that the village could 
make an application to the HPDF for funding for a water project. He was informed 
that no assistance would be given in support of an application to the HPDF, and if the 
village wanted a new well, it should apply to the District Council; a step which had on 
two occasions in the past met with no success. District Council representatives argue 
that the administration of the HPDF outside of District Council control undermines 
the Council’s legitimate authority and its ability to manage and direct the provision of 
public services and economic development projects in the District. The presence of 
District officials on the HPDF Project Development Group is not regarded as 
sufficient. Although the District Council is permitted to submit applications for 
funding to the HPDF, it did not do so for the first round of proposal assessments in 
1999.
76 HPDF Management Plan, Feb. 1998.
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6.9 CONCLUSIONS
At the time of writing, the HPDF has been active for three years, having made 
its first disbursements for locally identified projects in 1999. It is not possible at this 
point to make any kind of knowledgeable assessment of the success of the HPDF in 
meeting its objectives. However, the amount of time and energy CIDA has invested 
in designing the project and its unique and controversial administrative structure will 
make this a very interesting case to watch over the next few years. The history of the 
project thus far raises a number of issues which merit future attention.
This discussion of the lengthy and complicated gestation of the HPDF 
provides a powerful demonstration of the fact that the aid policy making process does 
not end with the articulation of policy objectives. The form Canadian aid takes and its 
outcomes are significantly determined by obstacles encountered in the process of 
implementation. These constraints arise both within the aid agency and in the 
recipient country.
It seems quite clear from the evidence presented above that CIDA was 
motivated to do something about the problems created by its wheat project in Hanang 
as a result of public criticism, and that the HPDF was bom primarily as an exercise in 
political damage control. With respect to the explanations of bureaucratic failure 
outlined in Chapter One, the history of the TCWP and the HPDF seems to provide a 
potent example of the manner in which oversight mechanisms for the aid programme 
function in the Canadian political system. It was a vigilant and vocal NGO lobby and 
critical press coverage which succeeded in moving CIDA to address the aftermath of 
the wheat project in Hanang. As the debates among CIDA officials recounted above 
suggest, CIDA management was anxious to limit the agency’s involvement in Hanang 
to what was necessary to quell public criticism. In determining the most appropriate 
course of action, the divergence of opinion among aid officials -  most often between 
the field office and agency headquarters -  is illustrative of the different pressures to 
which each was subjected. The field office’s interpretation of the situation in Hanang 
was shaped by its close proximity to events there and its interactions with the various 
local interest groups. Programme staff at headquarters where major management
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decisions were made, were operating within the Ottawa political context, where 
domestic political and economic considerations were comparatively more important.
Rather than setting up a large scale rural development project, CIDA chose to 
establish a small projects fund in Hanang. The political and economic parameters 
established for Canadian involvement in the project pose two questions. Firstly, can a 
project which is political in origin meet subsequently determined developmental 
objectives? Secondly, given the poor record of Canada Fund projects in Tanzania, 
can a similar small projects fund in Hanang be expected to meet with better success? 
Many of the small projects funded through the Canada Fund have not proven 
sustainable, and in Hanang itself there are rusting, unused maize mills and half ­
finished classrooms which demonstrate this. It is important to note that the design of 
the HPDF was not only a response to domestic political pressures in Canada, or 
expressed local needs in Hanang. It is also part of an international trend in aid 
practice which emphasizes participatory development, donor support to district- 
focused integrated rural development projects, and the establishment of small projects 
funds. Existing research on Social Funds of this type has questioned their 
effectiveness.77 Will the capacity building aspect and monitoring component of the 
HPDF serve to offset the weaknesses apparent in the Canada Fund model?
Faced with a community in caught up in a turmoil which its wheat project had 
contributed to creating, CIDA has invested considerable time and resources in 
consulting with the local population in defining the objectives of the HPDF and in 
obtaining broad public participation in and support for the project. No doubt it would 
have been severely criticized had it not done so. However, this approach is an 
extremely slow, expensive, and labour intensive method of disbursing aid funds. The 
planning phase involved the commissioning of two project feasibility studies; at least 
four planning missions to Hanang from Canada, with attendant costs for airfare and 
accommodation; several other visits from the field office and meetings between 
Canadian and Tanzanian officials in Ottawa and Tanzania; the hiring of consultants to 
produce four reports on different aspects of the situation in Hanang; and the 
organization of public meetings and workshops. After seven years in development
77 See for example Tendler,2000.
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and three years in operation, the HPDF made its first disbursements in June 1999 for 
sixteen projects amounting to around $10,000 in total. It is obvious that the Canadian 
aid programme as it is currently structured could not support many projects like the 
HPDF and hope to disburse even a fraction of its aid budget each year. On the other 
hand, one of the most adamant lessons of the history of aid is that merely throwing 
huge sums of money at a problem does not work, as the TCWP itself demonstrated. 
After forty years of ODA, it seems clear that aid must take a new form to be useful. 
For this reason, the HPDF will be an instructive case to watch unfold.
Although the HPDF began operations with broad public support in Hanang, 
there are a number of unresolved issues which loom as potential problems in the 
future. The most serious of these is the unresolved dispute over land use in the area. 
The records discussed above indicate that CIDA officials were convinced early on 
that resolution of the land use issue was central to the success of future economic 
development efforts in the District. However, this concern was subsequently set 
aside. As the HPDF continues to allocate funds without a District Land Use plan or 
District Development Plan to guide it in the distribution of resources throughout the 
District, the land use issue has the potential to flare up again in the future. In broader 
terms, this issue and this case in general is illustrative of the unresolved delineation of 
responsibility for and control over the aid process between donors and recipients. It 
also shows the way in which local political conflicts and institutional weaknesses 
disrupt and undermine even the best intentioned donor programmes. The lines 
between the responsible administration of aid funds, an irresponsible abdication of 
authority, and an infringement of local sovereignty is unclear.
As noted above, there are problems associated with the donor practice of 
circumventing the government bureaucracy and setting up parallel administrative 
structures for their projects. Critics argue that it undermines the parliamentary system 
and the budgetary process, and perpetuates the weaknesses of local government 
institutions rather than addressing them. It is also argued that this practice creates 
unsustainable management structures dependent on donor involvement to function. 
The counter to this argument is that poor, hungry, sick people cannot wait for huge 
and often corrupted government bureaucracies to evolve into efficient public service
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delivery mechanisms. In trying to implement its rural development project in 
Hanang, CIDA faced a suspicious and divided community, one where local conflict 
had escalated to the level of physical violence. In these circumstances, CIDA 
decided that the local District Council did not have the credibility to act as a conduit 
for aid funds. Residents had expressed their distrust of District officials and their 
belief that they were colluding with NAFCO employees to turf them off their land and 
siphon profits from the wheat scheme. The District Council’s record of managing 
Canada Fund projects in the past was poor. Bulgalda/KIPOC had its own internal 
weaknesses and did not appear to enjoy broad public support. Yet somehow, all of 
these parties had to be brought together if economic development efforts are to have 
any chance of succeeding in the District. CIDA elected to establish an independent 
board to administer project funds. The continued resistance of the District Council to 
this arrangement threatens to undermine the success of the project. Other donors in 
other areas have adopted different approaches. A comparison of these various 
approaches would be a useful exercise to ascertain best practice.
CIDA’s protracted negotiations with the NGOs CLWR, WUSC and CUSO 
over the implementation of the HPDF raises the issue of who should be implementing 
agents for aid projects. The literature and documentation reviewed in previous 
chapters suggests that commercial contractors are motivated primarily by profit 
potential in their pursuit and execution of aid contracts, and that this often conflicts 
with poverty reduction objectives. However, this case demonstrates that NGOs do not
•  •  78necessarily offer the magic solution to this problem of perverse incentives. 
CUSOTanzania’s actions in Hanang revealed its own political agenda and its 
susceptibility to the power and financial perks offered by the control of aid funds. 
CIDA’s initial dismissal of CLWR’s reading of the situation in Hanang, an 
interpretation which later proved to be more or less accurate, illustrates the degree to 
which the aid agency is dependent on its executing agents to provide the field 
knowledge to guide project management decisions. Several aid officials commented 
that in their view, the success or failure of an aid project frequently boils down to 
finding the right person or people to implement it.
78 See Edwards and Hume.
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A final matter of concern is the fact that the first solicitation of project 
proposals in Hanang did not yield any projects targeted at the Barabaig community, 
CIDA’s primary objective in initiating the project. Project administrators face the 
challenge of promoting the participation of the Barabaig population if they are not to 
be disadvantaged in the project selection process.
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CONCLUSIONS
Foreign aid was conceived of as a temporary measure. Early development 
theorists like Rostow imagined that it was possible for non-industrialized societies to 
achieve the conditions necessary for economic take-off in thirty to forty years. In 
1966, economist Rene Dumont boldly proclaimed that underdevelopment in Africa 
could be overcome in twenty years. After forty years of international development 
assistance, the majority of people in Tanzania and in most of Africa and the rest of the 
southern hemisphere are still living out their lives in terrible poverty and hardship.
The range of possible explanations for the persistence of poverty in these places 
extends far beyond aid policy; and ODA, no matter how well-intentioned or 
efficiently applied, can not by itself end poverty. Yet, even when assessed against the 
more limited objectives of individual aid projects and policies, the record of aid in 
Africa and elsewhere is poor. Project failure is the rule rather than the exception.
This study was conducted to improve our understanding of why aid so often 
fails, and why, despite a general awareness of the flaws in the Canadian aid 
programme, it has proven so resistant to substantial alteration. This understanding is 
a prerequisite to determining how the time, energy, and resources currently allocated 
to ODA might be used more effectively for poverty reduction. Four specific research 
questions were addressed. This research began with the assumption that 
understanding aid failure involves, in the first instance, a clarification of the 
objectives of aid, and secondly, of the forces which determine these objectives. The 
aim was then to assess the impact of these forces on the outcome of aid policies and 
projects. Finally, it was hoped that examining the decision-making processes within 
the Canadian aid programme in specific instances would yield some insights into 
CIDA’s capacity to apply the lessons of experience to improve aid practice. These 
questions have been approached through a detailed examination of the aid policy­
making and implementation process, focussed on a series of examples drawn from the 
history of Canadian ODA in Tanzania.
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Each of the cases reviewed here provides a demonstration of the multiplicity 
of forces exerting an influence on the course of events at each juncture in the 
decision-making process. Each also illustrates how attempts to improve aid practice 
have been frustrated by these intervening forces, even where expert advice and the 
lessons of forty years of development assistance efforts have indicated a particular 
course of action as the best option to improve the effectiveness of ODA.
The evidence presented here strongly suggests that despite its official 
objectives, finding and implementing the most effective means to assist economic 
development and poverty reduction in aid recipient countries has not been the primary 
objective pursued through the Canadian aid programme. However, it is hoped that 
this study makes it equally clear that most Canadian aid officials charged with 
administering Canada’s aid programme are committed to maximizing the 
‘development’ potential of aid resources. The problem, as Hyden and Mukandala 
observed with respect to the American aid programme, is that “Altruism inhabits 
whatever cracks and crevices of the policy structure are not covered by realist 
concerns.”1
In the cases examined here, there is little evidence that altruism or ‘humane 
internationalism’ as it is outlined in Chapter One is the guiding principle for Canadian 
aid policy. More often, the impact of a particular policy decision on the supposed 
beneficiaries of ODA is relegated to a secondary or tertiary consideration behind other 
‘realist concerns.’ These are primarily the interests of the Canadian commercial 
sector, Canadian foreign policy objectives and domestic politics. Also significant 
determinants of aid policy are bureaucratic politics, and in some cases, the actions of 
the media and public interest groups. Thus, in accordance with several of the papers 
cited in Chapter One, this study concludes that Canadian aid has been pressed into the 
service of mixed and often conflicting objectives the pursuit of which has reduced its 
effectiveness as a tool for economic development in recipient countries.
This study also addressed the question of the extent to which Canadian aid 
policy can be explained in terms of its participation in an international aid system, and
1 Hyden and Mukandala: 6
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the constraints inherent in the bureaucratic structure of the aid programme in Canada. 
International discussions and agreements forged in bodies like the World Bank and 
the DAC appear to have a weak but discernible and increasing influence on Canadian 
aid policy, particularly in placing issues on the international policy agenda.
The cases presented here also suggest that the Canadian aid programme 
suffers from some of the weaknesses common to bureaucratic institutions in general 
as well as some which stem from CIDA’s unique mandate as an aid agency, and that 
these affect Canada’s ability to deliver useful aid. In particular, it is argued that the 
administrative structure of the aid programme makes it very vulnerable to invasion by 
the political and economic interests outlined above, which run contrary to the interests 
of the intended beneficiaries of Canadian ODA. The cases presented here 
demonstrate that the scope for policy innovation is further constrained by common 
ailments of bureaucratic institutions like path dependence, an inappropriate incentive 
system, and weak oversight.
As the history of Canadian involvement in Hanang District, Tanzania 
presented in Part II illustrates, obstacles encountered in the project implementation 
process also pose significant constraints on the effective use of aid resources. The 
policies and actions of the recipient government; its capacity to administer aid 
effectively; local politics; and the existence of necessary supporting infrastructure for 
the aid project all had an effect on its outcome. The remainder of this chapter will 
assess the various factors which have shaped Canadian aid policy and their impact on 
policy outcomes as evidenced in the cases presented in the body of this thesis.
7.1 INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON CANADIAN AID POLICY
Chapter One highlighted external influences as a relatively unexplored avenue 
of investigation in the debates surrounding the determinants of Canadian aid policy. It 
introduced the concept of an aid regime as put forward by Wood, Lumsdaine and 
others to explain the establishment of the international aid system and the relative 
uniformity of the response of western industrialized countries to poverty in the South. 
While Lumsdaine argues that the institutions of development assistance were
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established to foster economic development in the South and end global poverty, 
Wood argues that the primary purpose of aid is to maintain stability in a global 
economic system which favours the interests of the industrialized countries of the 
West. This section addresses the question of the utility of this concept in explaining 
Canadian policy decisions in the specific cases examined here.
Demonstrating that an international aid regime exerts an influence on 
Canadian aid policy requires addressing four questions. Firstly, it is necessary to 
identify the principles and norms of the aid regime. Secondly, to determine the 
process by which these norms are transmitted throughout the regime and into the 
Canadian policy-making process. Thirdly, the formal and informal means by which 
these norms are enforced must be demonstrated. Finally, an assessment of the 
countervailing forces challenging regime norms must be made in order to determine 
the strength of the disciplinary power of an international aid regime on Canada and 
the relative strength of competing forces. For the claim that an international aid 
regime exists and that it influences Canadian aid policy to be accepted, there must be 
evidence that Canadian actions are not just based on a straightforward calculation of 
Canada’s own political and economic interests. In concrete terms, one might look for 
evidence of influence exerted by two prominent players in the foreign aid system: the 
World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, as has been 
done here. The World Bank is the largest and most powerful aid agency in the world 
controlling vast resources. The DAC, composed of the western aid donors, through 
its working groups and annual high level meetings plays a lead role in the negotiation 
and codification of internationally agreed principles governing aid practice.
The idea of a self-regulating international aid regime has appeal when seeking 
to explain why the response of western countries to poverty in the south has been so 
similar in form and content. At the most general level, structural adjustment, 
conditionality, decentralization, modernization through large scale mechanized 
farming projects like the TCWP, and the initiation of small projects funds with an 
emphasis on public participation like the HPDF, were all in accordance with broad 
trends in development assistance among western aid donors at the time each was 
initiated. However, in seeking to understand why Canadian ODA has taken the form it
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has in Tanzania, the explanatory power of the concept of an aid regime is limited, as 
the cases reviewed in this paper suggest. As it is hoped has been made clear in the 
preceding discussion, there were important factors particular to each case which 
shaped Canadian actions and which can not be described as emanating from any 
external source or as the result of pressure exerted through the international aid 
system.
Analyzing the Canadian aid programme as part of the international aid system 
does yield some insights into the aid process, however. It is without doubt that 
international donors can exert heavy pressure on aid recipient countries, bolstered by 
the power to withdraw aid. In contrast, the ability of organizations like the World 
Bank and the DAC to discipline donor behaviour is limited by a lack of formal, 
binding mechanisms to ensure compliance, and as yet imperfect channels of 
communication and cooperation. The World Bank exercises a degree of authority in 
determining aid doctrine by dint of its omnipresence and a research capacity few 
bilateral donors can match. But the discussion of balance of payments support in 
Chapter Three has demonstrated that there are limits to its authority, and it has no 
means to compel dissenters to conform. Although generally in support of the IMF 
structural adjustment programme in Tanzania, bilateral donors have, on several 
occasions, voiced opposition to the perceived overzealous actions of the Fund and the 
Bank. Likewise, the failure of the most recent round of negotiations around untying 
aid and the various means donors have employed to circumvent the principles of 
effective ODA as they have been agreed in the DAC and described in Chapter Three 
illustrates the weak disciplinary power of this institution.
This being said, it is argued that the adoption of structural adjustment as a 
development priority moved the level of aid intervention from the level of individual, 
discrete aid projects to the level of macro-economic policy. This necessitated 
increased international coordination and the delegation of leadership to the World 
Bank, patterns of decision-making which have become institutionalized in the aid 
system and opened CIDA to greater external influence. The influence of international 
policy norms on Canadian policy is not due simply to subordination to the dictats of 
the World Bank or the DAC, but arises from the consensus which emerged among
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donors as to the nature of the problem and the solution. It is more accurate in these 
cases to say Canadian policy is a confirmation of World Bank and DAC positions 
rather than in compliance with them. The most important implication of the advent 
of structural adjustment and policy conditionality, in the context of the this discussion, 
is that it represents a relinquishment of a certain degree of autonomy in policy-making 
to the international financial institutions.
Some divergence between the policies of multilateral and bilateral aid 
agencies can be attributed to the different position each occupies in the international 
system. The World Bank is the world’s largest aid donor, but it is also charged with 
imposing stability on the international economic system. Bilateral donors are subject 
to a domestic constituency of tax payers and are responsible for balancing aid with 
other government responsibilities. Domestic factors also contribute to the diversity 
which exists among bilateral donors. For example, during the 1980s and early 1990s 
all donor programmes in Tanzania contained a substantial component of Balance of 
Payments support. The remainder of Nordic aid was targeted at the social sector 
while Canadian aid concentrated on industrial infrastructure. Canadian programme 
documents from the 1970's and early ‘80's refer to a conscious policy decision not to 
engage in basic human needs programming rationalizing that the Nordics were 
already covering this ground and Canadian expertise lay elsewhere. This may be 
interpreted as a division of labour among donors rather than an abrogation of 
international norms. Diversity in the strategies employed by bilateral donors does not 
challenge the fundamental underlying principles of the international aid system.
Evidence of the weak disciplinary authority of the DAC does not completely 
discredit the concept of an aid regime, but it does suggest that its norms are not 
necessarily those codified in international agreements, but are more informal in 
nature. For example, since the 1960’s there has been a formal commitment among 
donors to allocate 0.7% of their GDP to ODA. Few donors have met this target 
without repercussions. This suggests that the internationally acceptable threshold 
much lower. With respect to tied aid, donor behaviour in the DAC as outlined in 
Chapter Three implies a general consensus that it is legitimate to pursue domestic 
interests through aid programmes. These examples suggest that while Lumsdaine’s
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conception of an international aid regime guided by altruism maybe illusory, Wood’s 
idea that aid has been employed chiefly as a means to support the global economic 
system as it currently exists may be closer the mark.
Nevertheless, in examining decentralization, the design and implementation of aid 
projects, and even to an extent, the decision to cancel aid to Tanzania, it is difficult to 
discern pressure exerted through Canada’s connections with international 
organizations. In each of these cases, domestic interests were of primary importance.
7.2 THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE AID 
PROGRAMME
As reviewed in Chapter One, several observers of Canadian aid have argued 
that its primary purpose is to advance Canadian economic interests abroad. They 
have pointed to the heavily tied nature of Canadian ODA; the emphasis in the 
programme on large infrastructure and mechanization projects requiring masses of 
Canadian-made equipment and technical assistance; the disproportionate amount of 
food aid offered to recipient countries; and the fact that the bulk of aid is directed at 
middle-income countries rather than the poorest countries where it is most needed as 
evidence that this is so. Some scholars have also suggested that the aid programme 
has been directed to the benefit of the Canadian commercial sector because this 
segment of the population enjoys an access to and influence upon Canadian policy­
makers that the general public and certainly the supposed beneficiaries of aid do not 
have. The evidence in support of this view of Canadian ODA is convincing. 
Certainly, the Canadian aid programme has all of the characteristics described above. 
However, the line between cause and effect is unclear in the literature. The research 
presented here has attempted to assess the evidence that commercial interests 
influenced policy-makers in specific instances. The conclusion drawn from this 
research is that they have done so.
Pratt’s argument that commercial interests enjoy preferential access to 
decision-makers proved difficult to assess as much of this activity is shielded from 
public scrutiny. However, such information as is available in the public domain
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reveals that representatives from Canadian manufacturing concerns, professional 
associations, and other firms seeking aid contracts are frequent callers on senior 
officials within CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
This is an opportunity which is not generally extended to a member of the public with 
a view to express concerning the aid programme. More significant than personal 
access to decision-makers, the events described here confirm that, as Freeman has 
argued, the interests of the Canadian business community are actively protected and 
advanced as a duty by the most powerful elements of the Canadian political system -  
the Ministries of Finance; Foreign Affairs and International Trade; Industry; and at 
various times Fisheries, Labour, and Agriculture. The responsibility of these agencies 
to protect the interests of the constituencies they serve overrides CIDA’s stated 
mandate to help poor people in other countries.
The most explicit evidence that Canadian economic interests shape aid policy 
is found in memoranda contained in government files. They record, for example, that 
the decision to decentralize aid administration in 1989 was made in an effort to 
improve the effective use of aid resources, but that this step was actively opposed by 
Canadian manufacturers and contractors who feared they would lose business to 
companies in aid recipient countries. Canadian officials considered this opposition to 
have been a significant contributing factor in the government’s decision to 
recentralize the administration of aid barely a year and a half later. Likewise, when 
Canadian bilateral ODA to Tanzania and the rest of East Africa was terminated in 
1993, government ministers and officials openly admitted that East Africa had been 
singled out to bear the brunt of the recent budget cuts because it was a region with 
limited economic potential. They stated publicly that Canada preferred to maintain its 
involvement in North, West, and Southern Africa where the potential benefits for 
Canadian exporters and investors were better. The removal of aid from East Africa 
coincided with an increase in aid to the emerging markets of Eastern Europe and 
China. As Chapter Four has argued, the cancellation of aid to Tanzania was part of 
collective response on the part of several donors to that country’s failure to make 
adequate progress with its policy reforms. However, it also coincided with an attempt 
originating within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the
2 Pratt; Freeman.
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early 1990’s to reassert its authority over the aid programme and to reorient it towards 
more explicitly commercial objectives. The Conservative government’s Prosperity 
Initiative, the privatization of aid delivery, and the Development Assistance Policy 
Update discussed in Chapters Two and Four were all part of this.
Canadian manufacturers and commercial contractors have long been open and 
vocal in their opposition to the further untying of Canadian aid for procurement 
outside Canada, even where this could be demonstrated to be more beneficial to the 
intended recipients of Canadian aid. CIDA and DFAIT actively solicit the views of 
representatives from the commercial sector on the aid programme and new policy 
initiatives, as they do other parties identified as ‘stakeholders’ in the aid programme, 
namely development NGO’s and academics. The most recent round of negotiations 
in the DAC on an agreement to further untie bilateral aid as discussed in Chapter 
Three revealed a significant and disturbing characteristic of the commercial sector 
lobby in Canada. The big manufacturers were apparently not particularly concerned 
about the proposed agreement, which was, in fact, very limited in scope. Much more 
vocal in their opposition were the small to medium size consulting firms who these 
days implement the bulk of Canadian bilateral projects. That these companies, which 
as a group are charged with fulfilling the objectives of projects ostensibly designed to 
improve the quality of life in aid recipient countries, would oppose any measure 
which would increase economic opportunities in these countries seems to indicate a 
clear conflict of interest. Their tacit acquiescence to Canadian support for the 
proposed agreement at the DAC in 1999 says more about the limited scope of the 
agreement than it does the virtues of commercial contractors as implementing agents 
for aid projects.
Where concrete evidence of the influence of Canadian economic interests on 
aid is less clear cut is at the design and implementation stage of individual aid 
projects. The series of commodity grants to Tanzania reviewed above indicate that 
there were occasions on which Tanzania was urged to take certain goods (particularly 
aluminium) instead of others for which they had expressed a need, sometimes at 
above world market prices. The awarding of the tenders by the Canadian government 
to producers very far from Tanzania created numerous logistical problems. However,
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as CIDA officials argue, these commodities were offered as outright grants and 
therefore represented additional resources to the Tanzanian economy which might not 
otherwise have been available. It is not possible on the basis of the research 
conducted to make an accurate assessment of the impact of Canadian commodity 
agreements on the Tanzanian economy or to judge if the balance of payments support 
they were meant to provide would have been more beneficial if it had been given in 
the form of foreign exchange rather than tied to the provision of Canadian 
commodities, though there are indications in the files that Canadian officials believed 
this to have been the case.
Freeman has argued that the Tanzania Canada Wheat Project discussed in 
Chapter Five was designed as a large-scale mechanized production scheme because it 
served the dominant political interests in both Canada and Tanzania. She claims that 
it was supported by Canadian officials as a means to sell a large quantity of Canadian 
manufactured machinery. However, a review of all archived documentation and 
memoranda related to the design and implementation of the project reveals no explicit 
reference to this as the rationale.for Canadian funding for the project. In fact, during 
the planning stage of Phase II of the project, which expanded the scheme fivefold, 
Canadian aid officials expressed the view that they did not want to be seen to be 
pushing large-scale mechanization. Nevertheless, against the advice of several 
evaluations of the project, they did fund the expansion, with disastrous results. But it 
appears to have been a political investment rather than an economic one, designed to 
promote goodwill between Canada and Tanzania, with a clear-eyed understanding at 
the outset that it was not economically sustainable. Likewise, Canadian support for 
the Hanang Participatory Development Fund was first and foremost an exercise in 
political damage control for CIDA. After deciding it needed to implement a 
community development project in Hanang, and delineating the financial limits of its 
responsibility to the residents of Hanang, Canadian aid officials concentrated on how 
to make the project work. Maximizing Canadian economic interests did not enter into 
it. With the exception of the commodity agreements cited above, there is no explicit 
reference in any of over the project files reviewed for this study that promoting 
Canadian exports was a determining factor in project design.
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In support of Freeman’s argument, it must be acknowledged that Canada’s tied 
aid policy imposed limits on the type of project CIDA can fund. However, the 
influence of Canadian economic interests is exerted at the level of policy-making, as 
described above. The impact of this influence is, on the other hand, apparent in 
project outcomes. The mechanized wheat project was wholly inappropriate for 
northern Tanzania. The heavy emphasis in the Canadian aid programme in Tanzania 
on infrastructure projects has left a long list of Canadian made equipment that the 
Tanzanian government cannot afford to maintain.
7.3 THE AID PROGRAMME AS A BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTION
Each of the explanations offered above cites particular political or economic 
interests as causal factors in the determination of Canadian aid policy. It is argued 
that the institutionalized modes of assistance and processes of policy-making and 
administration have also constrained the policy options open to aid officials, adding to 
the other pressures cited above which divert aid policy from its developmental 
objectives. More importantly, it is argued that certain aspects of the administrative 
structure for the aid programme actively facilitate the pursuit of these competing 
objectives through Canadian ODA.
7.3.1 The relative autonomy of CIDA
Brett, in speaking of bureaucratic institutions in general; and-Hyden and 
Mukandala with respect to aid agencies in particular; have identified the degree of 
autonomy exercised by a bureaucratic agency as a determining factor in its ability to 
fulfil its responsibilities effectively. Elgstrom argues that autonomy is a necessary 
precondition for ‘responsiveness’, or an agency’s ability to adapt and innovate. 
“Dependency reduces or eliminates the prospect for responsiveness.”4 The Canadian 
aid programme is extremely vulnerable to politicking and the advancement of 
Canadian economic interests abroad. This is largely the product of an 
institutionalized conflict of interest between competing government responsibilities.
3 Brett, 1993; Hyden and Mukandala, 1999.
4 Elgstrom, 1999:150.
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CIDA is officially charged with applying aid resources to help reduce poverty in 
recipient countries. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
which has jurisdiction over CIDA, is responsible for protecting and maximizing 
Canadian interests abroad. To the extent it does not do so in any particular case, it 
could be said to be negligent in its duties.
As the discussions of decentralization, tied aid, and the aid budget cuts of 
1993 presented above illustrate, DFAIT’s overriding authority for all aspects of 
foreign policy including aid policy has historically meant that its position has 
prevailed, though it has sometimes been tempered by general public opinion which 
favours using aid only as an instrument for poverty reduction. CIDA lacks a 
legislated mandate legally binding the government to place the interests of the 
supposed beneficiaries of aid above all others in making decisions with respect to the 
aid programme. The research presented here suggests that the ambiguity which exists 
as to the objectives of Canadian aid has not served the agency well, and that attempts 
to introduce innovations designed to improve the effectiveness of ODA have been 
repeatedly foiled. Likewise, the lack of clearly defined guidelines for entering into 
aid agreements has enabled CIDA to fund projects like the TCWP which did not pass 
scrutiny as an economically viable and sustainable investment. Following Hyden and 
Mukandala’s argument that an agency’s relative autonomy depends on its control of 
financial resources, information and political support for its mission, CIDA’s 
centralized administrative structure and the wholesale privatization of aid delivery has 
reduced its control over development knowledge, and thus further eroded its 
autonomy.
7.3.2 The principal/agent problem
This ambiguity as to the objectives of the aid programme is also apparent 
when one attempts to identify the “principal” to whom aid officials are accountable in 
making their decisions, and the “agent” who must bear responsibility for the 
implementation of aid projects and for their outcomes. As an aid agency, CIDA is 
unique among government services in that its intended beneficiaries live in far away 
countries, do not vote, or pay taxes in Canada. The interests of these people are
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represented by proxy in Canada, informally by a small but vocal international 
development lobby, and within the government by CIDA. However, the government 
documents reviewed above reveal a considerable level of confusion within 
government as to the true ‘principal’ to whom aid officials must be accountable. At 
various times the media, Parliament, Canadian tax payers, and those organizations -- 
both non-profit and commercial -- which might wish to bid for aid contracts, are 
identified as the parties whose interests must be considered in defining and 
implementing aid policy. This is a problem in so far as their interests do coincide 
with those of the supposed beneficiaries of Canadian aid, as was the case in each of 
the policy decisions outlined above. For example, if Canadian taxpayers are 
identified as the constituency to whom aid officials are primarily accountable, the 
decision to cut government expenditure by cancelling the decentralization of aid 
administration was justified. If, however, people living in poverty in aid recipient 
countries are identified as the principals the aid programme is designed to serve, the 
acknowledged evidence from thirty years of ODA that the aid programme wasn’t 
achieving it objectives coupled with indications from the field that decentralization 
was improving aid delivery should have indicated that the policy should have been 
retained, with some modifications. A similar calculation could be made for each of 
the cases outlined above.
In response to public criticism of its actions such as occurred following the 
1993 termination of aid to East Africa, CIDA and DFAIT have made a concerted 
effort to improve and increase consultation with various parties identified as 
‘stakeholders’ in the aid programme. In the case of Tanzania, this is evident in the 
extensive local consultations which preceded the implementation of the HPDF, and in 
the preparation of the most recent bilateral programme framework document. In 
Canada, at the level of policy formulation, the government has institutionalized 
consultations with representatives from the NGO community, universities, and the 
private commercial sector. While the effort to open the aid programme to wider 
public debate is laudable, attempting to define policy by constructing a consensus 
among these three interest groups is not necessarily in the best interests of the 
supposed beneficiaries of Canadian ODA. NGOs and academics may serve as 
advocates for these interests within the Canadian political system; a role the business
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community would probably not claim. However, organizations and individuals from 
all three sectors also serve at various times as paid agents charged with the 
implementation of the aid programme. Thus they are both agents and beneficiaries of 
aid. Further, the evidence of forty years of disappointing efforts demonstrates that 
formulating effective strategies to foster economic growth and at the same time 
safeguard the welfare of the vulnerable members of society is a complex endeavour 
requiring expert knowledge in a wide variety of fields; knowledge unavailable in its 
entirety to the Canadian taxpayer, the president of an engineering consulting firm, or a 
nomadic herdsman in Tanzania. Therefore, policy cannot be merely a compromise or 
consensus of their disparate views and interests.
Taking the design and implementation of aid projects out of the hands of a 
large bureaucracy and giving it to contracted experts has the potential to improve the 
constructive use of aid, depending on the agent chosen. However, the multiplicity of 
agents involved in the administration of the aid programme as a consequence of 
privatization has muddied the lines of responsibility and accountability. The 
theoretical literature on how bureaucracies work examined in Chapter One has 
pointed to a range of motivations which guide the actions of public officials and/or 
private employees in fulfilling their duties. When looking at the institutionalized 
processes of aid, it must be recognized that the motives of a salaried public official 
will differ significantly from those of a private contractor looking for repeat business 
or an NGO with its own particular agenda. A review of a cross-section of projects of 
CIDA projects in Tanzania reveals that most projects are contracted to commercial 
engineering or manufacturing firms with no specific commitment to promote 
international development and often no previous experience working in a developing 
country. This has led to serious problems in Canadian projects in several instances, 
an issue which requires further examination.
7.3.3 Oversight mechanisms: monitoring and incentives
This brings the discussion to a consideration of what the cases presented here 
have to say about the functioning of oversight mechanisms installed in the Canadian 
political system as a means of making sure that CIDA and its appointed agents do
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fulfil their obligations to administer ODA in the most effective manner possible. The 
Minister for International Cooperation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade are accountable to Parliament for the activities of CIDA and the 
aid programme. As noted above, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade has the responsibility to monitor aid policy, and reviews the 
annual budget estimates. The Auditor-General has authority to review any aspect of 
the aid programme and make recommendations, and publish his/her findings, and has 
done so regularly since the 1970’s. In addition, several Parliamentary task forces and 
special joint committees which have been struck over the years to review the aid 
programme and have served as useful fora for experts and other members of the 
public to express their views. Within CIDA, it has become standard practice to hire a 
consultant to monitor and evaluate aid projects. Outside of the government, a vigilant 
press, scholarly research, and a well organized lobby of international development 
NGOs have played a major role in monitoring the activities of CIDA and aid policy 
and bringing issues into public debate, as the cases outlined above testify. These 
various mechanisms appear to have functioned well in monitoring the aid programme, 
identifying problems and contentious policy issues.
Nevertheless, there are some serious limitations to this system, as the cases 
reviewed here also illustrate. There was wide public and Parliamentary opposition to 
the cancellation of aid to East Africa, but it happened anyway. This policy change 
was included in the annual federal budget estimates which are subject to review in 
Committee before being approved by Parliament. The Parliamentary Committee has 
no authority to increase a budget allocation. Further, the aid budget is not accepted or 
rejected by Committee or by Parliament on an item by item basis, but in two votes: 
one for CIDA’s operating expenses and the other for the who grant programme. The 
aid programme is not of sufficient public importance to delay the approval of the 
entire national budget.
As another example of the limitations of aid policy oversight mechanisms, the 
decision to decentralize aid administration was made in accordance with the 
recommendations of a special Parliamentary Committee struck to conduct a thorough 
review of the aid programme such as is not possible in the annual review of the
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budget estimates. A number of its other recommendations, including a legislated 
mandate for CIDA and the commitment to provide 0.7 % of GNP as ODA, were not 
accepted by the government. The commitment to decentralize was subsequently 
reversed.
This research has revealed further examples of the freedom of policy makers 
to disregard the advice and evidence of policy failure turned up by governmental and 
more informal mechanisms of policy oversight. The DAC Principles of Effective 
ODA condemn the practice of tying balance of payments support and establishing 
jointly administered counterpart funds, but Canada has continued this practice. 
Numerous independent evaluations of the TCWP concluded that it was not a viable 
project, and the residents of Hanang voiced their opposition to it, but CIDA continued 
to fund it. The Canadian government is not obliged to abide by the recommendations 
of parliamentary committees, the DAC, the Auditor-General, or independent 
evaluations of aid projects. There may be vocal moral outrage expressed when it fails 
to do so, but there is no legal sanction. In certain instances, during the outbreaks of 
violence on the Hanang wheat farms or in the aftermath of the 1993 budget cuts, for 
example, the NGO lobby and sympathetic elements of the media managed to keep up 
the pressure on CIDA and the government long enough to embarrass it into action, but 
this a rather hit or miss method of monitoring the operation of the aid programme, as 
the silent death of decentralization attests.
The cases presented here also bring into question the assumption on the part of 
CIDA and Foreign Affairs that the private commercial sector has a legitimate claim to 
be a ‘stakeholder’ in the aid programme. The rationale for considering private sector 
interests in the formulation of aid policy is fourfold. Official documents emphasize 
the mutual benefits of aid programme to recipients and to Canadian businesses, and 
senior decision-makers argue that demonstrating these advantages is necessary to 
maintaining public support for ODA . However, the benefits to the Canadian 
economy are in fact minimal, and public opinion does not support the use of aid funds 
for this purpose. With some logic, it is assumed that as agents contracted to 
implement aid projects commercial firms should be consulted as to how aid might be 
used more effectively. In addition, it is supposed that economic development efforts
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might be improved on the advice of successful entrepreneurs. However, these claims 
are not justified by the evidence presented above. The response of consulting firms 
and other representatives of the business community to efforts to untie aid over the 
years and to decentralization has been purely self-interested in nature, and took no 
account whatsoever of whether or not these were more effective methods of 
delivering aid. In opposing decentralization and the loosening of procurement 
regulations on the grounds that these policies would reduce their access to aid 
contracts, representatives of the Canadian commercial sector assumed the role of the 
‘principal’ rather than the ‘agent’ in the aid relationship.
The most recent report of the Auditor-General in October 2000 highlighted the 
weaknesses of CIDA’s incentive structure for its executing agencies. “Due to the 
nature of most development projects, as well as the complex logistics of getting 
Canadian staff on the ground, CIDA usually must pay contractors for the inputs they 
provide rather than for the outputs they achieve.”5
Therefore, executing agents have no formal incentive to implement useful and 
effective projects. This is reinforced by the lack of ex-post evaluations of Canadian 
funded projects which would assess a project’s long-term benefit. Where a 
solidaristic or purposive organization might be sufficiently motivated to seek this kind 
of success, a commercial contractor is unlikely to be motivated to do so. In fact, it 
would be irrational behaviour, in a market-driven context, to do more that the contract 
required when they are not evaluated in terms of the results they achieve.
One of the most serious weaknesses of aid management in Canada is that 
although helping to improve the quality of life of people in aid recipient countries is 
the official objective of ODA, the success of Canadian aid in meeting this objective is 
not even measured. Any scrutiny of Canadian assisted projects ends with the final 
disbursement of funding, meaning that the long-term impact of these projects is not 
assessed in any kind of systematic way. Current measurements of aid success are the 
volume of money moved, adherence to correct procedure in tendering and awarding 
of contracts, and the provision of inputs. In response to criticisms from the Auditor-
5 Auditor-General of Canada, October 2000, Section 14.81.
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General over the past few years, CIDA had adopted a Results Based Management 
approach, though the impact of this policy is not yet clear, and it still does not make 
provisions for assessments of sustainability after Canadian funding has come to an 
end.
Even in cases where the agents contracted to implement aid projects are not 
providing the agreed inputs, CIDA has not fired them. As the commodity grants to 
Tanzania described above illustrated, CIDA has in the past rehired suppliers who had 
failed to live up to the conditions of previous contracts because of a lack of alternative 
Canadian sources. The Auditor-General found that out of thirty three projects 
reviewed for the 2000 report, “15 had a significant portion of deliverables that were 
not being met as planned.”6 CIDA cancelled two of these agreements, but did not 
cancel the other thirteen. These decisions the Auditor-General attributed to a project 
planning and implementation cycle which is difficult to stop once it has been set in 
motion, a problem encountered by aid officials with respect to the TCWP in the 
1980’s.
To get a large project planned and approved, tendered, contracted and 
operationally planned can take anywhere from one to four or five 
years. It involves considerable expense and effort on the part of both 
CIDA and the host country partner. Given this large investment in 
resources and the short-term costs associated with cancellation, it is 
difficult for CIDA to decide to cancel the agreement when results are 
not forthcoming. CIDA does not build into its management of project 
agreements any formal requirement or mechanism for “off ramps”
(decisions to proceed*or withdraw).7
This type of path dependence is evident in the history of the Tanzania-Canada 
Wheat Project. Chapters Five and Six presented a detailed account of how the 
Canadian government responded to evidence of project failure at the wheat scheme. 
The most puzzling aspect of the TCWP was the Canadian government’s decision to 
fund this project and to continue funding it despite repeated negative assessments of 
its economic viability. Like the issues of tied aid; the re-centralization of aid 
management; and the cancellation of aid to one of the poorest countries in the world,
6 Auditor-General of Canada, 2000, section 14.83.
7 Ibid, Section 14.82.
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it is only when these decisions are weighed against Canada’s political and economic 
interests do these actions become intelligible.
However, the history of the TCWP suggests that there is something else at 
work, and that Canadian policy cannot be explained as a straightforward calculation 
of national interests. The decision to fund the TCWP appears to have been political 
one. The decision to continue to fund it long after its failure had become apparent 
was made in accordance with CIDA’s choice in the mid-1980’s, to continue to try 
bring its substantial investments in Tanzania to fruition rather than to cut its losses 
there. The heavily tied, capital-intensive, modernization projects begun in the 1960’s, 
which continued to make up the bulk of Canadian involvement in Tanzania in the 
1990’s, committed CIDA to a course of action from which it later found it difficult to 
extricate itself.
The Hanang Participatory Development Fund was also political in origin, and 
it illustrates the galvanizing force of public opinion in prompting CIDA and the 
Canadian government to respond to evidence of policy failure. While this thesis has 
focused on constraints on the effective use of aid resources arising from donor policy 
and administrative practices, the early history of the HPDF illustrates the numerous 
obstacles encountered in the aid recipient country which must be overcome, and the 
huge range of decisions which must be made in the process of designing an 
implementing an aid project. That these tasks took ten years to complete in the case 
of the HPDF is an indication of their complexity and of the constraints inherent in the 
bureaucratic structure of the aid process.
This report has drawn conclusions very critical of the role of Canadian 
commercial interests in the aid programme. It must be noted, however, that the 
projects described in detail in this paper -  the TCWP, the HPDF, and the series of 
commodity grants -  were all executed by Canadian government employees: the wheat 
project was designed and implemented by the Department of Agriculture, a cooperant 
was hired directly by CIDA to implement the HPDF, and most of the commodity 
grants to Tanzania were brokered by aid officials. The fact that they were 
implemented by salaried public servants did not spare them their share of problems.
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Nevertheless, the actions of the commercial sector lobby with respect to the issues of 
tied aid and decentralization brings into question their commitment to the official 
objectives of the aid programme. The actions of CUSO as recounted in Chapter Six 
suggests that using NGOs as implementing agents is not the automatic solution. The 
respective merits of various types of implementing agents requires further study.
Finally, it is necessary to address the question of the Canadian aid 
programme’s capacity to incorporate the lessons of experience into aid practice.
Hyden and Mukandala have argued that an aid agency’s autonomy to act is a 
necessary prerequisite of ‘responsiveness,’ and that this autonomy is in turn 
determined by the agency’s control of three types of resources: economic, political 
authority, and information. CIDA’s control of all three of these resources is limited.
It is dependent on the Treasury for its budget. Its political authority is limited by its 
subjugation to DFAIT. The cases examined here suggest that CIDA's capacity to 
respond effectively to policy failure and to improve aid practice is constrained by the 
pursuit of other interests through the aid programme.
With the current focus on macro-economic policy interventions, CIDA is 
largely dependent on the international financial institutions for information. 
Centralized aid administration and the privatization of aid delivery means that much 
of CIDA’s field knowledge comes second hand; i.e. from CEA's with vested interests, 
who have the power to withhold information or to present an interpretation which is to 
their own advantage. The lack of ex-post evaluations of projects limits the 
opportunity to learn from experience.
However, even without this type of evaluation, there is a wealth of information 
and experiential knowledge in CIDA project files that would be extremely useful to 
efforts to improve aid practice. In its practice of compiling Project Termination 
Reports which record the history of a project, its objectives and outcome, and any 
problems encountered along the way, in some detail, CIDA compares favourably with 
some other aid agencies in terms of maintaining an institutional memory. However, 
to be useful, this information must be readily accessible to policy makers, aid 
programmers and project planners, and to the public.
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Finally, we might recall Nossal’s question:
Does a large bureaucratic structure exist because a succession of 
cabinets — for other reasons -  decided to pursue a project-oriented, tied 
aid strategy of development widely disbursed over the globe, or are 
alternatives to the present package of development assistance avoided 
because they would threaten the existence of the bureaucracy.8
It is argued that the evidence presented here supports the first interpretation. A 
recurrent motif in the cases examined here has been the frustration of efforts to 
innovate and improve aid practice. This study has yielded a long list of constraints on 
the effective use of ODA encountered at every stage of the aid process from policy 
formulation through implementation, many of which can be characterized as 
weaknesses in the bureaucratic process. However, their persistence may be more 
readily ascribed to bureaucratic inertia rather than to any more active form of 
resistance. Without being malevolent in intent, and in fact, despite a genuine desire 
on the part of aid officials to use aid to reduce poverty, these flaws in the 
institutionalized processes of aid are sufficient to immobilize efforts to improve aid 
practice.
8 Nossal: 53.
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APPENDIX II
SUMMARY OF CANADIAN ASSISTANCE TO HANANG WHEAT PROJECT
1968 -1993
PHASE I (1968 -1977) ($6.7million)
1970 -1 9 7 5 - Phase I  o f Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project: Agronomic Wheat 
Research Project no. 902/00076
Canadian Executing Agent: Canadian Department of Agriculture.
Tanzanian counterpart: NAFCO
Experimental research to develop appropriate seed varieties and cultivation 
techniques in Tanzania. Included the provision of two Canadian scientists, training 
for Tanzanian staff, and the technical assistance, machinery and chemicals necessary 
for pilot project at Basotu. Very low yields recorded until adjustment to cultivation 
methods boosted production to North American levels in 1976.
Study ofproduce storage facilities (1970) Project no. 902/00125 ($610,000)
Large-Scale Wheat Production (1976-81) Project no. 902/10847-902/00602 
($2,132,2000).
Technical assistance for training in machinery maintenance and farm management, 
plus related equipment and supplies.
Adaptive Wheat Research and Production (1976-79) Project no. 902/00511 
($2,382,000).
Technical assistance to research component of project, training for Tanzanian 
technicians and researchers. Was to include the construction of a research station at 
Lyamungu, but this was not done as the site proved unsuitable.
Soils survey to identify areas for project expansion (1976) Project no. 902/00603 
($2.4 million) Initially intended to survey the whole country, but due to costs and 
time involved, ultimately limited to Hanang.
Basotu Farm Equipment (1977-80) Project no. 902/00609 ($1.5 million) -
provision of spare parts and machinery maintenance tools.
Wheat Sector Study (1977) Project no. 902/10850 ($230,000).
In light of Tanzanian decision to further expand production at Hanang, CIDA hired a 
consultant to assess the wheat sector “to identify and evaluate alternative strategies 
and time frames for achieving national self-sufficiency in wheat production.” The 
report made recommendations for technical improvements at Hanang, but did not 
outline alternative strategies for boosting wheat production nation-wide as specified in 
the terms of reference.
TCWP PHASE II (1979-1987) $43.9 million
Included: Infrastructure Support, Project no. 902/10828 ($25,318,458.37) 
and
Research and Production component, Project no. 902/10829 ($18,948,446.07)
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Technical and capital assistance for the establishment of five new wheat farms at 
Hanang, including training for Tanzanians in Canada, a staff of 16 Canadian technical 
advisors in Tanzania, and required farm machinery and agricultural inputs.
By the end of Phase II, CIDA reported that research had provided successfully 
adapted wheat varieties and yields had stabilized at North American levels, the 
Arusha Research Institute and the Hanang Wheat Complex were both under 
Tanzanian management. A Central Maintenance and Service Centre serving all seven 
farms in the scheme was fully operational. The wheat farms were employing 
approximately 1700 people. CIDA felt that Tanzanian management capacity was 
improving, and that it was realistic to look at phasing out Canadian technical 
assistance by 1991.
However, significant problems were encountered during Phase II of the project: Local 
opposition to NAFCO’s confiscation of land which traditionally belonged to the 
Barabaig nomadic cattle herders intensified. There was a shortage of spare parts 
necessary to run farm equipment, and weaknesses in farm management systems. 
Further, a series of project evaluations conducted in 1980’s - ’92 were unanimous in 
their conclusions that the project was not economically viable and would collapse 
without Canadian aid.
1980 -  Spare Parts Technical Assistance Project no, 902/10824 ($117,000)
To assist Tanzania in identifying spare parts requirements to maintain Canadian 
equipment supplied through the aid programme.
1982 -  Opening o f Line o f Credit for Spare Parts Project no, 902/10825 ($13.1 
million in total)
To finance procurement of spares from Canadian suppliers for five Canadian assisted 
parastatals including the Hanang Wheat Complex.
TCWP PHASE III (1987 -1993) Project no. 902/11835 ($27 million)
Contrary to the recommendations of several project evaluations as cited in Chapter 
Five and listed below that the wheat project was not economically viable, CIDA 
agreed to extend the project into a third phase. In Phase III, no expansion of 
production was planned. The objectives were: to provide funds for the purchase of 
replacement equipment and spare parts, technical assistance to strengthen NAFCO 
management and research capacity (51 p/y -  17 full-time Canadian staff in Hanang, 
and 65 p/y of training for Tanzanian staff), and a socio-economic study to serve as the 
basis for long-term planning in the wheat sector. CIDA planned to withdraw 
Canadian technical assistance in 1991. In fact, Canadian technical advisors remained 
on the project until funding was cut in June 1993 when all CIDA bilateral aid to 
Tanzania was terminated.
Selian Agricultural Research Institute (1991-93) Project no. 902/16422/16759-01 
($9 million approved, $2,367,150.77disbursed).
This project was intended to establish an agricultural research facility near Arusha to 
provide technical assistance to the Hanang Wheat Complex and other agriculture 
projects. The envisioned Canadian technical assistance was cancelled as a result of 
Canadian ODA budget cutbacks in Tanzania, as was the provision of scientific
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research equipment. Completed: Housing for seventy researchers and the Institute 
buildings.
ANCILLARY PROJECTS
Basotu Water System (1976) Project no, 902/00606 ($25,000)
Study on alternative water sources for domestic use on Basotu farm.
Basotu/Setchet Roads (1977) Project no, 902/00719 ($15,000)
Feasibility study for building of road between two farms, construction funded out of 
counterpart funds raised through the sale of Canadian food aid.
Basotu/Setchet Water Drilling (1979-80) Project no, 902/10834 ($145,000)
Test drilling, failed to find a long-term water source.
Hanang Power Line Extension (1988) Project no. 902/15448 ($3.1 million 
approved, 2,993,296 disbursed).
An 800 km extension to the national electricity grid. Electrification of the wheat 
farms, Haidom hospital, Katesh, and eight villages in Hanang. 25% of funds untied to 
purchase British materials.
Construction of primary schools and medical dispensaries on seven wheat farms, 
funded out Of Canada Fund and counterpart funds.
PROJECT EVALUATIONS
The results of these evaluations are discussed in the body of the text. All concluded 
that the TCWP was not economically viable, with transportation costs the major 
problem.
1977 -  Manitoba Pool Elevators, Project no. 902/10850 ($230,000)
1980 -  Project no. 902/00805
1986 -  Prairie Horizons Cost/Benefit Analysis of TCWP 1968-1985, Project no. 
902/13705
1986 -  Evaluation of Prairie Horizons Report, Project no. 902/13687 ($10,000).
1986 -  Corporate Study, Project no. 902/13687 ($23,000)
1987 -  Evaluation of Research component of the TCWP, Project no. 902/14966 
($30,000)
1988-89 -  Comparative Analysis of large-scale mechanized wheat production versus 
small-holder production in Tanzania. Project no. 902/14988 ($20,000) Conducted by 
Dean Frank of University of Manitoba.
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July 1989 -  Agriteam Study
1992 -  Organization and Management Study of Hanang Wheat Complex by Deloitte 
and Touche, Project no. 902/18705-64
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